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Abstract 
 
Food businesses bear the main responsibility for food safety.  They are legally 
mandated to use preventative food safety management systems, yet food incidents 
occur regularly.  Little research exists on these systems or failures from a management 
control perspective.  This thesis addresses this gap through the question “Why do food 
safety systems fail and how does this relate to the governance and management 
control of food safety in food manufacturers?" 
 
Two manufacturers, with the pseudonyms LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK, act as 
case studies, each with an embedded critical case of a non-reportable food incident.  
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, observation and documents.  
An inductive, thematic analysis identified nine themes, using within and cross-case 
comparison.  A second analytical stage used the management control paradigm 
Pragmatic Constructivism (H. Nørreklit, L. Nørreklit, & Mitchell, 2010), mapping codes 
and themes against the four dimensions of values, facts, possibilities and 
communication. 
 
A key finding was that the incidents were considered “unforeseeable”, challenging the 
use of conventional food safety management systems based on risk assessment, for if 
the hazards leading to failures are not identified, preventative controls cannot be put 
in place. Pragmatic Constructivism suggests that the companies failed to identify the 
causes of the incidents as “factual possibilities”, related to an unshakeable trust in 
their control systems and an over-reliance on specific expertise.  The implications for 
practice in developing and reviewing food safety management plans are considered, 
e.g. to involve staff who are knowledgeable and curious, but not necessarily experts in 
food safety, in order to develop plans based on both breadth and depth of insight.  
 
Pragmatic Constructivism posits that success requires a functional organisational 
topos, involving integration of the four dimensions.  Inadequate integration was 
observed in the LiquiComp UK case, whereas in PowderCo UK, very tight integration 
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was seen.  “Over-integration” is introduced as a new theoretical concept, which 
enriches the use of Pragmatic Constructivism in analysing and interpreting complex, 
real world situations, particularly system failures.   
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1.0 Introduction   
 
“I realise that food is never just an object on a plate or a menu.  Food always does 
something more than just being there.  It nurtures.  It speaks.  It travels.  It 
calculates.  It identifies.  It joins.  It separates.  It demarcates.  It historicises. It 
symbolises.  It empowers.  It disempowers.” (Coveney, 2014, p2) 
 
For food to play any positive role in the lives of individuals or society in general it must 
be safe.  Indeed, food safety is recognised as being fundamental to food security (Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2015, p53).  Even in developed 
countries a focus on food safety remains vital, as illustrated by estimates that 1 in 6 
Americans suffer from a foodborne illness annually, with an associated cost of $15.6 
billion (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).   
 
There is much research on the science, behavioural practices and laws governing food 
safety. However, within food business organisations (FBOs) food safety is managed and 
controlled by processes and systems and there is a gap in the literature in the study of 
food safety from a management control perspective.  By using case studies of non-
reportable food incidents, examined through the lens of a management control 
paradigm, this thesis addresses the literature gap. 
 
This chapter sets out the background and rationale for the study (section 1.1), 
examines its theoretical background and identifies the objectives and research 
question to be addressed (section 1.2).  Section 1.3 sets out the design and 
methodology used in the research study.  The findings and contributions of the 
research are given in section 1.4, whilst section 1.5 outlines how the rest of the thesis 
is organised.   
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1.1 Background 
 
In the 21st Century the food manufacturing industry plays a central role in supplying 
food and drink; it is also a major employer and economic contributor.  In fact, in the 
European Union (EU) the industry forms the largest manufacturing sector, with a 
combined turnover of €1,089 billion, employing 4.25 million people in 289,000 
companies (FoodDrinkEurope, 2016a).   The industry has become increasingly complex 
with interconnected supply chains spanning different countries, continents and 
regulatory frameworks, forming a complex socio-technical system (Nayak & Waterson, 
2016).   
 
Yet this success story of a global industry can also be seen as separating producers 
from consumers.  As Coveney (2014, p 2) states “... starting about 100 years ago, and 
more rapidly in the last 30 years, we have let go of food.  We have outsourced it to 
others who are largely invisible and unknown to us”.  Food has become big business 
and as consumers we are obliged to trust that the actors in the food supply chain do 
the right thing; to supply, as it is put in section 14 (1) of the UK Food Safety Act 1990, 
food of the “nature, quality and substance demanded by the purchaser”.   
 
Unfortunately, in recent years the reputation of the food industry has come under fire, 
with a perceived plethora of food safety and integrity scandals.  Even those which do 
not impact food safety, such as the 2013 EU horsemeat scandal, have been shown to 
affect consumers’ trust in the food supply chain and change their purchasing 
behaviour (Yamoah & Yawson, 2014).   
 
Food safety governance is complex and multi-layered, with stakeholders ranging from 
government, to the food industry and consumers themselves.  Historically, food safety 
legislation operated on a “command and control” basis; enforcement authorities, on 
behalf of government, took the major role in discovering food safety contraventions 
through inspection and testing of premises and products (Fairman & Yapp, 2005).  In 
the 1960’s a new form of food safety control – Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) - was developed by the Pillsbury Company when working with the National 
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to produce food for the USA space 
programme (Hulebak & Schlosser, 2002).  HACCP is a preventative system that seeks to 
identify hazards (chemical, biological, physical) and set appropriate controls in place.  
The requirement for FBOs to implement HACCP based food safety management 
systems (FSMSs) sits at the core of modern food safety legislation.  This places the 
main burden of responsibility for food safety governance on FBOs, in a form of 
“enforced self-regulation” (Fairman & Yapp, 2005).   
 
Whilst HACCP principles are well established and standardised (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission of the FAO and WHO, 2003), each FBO has a specific FSMS, based on their 
unique requirements (products, equipment, compliance with voluntary standards etc.) 
(Fotopoulos, Kafetzopoulos, & Gotzamani, 2011).  Thus, there is management 
discretion in the development, implementation and maintenance of the FSMS.  FSMSs 
can be considered a specialised form of management control system (MCS) and the 
impact of the FSMS on assuring food safety varies between companies. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Background, Research Objectives and the Research Question 
 
The academic literature underpinning this research study covers two fields: the 
mainstream “technical” literature on food safety management and food incidents, and 
that of management control. 
 
In the mainstream literature, HACCP and HACCP-like systems are widely recognised as 
enhancing food safety, reducing the burden of foodborne illness and providing 
benefits to FBOs, e.g. in waste and cost reduction, quality improvement, wider market 
access and defence against litigation (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2006).  However, implementation of HACCP based FSMSs by FBOs is 
challenging, particularly in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (e.g. Cobanoglu, 
2012;  E. A. Taylor, 2001), which account for 90% of European food businesses 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2016b). 
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Research has therefore concentrated on determining the barriers to and drivers for 
FSMS implementation, particularly HACCP based systems.  A number of models have 
been developed to categorise and explain both barriers and drivers.  The work of 
researchers from Salford University has been key and Gilling, E. A. Taylor, Kane and J. 
Z. Taylor (2001) classified 11 factors affecting HACCP compliance under the categories 
of knowledge, attitude and behaviour.  The model was later expanded (J. Z. Taylor, 
2008a) and used to develop systems to facilitate HACCP implementation in the UK 
hospitality sector (E. A. Taylor & J. Z. Taylor, 2008).   
 
Whilst the Salford model was developed using a qualitative, psychological research 
approach, the barriers identified encompassed both people and process related issues.  
Subsequent work continued to find barriers related to both areas (e.g. Kafetzopoulos & 
Gotzamani, 2014).   Despite this, the people side of the challenge has risen to 
prominence in recent years, with the emergence of academic work and commercial 
systems to define, categorise, measure - and potentially improve - food safety culture 
(FSC).   Interest in FSC rose following high profile food safety failures which were 
blamed on adverse FSCs, such as the John Tudor and Son case which resulted in 157 
reported cases of food poisoning and the death of a 5-year-old boy (Powell, Jacob, & 
Chapman, 2011).   
 
The final thread of mainstream literature pertinent to this research concerns food 
incidents.  Whilst information is collected and reported on cases of foodborne illness 
and food incidents by regulatory bodies, e.g. the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and 
Feed (RASFF), little work has been conducted to understand if reported incidents are 
due to people or process elements of FSMS failures, or whether the barriers to the 
implementation of FSMSs can also explain these incidents.  
 
This literature therefore informs the first three objectives for the research1:  
                                                          
1 Although these research objectives and central research question are pertinent to all FBOs, the 
majority of reported food safety incidents refer to processed foods, hence a focus on food 
manufacturers is relevant to this research study.  
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1. To determine whether food incidents can be related to specific people or 
process elements of FSMS failure.  
 
2. To determine the extent to which the barriers to the implementation and 
maintenance of FSMSs (particularly HACCP) found in the literature can be 
used to explain failures in FSMSs.   
 
3. To evaluate the relationship of FSC to failures in FSMSs.  
 
Notable in this review of the literature is the absence of studies which examine FSMSs 
as a form of MCS, using management control theories or paradigms.  Management 
control therefore forms the second field which underpins this research study.    
 
There are many definitions of management control.  Central to many definitions are 
the principles of processes and systems (both “hard” systems such as accounting and 
financial systems and “soft” systems such as organisational culture) being used by 
management to influence behaviour to achieve organisational goals (e.g. Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008).    
 
Using these definitions, management control and MCSs can be considered as forms of 
mechanical governance (L. Nørreklit, 2011; L. Nørreklit, 2017a). However, 
management control can alternatively be viewed as an activity set in a social context, 
where organisational leaders co-author the firm’s activities with other staff.  In this 
approach, set out as the “actor-reality construction”, the role of leaders is to create 
business specific guidelines or concepts – a “topos” - to enable a successful or 
functioning business reality.  This conceptual paradigm is termed Pragmatic 
Constructivism (PC), with the “topos” being achieved through the integration of four 
dimensions of reality: values, facts, possibilities and communication (H. Nørreklit, 
Mitchell, & Raffnsoe-Moller, 2017; L. Nørreklit, 2017a). 
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Positioned as a middle ground between social constructivism and a realist, scientific 
approach (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017), PC fits the philosophical needs of this research 
study.  This study also offers opportunities to contribute to the growing research on 
PC, expanding its use into the study of a non-accounting MCS, and using it to frame 
and explain the study of a system failure, rather than a 100% successful or functioning 
business.   
 
This second stream of research, combined with the identified gap in the mainstream 
literature, therefore leads to the fourth objective of the study:  
 
4a. To investigate food safety management from the perspective of management 
control, utilising PC, in order to ascertain the utility of PC for studying control 
systems outside of the mainstream of accounting.   
 
4b. To gain insight on the use of PC in cases of management system failure, as 
well as management systems under control.   
Taken together these objectives will inform the answers for the overall research 
question:  
 
“Why do food safety systems fail and how does this relate to the governance and 
management control of food safety in food manufacturers?” 
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
To address the research objectives and answer the research question, a qualitative, 
case study approach was taken.  Two food manufacturers were selected using 
purposive sampling.  Both organisations had well developed FSMSs / quality 
management systems (QMSs) and good track records of food safety.  Nevertheless, 
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both organisations had suffered a recent non-reportable food incident2. These 
incidents acted as embedded critical cases within the overall organisational case 
studies.  Therefore, both the general organisation and running of the organisations’ 
FSMSs and the incidents were investigated in a real-world context using multiple 
research methods: semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups, 
observation and document analysis.   
 
A “roadmap” to guide the research was created by combining the framework of PC (H. 
Nørreklit et al., 2010), with the additional dimensions of “FBO People” and “FSMS 
Process” to reflect the two clusters of barriers to FSMS implementation and 
maintenance identified in the mainstream literature.  This was used to develop three 
theoretical themes, related theoretical questions, and detailed interview questions 
used in the semi-structured interview guide, in an approach adapted from Wengraf 
(2001, p 63). 
 
The data was analysed thematically (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest, MacQueen, & 
Namey, 2012, p 21-48), first by hand, with coding then transferred into NVivo (version 
10, upgraded to version 11) for ease of data management.  Codes were developed 
inductively, then clustered into themes.  After several rounds of checking and 
reviewing, a total of nine themes were identified, seven of which describe the 
embedded cases, with six describing the overall organisations.   
 
Subsequent to the inductive, thematic analysis, a second round of analysis was 
completed, mapping themes and codes against the four dimensions of PC.  The case 
study findings were re-interpreted and re-presented in the light of the dimensions and 
related constructs. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Due to the sensitive nature of food safety, it was not possible to recruit companies to the study who 
had experienced reported food incidents. Non-reportable food incidents, akin to “near misses,” were 
substituted as the embedded critical cases.  Further details are given in Chapter 4.   
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1.4 Findings and Contributions  
 
The first significant finding of the study concerns the people / process elements of 
FSMSs and the non-reportable food incidents.  Five barriers to food safety governance 
were identified through the thematic analysis of the cases, of which four – system 
swamping, constrained communication, culture and values and organisational 
culture – were related to barriers to FSMS implementation in the extant literature.  
The case studies, and these barriers, demonstrate failures in both elements of food 
safety management, but failures by the people implementing and maintaining the 
processes were established as the core of the quality failures examined. This finding 
makes a contribution to knowledge, as it forms the first examination of non-reportable 
food incidents from this perspective.  
 
Furthermore, whilst there were commonalities between barriers identified in the 
literature and the causes of the case study incidents, neither incident was adequately 
explained by these.  Indeed, in both cases some potential barriers to FSMS 
implementation were organisational strengths.  This finding is of significance as it 
indicates that simply addressing barriers to FSMS implementation will not, by itself, be 
an adequate safeguard against future food incidents.   
 
Additionally, this study raises a challenge to the reliance of the industry on risk 
assessment based processes such as HACCP.  The fifth barrier to food safety 
governance identified in this research is that the incidents were considered 
unforeseeable, and hence appropriate controls for the underlying cascades of 
equipment and control system failures had not been put in place.  The finding that 
incidents were unforeseeable is itself a contribution to knowledge; indeed, it is 
contrary to the expectation that during the investigation of failures they are often 
viewed, in hindsight, as “inevitable” or “waiting to happen” (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).  
Further research is required to establish if this situation is replicated in other food 
incidents. 
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The unexpected nature of the failures was also explored through the lens of PC and it 
was concluded that there was a failure by the organisations to consider the hazards 
which led to the failures as “factual possibilities”.  There a lack of recognition of the 
truth gap between the proactive truth of “our FSMSs are effective” and the pragmatic 
truth of “we’ve experienced a failure which resulted in a non-reportable food incident” 
and both organisations continued to have an unshakeable faith in their QMSs and 
FSMSs.  This, combined with an over-reliance on narrowly focussed “expert opinion” to 
form HACCP plans, was suggested as potential reasons the possibilities were not 
identified.  This offers opportunities for improving organisational practices in 
developing FSMSs. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a key contribution of the study relates to the use of PC 
within the “roadmap” to guide the case study investigation and analysis.  The utility of 
PC in studying non-accounting MCSs been established, as has its use in exploring and 
understanding cases of organisational failure.  
 
Central to PC and the actor-reality construction is the concept that integration of the 
four dimensions (values, facts, possibilities and communication) is essential for 
construct causality and an effective functioning topos, with a lack of integration being 
associated with MCS failure.  The LiquiComp UK case demonstrated a relative lack of 
integration.  However, very close integration was seen in PowderCo UK.  This leads to 
the proposal that “over-integration” of the PC dimensions can also lead to a 
dysfunctional topos and a scale of integration of the PC dimensions has been 
developed and presented in Chapter 8.  This enriches the PC paradigm, offering the 
potential for finer grained analysis and interpretation of organisational topoi, better 
reflecting the complexities of real world situations.   
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis comprises eight chapters.  After this introduction, Chapter Two sets out the 
background to the thesis, justifying the central role of FBOs in food safety governance 
and positioning FSMSs within the field of management control.   
 
Chapter Three reviews the mainstream literature on FSMSs, food safety incidents and 
FSC, seeking to answer the question that when FSMSs fail is it due to process or people 
issues, or both.  A short review on the use of Quality Costing in the food industry is also 
given.  The research objectives and overall research question are identified from this 
literature review.  
 
Chapter Four addresses the philosophical underpinning and research methodology of 
the study.  PC is identified as a management control paradigm suitable for use in the 
research study.  The key concepts of PC are presented and critiqued with reference to 
the existing management control literature, followed by a detailed explanation of the 
research design, methodology, methods and ethical considerations of the current 
research.   
 
Chapters Five and Six present the empirical findings of this research, in the form of two 
case studies: PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK.  Each chapter comprises an 
introduction to the organisation, details the data collection and presents a thematic 
analysis, comparing and contrasting the overall case of the generally successful 
organisation with that of the embedded non-reportable food incident.   
 
Chapter Seven discusses the case study findings, using a cross case comparison (both 
the organisational and embedded cases) and in relation to the mainstream “technical” 
literature.  The cases are then further analysed and discussed using the paradigm of 
PC.   
 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Eight, showing how the research study has 
addressed the research objectives, identifying the contributions of the research, its 
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limitations and making recommendations for further work.  The final section of this 
chapter is a personal reflection on the research process.   
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2.0 Background 
 
The requirement for FBOs to provide safe food is enshrined in law across the world, 
e.g. Section 7 of the UK Food Safety Act, 1990 (as amended); article 14 of EU 
Regulation (EC) no. 178/2002 (as amended); in the USA the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011; the Food Safety Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2009 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2015); and in 
Australia, the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code, Standard 3.1.1, 2005 (as 
amended 2009).  Despite these laws, the incidence of foodborne disease remains high, 
indeed as Krebs (2013, p 59) states “Almost everyone has suffered from a bout of ‘food 
poisoning’...”.   
 
This chapter provides a background to the research study, by looking first at the size of 
the burden of foodborne disease and the nature and extent of reported food safety 
incidents.  Section 2.2 examines food safety governance and management control, 
before moving on to address the regulatory framework for food safety governance 
(section 2.3).  The relationship between food quality and food safety is explored in 
Section 2.4 and HACCP is introduced as the main component of modern food safety 
management systems, whilst monitoring systems are considered in section 2.5.  The 
argument that food safety is socially constructed is also presented in this last section.  
The chapter concludes by highlighting that the central responsibility for food safety 
rests with FBOs and the role that FSMSs play as a specialised form of MCS.  This sets 
the scene for the literature review in Chapter 3, which concentrates on the 
mainstream “technical” literature, seeking to understand the barriers to and drivers 
for FSMS implementation, the role of FSC and whether food safety incidents can be 
explained by the barriers to FSMS implementation.  
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2.1 The Ongoing Challenge of Food Safety 
 
The WHO estimated that 600 million cases of foodborne illness occurred in 2010, 
resulting in 420,000 deaths (World Health Organization, 2015).  Even in developed 
countries, foodborne illness remains commonplace, e.g. the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) (2016) estimates that 48 million Americans suffer from 
foodborne illness each year.  In the UK, data published by the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) showed that over 500,000 cases of infectious intestinal disease due to known 
pathogens were identified in 2009, with poultry being the food commodity related to 
almost half these cases (Tam, Larose, & O'Brien, 2014). 
 
Such data on foodborne illness generally concentrates on illness due to the 
microbiological contamination of food.  However, food safety relates not only to 
microbiological contamination, but other hazards such as contamination with physical 
or chemical residues harmful to health and in recent years, much attention has also 
been paid to the control and labelling of allergens as another type of food safety risk.  
Indeed, food safety is not a static concept, but one which evolves as new information 
about food, health and potential risks to health are discovered.  For example, 
acrylamide, a chemical formed in foods by the Maillard reaction (Mottram, Wedzicha 
& Dodson, 2002), is now recognised as a potential carcinogen and hence a chemical 
hazard in foods, so the EU has introduced legislation to control the level of acrylamide 
in foods such as potato products and coffee (Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2158).   
 
Food safety can therefore be considered to be “socially constructed”, in that what 
conditions are classified as a foodborne illness, or what factors are classified as food 
safety hazards, are determined by society.  Manning (2017), for example, argues that a 
broader spectrum of conditions, such as type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease, 
should be classified as foodborne illness with the factors in foods associated with these 
conditions (i.e. the nutritional composition of foods) considered as hazards and 
controlled in the same way as any other form of foodborne hazard.  The inclusion of a 
broader range of criteria to define food safety is supported by research with US 
consumers (Ringquist et al., 2016), which found that aspects such as “clear and 
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accurate labelling” and “nutritional composition” were considered to be part of food 
safety by a significant proportion of consumers.   
 
Whilst the nutritional composition of food is not, as yet, risk assessed and controlled 
by FBOs in the same way as pathogenic microorganisms, Governments are putting in 
place legislation aimed at influencing both FBOs and consumers to alter their 
perception of certain food ingredients and modify both the composition of foods and 
dietary intake.  For example, a “sugar tax” has been placed on soft drinks in the UK 
(The Soft Drinks Industry Levy Regulations, 2018).  However, the “classical” view of 
food safety, pertaining to microbiological, chemical and physical hazards, rather than 
nutritional hazards, is the focus for the current research study. 
This perspective fits with the UK FSA definition of a food incident as “an event where, 
based on the information available, there are concerns about actual or suspected 
threats to the safety or quality of food and/or feed that could require intervention to 
protect consumers' interests”3 (Food Standards Agency, 2017a).   2,265 incidents were 
notified and investigated in 2016/17 (Food Standards Agency, 2017b).   Figure 2.1 
overleaf shows the relative number of incidents, by hazard type.  
It is pertinent to note that in the EU, FBOs are only legally obliged to notify the 
authorities of any products placed on the market which they believe may be “injurious 
to health” (Regulation (EC) No 178/ 2002, Article 19). Thus, whilst the FSA definition of 
an incident encompasses “quality” as well as “safety” threats, FBOs are not legally 
obligated to report non-safety related quality issues, or issues which pertain to 
products which have not left their control.  However, the FSA data includes 
notifications from other categories of informants, including local authorities and the 
European Commission.  Hence the incidents recorded by the FSA include some 
incidents which may impact the quality of a food but not necessarily its safety, e.g. 
“organoleptic aspects”. Nevertheless, looking at the categories of incidents reported, it 
is clear that the vast majority of incidents pertain to potential food safety threats, e.g. 
                                                          
3 Note that food incidents relate to actual or suspected threats to food safety; not all incidents will result 
in actual foodborne illness. 
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mycotoxins, allergens, pathogenic organisms etc. and of particular note for this 
research study is the category of “foreign bodies”, which accounts for 5% of reported 
incidents4 5. 
Figure 2.1: UK Food Incidents 2016/17.  Relative Numbers by Suspected or Actual 
Hazard Type6 (Food Standards Agency, 2017b) 
 
                                                          
4 This thesis concerns two organisational case studies, each involving an embedded case of an incident 
involving a form of potential physical contamination. 
5 A recent analysis of FSA reports published by the insurance company Lockton Companies LLP (2017) 
suggests a much higher incidence of recalls – 23% -  due to “choking hazards” (physical contamination 
by glass, metal, plastic etc.), but it is impossible to ascertain from their report how these figures were 
derived from the FSA data.  
6 Hazard classification as per the EU RASFF database.  Some categories have a broader definition than 
might be expected by their titles e.g. adulteration / fraud includes counterfeit products; illegal import / 
export (including documentation irregularities) and use of unauthorised food production premises. Not 
determined / other includes “clandestine entrants”, where a person hides in a vehicle to avoid 
immigration controls, which presents a potential risk of contamination of the food load.  2016/17 UK 
figures show a large increase in reports of this type over previous years. 
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At the European level, an online tool called RASFF (Rapid Alert System for Food and 
Feed) is used to identify, trace and inform member states and other countries about 
actions taken on food, animal feed and food contact materials identified as having 
safety concerns. Reports cover both imported and EU produced goods.  In 2016, 2,993 
original notifications were transmitted through RASFF; the most common notification 
types are shown in Figure 2.2 (European Commission Directorate-General for Health 
and Food Safety, 2017). 
 
Figure 2.2: Top Notification Types in RASFF 2016 (European Commission Directorate-
General for Health and Food Safety, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
These figures speak for themselves in demonstrating the ongoing challenge facing 
society in assuring food safety.  This thesis addresses an element of this challenge by 
determining barriers to the effective governance of food safety from the perspective 
of food manufacturers.   
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2.2 Food Safety Governance and Management Control 
 
To address food safety governance, it is important to first consider what this means. 
 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “governance” as “the action, manner or 
fact of governing, government ... conduct of life or business; behaviour”, 
("governance," 2002) whilst the verb “to govern” is defined as “(to) rule with authority, 
conduct the policy, actions and affairs of (a State, subjects) … regulate the proceedings 
of (a corporation etc.); control, influence, regulate or determine (a person, another’s 
action, the course or issue of events); guide, direct, lead (in some course ...)” 
("govern," 2002). 
 
In business, governance is most often used in terms of corporate governance.  This 
refers to the system by which companies are directed and controlled, and in recent 
years has broadened from a consideration of purely financial prudence to a more 
inclusive interpretation involving a concern with “leadership systems, management 
control protocols, property rights, decision rights, and other practices that give 
organizations their authority and mandates for action” (Tihanyi, Graffin, & George, 
2014). 
 
Similarly to general corporate governance, the governance of food safety involves a 
concern with rules and regulations set by the state which control and influence aspects 
of business conduct and behaviour.  However, food safety governance is multilevel and 
complex, involving multiple stakeholders, with interrelated responsibilities, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
 
Whilst food safety legislation is a key component of food safety governance, for FBOs it 
also concerns internal processes and controls which determine organisational actions, 
i.e. it can be considered from a management control perspective. 
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Figure 2.3: Key Stakeholders of Food Safety Governance 
 
 
 
 
There are numerous definitions of management control and MCSs.  For example, 
Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) define management control as “the process by 
which managers influence other members of the organisation to implement 
organisational strategies”, whilst Malmi and Brown (2008) specify that management 
control encompasses “systems, rules, practices, values and other activities 
management put in place in order to direct employee behaviour”.  Traditionally 
management control has focussed on financial systems and processes, but Merchant 
and Otley (2007, p 785) posit that an MCS “is designed to help an organisation to adapt 
to the environment in which it is set and to deliver the key results desired by 
stakeholder groups”.  They also stress that the role of an MCS is to “keep organisations 
reliably on track” (Merchant & Otley, 2007, p 786).  As such it can be argued that a 
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control system for food safety is a specialised MCS through which an FBO addresses 
food safety governance.   
 
One challenge to this perspective rests on whether control systems for food safety can 
be seen as being under management control or simply dictated by the law.  This is 
explored in the following section. 
 
 
2.3 Food Safety Governance: the Regulatory Framework and Responsibilities 
 
As might be expected, much previous research on food safety governance has 
focussed on the regulatory environment (e.g. Caduff & Bernauer, 2006; Hutter, 2011).   
Historically, the legal basis for food safety was based on “command and control” 
systems (Fairman & Yapp, 2005), where the role of enforcement authorities was to 
discover, through inspection and testing, contraventions to food safety.   
 
However, over the past 30 years, in many countries and most clearly within the EU7, 
the regulatory approach has changed towards one of co-regulation (Rouvière & 
Caswell, 2012) or, as described by Fairman and Yapp (2005), “enforced self-
regulation”.  Under this regime the primary responsibility for food safety rests with 
FBOs, who are required to put in place systems and processes to manage risk and 
assure food safety, whilst the role of enforcement authorities has changed to one of 
assessing these systems8.   
 
This responsibility was put in place in the UK in the 1990 Food Safety Act, and across 
the EU was established with the enactment of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 on general 
food law. This regulation, developed to strengthen and harmonise food safety law 
                                                          
7 UK and EU legislation are used as the primary focus of discussion on food safety legislation, being the 
primary legislation impacting the case study organisations on which this research study is based.    
8 In the EU, this has also been reflected by a move away from prescriptive, “vertical” compositional 
legislation (e.g. Council Directive of 22 July 1074 on the harmonization of the laws of Member States 
relating to honey (74/409/EEC)) which encompassed safety as well as quality criteria, to “horizontal” 
legislation which applies across all food groups.     
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across the region, now forms the cornerstone of food safety law in the EU.  Figure 2.4 
(Bitzios, Jack, Krzyzaniak & Xu, 2017) illustrates the central role of Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002 in food safety law, its relationship with other pertinent legislation and the 
central role of HACCP as a key tool / process for food safety and hygiene.     
 
Figure 2.4: Regulation (EC) 178/2002: Roles, Responsibilities, Tools and Processes and 
Relationship to Other EU Food Laws (Bitzios et al., 2017) 
 
 
Unlike “command and control” processes which rely on the testing of finished 
products to assure their safety, HACCP and HACCP-like systems focus on the verifiable 
control of the food production process to ensure food safety.  Each business is 
required to develop their own FSMS, using HACCP-like systems, but with the discretion 
to design it to meet individual business needs and take into account not only the type 
of food business (retail, catering, manufacturing etc.) and product type (e.g. dairy, 
confectionery) but also the processes, equipment and environment in which the 
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business operates.   As such, these systems fit with Merchant and Otley’s (2007) 
description of an MCS, as the unique FSMS both helps the organisation adapt to its 
environment and to deliver the key results (safe food) desired by stakeholder groups 
(regulators, customers, shareholders etc.).  
As HACCP / HACCP-like systems form the backbone of modern FSMSs, the principles of 
HACCP are detailed further in section 2.4.  However, before examining HACCP in more 
detail, the relationship between food safety and food quality, and between FSMSs and 
QMSs must be considered.   
 
 
2.4 Food Quality, Food Safety and the Role of HACCP 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of an FSMS, but as stated previously, HACCP 
is generally accepted as the core of any modern FSMS.  To form a comprehensive and 
effective FSMS, HACCP must be supported by good manufacturing practice (GMP) and 
pre-requisite programmes (PRPs) for general hygiene (e.g. cleaning protocols, pest 
control), plus processes for specific activities such as traceability and recall systems 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006).   
 
Although HACCP was developed as a system to manage food safety (Hulebak & 
Schlosser, 2002), there is considerable overlap between food safety and food quality, 
and between systems to manage both, in the literature.  For example, Caswell (1998), 
sets out five categories of quality attributes of food products: food safety attributes; 
nutrition attributes; value attributes; package attributes and process attributes.  
Likewise, Sikora and Strada (2005), set out four attributes of food quality: safety 
(hazard free) and nutritional values (which they combine as an intermediate quality 
attribute named food health quality); sensory values and convenience.  From a 
systems perspective, classic texts on quality management in the food industry include 
the management of food safety as an integral part of such systems; for example, Early 
(1995, p. 167), notes that “food safety management is an aspect of quality 
management which food manufacturers cannot ignore”.   
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Other research suggests that consumers also appear to consider food safety as a 
quality attribute.  Verbeke (2005), in his work on drivers of consumers’ information 
needs in respect of food, states that “Safety is one of the food product attributes that 
can be used by consumers in their evaluation of product alternatives and their 
formation of quality expectations”, whilst Röhr, Lüddecke, Drusch, Müller and 
Alvensleben (2005) consider food safety to be “an important food quality attribute”, 
and classify it as a credence quality attribute, i.e. one which is worthwhile, but which 
cannot be evaluated in normal use (Darby and Karni, 1973). Likewise, van Rijswijk and 
Frewer (2008) demonstrate that consumers see food quality and food safety as 
interlinked concepts, with, in general, people perceiving high quality products to be 
safe, rather than safe products to be of good quality, i.e. safety is seen as an attribute 
of quality.     
 
In contrast, in the publication “Assuring food safety and quality: guidelines for 
strengthening national food control systems” (Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations & World Health Organization, 2003) food quality and safety are 
viewed as separate attributes.  This separation is also reflected in a number of 
publications which have touched on the relationship between food safety and food 
quality as part of a broader concern with food fraud and food crime.  Spink and Moyer 
(2011) developed a matrix which delineates food quality, food safety, food fraud and 
food defence incidents9 as separate risk categories, distinguished by intentionality of 
action and motivation.  Similarly, Manning and Soon (2016) examine the relationship 
between the four risk categories and against an overarching category of food crime, 
again separating food quality and food safety.  However, considering the four same 
risk categories, the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) portrays them as overlapping 
(GFSI, 2014).  Manning and Soon (2016) suggest that this aspect of the GFSI work 
merely reflects the use of a Venn diagram to describe the interaction of the categories. 
                                                          
9 Food fraud is defined as “the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made 
about a product, for economic gain”, whilst a food defence incident is defined as one which is 
perpetrated for ideological reasons with the intent to cause harm (Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
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In fact, this overlap better reflects that any intentional modification of a food product, 
its ingredients or packaging - be it motivated by monetary gain (food fraud) or ideology 
(a food defence incident) - may be injurious to the health of a consumer; i.e., it can 
have a food safety impact even if that was not an intended outcome.  
Considering the audit standards used across the food industry to monitor food safety, 
Mensah and Julien (2011) show that both safety and quality form an integral part of 
many standards.  Indeed, version 8 of the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global 
Standard for Food Safety, (BRC Global Standards, 2018) not only combines food safety 
and quality systems into one section, but includes the requirement that organisations 
undertake both threat and vulnerability risk assessments, i.e. food fraud and food 
defence concerns have also been interwoven into this food safety standard.   
It therefore appears that whilst there is an academic interest in separating food safety 
and quality (and indeed food fraud and food defence), from a practitioner perspective 
these concepts remain strongly linked and there continue to be strong links between 
FSMSs and QMSs.  Figure 2.5 illustrates how just some elements of a typical QMS and 
FSMS inter-relate.     
 
Figure 2.5: An Illustration of the Inter-Relationship of a typical FSMS and QMS 
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HACCP more specifically, is a scientifically based system which allows FBOs to identify 
hazards and establish effective measures for their control. HACCP is also a preventative 
system, in that it seeks to identify and control hazards (biological, chemical or physical 
agents in food, or a condition of food, which have the potential to cause an adverse 
health effect) before an adverse effect occurs.  HACCP based systems can be seen as 
diametrically opposed to traditional FSMSs which rely on testing of end products to 
determine whether they are safe or not.  Under HACCP, end product sampling and 
testing still exists, but is used as a verification of the control system, not as the main 
means of control.   
 
In 2003 HACCP was adopted as the preferred approach to food hygiene and safety by 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission of the FAO and WHO, 2003).   Under the CODEX approach, often referred 
to as “full HACCP”, seven principles for a HACCP system are set out (see Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6: The Seven Principles of HACCP (Codex Alimentarius Commission of the 
FAO and WHO, 2003) 
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In order to help FBOs apply HACCP effectively in the workplace, the CODEX approach 
also sets out twelve “logical” steps for HACCP implementation (see Figure 2.7) and 
gives additional information on the determination of CCPs. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Sequence for the Application of HACCP (Codex Alimentarius Commission 
of the FAO and WHO, 2003)  
 
 
 
 
In Europe, HACCP principles were set in general food hygiene legislation in the early 
1990’s (COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/43/EEC of 14 June 1993 on the hygiene of foodstuffs).  
Whilst full HACCP became mandatory for certain food sectors such as meat in the early 
2000’s (COMMISSION DECISION of 8 June 2001), HACCP principles were enshrined for 
all food categories in EU Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs.   
 
HACCP or HACCP principles have also been embraced in other countries.  In the USA, 
HACCP was initially limited to specific high-risk sectors with, for example, so-called 
“Seafood HACCP” (60 FR 65096, Federal Register, 1995).  However, there has been a 
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move towards a general use of preventative food safety with the enactment of the 
Food Safety Modernization Act in 2011.  In other less developed countries, HACCP 
based approaches may be recommended, but not mandatory, such as in Thailand 
(Food and Drug Administration Thailand, 2014), or only be mandatory for exported 
products, such as in China (Balzano, 2014). Even in developed countries it is recognised 
that the universal application of HACCP has lagged behind the legislative requirement, 
particularly in smaller and less developed businesses (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2006).  This in itself forms a concern for public 
health, as a large percentage of food is supplied from micro enterprises and SMEs.  
Figures published by the EU trade association FoodDrinkEurope (FoodDrinkEurope, 
2016a) show that of the €1,089 billion turnover of food and drink production in the EU, 
49.5% comes from SMEs.  This sector also provides employment for 2.8 million people, 
65.9% of the total number employed in food manufacturing. 
 
Given the central role that HACCP now plays in FSMSs in many parts of the world, the 
definition of such systems which is proposed for use in this research study is as 
follows:  
 
Food safety management system (FSMS) - a comprehensive and integrated system 
devised to identify and control food safety risks within an FBO, including HACCP and 
HACCP-like systems and supporting processes.  May be considered as a subset of an 
FBO’s QMS10. 
 
 
2.5 Measurement and Monitoring of Food Safety  
 
The verb “to monitor” is defined as “to observe, supervise, keep under review, 
measure or test at intervals, especially for the purpose of regulation or control …” 
                                                          
10 As previously outlined, food safety and quality can also be impacted by the deliberate adulteration or 
misrepresentation of foods, whether this is ideologically motivated (a food defence issue) or 
economically motivated (a food fraud issue). However, systems specifically to guard against these risks 
are not specifically considered within this research. 
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(“monitor”, 2002).  Many different systems to monitor food safety exist, ranging from 
supra-national systems such as the EU RASSF system, through national systems (such 
as FSA incident monitoring), through to industry specific schemes (such as the official 
controls of approved meat premises) and monitoring within individual FBOs and of 
specific products, as illustrated in Figure 2.8.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Monitoring Systems for Food Safety 
 
 
 
 
However, within HACCP, a distinction is drawn between monitoring and verification.  
Monitoring is defined as “the act of conducting a planned sequence of observations or 
measurements of control parameters to assess whether a CCP is under control”, 
(Codex Alimentarius Commission of the FAO and WHO, 2003).  Monitoring therefore 
concerns the routine observation and recording of the control of the specific hazards 
identified in the FBO’s HACCP plan and can be supported by a range of technological 
solutions11.  For example, commercial systems can now be used to automatically 
                                                          
11 Monitoring systems for CCPs may be seen as operating at the “task control” level described by 
Anthony and Govindarajan (2007), i.e. they are transaction oriented, ensuring that individual tasks are 
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record the temperature of cold storage facilities and provide alerts if the temperature 
increases above the safe range for storing perishable foodstuffs.   
 
Verification, on the other hand, is defined as “the application of methods, procedures, 
tests and other evaluations, in addition to monitoring to determine compliance with 
the HACCP plan” (Codex Alimentarius Commission of the FAO and WHO, 2003).  In fact, 
step 6 of the HACCP principles encompasses validation (to assure that the right 
controls points and limits been selected and the HACCP plan will be effective), 
verification that the plan is adhered to in practice and the regular review (and re-
validation) of the plan (Food Standards Agency, 2018).   
 
End product testing is therefore a verification activity under HACCP, as are audits, 
carried out by the FBO themselves, by a second party (generally buyers) or by a third 
party (independent specialist organisations).  As mentioned in section 2.4, many 
different audit standards exist, often combining food safety and food quality elements, 
along with other criteria such as crisis management preparedness (see Table 2.1).   
 
With the plethora of standards available, in 2000 the food industry set up the Global 
Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, 2014) in an attempt to prevent manufacturers from 
undergoing multiple audits to potentially conflicting standards.  However, since the 
European horsemeat contamination scandal in 2013 (Elliott, 2014), the major retailers 
(who form the main customers for audit results) have, to a large degree, reverted to 
working to their own specific standards and audits (B. Stevens, personal 
communication, 30 October, 2017).  
 
Despite the high reliance on audits across the food industry, they have been highly 
criticised as a means of assessing the status and success of an FBO’s FSMS as they 
generally assess or measure the performance of an organisation at only one point in 
                                                          
performed according to the rules set in the MCS.  For example, a monitoring system for temperature 
control operates at the point in the system set within the MCS (decided upon by the food safety / 
HACCP team), and monitors against the rule / standard for temperatures set by the team in the HACCP 
plan.    
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time.  Indeed, a number of organisations which go on to have serious breaches in food 
safety have a history of successful audits, suggesting that audits cannot successfully 
detect the risk of future FSMS failure (Powell et al., 2013). Likewise, researchers have 
demonstrated that the food inspection ratings of FBOs do not accurately predict the 
likelihood of occurrence of a food safety incident (Mullen, Cowden, Cowden, & Wong, 
2002).  This demonstrates the importance of the on-going monitoring of CCPs (and 
appropriate elements of pre-requisites) alongside the use of audits as a form of FSMS 
verification.   
 
 
Table 2.1: Key Common Requirements for Food Safety Standards (adapted from 
Mensah & Julien, 2011)12 
 
FSMS Elements Required 
& Audited 
BRC HACCP ISO 
22000 
SQF Dutch 
HACCP 
IFS 
Management system       
PRPs       
HACCP       
Validation & Verification       
Emergency preparedness / 
crisis management 
      
Quality management       
 
 
As this research study is focused at the individual business level, and both on-going, 
day-to-day monitoring of CCPs and pre-requisites is relevant, along with verification 
activities (including audits), a broad definition of FSMnSs which combines these 
activities will be used within this work: 
 
                                                          
12 BRC: British Retail Consortium global food standard; HACCP: CODEX HACCP; ISO 22000: International 
Organisation for Standards FSMS; SQF: Safe Quality Food 2000 level 2; Dutch HACCP: HACCP scheme 
designed by Dutch National Board of Experts; IFS: International Food Standard. 
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Food safety monitoring system (FSMnS) – a system put in place to observe, check and 
record food safety controls at CCPs and relevant elements of PRPs which together 
form part of the overall FSMS.  Food safety audits (internal, second and third party) 
will also be considered as part of an FBOs overall monitoring of food safety.   
 
FSMnSs can be seen as part of a suite of tools which form the overall FSMS, as shown 
in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: The Relationship of MCSs, the QMS, FSMSs and FSMnSs 
 
 
Before leaving the topic of the measurement and monitoring of food safety, it is 
pertinent to return to the nature of food safety.  In section 2.1 it was outlined that 
food safety can be considered to be socially constructed, in that society decides which 
aspects of the relationship between food and health should be encompassed by a 
classification of food safety and considered as food safety hazards. 
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However, the establishment of FSMnSs, which require us to measure and assess food 
safety against a standard, implies that food safety is an absolute: that we can assess 
and categorise foods as safe or unsafe.   
Given that the use of HACCP and HACCP-like systems is mandated by legislation, it is 
relevant to consider whether the regulatory bodies enforcing the laws, or the laws 
themselves, consider food safety as absolute.   
Using the UK as an example, the views of the FSA can be seen in their 2015 strategy 
document (Food Standards Agency, 2015), where they explain how they translate their 
legal responsibilities under the Food Standards Act 1999 and propose a definition of 
consumers’ interests in relation to food:  
“Food is safe and what it says it is, and we have access to an affordable diet, and 
can make informed choices about what we eat, now and in the future.” 
This implies that for consumers, and hence for the FSA who have a mandate to protect 
the interests of consumers, food safety is absolute.   
In contrast, food safety legislation sets out a more complex picture.  For example, 
Regulation (EC) 178/2002 states in Article 14.1 that “food shall not be placed on the 
market if it is unsafe”.  However, in this case safe food – or rather unsafe food – is not 
absolute, but is qualified in the legislation.  The normal conditions of use of the food 
and the information provided to the consumer are just two of the factors that 
influence whether a food could be considered as safe or unsafe.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that with the change in the regulatory environment 
from “command and control” to “enforced self-regulation”, there has been a 
concomitant transition from food safety being an absolute (enforcement authorities 
judge and determine food as safe or unsafe) to one where it is socially constructed by 
FBOs through the use of individually tailored HACCP based systems.  This view is 
echoed in Jackson’s (2010) work on consumer trust and anxiety about food, where he 
states that “the food industry have moved on from a concern with food safety in the 
absolute sense to one of risk management in relative terms”, quoting the head of food 
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technology at a major UK food retailer as saying “‘No longer do people … aspire to 
make safe food, they manage risk’.   
 
This change in approach from food safety as an absolute to a social construction has 
not been without problems for FBOs, as will be discussed in the literature review in 
Chapter 3, when the barriers to, and drivers for, the implementation of FSMSs are 
reviewed.   Furthermore, this perspective of food safety as socially constructed is one 
of the considerations which influences the philosophical approach of the current 
research study, which will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Foodborne disease and food safety incidents present ongoing challenges to society and 
the governance of food safety sits with a network of stakeholders. Government 
oversight, to develop and enforce legislation, is a key factor in food safety governance.  
However, it is FBOs who have the primary responsibility for food safety under the law.  
The processes and systems they use to manage food safety such that they are 
compliant with legal requirements and meet the demands of stakeholders (consumers, 
shareholders, staff etc.) for safe food, are critical.  FSMSs and FSMnSs have been 
defined, with HACCP presented as a key component of modern FSMSs.   
 
Importantly for this research, it has been argued that food safety is both a social 
construct and that food safety forms a critical aspect of the quality of a food product.  
Moreover, FSMSs have been shown to fit with Merchant and Otley’s (2007) definition 
of MCSs, being systems that enable the delivery of a key stakeholder requirement (safe 
food) and which help the organisation adapt to its environment (the type of food 
product, the processes, equipment etc.).  This sets the scene for using concepts drawn 
from management control to investigate and analyse the case studies which form the 
empirical element of this research study.  This approach will be covered in detail in the 
research methodology in Chapter 4.   
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However, before moving on to discuss the methodology, a more detailed review and 
analysis of the literature is required.  This is completed in two parts.  Chapter 3 
concentrates on the “technical” literature, critiquing models which identify barriers to 
and drivers for the implementation of FSMSs, plus models of FSC.  Literature on food 
safety incidents is also considered, to identify whether these can be explained by 
failures in the same areas which pose barriers to FSMS implementation.  Finally, a 
short overview of quality costing in the food industry is presented.  The second aspect 
of the literature review, addressing underlying concepts in management control, is 
covered in Chapter 4.   
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3.0  Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter set the scene for this research study by examining the challenge 
facing society with ongoing food safety issues, defining food safety governance and 
identifying FSMSs as a form of management control used by FBOs in the discharge of 
their responsibilities for food safety governance. 
 
For FBOs to address food safety governance, effective implementation and 
maintenance of FSMS and FSMnSs is required.  With the intended focus on FSMSs and 
FSMnSs at the organisational level, and given that FSMnSs form a part of an overall 
FSMS (as previously described in Chapter 2), a review of the literature describing 
possible barriers to and drivers of FSMS implementation and use was undertaken.  An 
examination of the literature pertaining to reported food safety incidents was also 
carried out, as such incidents may identify specific issues with the implementation or 
operation of FSMS or FSMnS.    
 
There have been numerous publications identifying a range of factors said to 
contribute to the challenges in implementing FSMSs, primarily looking at HACCP as the 
FSMS element13 of choice.  Ehiri, Morris and McEwen (1995) identified organisational 
factors (the costs and time taken for implementation and on-going maintenance of a 
system and for staff training, and the concern of the applicability of HACCP for all food 
business operations) and individually focused factors, such as the knowledge and 
understanding of HACCP by food operators, as potential barriers for successful FSMS 
implementation. This was supported by work in the UK dairy industry carried out by 
Henson, Holt and Northen (1999), which also identified employee motivation as a key 
challenge to implementing HACCP.  Another barrier, resistance to cultural change, was 
                                                          
13 As explained in Chapter 2, HACCP forms the core of modern FSMSs, but is combined with PRPs (such 
as cleaning and pest control plans, allergen management) and GMP for a fully comprehensive FSMSs.  
However, in the literature reviewed, there appear to be common concerns whether HACCP or HACCP-
like systems specifically or FSMSs in the broader sense are considered and research covering both is 
presented and critiqued in this chapter.   
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highlighted in a study conducted in the meat industry (Holt & Henson, 2000a).  
Motivation and resistance to change might be in part be explained by a lack of 
“ownership” felt by FBOs for FSMS development.   This was illustrated in the findings 
of a survey of FBOs in Ireland (n=710) (Food Safety Authority of Ireland, 2001) when 
almost 50% of respondents felt that it should be the responsibility of local or national 
enforcement bodies, rather than the FBO itself, to develop their FSMS.  This perhaps 
represents a lag between the change in the regulatory environment towards enforced 
self-regulation described in Chapter 2 and the recognition and acceptance of this 
change by FBOs.   
 
Business size and the amount of resources available for FSMS implementation have 
also been raised as key concerns, with the suggestion that SMEs may lack appropriate 
resources for effective HACCP implementation (Pritchard & Walker, 1998; E. A. Taylor, 
2001).  Other research has found the employment of a technical manager as the most 
important factor influencing success in adopting good food hygiene practices (Holt & 
Henson, 2000b), a resource that SMEs may not be willing or able to afford. 
 
In 1998, the challenge of HACCP implementation was recognised by an official from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, at that time the UK Government 
department responsible for food safety, with the question posed: 
 
“When HACCP appears to fail, is it the fault of the HACCP system itself or 
does the real failure lie with the people who are trying to implement it?” (R. 
T. Mitchell, 1998). 
 
Although this question is 20 years old, recent research shows challenges still exist with 
the understanding of, implementation and maintenance of HACCP systems, even in 
FBOs which are subject to the highest level of regulatory scrutiny.  For example, in a 
case study on Halal meat preparation in a UK slaughterhouse, HACCP was openly 
dismissed as “rubbish” by the owner of the company (Thomas, White, Plant, & Zhou, 
2017).  This question is therefore still pertinent, and the aim of this literature review is 
to ascertain if it can be answered from the extant literature.  By doing so, gaps in the 
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literature will be identified, enabling the development of the central research question 
and objectives of this research study.   
 
The remainder of this literature review is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 identifies 
and critiques a number of models which have been developed showing barriers to and 
drivers of FSMS implementation.  Section 3.3 examines the literature on reported food 
safety incidents, whilst section 3.4 explores FSC as a development of the people 
element of the question.  Section 3.5 returns to the financial resources required for the 
implementation and maintenance of FSMSs, and considers the use of “quality costing” 
in the food industry.  Section 3.6 concludes the chapter, with the identification of the 
research question and objectives of the thesis.    
 
 
3.2 Process or People?  Models of the Barriers to FSMS Implementation 
 
Whilst there is a body of literature identifying barriers and drivers of the 
implementation of FSMS, few researchers have sought to structure their data in terms 
of models which can be used by FBOs to guide FSMS implementation and so address 
food safety governance, or which can be used by academia to direct future research.  
The models discussed in this section have been identified from the literature search as 
the key papers where structured models of barriers to and / or drivers for FSMSs have 
been proposed.  As SMEs have been recognised as a particularly challenging sector for 
FSMS implementation (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2006), the models chosen for detailed review include a focus on this type of 
organisation, in order that the fullest range of barriers and drivers can be considered. 
 
3.2.1 Models of Food Safety Management Barriers and Drivers 
 
3.2.1.1 Model to Prioritise the HACCP Plan (Panisello & Quantick, 2001) 
 
Panisello and Quantick (2001) suggested that a successful HACCP plan should be built 
on four “pillars”: management commitment; education and training; availability of 
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resources and external pressures.  They postulated that for success and sustainability, 
these pillars need to be prioritised from commitment up to external pressures and that 
inverting this pyramid results in instability and HACCP failure (see Figure 3.1). 
 
The authors also summarised a large number of technical barriers which could impede 
the effectiveness of HACCP, before, during and after implementation. These ranged 
from physical organisational and process related factors, such as company size, type of 
product, plant layout and availability of equipment, through to people related factors 
such as management commitment, the relationship between companies and 
enforcement authorities and the behaviour and motivation of staff. 
 
Whilst these barriers have been identified in numerous other studies (for reviews see 
Fotopoulos et al., 2011; Jevšnik, Hlebec, & Raspor, 2006), Panisello and Quantick 
(2001) presented no detailed empirical data to further describe or quantify the relative 
importance of the technical barriers. 
 
Likewise, there was no attempt to “map” the technical barriers described into the four 
pillars for HACCP success.  Indeed, many of the technical barriers can be mapped 
across two or more of the pillars.  For example, the barrier “persistence of habits and 
attitudes” can feasibly be mapped across the pillars of “commitment”, reflecting the 
role of management commitment in driving organisational culture and worker 
behaviour; “resources”, reflecting that the availability of time and equipment (physical 
resources) impacts behaviour patterns; “education and training”, reflecting that 
appropriate knowledge can be viewed as part of the requirement for changing 
attitudes and behaviours, and even “external pressure”, where the requirements of 
customers (e.g. in catering outlets, for meals to be served promptly after ordering) can 
impact on staff habits and attitudes. 
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Figure 3.1: Model to Prioritise the HACCP Plan (Panisello & Quantick, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
This model therefore has limitations for practitioners, as it offers little guidance on 
how to address the technical barriers to strengthen the core pillars in an appropriate 
order of priority.  However, its use as a theoretical model to address the debate on a 
focus between process and people to drive success in FSMS and FSMnS 
implementation is clearer, as the fundamental pillars of commitment and education 
and training are people orientated at heart. 
 
3.2.1.2 HACCP Awareness to Adherence Model (Gilling, et al., 2001) 
 
Gilling et al. (2001) used a psychological approach to identify factors influencing HACCP 
adoption, building upon models previously developed of barriers to clinical practice 
and extending the psychological frameworks identified into the area of compliance to 
FSMSs.   They conducted a large-scale qualitative study (n=200), interviewing by 
telephone owners or managers of small businesses and technical managers from 
individual sites of larger businesses in northwest England.  In addition, five in-depth, 
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face-to-face, narrative interviews were conducted to confirm and further elaborate the 
barriers identified during the telephone interviews.  The awareness to adherence 
model identifies 11 factors underpinning barriers to compliance, built around 
knowledge, understanding and behaviours (see Figure 3.2). 
The qualitative, inductive research framework utilised by Gilling et al. (2001) fits well 
with the psychological approach of this study.  Whilst the direction and approach of 
the research is clear, it is nevertheless disappointing that the authors did not take the 
opportunity to report additional data on their survey population.  No information is 
given on the distribution of the sample between micro, small, medium and large 
businesses.  Therefore, whilst, it is reported, for example, that “awareness” was 
identified as a barrier in 15 micro businesses, it is impossible to know if this represents 
a large proportion of all micro businesses interviewed.  Likewise, the large sample size 
used in the telephone interviews implies that the results should be representative for 
SME food enterprises in the UK, and indeed the authors comment that all sectors of 
the industry from primary producers through to caterers were represented in the 
sample.  However, no data is reported of the barriers to FSMS implementation by 
industry sector, so it is impossible to judge if, for example, manufacturers report less 
barriers than caterers.  Reporting such basic quantitative data would better enable a 
judgement as to whether the model can be reasonably applied across the diversity of 
the British food industry. 
 
Additionally, Gilling et al. (2001) report some of the identified barriers in terms of non-
psychological factors.  Whilst the issues raised – time, financial and human resources – 
have been reported by earlier researchers to be barriers to FSMS implementation 
(Ehiri et al., 1995; Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Panisello, Quantick, & Knowles, 1999; 
Pritchard & Walker, 1998), the inclusion of these items means that the model cannot 
be considered as purely based on mental rather than physical factors.  
 
Breaking down the model in terms of the literature review question, i.e. does FSMS 
failure lie with the process or the people involved, it can be seen that Gilling et al. 
(2001) express the first level of barriers in people terms: knowledge, attitude, 
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behaviour and adherence.  At the second, detailed level, the barriers are a mixture of 
people and process related factors.  Thus, whilst the model has its roots in a people 
oriented, psychological approach, the authors have found process and people related 
barriers and it is not clear which area should be prioritised to improve FSMS 
implementation.  
 
Figure 3.2: HACCP Awareness to Adherence Model (Gilling et al., 2001) 
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3.2.1.3 Cognitive and Behaviour Model to HACCP Principle Adherence (Azanza & Zamora-
Luna, 2005) 
 
In common with Gilling et al. (2001), Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005) also utilised a 
psychological approach in developing their model.  They also reference a theoretical 
background of models from the assessment of adherence to medical guidelines. 
 
However, their methodology of model development differed from that used by Gilling 
et al. (2001), in that they first proposed their model and then validated this through a 
face-to-face survey with HACCP team members (n=27) in four micro- to small-scale 
food processors (meat processing and beverage manufacturers) in the Philippines.  The 
model can be considered an extension of the work of Gilling et al. (2001), being based 
on the same platforms of knowledge, attitudes and behaviour but identifying seven 
steps and 18 sub-items impacting HACCP compliance (see Figure 3.3).  Again, the 
model is not completely psychological in nature; e.g. industry intrinsic factors 
presented as barriers to adoption and adherence to HACCP include time, manpower, 
equipment and facilities. 
 
In contrast to Gilling et al. (2001), Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005) present basic 
quantitative data from the surveys to support the identified barriers.  The small 
number of participants is not conducive to the use of more advanced statistical 
analysis, e.g. to understand if there are significant differences in barriers identified in 
different industry sectors or with organisational size. Whilst the empirical findings 
validate the model to some degree, the nature of the questionnaire method and the 
highly limited scope of the research does not allow significant interpretation of the 
data or extrapolation to a wider population.   
Considering the people versus process question, Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005) 
present both the first and second level of barriers in people terms, whilst the detailed 
third level barriers combine people and process.  This indicates again a lack of clarity as 
to which barriers should form the priority for ensuring effective implementation of 
FSMSs. 
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Figure 3.3: Cognitive and Behaviour Model to HACCP Principle Adherence (Azanza & 
Zamora-Luna, 2005) 
  
3.2.1.4 A Model of Food Safety Management System Adoption (A Tested Model) 
(Arpanutud, Keeratipibul, Charoensupaya & E.A. Taylor, 2009) 
 
In contrast with the previous models, Arpanutud et al. (2009) utilised a deductive, 
quantitative approach.  They researched a range of factors (physical, financial and 
psychological) which they hypothesised would impact adoption of FSMSs in food 
manufacturing in Thailand.   These were tested using a postal survey questionnaire 
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(n=217), designed to enable multiple regression analysis.  Stratified random sampling 
was used to ensure that findings could be applied across the Thai food industry, and 
the sample size was calculated to allow for the examination of nine independent 
variables.   
Following regression analysis, seven hypotheses were supported as statistically 
significant, explaining 69.4% of the variance in the dependent variable (the level of 
food safety management adoption).  The proposed model splits these seven key 
determinants into three sections: motivational factors, contextual factors and 
organisational characteristics, as shown in Figure 3.4.   
Figure 3.4: A Model of Food Safety Management Adoption (a Tested Model), 
(Arpanutud et al., 2009) 
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An additional point of contrast to the previous models presented, is that this one 
explicitly considers expected benefits of implementing FSMSs as key determinants of 
successful implementation (expected gain of economic competitiveness and expected 
gain of social legitimacy) rather than considering only barriers to the implementation 
or success of FSMS. 
 
The strength of this study lies in the perceived robustness of the quantitative 
approach.  The consideration of required sample size (to ensure the study is 
sufficiently powered), the use of stratified random sampling and the relatively high 
response rate (45.2%) suggests that the data should be reliable and generalizable, at 
least within the Thai food manufacturing environment.  Care must be taken in 
extrapolating the results to other countries with different regulatory requirements, as 
some of the identified barriers / drivers may not be appropriate.  For example, in the 
EU, where a HACCP-based FSMS is mandatory by law, there would be no expectation 
of competitive advantage in installing such a system.   
  
Moreover, other research has demonstrated that there can be a clear mismatch 
between the reports of success in implementing FSMSs given by FBOs versus 
enforcement officials views (Yapp & Fairman, 2005), suggesting that there are severe 
limitations in using quantitative research methods to investigate FSMS compliance.  
Whilst Arpanutud et al. (2009) were not studying FSMS compliance per se, many of the 
survey questions relate to the respondents’ own views on the extent and quality of 
their own FSMS (e.g. “the company has a review process on the performance of 
FSMS”).  Hence their survey responses may have been impacted in a similar way to 
that found by Yapp and Fairman (2005).  It is not possible to ascertain the veracity of 
the responses to the survey, and no independent review of the organisations’ FSMSs 
was undertaken, but the robustness of this research may not be as great as suggested 
by the statistical analysis. 
 
Considering the people versus process debate, Arpanutud et al. (2009) present the 
barriers as a mixture of people and process related factors, so again, there is at this 
stage no definitive answer to the question. 
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3.2.1.5 Factors Influencing the Implementation of Food Safety Systems (Ball, Wilcock & 
Aung, 2009) 
 
In this research study Ball et al. (2009) conducted in-depth interviews with owners / 
general managers and employees (food safety coordinators and production 
employees) at five SME meat processing plants in Ontario, Canada.  The firms were 
selected as a purposive sample, to give insight into firms at different stages of FSMS 
implementation.  In addition, two focus group sessions were held with eight opinion 
leaders in food safety (employees of the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs and employees of three different food processing trade associations 
based in Ontario). 
 
The data was analysed to identify patterns and themes.  A model was then proposed, 
based on these findings together with earlier work (van der Wende, 2006), and framed 
using the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).  The model (shown in Figure 3.5) 
presents three main themes which influence FSMS implementation: production 
system, organisational characteristics and employee characteristics.   
 
In common with the other models presented, Ball et al. (2009) found that a mixture of 
physical / process related factors and psychological/ people related factors influence 
successful adoption of FSMSs.  However, the model is more sophisticated than those 
previously presented, in that the authors illustrate more clearly how the production 
system and organisational characteristics directly impact on employee characteristics, 
i.e. they show how the attitudes and subsequent behaviour of individual workers are 
changed by their experience of the environment in which they work.  The model also 
shows the difference between the intention to follow food safety practices and the 
actual execution of these practices, recognising that the production system and 
organisation characteristics can also act as barriers stopping workers from executing 
good intentions.   Thus unlike the four pillars model of Panisello and Quantick (2001), 
where no help was given to FBOs in prioritising which technical barriers to resolve, this 
model clearly implies that an FBO should resolve issues in production systems and 
organisational characteristics – i.e. process related factors - before or alongside 
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addressing employee characteristics, in order to achieve satisfactory and lasting 
implementation of an FSMS.  Thus, this model implies a dominance to addressing the 
FSMS process in order to ensure effective FSMS implementation. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Factors Influencing the Implementation of Food Safety Systems (Ball et al. 
2009, adapted from van der Wende, 2006) 
 
 
 
Ball et al. (2009) acknowledged that this model helped to describe factors influencing 
food safety behaviours, but could not be used as a predictive model without further 
validation. Other limitations of the study include the relatively limited sample and 
industry specific nature of the study population.  
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3.2.1.6 Critical Factors for the Effective Implementation of ISO 9001 and HACCP 
(Kafetzopoulos & Gotzamani, 2014) 
The models presented so far have focussed on barriers to and drivers for the 
implementation of FSMSs, particularly HACCP.  Kafetzopoulos and Gotzamani (2014) 
take a somewhat different approach, by conflating the study of HACCP implementation 
with that of the ISO 9001 QMS. This approach has merit, given that previous work has 
illustrated the inter-relationship of FSMSs and QMSs (e.g. Chountalas, Tsarouchas, & 
Lagodimos, 2009; Mensah & Julien, 2011) as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Through a survey of Greek FBOs that had implemented both ISO 9001 and an FSMS 
(HACCP or ISO 22000), Kafetzopoulos and Gotzamani (2014) aimed to measure the 
effectiveness of these systems; investigate the CFEI (critical factors for effective 
implementation) of the systems and finally assess the degree to which the effective 
implementation of the systems influences company performance.  It is the second of 
these objectives which is relevant to this literature review. 
 
The survey was conducted predominately by email and fax, with structured 
questionnaires being sent to 840 FBOs, from which 347 responded (a 42.3% response 
rate), split across the nutrition (59%), agricultural (23%) and beverages (18%) sectors.  
91% of the respondents were SMEs.   
 
A preliminary model is presented in which five CFEI are hypothesised for ISO 9001 and 
HACCP: internal business motives, employees’ attributes, organisation’s attributes, 
external environment and systems’ requirements.  These factors were derived from 
the authors’ previous work in this area (Fotopoulos et al., 2011; Fotopoulos, 
Kafetzopoulos, & Psomas, 2009; Psomas, Fotopoulos, & Kafetzopoulos, 2010) with the 
latent constructs confirmed by a first level of exploratory factor analysis of the survey 
data (see Figure 3.6).  A second level of critical factor analysis determined however 
that only three of the CFEI – employee’s attributes, the organisation’s attributes and 
internal business motives – made a significant contribution to the effective 
implementation of the systems in this study.  
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One concern arising from this research relates to the hypotheses tested: all five CFEI 
are hypothesised to have a positive relationship with ISO 9001 and HACCP systems. 
However, considering the associated items which make up each factor, it is clear that 
from previous research (e.g. Azanza & Zamora-Luna, 2005; Gilling et al., 2001) there 
should be an expectation of a negative relationship between some items and HACCP 
implementation. This is particularly marked for the factor of systems requirements, 
where all three associated items - the required time and cost of implementation and 
the volume of paperwork - are recognised as barriers to the implementation of HACCP, 
rather than positive factors encouraging successful implementation (Azanza & Zamora-
Luna, 2005; Gilling et al., 2001).  This aspect of the study therefore requires further 
consideration. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: CFEI for QMS and FSMS (Adapted from Kafetzopoulos & Gotzamani, 2014) 
 
 
Overall, as with the work of Arpanutud et al. (2009), the quantitative, deductive 
approach is key to the strength of this paper.  However, whilst the study had a high 
response rate, and indeed a relatively large number of respondents (n= 347) in 
comparison to other work in this area, no information is given in the paper as to 
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whether the original study population of 840 companies comprises the total 
population of Greek FBOs who have implemented both ISO 9001 and HACCP / ISO 
22000, how these were identified, and / or whether a sampling technique was used to 
identify these organisations from a larger population.  Likewise, no consideration is 
stated as to whether the study is sufficiently powered to test the model hypotheses. 
 
The authors also recognise some potential limitations of their work, namely that the 
hands-off nature of the survey may hide bias in the participants’ responses. This 
concern fits with those previously raised for the model of Arpanutud et al. (2009), i.e. 
that an organisations’ assessment of its success in terms of food safety is known to 
differ from that of independent assessors (Yapp & Fairman, 2005).  This might 
therefore impact on the reliability with which respondents’ answer questions relating 
to the success of FSMSs and QMSs.   
 
To determine whether this study helps answer the question of whether people or 
process issues are the key limitations for HACCP implementation, it is necessary to 
assess the individual items associated with each of the CFEI. As shown in Figure 3.7, 
both people and process issues are represented.  However, concentrating on the three 
factors shown in this study to significantly contribute to effective implementation, 
shows that people related elements predominate.   
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Figure 3.7: CFEI and Associated Items (Adapted from Kafetzopoulos & Gotzamani, 
2014) 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Comparison of Models  
 
All the models reviewed present a range of barriers to the successful implementation 
of FSMSs.  The most common barriers identified across all of the models are people 
related issues: the knowledge and skills of the workforce, their attitude towards FSMSs 
(i.e. whether they perceive them to be necessary and / or effective) and the 
commitment of implementing and using FSMSs by both management and staff.  
Process (technical and operational) barriers are also seen across all of the models, 
particularly relating to the complexity of FSMSs, the time and resources required for 
implementation and maintenance of the systems.   
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A key difference between the models lies in how they interlink and prioritise the 
barriers identified.  Panisello and Quantick (2001) prioritise their pillars of HACCP, 
putting commitment as the underpinning step.  In contrast, Gilling et al. (2001) and 
Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005) differ in their prioritisation, building from awareness 
(of the FSMS) as the initial step, through knowledge and onto acceptance / 
commitment, before behaviour change (implementation of an effective FSMS) is 
achieved.  Whilst this prioritisation appears logical, Rennie (1995) has challenged the 
model of knowledge – attitude – change in practice / behaviour (the KAP model) as 
being overly simplistic for the field of food safety education, as it takes insufficient 
account of the environment and of the preconceived ideas and current practices of 
people involved.  Admittedly, the models of Gilling et al. (2001) and Azanza and 
Zamora-Luna (2005) are more complex than the basic KAP model, but concerns 
remain.  For example, in a study of food handlers’ beliefs and self-reported practices, 
over 60% of people trained in food safety practices admitted to not following them on 
all occasions (Clayton, Griffith, Price, & Peters, 2002).  This suggests that knowledge 
without commitment is insufficient to ensure the implementation of FSMSs, and that 
as Panisello and Quantick (2001) suggest, addressing commitment to food safety must 
underpin any successful system implementation. 
 
The model of Arpanutud et al. (2009) differs again, in that all three groups of factors 
influencing FSMS implementation are treated equally. A key difference with this model 
is the grouping of a number of “motivational” factors – drivers for the implementation 
of FSMSs.   The work of Kafetzopoulos and Gotzamani (2014) supports this approach, 
also identifying internal business motives which drive FSMS/QMS implementation and 
further support can be found in a number of studies.  These include FSMSs as a 
customer requirement (e.g. Henchion & McIntyre, 2005), FSMSs as a pre-requisite for 
export (e.g. Cobanoglu, 2012; Williams, 2012) and belief that implementation of an 
FSMS will improve not only food safety but also profit margins (e.g. Jin, Zhou, & Ye, 
2008).  
 
Some of these drivers, such as FSMSs being required as a pre-requisite for exports, are 
particularly pertinent for FBOs based in countries with less developed legislation on 
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food safety management.  However, even in jurisdictions with comprehensive food 
safety and hygiene laws, such as the EU, government and regulatory bodies also 
believe that FSMSs such as HACCP bring benefits to FBOs and society in general.  The 
role of such systems in preventing foodborne disease, reducing costs (primarily by 
avoiding the costs associated with foodborne illness), improving legal protection (i.e. 
allowing businesses to demonstrate “due diligence”) and better managing risks within 
the business are identified as key benefits of HACCP-based systems (Kane, 2011).  
Communicating such benefits to FBOs may aid in gaining commitment to the 
implementation of FSMSs, as the benefits can help to off-set some of the perceived 
barriers to FSMS implementation. 
 
Of the models reviewed, that of Ball et al. (2009) can be considered the most 
sophisticated, not so much in terms of the number of individual barriers identified, but 
in the connections between the categories of barriers.  As previously discussed, these 
inter-relationships lead to the conclusion that process related barriers (physical / 
operational issues) must be addressed before or in parallel with addressing barriers 
related to employee characteristics. i.e., people related barriers.    
 
However, in addition to highlighting the differences between the models and their 
points in common, it is important to consider if data from other research supports or 
refutes any of the models in particular.  This is explored in the next section.    
 
3.2.3 Additional Empirical Research – Does it Support or Refute the Models? 
 
The majority of research into the implementation of FSMSs has not been directed at 
testing any specific model but rather has endeavoured to identify and comment on 
barriers and drivers identified in different parts of the food industry, across a wide 
range of countries.  For example, Baş, Yüksel and Çavuşoğlu (2007) studied barriers to 
HACCP implementation in Turkey;  Violaris, Bridges and Bridges (2008) studied HACCP 
implementation in the hospitality and manufacturing industries in Cyprus;  Mensah 
and Julien (2011) researched the implementation of FSMS in food manufacturers in the 
UK; Le, Bazager, Hill and Wilcock (2014) studied perceptions of food safety 
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management systems in the artisan cheese industry in Canada; Dzwolak (2014) studied 
HACCP implementation in Poland in small food businesses; Jin et al., (2008) studied 
HACCP adoption in food enterprises in China whilst Grover, Chopra and Mosher (2016) 
studied factors influencing the adoption of food safety controls required under the US 
Food Safety Modernisation Act.   
 
The exception to this trend is work carried out by researchers at Salford University, 
who have explored and expanded the awareness to adherence model of Gilling et al., 
(2001).  They also used the expanded model as a tool to develop and implement 
amended HACCP systems, primarily for the hospitality sector (E. A. Taylor, 2008a, 
2008b; E. A. Taylor & Kane, 2005; E. A. Taylor & J.Z. Taylor, 2004, 2008; J. Z. Taylor, 
2008a, 2008b; J.Z. Taylor & Forte, 2008). Two further studies by other research groups 
(Fielding, Ellis, Clayton, & Peters, 2011; Worsfold, 2006) have been identified which 
look at the implementation of HACCP-like systems akin to that developed by the 
Salford team.  Together these studies can be seen as providing evidence as to whether 
the awareness to adherence model forms a useful platform from which to develop 
targeted FSMSs; this research is considered below. 
 
From the Salford team, E. A. Taylor and J. Z. Taylor (2008) describe the research carried 
out under the auspices of the UK FSA to develop tailored HACCP methods for the 
hospitality industry.  “Menu-Safe” comprises 40 documented and validated safe 
methods, whilst “Safer Food, Better Business” comprises 25 shortened methods 
modified specifically for very small businesses.  Both systems use a daily diary to 
manage the HACCP principles of monitoring, corrective action and documentation.  In 
the research trial, Menu-Safe was implemented using a “hands-on” approach involving 
experienced chefs working directly with owner/managers of the subject catering 
operations (E. A. Taylor, 2008a). 
 
The success of the initial trial version of Menu-Safe was evaluated using a qualitative 
methodology (J. Z. Taylor, 2008a, 2008b). In-depth narrative interviews were 
conducted in small hospitality businesses (n=22) in Greater Manchester and the 
findings were used to further develop the awareness to adherence model expanding it 
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to 21 barriers to HACCP / FSMS implementation.   After implementation of the Menu-
Safe system, follow–up interviews were carried out at 6 months (n=12) and 3 years 
(n=5) to ascertain changes in knowledge, behaviour and attitude and to understand if 
changes were maintained between 6 months and 3 years without contact during this 
period.  FSMS documentation and records were also examined to assess whether the 
system had been fully implemented and maintained.  J.Z. Taylor (2008a, 2008b) 
concluded in this research that Menu-Safe could be viewed as a success, reducing or 
eliminating the 21 barriers to FSMS implementation identified at the start of the 
research.  
 
However, the limitations of this research must be recognised.  First, the research 
focussed only on hospitality; there is no evidence in these studies as to whether this 
approach would work in other sectors of the food industry.  Second, there was a high 
drop-out rate in the study; only 54% of businesses completed the 6 month follow up 
and only 12% the 3 year follow up.   Despite recognising the high turnover of staff in 
the hospitality sector, the study was designed such that follow up interviews were only 
conducted with the same managers as participated at the start of the study (Taylor, 
2008a).  An alternative study design, allowing follow up interviews with other staff / 
management and / or utilising the documentation review in all businesses, might have 
elucidated different results.   
 
The work of Worsfold (2006) forms another implementation study of Menu-Safe, 
conducted separately to the Salford group.  She reports on a workshop format 
designed to deliver the trial Menu-Safe pack to 42 small fast food businesses.  These 
businesses were recruited via trade directories and with the assistance of local 
authority environmental health officers (EHOs).  Knowledge, behaviour and attitudes 
were assessed before training using a questionnaire.  At the end of the course a 
second questionnaire was used to assess relevance and overall satisfaction with the 
course and the level of confidence to proceed with using the knowledge gained, i.e., a 
measure of intention to implement the Menu-Safe system.   
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Analysis of the pre-course questionnaires demonstrated that businesses were 
confident that they were operating food safe businesses, but in reality, there was a gap 
between this confidence level and the participants’ understanding of risks and actual 
behaviours.  Also of note was the challenge in recruiting study participants; even with 
the involvement of EHOs, there was a great reluctance on the part of businesses to 
participate, which in itself can be seen as a measure of attitude towards FSMSs.  Whilst 
Worsfold (2006) reports success in terms of basic quantitative data for measures of 
satisfaction and relevance of the workshops, there was no follow up on actual 
implementation in the businesses and no independent verification to ascertain if 
appropriate changes in food safety practices took place.  It is thus impossible to judge 
from this work if the tailored HACCP method was successfully implemented without 
direct support and intervention in the individual businesses as provided in the original 
work of the Salford team (J.Z. Taylor, 2008a, 2008b).   
 
Despite these limitations, these studies suggest that the awareness to adherence 
model has been successfully used as a basis for the development and implementation 
of modified HACCP-like systems, primarily for SMEs in the hospitality industry.  More 
recent work (Lowe & J.Z. Taylor, 2013) has also utilised the framework to identify 
barriers to HACCP amongst primary producers (farmers and growers), and of course 
the model of Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005) previously discussed, is an extension of 
the original Gilling et al. (2001) work.  In addition, the qualitative research approach 
and fundamental principle of developing a tailored HACCP-like system for a specific 
industry sector, received the endorsement of the FAO/WHO in their guidance report 
on the application of HACCP in small and /or less-developed food businesses (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006).   
 
However, another study evaluating the implementation of a tailored HACCP-like 
system (Fielding et al., 2011) echoes concerns discussed earlier, i.e. that the 
prioritisation of barriers, putting awareness / knowledge before commitment, will not 
necessarily lead to behaviour change.   
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Fielding et al. (2011) present a quantitative study set up to evaluate the success of 
implementation of an FSMS pack developed with the backing of the FSA.  The pack 
comprised a written information resource tailored to manufacturers of fresh chilled or 
frozen soups and sauces (or producers of ready meals containing these sauces).  The 
initiative was designed on a similar basis to Menu-Safe in that it was industry / product 
specific and aimed at breaking down previously identified barriers to FSMS 
implementation, such as the lack of technical resource in companies.  
 
The study was designed to assess the effect of intervention (resource delivery) versus 
control (no resource), and to assess the impact of business size on the success of the 
intervention.  Implementation of the FSMS pack was assessed by questionnaires and 
check lists administered during assessment visits 4 months after the intervention 
point, using trained and validated assessors.   
 
Unfortunately Fielding et al. (2011) experienced great difficulties in recruiting subjects 
into the study.  Only 123 out of 3000 companies agreed initially to participate - a 4.1% 
response rate.  This was reduced by the withdrawal of 81 companies prior to the 
assessment visit.  Even the response rate of local authorities was low, with only 56% 
responding to a request for participation (including a letter from the FSA).  
 
The study was therefore greatly underpowered and unbalanced in terms of both 
intervention and control groups and business size in each group.  A trend was reported 
for higher attitude scores in the intervention group, particularly in SMEs (rather than 
microbusinesses) but no significant difference could be seen between intervention and 
control groups to indicate that the resource was effective in improving the knowledge, 
behaviour or attitude of the participants.  A small survey of non-responders (n=14, 
50% control, 50% intervention) was also conducted to ascertain any differences 
between participants and non-responders.  These indicated that non-responders may 
have lower knowledge but a more positive attitude towards food safety, i.e. they may 
falsely believe that they have an appropriate FSMS in place.   
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The small sample size and lack of power of the study makes it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions, but the results indicate that providing information / improving knowledge 
and changing the FSMS process alone does not necessarily lead to improvements in 
attitude and behaviour and adequate FSMS implementation. 
 
3.2.4 Summary of Identified Barriers and Benefits. 
 
One of the challenges in comparing different studies on FSMS implementation is the 
lack of consistency in the naming and description of barriers (Jevšnik et al., 2006).  
 
Despite this challenge two review papers have been identified which endeavour to 
consolidate the information on barriers and benefits to HACCP implementation and 
from there to prioritise these factors.  Jevšnik et al. (2006) identified 12 scientific 
papers with empirical research findings and 7 technical studies, with data presented on 
practical experience and reviews of other literature.  Based on this work, they 
classified elements into 21 categories and ranked them by frequency of occurrence in 
each published paper reviewed.  Fotopoulos et al. (2011) conducted a similar exercise, 
reviewing 31 papers and identified 32 factors, positive and negative, related to HACCP 
implementation.  Using Pareto analysis, they identified 11 “critical” factors, (one 
positive and ten negative) which when taken together accounted for over 78% of all 
mentions of elements influencing HACCP implementation in the literature reviewed. 
 
Figure 3.8 overleaf shows the factors identified by Jevšnik et al. (2006) presented in 
rank order and Fotopoulos et al. (2011), again, presented in rank order.  In addition, 
the elements have been classified as primarily related to the FSMS process (process, 
technical or operational areas) or to people (staff and management) related areas.   
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Figure 3.8: Factors Related to the Success of HACCP Implementation and 
Classification into People or Process Areas 
 
 
 
As might be expected, there are clear similarities between the barriers identified in the 
two reviews.  From a people perspective, knowledge and skills – or the training to 
develop these – rank as key barriers, as do commitment by both staff and 
management.  From a process perspective, resources appear to be a commonly 
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quoted critical barrier, as does the complexity of HACCP, as evidenced by barriers of 
documentation, excessive paperwork and the time required to develop and implement 
HACCP.  Overall however, there are roughly equal numbers of people and process 
related barriers, which appears to leave the debate open as whether process or people 
change is required for effective FSMS implementation. 
   
However, returning to the empirical studies of the Salford group, these utilise a form 
of process change to elicit improvements in FSMS implementation.  This is 
demonstrated by the descriptions of “Menu-Safe” and “Safer Food, Better Business”, 
with the creation and use of an industry tailored approach, simplifying the HACCP 
system through the introduction of the safe methods and daily diary etc. (E. A. Taylor 
& J.Z. Taylor, 2008). 
 
Whilst the studies in the hospitality sector were deemed to be largely successful, the 
relative failure of this approach in the manufacturing sector (Fielding et al., 2011) 
suggests that changing the FSMS process alone is insufficient.  The low recruitment 
and high dropout rates in the study (Fielding et al., 2011) can be seen as indicators of 
significant issues with people related barriers such as commitment and attitude to 
food safety.  
 
Indeed, the challenges organisations face in implementing FSMS may even increase 
negative attitudes towards these systems, as was seen in a longitudinal study of SMEs 
in Cyprus tracking HACCP and ISO 22000 implementation and compliance over 30 
months (Charalambous, Fryer, Panayides, & Smith, 2015).  In this study cost and 
complexity were postulated as the main concerns, leading to a change from a positive 
attitude and intention at the start of the study to negative attitudes after 30 months.  
Similarly, Qijun and Batt (2016) found when studying barriers and benefits to the 
implementation of third party certified FSMSs in Shanghai, that the perception of 
barriers and constraints by food processors escalated as they progressed in developing 
quality assurance certification.   
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Also, whilst the Salford group changed the FSMS process in their work, they 
implemented the new system in a person-centred way, using experienced chefs to 
work directly with the study participants (E. A. Taylor, 2008a). This was in direct 
contrast to Fielding et al. (2011), who used a hands-off approach to disseminate their 
targeted FSMS. 
 
Overall, the research findings demonstrate the complex and inter-related nature of the 
barriers to effective FSMS implementation.  From the models discussed, the 
supporting empirical research, and the summary of barriers collated in the review 
papers, it is clear that people factors, such as knowledge, skills and motivation, are key 
to FSMS implementation, but they are impacted by process factors such as complexity, 
cost and time for system implementation, as well as fundamentals of the food 
production business itself (e.g. complexity of food production process; facilities 
available).   
 
Having reviewed the barriers to and drivers for the implementation of FSMSs, the next 
stage of the literature review considers the literature on reported food safety 
incidents, in order to determine if these give any further indications on the balance 
between process and people related issues with FSMS implementation and 
maintenance.   
 
 
3.3 Food Safety Incidents: People or Process Failure? 
 
The pervasive nature of reported food safety incidents was presented in Chapter 2, 
with Figure 2.1 showing the relative number of hazards by type for food incidents 
investigated by the UK FSA in 2016/1714.  Incident reports published in the UK and EU 
are next considered, to ascertain if this published data gives further insight to the 
                                                          
14 As noted in Chapter 2, the FSA classifies incidents as  “an event where, based on the information 
available, there are concerns about actual or suspected threats to the safety or quality of food and/or 
feed that could require intervention to protect consumers' interests” (Food Standards Agency, 2017a), 
although FBOS are only obliged to report to notify the authorities of any products placed on the market 
which they believe may be “injurious to health” (Regulation (EC) No 178/ 2002, Article 19). 
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causes (people or process) of incidents, particularly food safety incidents (as opposed 
to those incidents where there is no risk to human health), which can be postulated to 
be caused by FSMS failures. 
 
Both UK FSA (Food Standards Agency, 2017b) and EU RASFF annual reports (European 
Commission Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, 2017) contain a wealth of 
detail enabling analysis of incidents by hazard type15, food type, origin of product or 
reporting country. However, neither report gives robust information about specific 
safety system failures.   The RASFF report for 2016 (European Commission Directorate-
General for Health and Food Safety, 2017) presented more specific descriptions of four 
specific cases of cross-border outbreaks of foodborne illness.  Whilst affected 
countries, bacterial strains and food vehicles were presented in these case 
descriptions, there was no information as to how or why the relevant food safety 
systems had failed.  Likewise, there is insufficient detail in the on-line RASFF or FSA 
databases to determine the root cause of incidents and understand, in relevant 
incidents, why safety systems have failed.  For example, a report of risk of Clostridium 
botulinum in flavoured oils due to inadequate processing could result from a 
breakdown in processing equipment and a failure in an alert system to notify 
production staff of inadequate time / temperature treatment (a failure in an FSMnS) or 
be a more fundamental problem in that the original HACCP plan failed to identify this 
part of the process as a CCP and adequate monitoring was not put in place (a failure in 
knowledge or skills of the individual completing the HACCP plan and thus in the overall 
FSMS). 
 
In the USA, data is available on inter-state outbreaks of foodborne illness16 from three 
main sources: the Department of Agriculture (USDA) who have responsibility for meat, 
                                                          
15 27 different hazard types, are identified and reported upon, covering the spectrum of microbiological, 
chemical and physical hazards in specific subsets (e.g. for chemical hazards, separating allergens, food 
additives, heavy metals etc.) plus additional hazards such as adulteration / fraud, packaging defects and 
labelling issues.   
16 An outbreak of foodborne illness is defined by the CDC as “an incident in which two or more persons 
experience a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a common food” (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2017).  Thus, all outbreaks result from an incident (as previously defined) but not all 
incidents cause actual illness or indeed an outbreak of foodborne illness.  
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poultry, certain fish and processed egg products; the FDA who cover all other 
foodstuffs and the CDC, who report on outbreaks in general.   
 
The CDC National Outbreak Reporting System database for 2016 (Centers for Disease 
Control, 2018) lists 841 food related outbreaks for 2016, the majority of which (77%) 
resulted from microbiological contamination.  The aetiology was not reported for 21% 
of cases, whilst the remaining 2% (17 cases) were due to chemical toxins, all but one 
case being of natural origin (ciguatoxin or scombroid toxin) related to fish 
consumption.  The vast majority of outbreaks (97%) concerned food prepared and 
served out-of-home (restaurants, institutional catering etc.).  Whilst some data is 
available on the implicated food vehicles and contaminated ingredients (e.g. beef as a 
contaminated ingredient in a taco meal which acted as the food vehicle), no data is 
available through this site to distinguish how or why the contamination occurred, thus 
it is impossible to judge how FSMSs failed, and whether people or process related 
elements lie at the root of these failures.  
 
In contrast, data is available from the FDA on a smaller number of outbreaks which 
were investigated by them.  Looking at the same time period (2016), the FDA report 
investigating 22 multistate outbreaks, although more detail is available on only 16 
outbreaks via the FDA website (US Food and Drug Administration, 2018a).  As with the 
FSA and RASFF databases, the main purpose of the FDA information is to alert 
consumers and the food industry of concerns and the actions they should take to avoid 
illness.  In only four of the 16 detailed outbreaks listed for 2016 is more information 
given on the reasons for contamination, and in only one of these cases are FDA 
inspection reports (redacted to remove commercially sensitive material) available.  For 
these four cases, inadequate hygiene measures appears as a common thread (e.g. lack 
of handwashing facilities; inadequate pest control), although a lack of a preventive 
plan to guard against Salmonella contamination and poor record keeping was noted in 
one case, which suggests failures in developing and managing a FSMS.  However, 
again, there is an overall lack of specific data across the data set to make a more 
detailed assessment of FSMS failures and causes.  
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In addition to data on outbreaks, both the FDA and the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) of the USDA report data on recalls, with the USDA reporting 122 recalls 
in 2016 (USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service, 2018) and the FDA reporting 484 
recalls pertaining to food and dietary supplements (US Food and Drug Administration, 
2018b).  Again, the focus is on providing information to alert consumers and the 
industry about products which are possibly injurious to health and there is a lack of 
systematic analysis of this data available through the enforcement authorities.   
 
Both the FSIS and FDA identify three classes of recalls based on the severity of 
potential outcomes of consuming products.  There are slight differences between 
these classifications (as shown in Table 3.1) and also in the availability of this data; all 
FSIS USDA notifications contain this data, whilst it is not immediately available for FDA 
recalls.  The classification systems do not help to determine the reasons for FSMS 
failures underpinning the need for product recalls.  
 
Table 3.1: USA Recall Classification Systems 
 
 FSIS of the USDA FDA 
Class I A health hazard situation in which 
there is a reasonable probability 
that eating the food will cause 
health problems or death. 
Dangerous or defective products that 
predictably could cause serious health 
problems or death. 
Class II A potential health hazard 
situation in which there is 
a remote probability of adverse 
health consequences from eating 
the food. 
Products that might cause a 
temporary health problem, or pose 
only a slight threat of a serious 
nature.  
Class III A situation in which eating the 
food will not cause adverse 
health consequences. 
Products that are unlikely to cause 
any adverse health reaction, but that 
violate FDA labelling or manufacturing 
laws. 
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As the level of detail required to investigate causes of FSMS failure is not available 
through the routine publications of the enforcement authorities, additional literature 
searches were conducted to identify reviews of food safety incidents / foodborne 
illness outbreaks published in the academic literature since 2010.  18 papers and 
edited book chapters were identified, with one paper analysing violations reported in 
enforcement official inspections of FBOs, six publications focussing on reported food 
safety incidents / product recalls and ten analysing reported cases of foodborne illness 
or outbreaks.  One paper (Zhang & Xue, 2016) specifically considers food fraud / 
economically motivated adulteration of food, but was included in this analysis as much 
of the adulteration discussed in the paper has food safety implications (e.g. the 
presence of forbidden additives or medicinal products).  Indeed, food fraud cases are 
covered in other papers (e.g. Vemula, Kumar & Polasa, 2012; Wright, 2016; Manning, 
Wallace & Soon, 2016; Potter, Murray, Lawson & Graham, 2012) alongside 
“traditional” food safety incidents resulting from microbiological contamination etc.17  
This reflects the recent interest in food fraud and perfectly illustrates the inter-
relationship between food quality, food safety and food fraud, which was discussed in 
Chapter 2.   
 
The reviews cover both highly developed countries with comprehensive food safety 
regulations such as the USA and UK, and those with developing legislation and systems 
such as India and China and consider the full range of products from agricultural crops, 
to highly processed foods and provision from food service outlets.  Appendix A 
provides more detail, tabulating the main findings of each paper with a short 
discussion as to whether there is a specific link to process or people factors as a root 
cause of incidents reported.   
 
Overall, these reviews have focussed predominantly on outbreaks involving the 
microbiological contamination of foods, rather than the full range of incidents 
                                                          
17 Whilst food fraud is frequently classified as such due to the intentional nature of product adulteration 
/ substitution (Spink & Moyer, 2011), it bears highlighting that there is no intent on the part of the 
fraudster to impact food safety or public health.  Indeed, the “successful fraudster” aims to remain 
undetected so they can repeat the product adulteration etc., and so gain further financial benefits.  
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(physical, chemical, microbiological etc.) reported by enforcement authorities in their 
annual reports.  Of note is that in developing countries there appear to be specific 
concerns with the adulteration of products.  Accidental contamination from natural 
(e.g. toxins produced by mouldy grain) or chemical sources (e.g. pesticide residues) 
and deliberate, fraudulent contamination (e.g. use of illegal food colourings) are 
identified as concerns (e.g. Vemula, Kumar & Polasa, 2012), with the lower educational 
level (particularly in rural areas) and less advanced legislative and enforcement 
environments being implicated as causative factors.  The work of Potter et al. (2012) is 
also of note.  The authors have attempted to systematically review hazards within the 
agri-food industry by considering recalls in the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the USA 
between 2004 and 2010.  They created three main recall categories: chemical, 
biological and operational.  This last category encompasses a wide range of issues, 
from “production contamination” (with glass, metal, plastic etc.) through to the use of 
unauthorised ingredients, incorrect labelling and product spoilage and accounted for 
55% of the recalls studied.  Potter et al. (2012) claim that “operational product recalls 
are largely caused by preventable human errors”, however, they present no evidence 
to substantiate this claim.  Interestingly, they recommend future research should 
investigate how HACCP, statistical quality control, traceability and supply chain risk 
management – i.e. processes – can be used to prevent operational hazards, implying 
that improving FSMS processes can overcome human errors which might be thought 
to relate more to people factors such as training and behaviour.  
 
Given the range of study methodologies, countries and products of interest, few firm 
conclusions can be drawn from this literature.  However, whilst both process and 
people related causes of incidents can be determined from the information presented, 
an increasing focus on people as the causative factor in food safety failures is 
apparent, with the construct of FSC being identified in some papers (e.g. Wright, 
2016).   
 
Finally, returning to the classification or typology of incidents, a new classification of 
food safety scares (a food safety incident which impacts consumer demand) has been 
proposed by Whitworth, Druckman and Woodward (2016).  This combines both the 
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hazard (physical, biological or chemical contamination) with, where appropriate, the 
mechanism through which it arises (wilful deception, transparency and awareness 
issues), aiming to provide FBOs and enforcement authorities with better information 
to manage and prevent food scares.  However, even with this classification the root 
cause of FSMS/ FSMnS failure is not necessarily captured and this classification would 
not aid in the determination of whether people or process issues underpin FSMS 
failures.   
 
The relative lack of comprehensive analysis of food safety incidents and food scares 
therefore forms a gap that potentially inhibits FBOs and enforcement authorities from 
gaining the optimum learning of how to prevent future incidents.   To fully address this 
gap and identify if there is any systematic failure of specific elements of FSMS or 
FSMnS in reported cases of food safety incidents, secondary analysis of both published 
and in-company data would be required, which falls outside of the scope of this 
literature review.   
 
However, with this gap in the literature identified, two objectives for the current 
research study are proposed: to determine whether reported food safety incidents can 
be related to specific people or process elements of FSMS failure; and to determine 
the extent to which the barriers to the implementation and maintenance of FSMSs 
(particularly HACCP) found in the literature can be used to account for failures in 
FSMSs18.   
 
Before moving forward to address these objectives, a further consideration of the 
people side of the barriers to FSMS implementation and maintenance is required.  As 
noted above, a number of the papers reviewed in this section have touched on the 
topic of FSC, to encompass the organisational attributes of staff (and management) 
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour around food safety.  However, this terminology is 
less common in the work on barriers to and drivers of FSMS implementation.  The 
                                                          
18 Whilst the gap identified in the literature pertains to reported food safety incidents, it was not 
possible to recruit organisations to the research who had reported such incidents, and the research 
objectives were modified accordingly.  This is discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1. 
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concept of FSC is therefore explored further in section 3. 4 to understand if and how it 
complements the work on FSMS implementation, maintenance and failure. 
 
 
3.4 People and the Role of Food Safety Culture (FSC) 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
Previous sections have identified and discussed the range of factors identified as 
barriers to and drivers for the successful implementation of FSMS.  After an early focus 
on operational and knowledge based barriers, Gilling et al. (2001) transformed the 
field with the identification of underlying psychological barriers to successful FSMS 
implementation.  Subsequent work has confirmed the importance of these factors, 
such as confidence in the application of systems and perception of the benefits of 
FSMS (e.g. Lowe & J.Z. Taylor, 2013; J. Z. Taylor, 2008b).  Such barriers can be related 
not only to the beliefs and attitudes of individuals but also to those of the organisation 
as a whole, i.e. they can be seen as part of the organisation’s culture, specifically its 
FSC. 
 
Recognition of the importance of FSC and its subsequent study started after one of the 
major food safety incidents in the UK in 2005.  In this incident (the John Tudor & Son 
case) the provision of cooked meat products contaminated with E. coli O157 in South 
Wales led to 157 reported cases of food poisoning and the death of a five-year-old boy 
(Powell et al., 2011).  In the public enquiry on this case, the culture of the FBO 
responsible for providing the contaminated meat was highlighted as one of the key 
causes of the food poisoning outbreak (Pennington, 2009).   
 
Subsequently it has been proposed that a good or strong FSC “gives employees a sense 
of purpose in maintaining food safety standards” (MacAuslan, 2013), with programmes 
designed to address FSC being positioned as PRPs (Mortimore & Warren, 2014).   
However, to develop programmes to address FSC, it is important to first define FSC and 
understand its position vis-à-vis organisational culture.   
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This section therefore defines FSC and examines the relationship between FSC and the 
general field of organisational culture.  Models of FSC are critiqued, examining the 
assessment or measurement of FSC and considering if FSC can act as a construct to 
bring together the people related elements of the barriers to FSMS implementation.   
 
3.4.2 FSC vs. Organisational Culture 
 
FSC has been defined as “the aggregation of the prevailing, relatively constant, 
learned, shared attitudes, values and beliefs contributing to the hygiene behaviours 
used within a particular food handling environment” (Griffith, 2008, 2009 cited by 
Griffith, Livesey, & Clayton, 2010a).  Whilst this definition is specific to FSC, it shares 
many common elements with well-known definitions of organisational culture.  
 
Deal and Kennedy popularised the definition of organisational culture as “the way we 
do things around here” (Bower, 1966 cited by Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p 4). Although 
this is a simplistic definition of a complex phenomenon, it has merit due to the 
emphasis placed on actions which can be observed, rather than simply purported 
values and beliefs.  This perspective therefore fits with the definition of FSC given 
above, as this puts an emphasis on “… behaviours used within a particular food 
handling environment” (my emphasis, Griffith, 2008, 2009, cited by Griffith et al., 
2010a). 
 
According to Schein (2004, p 26) there are three levels to organisational culture:   
 artifacts - the visible symbols of culture such as structures and procedures;  
 espoused beliefs and values – the strategies, goals and philosophies of an 
organisation;  
 basic underlying assumptions – the unconscious, taken for granted beliefs, 
thoughts and perceptions which act as the sources of values and actions.   
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Going back to the definition of FSC (Griffith, 2008, 2009, cited by Griffith et al., 2010a), 
it is implied that FSC relates to the middle and bottom layers of Schein’s (2004, p 26) 
organisational culture model, rather than the top-level elements which could comprise 
items such as a written food safety policy. 
 
We can also compare the elements of an FSC to the overall elements of organisational 
culture described by Johnson (1988) as a “cultural web”.  Johnson (1988) argues that 
the organisational paradigm, which he defines as “the set of beliefs and assumptions, 
held relatively common through the organisation ...” is influenced by many aspects of 
the organisations work, including routine, power structures and rituals and myths.  
Aspects of organisational culture which make up elements of FSC can be mapped 
against the cultural web, as shown in Figure 3.9.   
 
In summary, FSC can be considered as a sub-set of the total organisational culture.  It 
might therefore be reasonable to assume that the strength of an organisation’s FSC 
depends not only on the elements contributing to the FSC, but on the relative visibility 
and emphasis put on these elements versus other aspects of the overall organisational 
culture.   
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Figure 3.9: How Elements Making up FSC Map against the Cultural Web (adapted 
from G. Johnson, 1988) 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Models of FSC 
 
FSC has been proposed as an “emerging risk factor” for food safety (Griffith et al., 
2010a), with the recommendation that the FSC of a business should be evaluated in 
the same way that other risk factors, such as raw materials, food handler behaviour, 
and microbiological hazards, are assessed (Griffith, 2010b).   Such evaluation may be 
useful not only for FBOs but could also form part of commercial food safety standard 
requirements and official inspections by enforcement officers.  However, to undertake 
these evaluations a deeper understanding of FSC is required, to which end a number of 
conceptual models of FSC have been developed.  Seven of these models are presented 
and critiqued below.   
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3.4.3.1 Factors Affecting Food Safety Performance (Griffith et al., 2010b) 
 
Griffith et al. (2010b) propose a model of factors affecting food safety performance.  
As shown in Figure 3.10, this model positions FSC as a determinant of five key factors 
which impact food safety performance: leadership, communication, commitment, 
environment and risk.  FSC is also seen as having a relationship to the organisation’s 
management systems, style and processes, which directly impact food safety 
performance. 
 
Griffith et al. (2010b) support this model with reference to the broad published 
literature on organisational culture and more specifically organisational safety culture.  
There is a large degree of cognitive consonance between this model and the work 
previously reviewed on barriers to FSMS in section 3.2, as the elements identified here 
as key factors affecting food safety performance have been noted previously as 
barriers to FSMS implementation, in particular commitment, of management and / or 
staff was seen as a requirement for effective FSMS implementation in five of the six 
models presented in Section 3.2.1  (Kafetzopoulos &  Gotzamani, 2014; Ball et al., 
2009; Arpanutud et al., 2009; Azanza and Zamora-Luna, 2005; Panisello & Quantick, 
2001) as well as the two review papers cited in Section 3.2.4 (Jevšnik et al, 2016; 
Fotopoulos et al., 2011). Communication was also noted as a key concern by Jevšnik et 
al, 2016, and of course is a critical first step in creating knowledge and awareness of 
FSMSs, which forms a critical barrier in the models Gilling et al., 2001 and Azanza & 
Zamora-Luna, 2005. 
 
Griffith et al. (2010b) recognise that a continuum of FSC, from negative to positive, can 
be identified.  They also acknowledge that a range of measures should be used to 
assess FSC, ranging from quantitative surveys of food safety climate, individual or 
group interviews and audits, including observation of working practices.  Throughout 
their paper they give more detail on each of the key factors identified which could be 
used to create measures or assessment criteria for FSC. 
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Figure 3.10: Factors Influencing Food Safety Performance (Griffith et al., 2010b) 
 
However, Griffith et al. (2010b) present no new empirical data within this paper to 
illustrate the use of the model for the assessment or categorisation of FSC or to 
demonstrate how such measurement could be used to change an organisation’s FSC.  
In conclusion therefore, this model links with the previously discussed work on barriers 
to the implementation of FSMS and provides a theoretical framework on which to 
build criteria for the assessment of FSC, but it lacks the detail required for FBOs or 
enforcement officers to utilise as a practical tool. 
 
3.4.3.2 The Food Safety Culture Excellence Model (J. Z. Taylor et al., 2015; J. Z. Taylor, 
2011) 
 
This model was originally developed by J. Z. Taylor (2011) as a theoretical framework, 
combining her previous work on behavioural barriers to FSMS implementation (J. Z. 
Taylor, 2008b) with an understanding of a number of major psychological theories 
including social norms, self-efficacy, planned behaviour and reinforcement (see Figure 
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3.11).  As well as illustrating how each of the psychological theories relates to food 
safety behaviour (e.g. the impact of social norms on the likelihood of a food handler to 
wash their hands), J.Z. Taylor (2011) referenced her previous work to substantiate the 
model framework. The original model (Figure 3.11) therefore clearly demonstrates 
how the people related elements of barriers to FSMS implementation can be 
encompassed by the construct of FSC.   
 
J.Z. Taylor has since further developed the model into the FSC excellence model (J. Z. 
Taylor et al., 2015), see Figure 3.12, creating an on-line survey tool which is made 
available via a commercial relationship between Taylor Shannon International and 
Campden BRI (Campden BRI, 2017).  Whilst the original model focussed on 
understanding the factors which make up FSC, the culture excellence model and tools 
are designed to assess an organisation’s current FSC, and gives numerical scores on a 1 
to 5 scale where 3 equates to “good” and 5 to “excellent”.  In contrast to other models 
e.g. that of NSF International Ltd. (2014), no attempt is made to create a descriptive 
typology of the different levels of FSC represented by the overall model scores.   
 
Given its commercial nature, full details of the survey tool and scoring method used to 
apply the model are not available in the academic literature. However, it is clear that 
scores are obtained for each of the four model categories (people, process, purpose 
and productivity) together with individual scores for the dimensions which underpin 
each category, with the aim of producing information which an FBO can use to target 
improvement efforts, i.e. there is an explicit expectation that organisations can 
improve their FSC.  It is interesting to note that whilst the model is set up to measure 
FSC, one of the categories assessed relates to process, i.e. there is an implication that 
controls and systems used for food safety management affect FSC.  
 
Overall the framework has evolved from one which endeavours to understand the 
factors which influence FSC, to one that can be used by consultants to assess FSC and 
through that enable organisations to effect change.  The proprietary nature of the tool 
used to apply the model limits the detail available to fully critique it.  Similarly, whilst 
Taylor et al. (2015) report a single case study applying the model and related tools, a 
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more comprehensive analysis of the use of the model is required to ascertain if its use 
meets the aim of assisting FBOs to effect cultural change within their organisations.   
 
 
Figure 3.11: A Theoretical Framework for Food Safety Culture (J. Z. Taylor, 2011) 
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Figure 3.12: The Food Safety Culture Excellence Model (J. Z. Taylor et al., 2015) 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3.3 The FSA/ Greenstreet Berman Ltd Model (Wright, Leach & Palmer, 2012a, 2012b)   
 
In 2012 the UK FSA commissioned a risk consultancy agency, Greenstreet Berman Ltd, 
to review the status and effectiveness of safety culture diagnostic tools and develop a 
tool for identifying aspects of good / poorer FSCs in FBOs, specifically aimed at SMEs 
(Wright, Leach & Palmer, 2012a).  As a result of this work, the FSA published a Food 
Safety Culture Diagnostic Toolkit for Inspectors (Wright, Leach & Palmer, 2012b). 
 
The model was developed after an extensive review of the literature on FSC and a 
review of nine existing tools on safety culture and climate, not specific to the food 
industry (Wright et al., 2012a).  No empirical data on the use of the model to assess 
FSC is presented by Wright et al. (2012a). However, a degree of validation of the model 
was achieved through the development process, as the initial model was reviewed by 
FBOs and EHOs in two workshops and modified according to their feedback.   
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Five of the tools identified in the report were based on a typology, or category 
approach, where different types of culture can be described and businesses 
categorised against them (Wright et al., 2012a).  Additionally, three of the tools 
reviewed were based on the theory of cultural maturity, which implies that businesses 
move through sequential stages of development as their maturity grows. The authors’ 
state that whilst there is research to indicate that different typologies of FSC can be 
identified, there is inadequate research to demonstrate that FBOs move through 
sequential levels of maturity, hence a maturity based model was rejected. 
 
The finalised FSA / Greenstreet Berman model identifies five typologies or categories 
of food business, as shown in Figure 3.13 
 
Figure 3.13: The FSA/ Greenstreet Berman Ltd Model: Model Categories or 
Typologies (Wright et al., 2012a, 2012b) 
 
 
Eight elements of FSC are also identified (see Figure 3.14) and in the final toolkit, a set 
of questions pertaining to these elements is given, enabling enforcement officers to 
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assess and categorise the FSC of FBOs.  These assessment elements of FSC (Figure 
3.14) link with the previously presented work on barriers to and drivers of FSMS 
implementation, e.g. knowledge (Gilling et al., 2001; Ball et al., 2009) and training in 
food safety (Jevšnik et al., 2006; Fotopoulos et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3.14: The FSA/ Greenstreet Berman Ltd Model: Assessment Elements of FSC 
(Wright et al., 2012a, 2012b) 
 
 
 
 
Advice and guidance for each element in each category is then given to aid the 
enforcement officer in working with FBOs to develop their FSC.  The tool kit also allows 
for two levels of analysis, depending on the time and resources available to the 
inspector, with analysis being based upon qualitative and quantitative data including 
documentation of, for example, the current FSMS and training logs, observation of 
working practice during the inspection and interviews / discussions with management 
and staff.  As such, the practical application of the tool complies with 
recommendations given by Griffith et al. (2010b) that the assessment of FSC should 
vary with the needs of the investigation.  The method also fits with the tri-component 
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reciprocal safety culture model (Cooper, 2000), which is based on assessment of 
subjective internal psychological factors, observable safety related behaviours and 
objective situational features, and which Cooper proposes as a framework to assess 
and benchmark safety culture in organisations. 
 
Some concerns with this model need to be highlighted.  As described above, the 
published model includes not only an assessment model and method, but standardised 
ways in which inspectors can use the assessment to guide the FBO on FSC 
development. This lies in contradiction with the authors’ statement that there is 
insufficient research to justify a maturity development model of FSC.  From a 
practitioners’ perspective, it is critical to understand if the approach offered in the FSA 
toolkit (Wright et al., 2012b) can enable an FBO to alter its FSC, and if this progression 
is, or should be, sequential in order to build steady improvements or if larger 
progressions can be made with certain cultural typologies missed out in the 
development process.  Whilst subsequent work by Wright and Leach (2013) has 
proposed the application of the model alongside a simple framework to identify FSC 
changes required and to assess progress, further empirical work is required to 
ascertain the success of this approach.   
 
Other concerns about the practical use of the toolkit (complexity, length, repetition, fit 
with existing food safety evaluation schemes) were identified by Nayak and Waterson 
(2017) who conducted semi-structured interviews with EHOs, academics and FBO 
managers.   
 
One particular concern about the model relates to the number and descriptions of the 
culture types, especially with category 1, which describes a culture where the 
organisation consciously ignores or breaks food safety rules and laws.   Whilst there is 
evidence of the existence of “calculative non-complier” FBOs (Powell et al., 2011) 
there is little evidence to date to quantify the number of businesses which could be 
determined as non-compliant due to this specific culture versus those businesses 
which are non-compliant due to ignorance. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
description of “calculative non-compliers” describes businesses who are perpetrating 
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food fraud (intentional non-compliance, for economic gain) in some fashion, and the 
inclusion of this category conflates food safety and food fraud concerns.   
 
In Nayak and Waterson’s (2017) study, participants recommended that only three 
categories of FSC be used: non-compliers, pro-active compliers and leaders, due to 
concerns of reliability and complexity of the full model.  Putting this aside, before the 
category of “calculative non-compliers” is utilised, further research is needed to 
determine if the “rule breaking” culture described in this typology can be seen as a 
state of (im)maturity and that organisations can develop better FSCs, or whether 
organisations possessing such cultural attitudes fit better with other change models.   
 
3.4.3.4 The NSF International Maturity Model (NSF International Ltd., 2014) 
 
NSF International Ltd, an organisation which works across the world as consultants, 
auditors and certifiers for the food industry, has developed a corporate food safety 
maturity model (NSF International Ltd., 2014).  It is proposed as part of a strategic tool 
to benchmark an organisation’s internal FSMS, enabling management to identify 
strengths and weaknesses in the current system and so plan appropriate actions for 
further growth and development of the organisation’s FSC (NSF International Ltd., 
2014). 
 
The NSF International tool kit also maps an organisation’s perception of its current 
status versus an independent audit of actual status.   NSF International Ltd. (2014) set 
out that this enables organisations to more accurately prioritise areas for 
improvement. 
 
The model is based upon a philosophy that organisational FSC progresses through 
different levels of sophistication or maturity, described in the model as “generations”, 
as shown in Figure 3.15 below.  The model also gives descriptions of each category or 
generation.   
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Figure 3.15: The Maturity Model Generations (NSF International Ltd., 2014) 
 
 
 
The tool is applied via a benchmarking exercise to assess perceived and audited food 
safety maturity status and is carried out using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, including reviewing policies and procedures, assessment of plants and 
facilities, observation of operations, sampling (of products and / or raw materials), 
structured interviews with staff from front line to senior management, and on-line 
psychological assessments.  The aim is to scrutinise the business on nine key 
dimensions or markers of food safety maturity, shown in Figure 3.16, across an FBOs 
operations.   
 
Although it is possible to see some links between these dimensions and the barriers / 
drivers of FSMS implementation previously identified in Section 3.2 (e.g. training and 
development), the dimensions are far more general than the assessment criteria set 
out in the FSA / Greenstreet Berman model (Wright et al., 2012a, 2012b).    
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Similarly, whilst Wright et al. (2012a, 2012b) set out specific questions to be used by 
enforcement officers utilising the FSA / Greenstreet Berman model, the NSF 
International Ltd (2014) model is more generic.  Specific questions for each assessment 
area are not set, rather areas of the business are identified for data collection, with the 
process requiring comprehensive auditing and staff interviews (NSF International Ltd., 
2014).  Despite this contrasting approach, this model also complies with the 
recommendations of Griffith et al. (2010b) and fits with the tri-component safety 
model (Cooper, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Assessment Elements for FSC in the Maturity Model (NSF International 
Ltd., 2014) 
 
 
 
Looking at the typologies described in the NSF International Ltd. model, there is 
considerable overlap with the FSA / Greenstreet Berman model (Wright et al., 2012a, 
2012b), key differences being in the lowest and highest categories.   
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For the highest category, NSF International Ltd. (2014) recognise a generation 5 
category of excellence in industry leadership, which appears to go beyond the level of 
leadership envisioned by Wright et al. (2012a, 2012b).  At generation 5, FSC is 
described as part of the “company DNA”, being second nature to everyone in the 
organisation at all levels.  In contrast, the leadership category described by Wright et 
al. (2012a, 2012b) fits more closely with the description of senior management 
commitment in the NSF model. 
 
At the lowest level, both models describe organisations where foods safety is seen as 
being outside of the companies’ priorities, is not budgeted for and where no or few 
policies and procedures exist.  The key difference is that the FSA / Greenstreet Berman 
model describes a culture where the organisation consciously ignores or breaks food 
safety rules and laws.  The NSF model does not imply such a criminal or immoral mind-
set, but implies a neutral culture due to an ignorant or uninformed management and / 
or workforce. 
 
The NSF International Ltd. (2014) model appears well suited to its intended use as a 
tool for use by consultants in assessing and developing culture in FBOs.  The main 
drawback to this model is the lack of a clear description of the theoretical background 
and development of the NSF International Ltd. model, which perhaps results from the 
proprietary nature of the tool and its use by the organisation in their consultancy work. 
It might also be reasonable to assume that a large database of evidence exists within 
NSF due to the large number of FBO audits which will have been conducted over many 
years, and that this evidence informs the development of the maturity model.   
 
However, the model is also more generic in nature than those already considered in 
this section of the thesis.  Whilst set out as a maturity model of FSC, it might be equally 
applicable to evaluate and describe an organisation’s health and safety culture or 
innovation culture, or any such subset of overall organisational culture.  Taking this 
into account, together with the limited theoretical underpinning, and lack of 
transparency of evidence of empirical support, from an academic perspective, it 
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appears necessary for the model to be subjected to rigorous testing and review before 
it can be determined as suitable as a theoretical framework for future research on FSC.   
 
3.4.3.5 The Behaviour-Based Food Safety Management System Continuous Improvement 
Model (Yiannis, 2009) 
 
Yiannis’s (2009) book on FSC presents a view that FSC is critical to making the 
behavioural changes required in the food industry in order to improve the delivery of 
safe food.  FSC is presented as being “owned” by the leaders of an organisation and, in 
a similar fashion to that proposed by Schein (2004, p23) with respect to general 
organisational culture, FSC is seen as an aspect of an organisation which can be 
changed and developed by the organisation’s leaders.   
 
Yiannis (2009) presents a behaviour-based continuous improvement model which he 
proposes as a systematic way to create or strengthen the FSC of an FBO.   This is shown 
in Figure 3.17. 
 
As a food safety practitioner, Yiannis does not present any specific empirical data to 
substantiate his model, rather presenting it as the result of his long career in the field.  
Despite the practitioner development of the model, its theoretical basis is presented, 
with Yiannis referencing a plethora of behaviour change theories and models, ranging 
from Skinner’s work on operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953), through to social 
cognitive theory (McAlister, Perry, & Parcel, 2008). 
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Figure 3.17: The Behaviour-Based Food Safety Management System Continuous 
Improvement Model (Yiannis, 2009) 
 
 
 
Whilst measurement is one of the elements of the model, no framework is presented 
to assess or categorise an organisation in terms of FSC.  Therefore, Yiannis’s (2009) 
model represents a tool which FBOs can use to change (and hopefully improve) their 
FSC, rather than a tool to assess or categorise the current cultural status.  It might 
therefore be better viewed as an adjunct to other models, as a way of enabling an FBO 
to progress up the maturity generations (NSF International Ltd., 2014) or through the 
FSA / Greenstreet Berman typologies (Wright et al., 2012a, 2012b).   
 
Likewise, as a change model, there is little specific overlap between this model and the 
specific barriers / drivers of FSMS implementation addressed in Section 3.2.  However, 
this model could, in theory be used to address not only change in FSC but also in 
process barriers to FSMS implementation (for example, addressing specific concerns 
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about completion of HACCP documentation, or the process of hazard analysis).  From 
an academic perspective, research is required to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
model as a tool to drive change before it can be used as a standalone framework for 
future research on FSC specifically or the improvement of FSMS implementation in 
general. 
 
3.4.3.6 Food Safety Culture Model (De Boeck, Jacxsens, Bollaerts & Vlerick., 2015) 
 
In contrast with the previous models reviewed, De Boeck et al. (2015) endeavour to 
develop a model which differentiates between overall FSC and food safety climate.  
They define FSC as “the interplay of the food safety climate as perceived by the 
employees and the managers of a company (so called ‘human route’) and the context 
in which a company is operating, the current implemented FSMS, consisting of control 
and assurance activities (so called ‘techno-managerial route19’) resulting in a certain 
(microbiological) output” (De Boeck et al., 2015).  This is illustrated in Figure 3.18 
overleaf.  
 
Whilst De Boeck et al. make the distinction between FSC and food safety climate, they 
acknowledge that confusion exists between the two terms.  Indeed, in developing their 
model they not only reference previous work on FSC by Yiannis (2009), J.Z. Taylor 
(2011) and others, but draw heavily on the FSC model of Griffith et al.  (2010b), who 
themselves recognised the confusion between FSC and climate.   
 
Again, there is coherence between the factors which De Boeck et al. (2015) set out as 
components of food safety climate and barriers / drivers to FSMS implementation.  Of 
particular note is the inclusion of “resources” as a component.  Although J.Z. Taylor 
(2011) also included resources as one of the underlying components of her framework 
for FSC, it was not specifically included in her later FSC Excellence model (J.Z. Taylor et 
al., 2015). However, a lack of resources – both financial and human – are recognised as 
                                                          
19 The techno-managerial route is based on previous work by the research group including Luning et al. 
(2011) and Luning et al. (2015) 
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barriers to FSMS implementation (Jevšnik et al., 2006; Fotopoulos et al., 2011) and can 
be seen as “process” related barriers.  Therefore, similarly to J.Z. Taylor et al. (2015) 
there is an implication that process elements impact FSC. 
 
Figure 3.18: Food Safety Culture Model (De Boeck et al., 2015) 
 
 
De Boeck et al. (2015) also present a number of questions for each component of the 
food safety climate element of their model, which together comprise a tool to assess 
food safety climate through the means of a survey.  This tool was first assessed by a 
number of experts from regulatory agencies, certification bodies and FBOs, before 
being utilised in a pilot study to assess food safety climate in eight affiliates of a large 
meat processing company, where the results of staff and management were 
elaborated and compared.  A benefit of the tool appears to be its ease of use (taking 
only five minutes to complete) and the ability to compare management and staff 
findings pictorially, although the authors note that further research and refinement of 
the tool is required.  
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One puzzling point about this model is the restriction of the proposed impact of FSC / 
climate to that of a microbiological output.  The control of microbiological 
contamination is certainly key to food safety, but is by no means the only food safety 
hazard which results in food incidents and recalls, or in foodborne illness (as discussed 
in Section 3.3) and that could be expected to be impacted by FSC or climate.  This 
restriction perhaps mirrors the research groups’ previous areas of specific interest (e.g. 
Jacxsens et al., 2015), although more recent developments of the model have 
expanded the outputs to a more general target of “food safety; food quality and 
hygiene” (De Boeck, Mortier, Jacxsens, Dequidt, & Vlerick, 2017). 
 
This recent publication (De Boeck et al., 2017) also expanded the model, by splitting 
the “human route” into an organisational and a personal level, with food safety 
climate impacting individual behaviours (compliance and participation), which then 
lead to the output of the system.   Job burnout and stress were postulated as 
moderators of the system, as were knowledge and motivation.  This revised model was 
tested in two Belgian vegetable processing companies, with the authors concluding 
that a better FSC / food safety climate was indeed positively associated with food 
safety behaviour, with knowledge and motivation acting as partial mediators of the 
effect.  However, neither job burnout nor stress appeared to have a mediating effect 
(De Boeck et al., 2017).   
 
Overall, the studies demonstrate that the model and survey tool can be utilised to 
understand and assess FSC / climate and confirm the importance of human factors in 
the context of food safety. 
 
3.4.2.7 Food Safety Culture Dimensional Framework (Jespersen, Griffiths & Wallace., 
2017) 
 
Having previously developed a model of food safety capability areas and maturity 
(Jespersen, Griffiths, Maclaurin, Chapman, & Wallace, 2016),  Jespersen et al. (2017) 
now present a dimensional framework, based upon their own work,  other models of 
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FSC (De Boeck et al., 2015; NSF International Ltd., 2014; J. Z. Taylor et al., 2015; Wright 
et al., 2012a, 2012b) and the work of Ball et al. (Ball et al., 2009; Wilcock, Ball, & 
Fajumo, 2011) on FSMS implementation, together with one model of quality culture 
and one of safety culture.  
 
Jespersen et al. (2017) applied a systematic framework to evaluate the models, 
carrying out a content analysis of each of the other models.  They identified five 
affinity groupings of FSC dimensions which form their framework, as shown in Figure 
3.19.  
 
Given that the dimensional framework has been developed from other models of FSC 
and models of barriers to / drivers of FSMS implementation, there is obvious synergy 
between the components which make up each dimension and the barrier to / drivers 
of FSMS discussed in Section 3.2. For example, the dimension of people systems 
includes components such as training and communication.   
 
 
Figure 3.19: Food Safety Culture – Dimensional Framework (Jespersen et al., 2017) 
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Whilst no details are given within this paper about the measurement of FSC, previous 
work by the group has utilised a survey tool to assess FSC maturity (Jespersen et al., 
2016).  Subsequently Jespersen and Wallace (2017) have utilised the dimensional 
framework to assess the FSC of five multi-national food companies, utilising a self-
assessment questionnaire sent to employees; analysis of food safety documentation 
(audit reports, food safety meeting minutes, inspection reports, GMP records) and 
semi-structured interviews with senior production plant and food safety staff.  The 
researchers concluded that using the three different methods to triangulate the results 
was critical to ensure that the FSC maturity of each plant was correctly classified, as 
relying on a single method gave different results (Jespersen & Wallace, 2017).   
 
The strength of this model is that it not only synthesizes work in the field of FSC, but 
that it has already been demonstrated as an effective tool for use in the research of 
FSC.   However, further details of the assessment methods, and work demonstrating 
the successful application of the model in a range of FBOs, and by other researchers, 
practitioners and enforcement officers, is required before the model can be adopted 
as a standard across the industry.   
 
3.4.5 Summary 
 
Seven models of FSC have been reviewed in this section. As work has progressed in the 
area of FSC, models have developed, from frameworks setting out an understanding of 
FSC (e.g. Griffith et al., 2010b) and practice models to improve FSC within businesses 
(e.g. Yiannis, 2009), to more complex models which attempt to combine a descriptive 
framework of FSC with categorisation or measurement of FSC using a variety of 
methods.   
 
The theoretical underpinning of the models varies, with reference to theories of 
general organizational culture, organizational safety culture and theories of behaviour 
change.   In addition, the relationship between barriers to the implementation of FSMS 
reviewed in section 3.2 can also be clearly seen in many of the models, in the 
description of elements which make up FSC and / or in the descriptions of different FSC 
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typologies.  Primarily the FSC models show coherence with barriers / drivers previously 
categorised as “people” related elements of FSMS implementation, such as training, 
commitment and communication. However, the models of J.Z. Taylor et al (2015) and 
De Boeck et al. (2015) imply that process related factors (resources, systems) directly 
impact FSC.   
Of all the models reviewed, those available as commercial packages for FSC 
assessment (NSF International Ltd., 2014; J. Taylor et al., 2015) have been most 
extensively used.  However, little of this data has been made available for peer review 
and publication and so the robustness and reliability of these models cannot be fully 
ascertained.  There is growing empirical data to support the models of De Boeck et al. 
(2015) and Jespersen et al. (2017), demonstrating that not only has FSC become an 
increasingly important topic for food safety professionals but a key area for 
researchers in food safety.  The model of Jespersen et al. (2017) shows particular 
promise as a synthesis of key work in FSC. 
 
One important area to consider is that of the assessment or measurement of FSC.  
Whilst J. Z. Taylor et al. (2015) and De Boeck et al. (2015) have focussed on developing 
quantitative survey tools which can be quickly and easily used by organisations, the 
other models appear to require a combination of measurement methods, combining 
audit methods (examination of documents, observation etc.) with qualitative 
interviews and staff questionnaires.  Indeed, Jespersen & Wallace (2017) recommend 
this approach as having greater reliability than using a single method.   
 
However, a challenge faces industry, enforcement officials and researchers in utilising 
a “mixed methods” approach to assessing FSC.  Many of these methods (interviews, 
questionnaires, reviews of policies and procedures) take considerable time and effort 
to apply.  They do not easily form part of an on-going, day in, day out, performance 
monitoring system within an FBO, being more suited for use on an intermittent basis.  
Even short, quantitative surveys (such as utilised by J. Z. Taylor et al., 2015) can only be 
used periodically if their integrity is to be maintained. Other measures which can be 
used more frequently or even daily, such as a review of customer complaints or 
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observation of staff working practices, can be related to some assessment elements, 
but would require organisations to develop appropriate structures to capture, report 
and review such data.  Whether such measures are being considered or used by FBOs 
as a measure or proxy measure of FSC is a gap in the literature.  Likewise, while FSC 
was introduced as a factor in some of the food safety incidents discussed in Section 3.3 
(e.g. Wright (2016); see Appendix A for details), there is a relative paucity of 
empirically based studies on FSMS failures and FSC.  This therefore leads to the third 
research objective, to evaluate the relationship of FSC to failures in FSMSs.  
 
In summary, FSC can be considered a useful construct to bring together the people 
related barriers to the implementation of successful FSMSs, but challenges remain in 
the assessment of FSC particularly as part of standard practice by FBOs and 
enforcement officials.  Returning to the question of whether people or process are the 
cause for failure of FSMS implementation (R. T. Mitchell, 1998), the balance of opinion 
from this work appears to be that a strong FSC is seen as a pre-requisite for ensuring 
that the process (the FSMS) can be applied correctly within an organisation.   
 
Before concluding this literature review, the issue of finance and the cost of resourcing 
food safety should be considered.  Cost has been recognised as a common barrier to 
FSMS implementation (e.g. Ehiri et al, 1995; Gilling et al., 2001).  However, it has been 
suggested by some authors that implementing FSMSs will not only reduce costs to 
society through reduction of foodborne illness, (Kane, 2011), but may also improve 
business profitability (e.g. Jin et al., 2008).  The following section briefly looks at the 
concept of Quality Costing and considers its use to understand the costs and benefits 
of HACCP and related systems in the food industry. 
 
 
3.5 Quality Costing in the Food Industry 
 
Quality costing is seen as one of the tools or techniques which organisations should 
employ in their pursuit of an organisation wide total quality management programme 
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(Dale & Plunkett, 1999, p 3).   Feigenbaum (1956) was one of the pioneers of this work, 
identifying the high cost of quality.  Whilst Feigenbaum (1956) quotes anecdotal 
reports of quality-cost expenditures of 7 to 10% of the cost of sales, other authors 
suggest that properly measured costs can be much higher.  Giakatis, Enkawa and 
Washitani (2001) report costs between 5 and 30%, whilst Dale, Reid & Bamford (2016) 
suggest that expenditure on quality can range from 5 to 25% of annual sales turnover. 
 
In order to ascertain such figures, it is critical to define what is meant by the “cost of 
quality”.  In his publication on quality management for the food industry, Early (1995, 
p 33) summarised the cost of quality as “the cost of getting things right plus the cost of 
getting things wrong” or, put another way, the sum of the cost of conformance (to 
required standards) plus the cost of non-conformance.  This fits with Feigenbaum’s 
(1956) suggestion that costs can be attributed into three areas: failure (F) costs, 
appraisal (A) costs and prevention (P) costs, the so called PAF model.   This general 
classification was elaborated by the British Standards Institute in BS 6143 Part 2 (1990) 
splitting failure costs into internal and external failures costs.   Definitions of these 
categories are shown in Table 3.2.  
 
The four-category version of PAF continues to be the most widely accepted model for 
quality costing (Chatzipetrou & Moschidis, 2017).  However, there are criticisms of the 
PAF model, for example, Gryna (1999) suggests that this view is too limited, and that 
the cost of lost sales due to poor quality (generally a hidden cost to the business) and 
the cost of inefficient processes should also be included.  Yang (2008) also proposes an 
extension to the traditional four-category PAF model, splitting hidden costs into extra 
resultant costs (items caused by failures or errors which can be trace and counted, 
such as increased engineering time or premium freight costs) and estimated hidden 
costs (cost items which are difficult to analyse and quantify such as loss of sales which 
can be estimated on the basis of lost market share, for example).   
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There is also debate in the literature as to whether costs should be termed “quality 
costs” / “cost of quality” or alternatively the “cost of poor quality” (Yang, 2008).  
Whilst Yang (2008) suggests that the terms are essentially synonymous, this potentially 
contradicts one of Feigenbaum’s (1956) original assertions, that quality can be 
improved – and the total cost of quality reduced – by increasing spending on 
preventative activities, i.e. that some costs are associated with meeting the necessary 
quality standards, rather than being a cost of poor quality.  Feigenbaum (1956) further 
explains that allocating expenditure to preventative actions should reduce defects and 
hence failure costs, and, with more effective inspection and audit practices, also 
reduce appraisal costs.   
 
As previously discussed, HACCP-based FSMSs are preventative systems, aiming to 
control food production to ensure that safe food is produced, rather than relying on 
the detection of “unsafe” foods.  It might therefore be expected that in implementing 
HACCP-like systems, FBOS will see an increase in the “prevention” costs and a 
concomitant decrease in “failure” costs.   
 
The use of the PAF model to measure the cost of quality in the food industry has been 
challenged.  Dale and Wan (2002) evaluated four different quality cost systems in a 
food flavourings manufacturer and found that the lack of quality cost data recorded in 
the accounting team and the relative complexity of the process were barriers to the 
effective use of PAF by the organisation.  However, most research on the cost of 
quality with FBOs continues to be based around the PAF framework.  
 
Indeed, there has been a focus on using the PAF model to study and explain the costs 
of FSMSs (GMP and HACCP) either exclusively (Romano, Cavicchi, Rocchi & Stefani, 
2004; Zugarramurdi, Parin, Gadaleta and Lupin, 2007; Lupin, Parin & Zugarramurdi, 
2010; Waisarayutt and Wongwiwat, 2015) or alongside standards QMSs such as 
ISO9001 (Chayzipetrou & Moschidis, 2017; Moschidis, Chatzipetrou & Tsiotras, 2018).  
In contrast Omurgonulsen (2009) studied quality costs in the Turkish food industry, but 
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did not specify what types of QMS or FSMS were employed by the participating FBOs. 
 
The work of Lupin et al. (2010) is of particular interest.  They are the only researchers 
to explicitly discuss and justify the study of the economic benefits of HACCP 
implementation through quality costing, identifying and categorising the costs of 
HACCP implementation and maintenance (and the costs of failures of HACCP) against 
the PAF model, as shown in Table 3.2, overleaf.  
 
Moreover, Lupin et al. (2010) demonstrate that over a three-year period, the 
application of HACCP reduced the total cost of quality in three case study FBOs.  As 
expected, with the implementation of HACCP, failure costs fell, while prevention costs 
rose.  A somewhat unexpected finding was that appraisal costs stayed relatively 
constant, when it might be expected that appraisal costs would fall with a reduction in 
final product testing.  Indeed, Feigenbaum (1957) suggests that appraisal costs should 
fall as product quality improves through spend on prevention of defects.  However, 
Lupin et al. (2010) found that the fall in costs associated with final product testing was 
counter-balanced by an increase in monitoring costs at CCPs, together with the costs 
of record keeping etc. 
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Table 3.2 The PAF Model Categories and Examples Relating to HACCP (British Standards 
Institute, 1990; Lupin et al., 2010) 
Prevention costs The cost of actions taken to investigate, prevent or reduce the risk 
of non-conformity or defect.    
e.g. costs of HACCP plan development; training and 
communication on HACCP; design and development of 
measurements for CCPs; costs to implement and validate the 
HACCP plan; calibration and maintenance of equipment to test and 
measure compliance at CCPs; initial assessment, subsequent audit 
and surveillance of suppliers to ensure they meet required safety 
levels; cost of formal HACCP training; HACCP system auditing; 
analysis and reporting of safety data; safety improvement 
programmes.   
Appraisal costs The cost of evaluating the achievement of quality requirements 
including, including the costs of verification and control. 
e.g. pre-production verification of HACCP plan; inspection and 
testing of raw materials; initial and ongoing monitoring of CCPs 
and hygiene plans; materials consumed during analysis and testing; 
any intermediate or final product analysis; mandatory inspections 
by authorities; storage and filing of HACCP plans, test results etc. 
Internal failure costs  Internal costs due to non-conformities or defects. 
e.g. Scrap (intermediate materials or final products that cannot be 
reworked for safety reasons), including labour and overhead costs; 
replacement of defective materials; rework and repair when 
possible; corrective actions following departure from critical limits 
at CCPs; testing, monitoring and verification of re-worked 
materials; downtime: cost of personnel and idle facilities due to 
product failures.   
External failure costs  Costs arising after delivery to a customer, due to non-conformities 
or defects.  
 e.g. complaints – cost of research and compensation; warranty 
claims related to safety issues’ products rejected and returned; 
cost of concessions to retain customers (e.g. discounts following 
non-compliance situation); recall and withdrawal costs; product 
liability (cost of claims, plus cost of insurance premiums etc.)  
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Rather than looking at the impact of a FSMS / QMS on the cost of quality, the aim of 
Chatzipetrou and Moschidis (2017) was to understand if and how quality costing is 
used in the food industry in Greece and whether it helps to drive quality improvement 
and reduce production costs.  Using a questionnaire approach (n=250) they found that 
quality costing plays a limited role in the industry.  Their work supports the findings of 
Lupin et al. (2010) that FBOs spend more on prevention and appraisal costs than on 
failure costs.  However, several limitations to the study were highlighted.  Not only was 
the data self-reported but accounting systems used by FBOs did not record data in the 
specific categories utilised in the PAF method, and some costs could not be allocated 
using this model.  This echoes the earlier work of Dale and Wan (2002) in that cost 
allocation against the PAF categories can be problematic. 
 
In Turkey, Omurgonulsen (2009) studied the cost of quality using data from large food 
manufacturers (n=7) over the time period 2000 – 2005, and demonstrated the 
expected trade-off between conformance and non-conformance costs.  However, 
whilst external non-conformance costs were shown to be reduced with higher 
conformance costs (prevention and appraisal), no relationship was seen with internal 
failure costs.  Omurgonulsen (2009) suggests that with quality-based learning, non-
conformance costs should decline over time, without a corresponding increase in 
spend on conformance, which might explain this finding.  However, looking at the data 
on costs provided in the research paper, internal failure costs rose over the course of 
the study in five of the seven companies, with two companies seeing massive increases 
(over 8,000%).  Without further information it is impossible to understand the cause of 
such increases, but they may have skewed the results of the study.  There is also no 
indication in this work as to the QMSs / FSMSs employed by the participating 
companies.  Although HACCP-based systems have been required under Turkish law 
since 2000 (Karaman, 2012), a number of studies have demonstrated poor uptake of 
HACCP (Bas et al., 2007; Karaman, 2012).   It can therefore be postulated that at the 
time of the study the FBOS were not using HACCP-based preventative approaches and 
might therefore have been reliant on end product testing, with the concomitant 
expected higher cost of internal failures.  
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In summary, quality costing approaches appear to have some relevance in quantifying 
the potential financial benefits of implementing preventative based QMSs and FSMSs, 
and support the financial drivers for FSMS implementation identified earlier (Jin et al., 
2008; Kane, 2011).  However, work to date in the food industry supports more general 
findings (Williams, van der Wiele and Dale, 1999) of the challenges faced in attempting 
to use a traditional four category PAF costing method, particularly in terms of the 
availability of the required financial data.  Given the preponderance of SMEs in the 
food industry, alternative costing approaches, as presented by Dale and Wan (2002) 
may be more practical to implement.   
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The aim of this literature review was to determine whether the extant literature could 
answer the question of whether failure to implement or maintain FSMSs was primarily 
due a failure with the systems or with the people implementing them, and from this to 
develop the central research question and objectives of the study.   
 
To address this question, a number of models setting out barriers to, and drivers of, 
FSMSs have been presented and critiqued, then further challenged using published 
empirical research data and review papers.  The barriers most commonly identified in 
the models examined concern people attributes: the knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours demonstrated by staff and management towards FSMSs.  However, 
process related barriers, particularly those relating to the complexity of systems and 
the time and resources (human and financial) to implement and maintain systems are 
also common across the models reviewed.  Two of the models (Arpanutud et al, 2009; 
Kafetzopoulos& Gotzamani, 2014) also identify drivers or motivational factors for the 
implementation of FSMSs, such as a gain in social legitimacy, improved product quality 
and financial benefits.  The key differences between the models lies in the links 
between and prioritisation of identified barriers.  Staff and management commitment 
to food safety (and the implementation of systems to manage it), as identified by 
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Panisello and Quantick (2001), has been postulated as a fundamental requirement for 
successful FSMS implementation.   
 
There are numerous studies examining barriers to / benefits of FSMS implementation 
in different countries and areas of the food industry, e.g. Jin et al. (2008) studied 
HACCP adoption in China whereas Dzwolak (2014) address HACCP implementation is 
small businesses in Poland.  However, only a limited number of studies have directly 
considered work to address the barriers identified in the specific models of barriers to 
FSMS implementation. Of these studies, the work of the Salford research group (E.A. 
Taylor, 2008a, J.Z. Taylor, 20081a, 2008b etc.) is of particular interest as it concerns the 
application of the Gilling et al. (2001) HACCP awareness to adherence model to 
develop amended HACCP systems for application in the catering industry, i.e. work has 
focussed on modifying the FSMS “process” in order to reduce the barriers to FSMS 
implementation.  Whilst J.Z. Taylor (2008a, 2008b) has claimed success in developing 
and implementing a modified HACCP-like process – and indeed this has been adopted 
by the FSA as the resource tool “Safer Food, Better Business” for SME food service 
outlets – limitations of the evidence base have been identified, primarily the limited 
nature of follow up with businesses implementing the modified system.  It has also 
been noted that work by Fielding et al. (2011) to design and implement a similar 
system in a manufacturing setting was less successful and it is clear that the people 
and process factors are highly inter-related and that both sets of factors need to be 
addressed for successful FSMS implementation. 
 
The concept of FSC was identified as possibly representing the people related factors 
impacting FSMS implementation and to be under-represented in this field of research 
to date, hence literature on FSC was also reviewed.  Whilst a number of models of FSC 
are now available, there is a paucity of published, peer-reviewed empirical data on the 
application of these models demonstrating success in using the models to measure 
and / or improve FSC, the work of De Boeck et al. (2017) and Jespersen and Wallace 
(2017) being the exceptions.  Thus whilst the construct of FSC is now well established, 
more research is required to further develop the area.  In terms of FSMS 
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implementation however, the conclusion can be drawn that FSC acts as a pre-requisite 
for ensuring the application of FSMS processes in an organisation. 
 
Published reports of investigations into the causes of food incidents were also 
examined, in order to understand whether known system failures have been related to 
the FSMS process or the people utilising the systems.  Data published by enforcement 
authorities in the US, EU and UK has been examined, together with reviews of the area 
published in the academic literature.  In general, data published by enforcement 
authorities is targeted at establishing the food vehicle and / or hazard (e.g. specific 
microbiological contaminant) responsible for causing, or at risk of causing, foodborne 
illness and in aiding the effective withdrawal or recall of affected products from the 
market.  Little data is available to ascertain the underlying causes of FSMS failures 
which have resulted in foodborne illness and / or product recalls.  Within the academic 
literature there is a wide variation in study design and methodology, and it is not 
possible to draw any firm conclusion from this literature on detailed relationships 
between FSMS failure and food incidents. A detailed, comprehensive analysis of food 
incidents would require access to both company and enforcement official data and 
remains a gap in the literature. 
 
This literature search has also identified a lack of research on FSMSs from the 
perspective of management control.  However, given the focus of accounting and cost 
control as a form of management control, a brief review of the field of quality costing 
in the food industry was also undertaken.  The majority of work uses the PAF model of 
quality costing (Feigenbaum, 1956) with Lupin et al. (2010) specifically studying the 
economic benefits of HACCP implementation through the PAF model of quality costing.   
 
Returning to the question of whether people or process drive the success or failure of 
any FSMS, the literature reviewed fails to give a clear cut answer.  Whilst people 
related elements are commonly identified, and a strong FSC can be considered a pre-
requisite for FSMS implementation, most work on improving FSMS implementation 
has focussed on process change.  It might therefore be concluded that to date, the 
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argument is fairly evenly balanced as to whether the key to the success or failure of 
any FSMS lies with the people or the system itself.   
 
Against the background established in the previous chapter of food safety governance 
and management control, a number of gaps in the literature have been identified, 
from which three objectives are identified for this research study20:  
1. To determine whether food incidents can be related to specific people or 
process elements of FSMS failure. 
 
2. To determine the extent to which the barriers to the implementation and 
maintenance of FSMSs (particularly HACCP) found in the literature can be 
used to explain failures in FSMSs.   
 
3. To evaluate the relationship of FSC to failures in FSMSs.  
 
Finally, the literature search has identified that whilst FSMSs can be considered as a 
form of management control system, there is a lack of research in the field using this 
outlook.  This leads to the fourth and final objective21:  
4. To investigate food safety management from the perspective of management 
control. 
Taken together, these objectives will enable answers to be developed to address the 
overall research question for the study:  
 
 “Why do food safety systems fail and how does this relate to the governance 
and management control of food safety in food manufacturers?” 
                                                          
20 Although these research objectives and central research question are pertinent to all FBOs, the 
majority of reported food safety incidents refer to processed foods, hence a focus on food 
manufacturers is relevant to this research study.  
21 Although Quality Costing has been identified as a potential construct through which to explore food 
safety systems, there is no intention to conduct a costing exercise as part of the current research and no 
specific objective relating to quality costing is developed.  
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Having established the research question and objectives the following chapter will 
consider the philosophical underpinning and methodology of the study.    
Pragmatic Constructivism (PC), a management control paradigm, is identified as fitting 
with the ontological and epistemological requirements of the study and its key 
concepts are presented and critiqued with reference to the management control 
literature.  A multiple case study design, using food incidents22 as embedded cases, is 
developed and the selection of two large food manufacturers, with well-developed 
FSMSs and QMSs and good food safety track records is explained.  This enables the 
interplay between the generally effective, successful organisation and the failures of 
the food incidents to be examined and the data collection and analysis methods are 
presented in detail.    
 
  
                                                          
22 The original intent for the research was to recruit organisations which had experienced food incidents 
requiring official notification and withdrawal / recall of products.  Due to challenges in recruitment, the 
design was changed to study two organisations which had experienced non-reportable food incidents.  
This is explained further in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1. 
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4.0 Philosophical Underpinning and Research Methodology 
 
Chapters 1 to 3 set out the background to the thesis, establishing that whilst FSMS can 
be considered as a specialist form of MCS, there is a lack of literature on food safety 
management and failures in FSMSs from this perspective.  This chapter sets out the 
research methodology which incorporates the use of a management control paradigm 
– Pragmatic Constructivism (PC) - to inform both data collection and data analysis.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows.  First, the ontological, epistemological and 
axiological frameworks underpinning the mainstream food safety literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3 are considered, which helps inform the development of the pragmatic, 
constructivist philosophical stance used in this research.   
 
Next, PC is identified and critiqued as a specific philosophical framework within the 
field of management control.  A theoretical “roadmap” for the research is developed 
by combining PC with the concepts of people and process barriers to FSMS 
implementation, as presented in Chapter 3.   
 
This leads to the third section of this chapter, which sets out the research design – a 
multiple case study with embedded critical cases of non-reportable food incidents23 
and presents the ethical considerations of the research. This is followed by a detailed 
description of the methods used for data collection and analysis, together with a 
discussion of how the quality of the research has been assured.  A short conclusion 
completes the chapter.   
 
                                                          
23 The initial research design was developed with reported food incidents – i.e. failures of food safety – 
as the embedded critical cases. However, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, it proved impossible to recruit 
organisations to the study who had experienced such incidents.  The study design was therefore 
modified such that non-reportable food incidents (internally managed food safety or quality issues) 
acted as the critical, embedded case studies.   
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4.1 Ontological, Epistemological and Axiological Frameworks within the 
Mainstream Research Field 
 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012, p 17) state three reasons for researchers to 
understand the philosophical issues underpinning management research: to clarify 
research design; to ensure that the chosen research design will “work” and to identify 
and create new research designs.  The key areas of research philosophy which need to 
be considered are described in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1: Key Areas of Research Philosophy (adapted from Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012, p 18) 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 3, a number of models of barriers to and drivers of the implementation of 
FSMSs and of FSC were identified.  Whilst not explicitly declared by the authors, the 
research philosophy underpinning each model can be deduced through examination of 
the research methods and data analysis techniques used.  Table 4.1 shows the range of 
ontological, epistemological and axiological perspectives used in these studies.  The 
theoretical and quantitative based studies on FSMS models sit at the realist, positivist 
end of the spectrum.  In contrast, qualitative studies, considering psychological 
barriers to FSMS implementation, appear to be framed against a relativist, 
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constructionist/ constructivist paradigm24.  The models on FSC show a similar range, 
with those looking at categorisation or typologies of culture appearing positivist and 
realist, whilst the more theoretically based tend to be relativist and constructivist in 
nature.   
 
Axiologically, some researchers, such as Azanza and Zamora-Luna (2005), make clear 
attempts to position themselves so that their values do not impact their research.  
However, all the researchers show an inherent bias towards the subject in that FSMSs, 
particularly HACCP based systems, are seen as appropriate for assuring food safety, 
and a highly developed, or strong FSC is seen as desirable for all FBOs to attain. 
 
Some FSC models have been developed from the broader field of organisational health 
and safety culture.  Guldenmund (2010) reviewed work in this field, creating three 
categories of research on safety culture: 
 The academic approach, giving “thick descriptions”, predominately based on 
qualitative insight into the nature of an organisation’s safety culture and 
historical in outlook. 
 The analytical approach, based on survey research, which is quantitative in 
nature and considers the present nature of the safety culture in an 
organisation. 
 The pragmatic approach, which rather than being based on empirical research 
is based on experience and expert judgement, and aims to improve an 
organisation’s safety culture, i.e. it describes a desirable future state. 
This categorisation gives another way to understand the dominant research 
philosophies in the field of FSC and FSMSs, particularly as the time horizon of research 
is another factor to be considered in determining appropriate research methodology 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012, p 128).  Table 4.1 therefore also includes an 
analysis of models against Goldenmund’s (2010) categorisation. 
                                                          
24 Constructionism / constructivism are used interchangeably across the literature.  For the remainder of 
this thesis constructivism will be used as the preferred term. 
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The analysis shows that research on models of barriers to and drivers of FSMSs 
encompasses the spectrum of academic, analytical and pragmatic research traditions.  
A similar split is seen with the models on FSC, but inherent in all of these models is, to 
a greater or lesser degree, the pragmatic approach of a drive towards a future 
desirable state of a strong FSC. 
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Table 4.1: A Classification of FSMS / FSC Models by Philosophical Approach  
FSMS Models Summary Philosophical Approach 
Model to prioritise 
the HACCP plan 
(Panisello & 
Quantick, 2001). 
This paper presents a theoretical 
model of barriers to the 
implementation of FSMS, derived 
from earlier published empirical work.  
 
 
The authors present the model as the “one true way” to prioritise HACCP 
pillars, which was determined by study of previous work.  They also state 
that the pillars (commitment, education and training etc.) can be difficult to 
measure.  They therefore appear to be taking an ontological position of 
“internal realism” (truth exists but is obscure; facts are concrete but cannot 
be accessed directly) and an epistemological stance of positivism, i.e. the 
social world exists externally and can be assessed objectively (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2012, p 22) The prioritisation of HACCP pillars within the model implies 
an axiology where the values of the researchers (a belief that HACCP is an 
appropriate system) have impacted upon the development of the model, 
which may be at odds with the positivist epistemological stance.  
Guldenmund: pragmatic approach. 
HACCP awareness 
to adherence model 
(Gilling, et al., 2001). 
This paper builds upon models of 
adherence to medical guidelines, 
utilising a predominately qualitative 
approach to analyse the results of 200 
telephone and 5 in-depth face-to-face 
The predominately psychological approach used to develop the model 
implies an ontology of relativism (i.e. there are many “truths” and facts 
depend on the viewpoint of the observer) together with an epistemological 
approach of constructivism (i.e. reality is constructed and given meaning by 
people) (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p 23).  When considered with later work 
107 
 
interviews.   
 
 
by the same group (e.g.  J. Z. Taylor, 2008b), the axiology of the research can 
be identified as “value laden”, i.e. the researcher becomes part of the 
research.    Indeed, in later studies emphasis is placed on minimising the 
impact of the researcher on the results by choosing a young, female, 
psychology graduate to conduct in-depth qualitative interviews.  
Guldenmund: academic approach. 
Cognitive and 
behaviour model to 
HACCP principle 
adherence (Azanza 
& Zamora-Luna, 
2005). 
This paper sets out a hypothetical 
model of barriers to HACCP adherence 
based on concepts from models of 
physician adherence to medical 
guidelines and the work of Gilling et. 
al. (2001).  The model was tested 
through quantitative analysis of a 
survey of HACCP team members in 4 
food processors in the Philippines. 
The authors present the model as a hypothesis to be tested using 
predominately quantitative methods, i.e. they present their research within 
an ontological framework of realism / internal realism and an 
epistemological approach of positivism.  From an axiological perspective, the 
methods used endeavour to separate the researcher from the subject i.e. 
they purport a value-free stance.  
Guldenmund: analytical approach. 
 
A model of food 
safety management 
system adoption (a 
tested model) 
This paper sets out a number of 
hypotheses of factors that affect the 
adoption of FSMS, which are 
investigated using a survey 
The natural sciences approach (hypothesis proposal; quantitative survey 
methods; randomised sampling; use of descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses), is strongly indicative of an ontology of 
realism, a positivistic epistemology and an axiology of value-free research.  
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(Arpanutud et al., 
2009). 
questionnaire, with a stratified 
random sample of Thai food 
manufacturing firms. 
Guldenmund: analytical approach. 
Factors influencing 
the implementation 
of food safety 
systems (Ball et al., 
2009) 
The researchers utilised qualitative 
methods: 13 semi-structured 
interviews with workers at 5 meat 
processing plants (purposive 
sampling) plus 2 focus groups with 
industry and government 
representatives, with analysis using 
NVivo 7 qualitative data analysis 
software. 
Ball et. al. (2009) state that they “set out to gain insight into different views 
about factors that influence the adoption or implementation of FSMS”, i.e. 
they adopt an ontological perspective of relativism.  They also demonstrate a 
constructivist epistemological approach through their use of a combination 
of deductive and inductive data analysis.   The authors accept that there may 
be some bias in data collection, due to both the subject selection and 
previous relationships between the researchers and focus group participants, 
i.e. they accept that axiologically, the research cannot be value free.  
Guldenmund: academic approach. 
Critical factors for 
the effective 
implementation 
(CFEI) of ISO 9001 
and HACCP 
(Kafetzopoulos & 
Gotzamani, 2014). 
The authors set out a hypothetical 
model of CFEI for HACCP and ISO 9001 
based on their previous research.  
Empirical data from an email / 
telephone survey of 347 Greek FBOs 
who have implemented both ISO 9001 
and either HACCP or ISO 22000, is 
This research uses a natural sciences approach, developing multiple 
hypotheses, using a quantitative survey and factor analysis to identify 
statistically significant CFEI. This indicates an ontology of internal realism and 
a positivist epistemology.  Whilst the research methods indicate an axiology 
of value-free research, there is evidence that due to their previous work, the 
authors place a positive value on HACCP and related systems.   
Guldenmund: analytical approach.  
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 subjected to two levels of factor 
analysis, from which three of the CFEI 
are determined to make a significant 
contribution to the effective 
implementation of the systems. 
FSC Models  Summary Philosophical Approach 
Factors influencing 
food safety 
performance 
(Griffith et al., 
2010b). 
This paper presents a theoretical 
model of factors influencing food 
safety performance, including FSC, 
derived from studies of organisational 
safety culture in other highly 
regulated environments.  
 
 
FSC is presented as an element of organisational culture, which by definition 
pertains to the work, values and beliefs of a group of people.  Hence, the 
philosophical perspective of work on FSC by default accepts an ontological 
background of relativism or nominalism (that facts are human creations, with 
no recognised truth) (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p 19).  This paper 
generates a theory, based on related work on organisation safety culture, 
and therefore fits an epistemological perspective of constructivism.  The 
axiological basis of the researchers is not clear as no empirical research is 
presented.  However, the researchers discuss the differences between 
positive and negative FSCs, implying a value laden position.   
Guldenmund: academic / pragmatic approach. 
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The Food Safety 
Culture Excellence 
Model (J. Z. Taylor 
et al., 2015; J. Z. 
Taylor, 2011). 
 
 
This paper sets out a model of FSC, 
amended from that first proposed by 
J.Z. Taylor (2011), developed from a 
range of classical psychological and 
organisational culture theories, and 
presents an empirical case study 
applying the model in a large catering 
organisation in Abu Dhabi.   
 
 
In proposing the original model, with its underpinning of psychological and 
organisational culture theories, Taylor (2011) appeared to demonstrate an 
ontological and epistemological approach of relativism and constructivism.  
However, the original qualitative assessment method for FSC has been 
modified to a survey for completion by groups of people, generating a 
numerical score in four FSC categories.  As such, the authors appear to have 
shifted ontologically towards internal realism, and epistemologically towards 
positivism.  There is a clearly value-laden axiological approach, evident in the 
title of the model (FSC excellence) and in the scoring system (1 to 5, with 5 
seen as high or good).   
 
Guldenmund: analytical / pragmatic approach. 
The FSA/ 
Greenstreet Berman 
Ltd model: model 
categories or 
typologies (Wright 
et al., 2012a, 
2012b). 
This work presents a typology of FSC 
derived from earlier work on 
organisational safety culture across a 
range of industries. 
The typology is presented as a tool for use by safety inspectors, i.e. the 
authors give the model a realist and positivist perspective of the best or 
correct way to assess FSC.  From an axiological perspective, the tool is 
presented as a “scientific” style tool (i.e. value free), however the typology is 
value driven, distinguishing and judging organisations in terms of attitude, 
behaviours and performance.   
Guldenmund: academic / pragmatic approach. 
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The NSF 
International 
maturity model (NSF 
International Ltd., 
2014). 
The paper presents a model of cultural 
maturity as a framework for 
organisational mapping and 
development. 
NSF International Ltd. (2014) present this as a “best practice” model to be 
used with organisations to assess and improve FSC. As such they present the 
model within a realist and positivist framework.  Axiologically, the method is 
set out as being independent of the assessors; however, the framework itself 
is not value free, as the higher levels of FSC are set as desirable for all FBOs. 
Guldenmund: academic / pragmatic approach. 
The behaviour-
based food safety 
management 
system continuous 
improvement model 
(Yiannis, 2009). 
The paper presents a model of FSC 
development, based on a number of 
psychological and marketing theories 
and developed from the author’s 
experiences in the food industry.  
Whilst recognising organisational culture and hence FSC as being based on 
group belief, values etc. (i.e. inherently relativist and constructionist), Yiannis 
(2009) presents the continuous improvement model as a systematic way to 
assess and improve FSC, i.e. he takes a realist and positivist approach to 
utilising the model.  No empirical research is presented, so the axiological 
approach cannot be directly determined, but would appear to be value-laden 
as influencing change to improve FSC is the core purpose of the model. 
Guldenmund: pragmatic approach. 
Food safety climate 
self-assessment tool 
(De Boeck et al., 
2015). 
De Boeck and colleagues present the 
development of a self-assessment tool 
for food safety climate (the “human 
route” for microbiological food safety) 
within a broader definition of FSC 
Food safety climate and FSC are again presented as group phenomena, so a 
relativist, constructivist approach would be expected.  However, similarly to 
J. Z. Taylor et al. (2015), the authors create a structured questionnaire which 
is scored, and basic statistical techniques are used to compare the results 
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which also encompasses a “techno-
managerial route”.  It is based on the 
five factors of FSC set out by Griffith et 
al. (2010b).  
from staff and management respondents in a small pilot study, i.e. there is a 
shift towards a realist / internal realist and positivist approach.   
Guldenmund: analytical / pragmatic approach. 
Food Safety Culture 
Dimensional 
Framework 
(Jespersen et al., 
2017). 
This paper presents a framework of 
FSC, developed as a collation of 6 
existing models of FSC, one model of 
organisational culture and one of 
quality culture.  A systematic, 
qualitative comparative analysis of the 
models was conducted, from which 
the dimensional framework was 
developed.   
FSC is presented as a subset of organisational culture, and recognised as a 
group phenomenon based on values, beliefs and shared behaviours, i.e. 
relativist and constructivist.  In axiological terms, the research is value laden, 
not only in the presentation of FSC, but in the methods used to develop the 
dimensions model, where each of the pre-existing models were critiqued for 
quality against National Research Council guidelines and for trustworthiness 
against a four-step validation strategy.  
Guldenmund: academic / pragmatic approach.  
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4.2 The Philosophical Approach of the Current Research Study 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, research on FSMSs and FSC covers the 
breadth of ontological and epistemological approaches from realist and positivist, to 
relativist and constructivist.  The research generally takes an axiological stance of 
accepting FSMSs (including HACCP) as the appropriate means to assure food safety, 
believing that FBOs should strive to exhibit a strong FSC.   
 
It was established through the literature review that FSC is a useful construct for 
further study into the people related elements affecting the implementation of FSMSs.  
Therefore, a philosophical perspective which encompasses the nature of FSC as a 
phenomenon generated by group understandings, beliefs and values is critical for the 
integrity of the research.  The chosen philosophical perspective also needs to reflect 
the viewpoint established in Chapter 2 of food safety being socially constructed, rather 
than absolute.  
 
From a philosophical perspective it is therefore difficult to justify a realist ontological 
approach, which would attempt to view FSC as “one truth”, understood and acted 
upon in an identical manner by all people in an FBO.  However, a relativist position, 
which would set out multiple “truths” or understandings of FSC may be too broad, as 
the essence of organisational culture and hence FSC is that of some common beliefs, 
values and understanding between organisational actors.  Easterby-Smith et al. (2012, 
p 31) describe pragmatism as a philosophical approach which offers a compromise 
between (internal) realism and relativism, allowing for the creation of structures from 
the lived experiences of people.  
 
In common parlance, pragmatic is often used as a synonym for practical, realistic or 
sensible, particularly when applied to problem solving.  However, as a philosophy, 
pragmatism is far more complex and has undergone many transitions and 
modifications since the founding fathers, Charles Saunders Pierce (1839 – 1914), 
William James (1842 – 1910) and John Dewey (1859 – 1952) first developed 
pragmatism as a philosophy in the USA in second half of the 19th Century.  Even at this 
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time, there were differences in detail and approach, as Depew (1995, p 13) explains 
when he describes classical pragmatism as a “patchwork bricolage”, and the revival of 
interest, led by Richard Rorty (1931 – 2007) and Hilary Putnam (1926 – 2016) has 
further developed thinking in the area (Malachowski, 2004, p xviii).  Putting differences 
aside, the notion of practical consequences is central to pragmatism, (Malachowski, 
2004, p xx), but as Morgan (2014) emphasises, as a philosophy pragmatism goes 
beyond problem solving and beyond simply considering “what works”.  Indeed, 
Rutherford (2013) explains that from a philosophical perspective “what works” must 
be thought of in terms of large scale, consistent and systematic application over time 
and across society.  Morgan (2014) also demonstrates how pragmatism encompasses 
the circular relationship between actions and beliefs and how both actions and beliefs 
are socially shaped.  Taken together these elements suggest a fit between the 
pragmatic philosophy and the concepts of FSC and organisational culture presented in 
Chapter 3.   
 
Similarly, the research question and objectives fit with an epistemological perspective 
of constructivism, which focuses on understanding and appreciating the experiences of 
people (rather than relying on fundamental laws) and allows for the study of complex, 
whole situations, rather than taking a reductionist approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012, p 24).  
 
At this point it is worth returning briefly to the question of whether truth is considered 
as absolute (there is one truth) or relative (there are multiple truths) in terms of food 
safety, particularly given the previously established perspective of food safety as being 
socially constructed.  Generally, within social constructivism truth is viewed as relative; 
individuals, with their different world views, may perceive different truths or realities – 
as P. Berger and Luckman (1966, p 15) put it in their classic text, “what is ‘real’ to a 
Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American businessman”.  However, some 
theorists within the field of social constructionism also accept that there are facts (or 
truths) which are independent of human perception, so called “brute” facts 
(Anscombe, 1958 in Searle, 1995).  With regards to the current research it is clear that 
there are certain aspects of food safety which can be considered as “brute” facts, e.g. 
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the pathogenic nature of Campylobacter jejuni for humans is independent of 
perceptions of reality. Therefore, a philosophical approach which avoids the extremes 
of social constructivism, acknowledges “brute” facts and encompasses a group as well 
as an individual approach in knowledge creation and recognition, is required to fit with 
the subject area. 
 
In considering the fit of ontology and epistemology against the research area, the 
philosophical framework or paradigm of Pragmatic Constructivism (PC)25 was 
identified.  Positioned primarily in the study of accounting as a management control 
practice (e.g. H. Nørreklit et al., 2010), PC does not simply blend pragmatism and 
constructivism, but is rooted across a number of epistemological perspectives: 
positivism, rationalism, constructivism and functionalism (Guven-Uslu, 2017). PC is 
used as a paradigm for understanding and conducting research on actors’ construction 
of valid practice (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017), i.e. at its heart is a pragmatic perspective of 
sound and effective practice.  Offering a middle ground between social constructivism 
and a realist, scientific approach (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017), PC fits with the 
philosophical needs of this research project and offers a suitable management control 
paradigm through which to study food safety management.  The PC framework and 
some key concepts which are used in this research study are described in more detail 
below.  
 
4.2.1 Pragmatic Constructivism and the Actor-Reality Construction 
 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, there is wide variation in the definitions 
of management control and the conceptualisation of MCSs.  Many definitions are 
“based on the assumption that someone (senior manager / top management team / 
dominant coalition) is seeking to control the behaviours of others (middle 
management, employees)” (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  This approach can be considered 
                                                          
25 Pragmatic Constructivism has also been used by Avenier and Thomas (2015) as another term for 
radical constructivism or teleological constructivism.  However, in this thesis, PC refers exclusively to the 
framework as described and used within the Actor-Reality Construction as described by Nørreklit and 
collaborators. 
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a form of mechanical governance: rules and prescriptions are formed at the 
managerial level and used to control the activities performed by employees (L. 
Nørreklit, 2011; L. Nørreklit, 2017a).  
 
In contrast to this approach, PC is positioned as a framework of actor-based 
governance, or “actor-reality construction”.  PC considers management control as an 
activity set in a social context, i.e. it considers that business and processes do not run 
“automatically”, rather that organisational leaders’ co-author the activities of the firm 
with other staff, treating them as inherently creative actors.  The role of leadership is 
to create a set of business specific guidelines or concepts – a functioning and 
successful business reality - to encompass and inspire the co-authorship of actions.  In 
the PC framework this reality is termed the organisational topos26 and is achieved by 
the integration of four dimensions of reality: facts, possibilities, values and 
communication (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017; L.  Nørreklit, 2017a), as shown in Figure 4.2.     
 
Figure 4.2: A Framework for PC (adapted from H. Nørreklit et. al., 2010) 
 
                                                          
26 Topos (singular) / topoi (plural) comes from the Greek, referring to a specific place or space.  As L. 
Nørreklit (2017a, p68) explains “whereas a utopia is a non-existent place, an unattainable ideal, the 
topos is an existing place, the place of practice it controls”.  
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As stated above, the topos should inspire and guide actors’ actions to give success.  
This can also be expressed from an alternative perspective, in that only actions that 
integrate all four dimensions to form a coherent topos will ensure the relevant effect 
and bring about the intended causality (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017).  That is, integration of 
facts, values, possibilities and communication is required for “construct causality” or to 
give the required cause and effect of any action or set of actions.   
 
With its basis of the actor-reality construction, PC therefore offers an inclusive 
paradigm for understanding and researching the functioning of MCSs and one which 
fits with the concept of organisational culture / FSC as it encompasses the idea of 
collective involvement. 
 
PC has been used in different ways by the research community: as a theory to be 
tested (e.g. Seal & Mattimoe, 2016), as a normative guide (F. Mitchell, Nielsen, 
Nørreklit, & Nørreklit, 2013), to guide the research process itself (e.g. H. Nørreklit, 
2014) and to interpret and explain empirical data (e.g. Guven-Uslu, 2017; Jakobsen, 
2017).  For the current study, the intention is to use PC to develop a “theoretical 
roadmap”, by combining the PC framework with insights from the “technical” 
literature reviewed in Chapter 3.  This theoretical roadmap will then be used both to 
guide aspects of the research process (the development of theoretical themes, 
theoretical questions and interview questions) and in data analysis.  These processes 
are explained in more detail in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.4 respectively. 
 
Whilst the four dimensions and integration (leading to construct causality) form the 
core of PC, other related concepts - namely those of pro-active truth, pragmatic truth 
and the truth gap27 - form a useful analytical tool.   Pro-active truth is the expected 
outcome based on facts and analysis at the point of decision making, but before 
                                                          
27 In common with constructivist epistemology, in the PC framework truth is generally considered to be 
relative (from individual or group perspectives), rather than absolute, with the exception of “brute” 
facts (Anscombe, 1958 in Searle, 1995).  However, relative and absolute truth are not commonly 
discussed in PC, the emphasis instead being placed on potential differences between pro-active and 
pragmatic truth as two of the relative perspectives of truth and the analysis of the case studies using PC 
constructs in Chapter 7 will focus on pro-active and pragmatic truth and the truth gap, rather than 
absolute and relative truth.  
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actions have occurred, whilst pragmatic truth is an ex-post evaluation of the actual 
outcome.  If pragmatic truth does not equal pro-active truth, then a truth gap exists (H. 
Nørreklit et al., 2017).  This concept is used in studying whether there are differences 
in pro-active truth (the FSMS works) and the pragmatic truth (the experience of a 
serious, non-reportable food incident) in the case studies which form the basis of this 
research study.  
 
This last section has focussed on setting out and explaining PC, demonstrating its 
attractiveness for the current research study in terms of its inclusivity driven by the 
actor centred approach, its fit in the philisophical middle ground between 
constructivism and realism and its pragmatic heart, where integration of the four 
dimensions leads to a functioning reality. Before considering limitations and challenges 
to the use of PC, it is also worthwhile to review it in light of Guldenmund’s (2010) 
safety culture classifications.  The nature of the four dimensions, where facts, values 
and communication sit in the present / past, and possibilities sit in the future, means 
that PC can, with the appropriate research methods, straddle Guldenmund’s three 
approaches.  For the current research study, which combines analysis of the 
organisation “today” (i.e. at the point of data collection) and analysis of an historical 
(albeit relatively recent) non-reportable food incident , the academic and analytical 
approaches dominate.  However, as with other FSMS / FSC work, an element of the 
pragmatic approach is seen, particularly as the case study companies describe the 
activities undertaken to address the quality failures and improve working practices.   
 
Returning to PC itself, there are, as with any philisophical approach, limitations and 
challenges in using it.  The main critique of PC as a paradigm comes from Laughlin 
(2010), who was specifically addressing H Norrreklit et al.’s (2010) theoretical paper 
positioning PC as a pragmatic foundation for accounting practice.  Laughlin challenged 
whether PC should be considered as a paradigm or a methodology.  Indeed, the 
variation in terminology and classification of PC is one of the challenges faced in using 
it, and is specifically adddressed in the Researcher’s reflections in Chapter 8.  PC is 
relatively new and it is perhaps inevitable that terminology and concepts evolve and 
change as they are put into practice.   
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The second key limitation set out by Laughlin (2010) concerns generalisability; he 
suggests that PC is limited to characterising (an organisation) at a specific space and 
time, whereas for PC to act as a paradigm for accounting practice, generalisation from 
the specific to the global sense would be required.  Whilst this might be a valid 
criticism and limitation of PC as a paradigm for accounting practice, this does not 
invalidate the use of PC to guide data collection, analysis and interpretation within a 
case study setting.  Indeed, this is the way that PC has predominately been used to 
date (e.g. Guven-Uslu, 2017).  Of course, the generalisability of findings is a limitation 
of case study research itself; this is addressed in section 4.4 and Chapter 8. 
 
Other challenges to the use of PC relate to its primary use in studying different aspects 
of mainstream accounting and management control practices.  Although PC has been 
used to study issues such as the strategic performance of organisations (F. Mitchell, et 
al., 2013; Seal & Mattimoe, 2014), there is no track record to demonstrate that PC can 
be successfully applied to study FSMSs.  However, this challenge creates an ideal 
opportunity to contribute to the field by demonstrating the applicability, or not, of PC 
to the study of non-financial MCSs.   
 
As might be expected, given the focus of topos creation to direct successful actions, PC 
has been primarily used in the study of functional (successful) MCSs, the study by 
Beusch (2011) perhaps being an exception.  The use of PC to study specific failures, 
such as the quality failures acting as embedded cases in the current research, is 
therefore largely untested, but again offers an opportunity to contribute to the 
development of research in the field. 
 
In conclusion therefore, PC presents as a framework which fits with the philosophical 
requirements of the current research.  Whilst having a relatively limited track record of 
use, this in itself means that the current research will offer opportunities to make 
significant contributions to academic knowledge.  
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The following section moves on from the philosophical underpinnings of the research 
study to considerations of study design, the development of a “roadmap” to guide 
data collection and analysis in the current study, and ethical considerations. 
 
 
4.3 Research Design, the Research “Roadmap” and Ethical Considerations  
 
4.3.1 Research Design 
 
A qualitative, case study approach was selected for this research study as it enabled 
the use of a real-world context to investigate the research question in depth (Yin, 
2014, p 16).  Case studies are frequently used to generate theory (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007), but can also be used to explore existing theory (Saunders, Lewis, &  
Thornhill, 2012, p 180).  This approach therefore fits with the research objective of 
investigating food safety management from a management control perspective, and 
specifically using the PC framework within this.   
 
By using two different FBOs as cases - with an internally managed, non-reportable food 
incident in each organisation acting as an embedded, critical case - both within and 
cross-case comparisons have been completed.  The use of the critical cases also allows 
the research question to be framed against a potential failure of food safety 
governance offering the required insights to address research objectives one and two.  
 
The overall research question set out for this research study is particularly suited to 
examination using an in-depth qualitative approach.  Whilst qualitative methods 
cannot determine results which are generalisable to the entire food industry, these 
methods are well established in research of organisational culture / FSC and in 
researching barriers to the implementation of FSMSs, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
Qualitative methods also appear to offer advantages over quantitative methods in the 
study of FSMSs and food safety.  Published research indicates a low degree of success 
in engagement with FBOs for large scale, randomised surveys in the area of food safety 
management (e.g. Fielding et al., 2011).  Furthermore, quantitative methods have 
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been criticised as inappropriate for work on food safety, as FBOs and enforcement 
officers have been shown to give opposing views of the success of FSMS 
implementation and food safety status within organisations (Yapp & Fairman, 2005).  It 
is also notable that qualitative methods are rising in prominence within management 
control research (Spekle & Kruis, 2014), hence the use of qualitative methods fits with 
the fourth objective of this research study to consider food safety from this 
perspective.   
 
4.3.2 Development of a Roadmap to Guide Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Yin (2014, p17) asserts the use of a theoretical framework to guide both the data 
collection and analytical phases of case study research.  It was not the intention of this 
research study to develop and test a new conceptual framework, but a “roadmap”, 
combining the PC framework with insights from the mainstream technical literature on 
barriers to and drivers of FSMS and FSC, was created to guide data collection and 
analysis.  It became immediately evident that the complexity of FSMS / FSC models 
posed a hindrance to developing such a roadmap.  Consequently, this work was 
simplified by simply referencing “FBO people” and “FSMS Process” as the two clusters 
of barriers to and drivers for FSMS implementation and maintenance.  At a basic level 
FSC can be viewed as combining some of the people related elements affecting FSMS 
implementation, and hence is captured here in the “people” cluster.  The resulting 
roadmap is shown in Figure 4.3 overleaf.  
 
The theoretical roadmap can thus be considered as combining a “technical level”, 
based on the mainstream extant literature on FSMSs and FSC, with the framework of 
PC.  This roadmap was then used to inform the development of theoretical themes, 
theoretical questions and interview questions, in an approach adapted from Wengraf 
(2001, p 63), as shown in Figure 4.4.    
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Figure 4.3: A Theoretical Roadmap to Study Food Safety Governance  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: From CRQ to IQ, an Abductive Approach (adapted from Wengraf, 2001). 
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An abductive approach was taken to the research, in that the theoretical roadmap not 
only informed the data collection, but was used to frame the data analysis.  The 
research findings were used to explore the applicability of the roadmap (the people – 
process clusters from the mainstream literature and the PC framework and concepts) 
to the research on FSMSs and food incidents and to critique the underlying PC 
paradigm and concepts. 
 
The case study approach allowed for the collection of data using several formats: 
observation during site visits, analysis of documents ranging from process plans to 
signage displayed in the production environment, and interviews.  This allows for the 
process of triangulation, so that findings from interviews can be further substantiated, 
or challenged, by reference to other data sources, a process which increases the 
robustness of data analysis and strengthens the construct validity of the research 
findings (Yin, 2014, p 121).  
 
Whilst Yin (2014, p 110) proposes the use of unstructured interviews to collect case 
study evidence, a semi-structured approach was decided upon using a standardised 
interview guide.  In this way the three theoretical themes could be approached in a 
consistent manner, whilst also allowing some freedom to explore other relevant areas 
arising during the interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 213).   The interview guide was 
developed and tested with five food industry experts (three senior quality / regulatory 
managers; one new product development director and one independent consultant in 
food safety / health & safety), all of whom had been involved in investigating and 
resolving food safety and quality incidents.  In each case the theoretical themes, 
theoretical questions and interview questions (including prompts / follow up 
questions) were shared by email with the experts.  Feedback was taken by telephone 
(3 experts), email (1 expert) or face-to-face conversation (1 expert) on whether the 
interview questions reflected the intended theoretical themes and questions, the 
clarity of the interview questions and suggestions for improvement.  The experts were 
also consulted about the type of documents which would be useful to access to 
complement the information obtained in the interviews and enable triangulation of 
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the interview data. 
 
Finally, the interview guide was piloted by conducting an interview with the previous 
owner of a small dairy company.  The final interview guide is given in Appendix G for 
information.   
 
4.3.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
In line with the University of Portsmouth Ethics Policy (Kolstoe, 2017), the research 
study was submitted for review and approval by the ethics committee of Portsmouth 
Business School (see Appendix H for confirmation of ethical approval).  A number of 
key ethical considerations were identified and the approach taken to assure the ethical 
conduct of this research study is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.4 Interim Summary 
 
Having reviewed the philosophical background to the extant literature on barriers / 
drivers of FSMS and FSC, PC was identified as an appropriate management control 
paradigm with which to research FSMSs and food incidents and a theoretical roadmap 
was developed to frame both data collection and analysis.   
 
A multiple case study design was developed, using non-reportable food incidents 
(internally managed failures in food safety or quality) as embedded critical cases, 
allowing for within- and cross-case comparisons, with data to be collected using 
interviews, observation and through studying existing documentation.  A semi-
structured interview guide was developed, with reference to the theoretical roadmap, 
reviewed by a number of industry experts and piloted.  A number of ethical 
considerations for the research study have also been identified and outlined.   
 
The next section of this chapter provides more detail on the methods of data collection 
and analysis (including the selection of case study organisations and individual 
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participants), together with thoughts on the evaluation and assurance of the quality of 
the research study. 
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Table 4.2: Ethical Considerations for the Research Study 
Ethical Consideration Approach taken 
Informed consent. Informed consent was sought at both organisational and individual participant level; data collection 
commenced only after organisational consent had been obtained28.  
Information sheets and consent forms were developed for both organisations and individual 
participants (see Appendices E and F).  Information sheets and consent forms were circulated to all 
individual participants by company gatekeepers prior to interview sessions being arranged.  As all 
interviews / group discussions were recorded, with participants reminded of the study aims at the start 
of each session, verbal consent was also sought and recorded.    
Anonymisation of data. Companies and individual participants were assigned specific codes, used in place of names to identify 
recordings / transcripts etc.  During transcription data was anonymised to remove references to 
individual and company names, products, locations of food business facilities etc.   
To facilitate the security of companies and individuals, electronic and physical copies of consent forms 
(giving both codes and identifying data) were stored in separate secure locations to recordings and 
transcriptions.    
                                                          
28 In addition to the informed consent procedures approved by the ethics committee, LiquiComp UK required that the University of Portsmouth, on behalf of the University 
and the Researcher, enter into a Non-Disclosure Agreement which set down additional constraints on anonymity and data disclosure.   
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Data security. All data (raw and analysed) has been stored securely on the university secured networked drive and / 
or in a secure, locked location (e.g. paper copies of consent forms, coding journal, case study logs etc.).   
Specifically, all interview recordings were made using a digital voice recorder (Olympus WS-852); 
interviews were then downloaded and stored securely on the university secure networked drive and 
deleted from the voice recorder.  All transcription was completed by the Researcher, with transcripts 
stored on the secured networked drive.   
All data will be stored until publications (PhD thesis and academic publications including journal 
articles, book chapters and conference presentations) are finalised; this formed part of the 
organisational and individual consent obtained from participants. 
Due to the potential commercial sensitivity of the research, it has been determined that it is 
inappropriate for data to be available for open access, but anonymised data will be stored on the 
university data repository at the end of the research study. 
Sensitivity of topic area. Given the sensitivity of food safety and quality, it was anticipated that companies would perceive the 
data obtained as commercially sensitive and perceive there to be a reputational risk should data be 
inappropriately disclosed.  This risk was managed by anonymisation and appropriate secure storage of 
all data. 
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Disclosure of food safety 
concerns. 
Although the research was clearly positioned as exploring and understanding an historic food incident 
and current business practices from a management systems perspective (i.e. not an audit or food 
safety inspection of either the incident or current working practices) it was anticipated that during 
interviews participants might disclose concerns about the food safety of current working practices.  To 
mitigate any concerns of exposure of the individual participant, or concerns about the wider safety of 
consumers, a protocol was established with each organisation giving a secure and confidential way for 
participants to report any safety concerns without involving their line manager or the gatekeeper (e.g. 
utilising company “whistle blower” hot lines).  In fact, this protocol was not required when working 
with participants in either case study organisation.  
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4.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Case Study Selection  
 
A purposive sampling approach (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 429) was taken to select the 
case studies for this research, the intention being for the organisations to be “typical 
cases”, and the incidents themselves to act as embedded “critical cases”.  Initially, a 
data base was constructed listing all UK business who had reported food safety 
incidents to the UK FSA between January 2013 and January 2015, with the intention 
that this form the population of possible case study organisations.   
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the research, contacts were initially made with FBOs in 
the database through company employees (mainly senior technical and quality staff) 
known to the Researcher or supervisory team.  Unfortunately, after a number of 
detailed conversations it became apparent that gaining access to study a reported 
food incident entailing a failure in food safety, was highly unlikely to be successful.  
Not only was the nature of the research challenging, but the fast-moving nature of the 
UK food industry acted as a barrier to access: brands had been sold, manufacturing 
facilities had been changed (particularly for contract manufactured brands) and 
contacts within organisations had changed.   
 
An alternative study design, requiring access to study company QMSs/FSMSs in 
general and a past non-reportable, internally managed food incident was therefore 
developed29.  Such incidents could therefore result from failures in FSMSs or QMSs or a 
combination of both.  As discussed in Chapter 2, FSMSs are considered a sub-set of 
QMSs, so a close relationship between failures in both systems could be expected.  
Indeed, this is supported by the conflation of QMSs and FSMSs in some of the 
literature (e.g. Kafetzopoulos & Gotzamani, 2014; Mensah & Julien, 2011).  With this 
modification to the study design, a snowball sampling approach was taken (Bryman & 
                                                          
29 The change in focus to study non-reportable, internally managed food incidents, rather than 
reportable food safety incidents, reduced the risks inherent in the study, from an ethical perspective.  
Resubmission and re-approval by the ethics committee was therefore not required.   
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Bell, 2015, p 435), and a large number of UK FBOs were contacted (by email, 
telephone, at face-to-face meetings or via LinkedIn) with requests to participate in the 
study and / or place the Researcher in contact with other possible study participants.   
 
After extensive discussions two large, well-established food manufacturers30 agreed to 
act as research case studies.  Both companies produce shelf stable products for sale in 
the UK and export markets and have long-standing QMSs and FSMSs, and both 
identified a recent (in the previous 6 months at the start of data collection) non-
reportable food incident which had a high impact in the organisation and which could 
act as the embedded critical case.  To preserve the anonymity of the organisations 
they are named as PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK within this thesis.  A full 
description of each is given in the presentation of research findings in Chapter 5 
(PowderCo UK) and Chapter 6 (LiquiComp UK). 
 
4.4.2 Participant Selection 
 
Once organisational consent had been obtained, the Researcher worked with a 
designated gatekeeper to identify and contact potential study participants.  Again, a 
purposive sampling technique was used, selecting participants who had been involved 
in the identified incident (incident investigation or resolution) and/ or whom were 
regular users of the organisational FSMSs / QMSs.  An invitation letter, information 
sheet and consent form were supplied by email to the gatekeepers, with the request 
to pass these to every potential participant prior to setting up interviews.  As detailed 
previously, verbal consent was also sought from individual participants at the start of 
each interview. 
 
                                                          
30 Whilst the majority of work on barriers to and drivers of FSMS implementation has been conducted 
with SMEs, the implications of failures in food safety / quality in large FBOs are potentially greater, given 
the volume of goods produced and the breadth of distribution of products both nationally and 
internationally.   Similarly, whilst SMEs are recognised as facing specific challenges in implementing 
FSMSs (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006), the investigation into failures of 
food safety / quality might be more enlightening in companies with established systems, rather than 
where systems are less developed. Thus, the use of large food manufacturers as case studies potentially 
strengthens, rather than weakens the robustness and relevance of the research study.  
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At PowderCo UK seven members of staff and management were initially interviewed, 
encompassing quality and production teams. During the initial data collection, the 
central role that the engineering team played in identifying and resolving the incident 
became obvious.  Therefore, an additional interview was arranged with a senior 
engineer who had participated in the incident investigation and resolution.  Details of 
the participants are given in Chapter 5.   
 
At LiquiComp UK, a total of 17 staff and management were interviewed, from both 
head office and production sites.  Details of the study participants are given in Chapter 
6.  
 
4.4.3 Methods of Data Collection 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary method of data collection.  In 
PowderCo UK interviews were held at the manufacturing site, with three individual 
interviews and one group interview (with five members of the site HACCP team) 
completed.  In LiquiComp UK interviews were held at the head office (including one 
group interview, with one participant joining by telephone conference call) and at a 
manufacturing site; two individual interviews were also conducted by telephone.  
Interviews typically lasted just under an hour (range 33 minutes to 3 hours).   
 
The use of a combination of individual and group interviews (and, indeed, the 
combination of face-to-face and telephone interviews) was driven by the availability of 
participants and access given to the Researcher by the case study organisations.  A 
concern in using group interviews is the possibility of “group effects” (Bryman & Bell, 
2011, p. 526), where interviews may be dominated by more voluble participants and 
other group members may feel unable to express alternative views.  This may be of 
particular concern if certain participants are perceived to have greater authority or 
power than others.  In order to minimise the impact of such effects, care was taken in 
facilitating group interviews, setting out ground rules at the start of the session 
(explaining that all views were welcome and that there were no right or wrong 
answers to the questions).  All participants were encouraged to participate in the 
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discussions, with the Researcher asking for specific input on the basis of job role, 
experience in other organisations etc.  Despite this, it is of course impossible to ensure 
that that there is no bias in group interviews, or indeed in individual interviews.  
Therefore, in addition to interviews, in both case studies manufacturing site tours were 
undertaken and access was also given to a range of documents regarding general food 
safety and quality management practices and the specific incidents31.  Triangulating 
information between interviews and with the observational and documentary data 
helped to assure the quality of data collection and interpretation.   
 
Full details of the data collected are given for PowderCo UK in Chapter 5 and 
LiquiComp UK in Chapter 6.   
 
4.4.4 Methods of Data Analysis 
 
Before starting data collection, a decision was required about the intended method of 
analysis. This was important to set out prior to data collection, as it might influence 
both the collection and handling of data.  For example, a method such as conversation 
analysis would require production of detailed transcripts from all interviews, complete 
with notation for pauses, timing of periods of silence etc. (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 533).  
Indeed, Bryman and Bell (2015, p 579) neatly describe the challenge facing any 
researcher who undertakes qualitative research: “Because qualitative data deriving 
from interviews or participant observation typically take the form of a large corpus of 
unstructured material, they are not straightforward to analyse.  Moreover, unlike 
quantitative data analysis, clear cut rules about how qualitative data analysis should be 
carried out have not been developed.” 
 
                                                          
31 As discussed in Section 4.3.2, a target list of documents was developed with the input of industry 
experts prior to data collection.  However, the exact documents reviewed in the case studies varied.  In 
some instances, additional documents were made freely available, e.g. in PowderCo UK, the Researcher 
was able to observe and document data on posters displayed around the site.  The Researcher also 
requested additional documents where they were required to explain aspects of the cases, e.g. in 
PowderCo UK the Researcher requested additional information about the practice of “Gembas” and was 
provided with a PowerPoint presentation explaining this.  
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This lack of clear cut rules is evident when prior research on benefits of and barriers to 
FSMS is considered.  As shown in Table 4.1, much of this research is qualitative in 
nature, but only sparse details of the analytical methods used are given in publications.  
For example, Gilling et al. (2001) describe constructing “pen portraits” from the five 
narrative interviews they conducted as part of their research, whilst Ball et al. (2009) 
state they used NVivo 7 qualitative data analysis software to “identify patterns and 
themes” using a combination of deductive and inductive analysis.    
 
For case study research, such as the current research project, Yin (2014, p. 136) 
suggests four general analytical strategies:  relying on theoretical propositions; 
working your data from the “ground up”; developing a case description or examining 
plausible rival explanations.  As the intention was already established with this project 
to use the theoretical roadmap set out in section 4.3 to inform the data analysis, using 
only an inductive from the “ground up” approach was deemed inappropriate.  
However, with the abductive nature of the study in mind, it was also necessary to 
allow new insights to be generated from the data to critique the roadmap and its 
underlying components, so a relatively flexible approach was deemed desirable.  It was 
also judged important that case descriptions be generated, to allow both within and 
cross-case comparisons.  
 
Thematic analysis is considered one of the most common approaches to qualitative 
data analysis, but one that has been criticised as lacking in specificity (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 599).  Nonetheless, the basic approach of “identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” and describing the data set in 
“rich detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006) fits with at least some of the requirements to build 
a case description.  It is also possible to incorporate concepts or theories of interest 
into the theme identification process (Ryan & Bernard, 2003), hence this method 
allows incorporation of the desired abductive approach. 
 
An analytical plan (shown in Table 4.3) was therefore developed utilising the six phases 
of thematic analysis developed by Braun and Clarke (2006) combined with the work of 
Guest et al. (2012, p 21 - 48) on applied thematic analysis.  The theoretical roadmap 
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was applied in two stages with the people / process clusters being considered in the 
initial thematic analysis, and the PC paradigm being incorporated in a separate stage of 
analysis as step 7.  The coding and analysis was completed by the Researcher and 
discussed in detail with the Supervisory team, to sense check and verify both the 
inductively generated codes and themes and the second stage of analysis against the 
four PC dimensions.  
 
Given the nature of the multiple case study design and this multi-step analysis, the 
report writing stage was also divided, with the production of single case study reports 
using the thematic analysis (Chapters 5 and 6) as step 8, followed by a separate report 
comparing the case studies to each other, the extant literature and the PC paradigm, 
presented in the thesis as the Discussion in Chapter 7. As a final step, respondent 
validation was completed by sharing the reports and seeking feedback from the 
gatekeeper contacts in each company. 
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Table 4.3: Thematic Analysis Phases and Description 
Number Phase Description of process PowderCo UK LiquiComp UK 
1 Write analysis plan Preparation of analysis plan. Plan created for each case study, including within and between case 
comparisons. 
2 Data familiarisation Transcription of data; reading / 
re-reading data, noting initial 
ideas. 
All transcription carried out by the Researcher using “Transcribe” 
(https://transcribe.wreally.com/) software to give an “intelligent 
verbatim” account of all individual and group interviews.  This enabled 
both familiarisation with the data and enabled appropriate 
anonymisation of the data to be completed.  Quality control was 
undertaken by completing a full playback and check of each script 
against the recordings. 
3 Generation of initial 
codes. 
Coding interesting features of 
the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set, 
collating data to each relevant 
code. 
Codebook developed.  
Initial structural coding based on 
the theoretical themes which 
informed the creation of the 
semi-structured interview guide.  
Subsequent inductive coding. 53 
codes created. 
Initial structural coding not used, 
due to the more varied nature of 
the interviews (e.g. head office 
participants not able to discuss 
manufacturing plant FSMnS). 
Transcripts coded against codes 
created in PowderCo UK case, with 
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All initial coding completed by 
hand; coding then transferred 
into NVivo (version 10; upgraded 
to version 11), for ease of data 
management.  
 
51 of the original 53 codes used; an 
additional 30 codes created 
through inductive process, giving 81 
codes in total.  
See Appendix B for the code book 
with examples, and Appendix C for 
an extract of a coded transcript. 
4 Searching for 
themes. 
Collating codes into potential 
themes and gathering all 
relevant data into each 
potential theme. 
Themes created inductively using 
a clustering approach; 13 initial 
themes generated.  
Each new code considered for 
categorisation against existing 
themes; no new themes created. 
Thematic maps created, clustering 
of codes to sub- and final themes 
and to the people / process clusters 
(Figure 6.6). 
5 Reviewing themes. Level 1 check: do the themes 
work against the coded 
extracts?  Level 2 check: do the 
themes work against the entire 
data set? Generate a thematic 
map of the analysis. 
Themes cross checked against 
coded extracts and entire data 
set.  Several themes merged and 
9 final themes generated.  
Thematic map created showing 
codes clustered to sub- and final 
themes and to the people / 
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process clusters of the theoretical 
roadmap (Figure 5.6).   
6 Defining and naming 
themes. 
Refine the specifics of each 
theme and overall story.  
Generate clear definitions and 
names for each theme. 
Specifics of themes reviewed; coherence also checked by mapping 
themes to show relevance to the embedded case (the incident) and 
overall organisational case (Figures 5.3. and 6.2 for PowderCo UK and 
LiquiComp UK respectively). 
Although the codes and themes were created primarily from the 
interview data, other data sources (documents, observations) are 
combined to triangulate the findings, verifying the themes and their 
impact on the overall case studies.  
7. Analysis against 
theoretical roadmap. 
Analyse the inductively 
generated themes against the 
analytical framework. 
 The 9 themes were mapped 
against the 4 PC dimensions.  To 
check validity, the individual 
codes were separately mapped 
against the PC dimensions, and a 
comparison made of the 
locations of code to dimension 
when mapped at the theme level, 
and code to dimension when 
The activity was re-run using the 
additional codes identified in the 
LiquiComp case study.  No changes 
were made in the overall mapping 
of themes to PC dimensions. 
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mapped at the individual code 
level.   
Colour coded maps were created 
showing the relationship of the 
themes to PC dimensions, and 
codes and themes to PC 
dimensions.  
8. Producing the 
reports: part 1 
individual case 
studies. 
Relate analysis back to research 
questions; selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples; 
producing scholarly report. 
An initial report was created of 
the PowderCo UK case (Chapter 
5). This used the themes to 
describe and analyse the (i) 
embedded case (ii) organisational 
case and (iii) the relationship of 
the embedded case to the 
organisation. The “process” vs 
“people” clusters were also 
addressed in the findings.  
A second report was produced 
using the findings of the LiquiComp 
UK case (see Chapter 6) as per the 
first case study.  
9 Producing the 
reports: part 2, cross 
Relate analysis back to research 
questions; selection of vivid, 
Part 2 of the report is presented as the Discussion (Chapter 7), which 
entails a cross-case comparison for both the embedded and 
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case comparison; 
comparison with the 
literature and review 
against the 
theoretical 
framework.   
compelling extract examples; 
producing scholarly report. 
organisational cases; a comparison to the extant literature on FSMS and 
FSC, and finally a presentation and discussion of the results using the PC 
paradigm (including the four PC dimensions, integration for construct 
causality and the concepts of pro-active and pragmatic truth and the 
truth gap). 
10.  Respondent 
validation. 
Sharing of the research findings 
and analysis to ensure good 
correspondence between the 
findings and the perspectives 
of the participants. 
It was not feasible to seek feedback from every individual study 
participant to validate the transcript of their interview (the Researcher 
was not provided with direct email access, for example).  However, the 
relevant individual case studies and the cross-case comparison and 
discussion were shared with the gatekeepers from LiquiComp UK and 
PowderCo UK. This enabled assurance of anonymisation etc. for the 
organisations themselves and allowed the Researcher to ensure that 
there was good correspondence between the reported findings and the 
perspectives of the organisations.  Minor amendments were requested, 
and in the case of LiquiComp UK, additional data supplied to support 
some of the research findings.   
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4.4.5 Evaluation of Research Quality 
 
Understanding the quality and standard of research is of importance not only when 
considering the publication of research, but also to ensure that research is conducted 
ethically, for funding institutions to make or assess decisions on spend and, of course, 
for researchers themselves to evaluate the standing of their own work (Flick, 2007, 
p3).  Quantitative research is traditionally evaluated using the criteria set out in Figure 
4.5, but the applicability of this criteria to qualitative research has been questioned 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 400; Flick, 2007, p15), given the differences in ontological and 
epistemological perspectives which often exist between researchers conducting 
quantitative and qualitative work.  As Bryman and Bell (2015, p 400-401) explain, such 
criteria “presuppose that a single absolute account of social reality is feasible”.  
However, this presupposition does not fit with the pragmatic and constructivist 
approach taken for the current research study.   
 
 
Figure 4.5: Traditional Quality Criteria for Scientific Research 
 
 
Nevertheless, ensuring that qualitative research is conducted with appropriate rigour 
and standards remains important (Anderson, 2017).  To that end alternative criteria for 
qualitative research quality have been proposed (Anderson, 2017; Bryman & Bell, 
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2015, p 400; Tracy, 2010).  The application of such criteria not only influenced the 
research design and methods used, but is evident in the production of this thesis. For 
example:  
 the “worthiness” of the topic is set out in the introduction and background;  
 the transparency of methods and challenges in undertaking the research is 
evident in this chapter and through the findings and discussion in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7;  
 the paradigmatic positioning of the research is set out here and forms a pillar of 
the discussion in Chapter 7;  
 the resonance and credibility of the findings is evidenced by the “thick 
description” of the case studies given in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; 
 the credibility and consistency of findings has also been supported by the 
triangulation of the findings from the semi-structured interviews with other 
data sources (observation and documentation) and the use of respondent 
validation with the company gatekeepers.   
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter started with a review of the philosophical approaches taken in key 
papers on FSMSs and FSC.  From this, a pragmatic and constructivist perspective 
was identified as an appropriate fit with the field.  The specific paradigm of PC, 
developed in the management control literature, was identified and used to build 
a theoretical roadmap to inform the current research study.   
 
The selection of PC as a management control paradigm for this research study leads to 
a modification of the fourth objective of the research, as follows:  
 
4a. To investigate food safety management from the perspective of management 
control, utilising PC, in order to ascertain the utility of PC for studying control 
systems outside of the mainstream of accounting.   
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4b. To gain insight on the use of PC in cases of management system failure, as 
well as management systems under control.   
 
With the overall research question of “why do food safety systems fail ...” and the 
objective of studying past food incidents to examine this, a qualitative case study 
methodology was selected, to enable the in-depth investigation of food safety failures 
in a real-world context.  However, as discussed, it proved impossible to engage any 
FBOs who had reported food incidents (due to food safety failures) as research 
participants.  Hence, an alternative approach was taken, using non-reportable, 
internally managed food incidents (resulting from failures in FSMSs and / or QMSs) as 
the embedded cases, and the cooperation of two large UK based food manufacturers 
was obtained through purposive, snowball sampling.   
 
With the collection of data primarily through semi-structured interviews (informed by 
the theoretical roadmap), along with documentary evidence and observations, a 
systematised form of thematic analysis was developed (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et 
al., 2012, p 21 - 48).  Lastly, ethical and quality considerations of the research have 
been presented, both of which are critical in the research process.  
 
The next three chapters of this thesis present and discuss the results of the research.  
Chapters 5 and 6 present PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK respectively, considering 
the embedded and overall organisational cases.  The comparison of the two cases – 
again looking at the embedded critical cases and overall organisations – is discussed in 
Chapter 7. The study findings are also considered in light of the extant literature on 
FSMSs and FSC and then against PC as the management control paradigm 
underpinning the study.     
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5.0 Case Study 1: PowderCo UK 
 
Having set out the philosophical background to this research study and detailed the 
methodological approach taken, we now turn to the case study investigations 
themselves.   
 
This chapter details the results of the first case study.  PowderCo UK is a long-standing 
food manufacturer, which operates a comprehensive QMS and FSMS, both of which 
are accredited to external standards.  Despite this, in the summer of 2015, PowderCo 
UK experienced a food incident: a defect arose in some manufacturing equipment, 
resulting in the formation of very fine metal shards which contaminated a powdered 
food product.  Although upon investigation the incident was deemed not to require 
reporting to the FSA, the incident was discovered to result from failures in the QMS 
and FSMS and had a large impact on the organisation.  This incident therefore forms a 
suitable critical case for the current research.    
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.1 gives a brief background to the 
organisation; section 5.2 describes the specifics of data collection and analysis related 
to this case, whilst section 5.3 discusses the findings of the thematic analysis, split into 
an initial examination of the incident, followed by broader findings related to the 
overall organisation.  Finally, section 5.4 addresses the relationship between the 
embedded critical case and the overall organisation, with a view to answering the 
question of whether people, process or a combination of the two are to blame when 
FSMSs or QMSs fail.   
 
 
5.1 Company Background 
 
PowderCo UK is a manufacturing plant for powdered food products. It is part of a large 
multi-national organisation which develops, manufactures and markets food and non-
food products in over 150 countries.  For 2015, PowderCo Global reported a turnover 
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of over £20 billion across all product sectors.  PowderCo UK is the only UK based food 
manufacturing plant in the organisation; other food products are manufactured in 
company factories internationally or by third party suppliers (see Figure 5.1). 
 
The role of PowderCo UK is the manufacture and onward supply of finished products 
(in bulk) to the next step of the supply chain (contract packers in the UK and overseas).  
Manufacturing is supported by a range of functions including product quality, health 
and safety, engineering and human resources.  Other aspects of the business, such as 
central purchasing, sales, marketing and research and development (R&D), are located 
separately to the PowderCo UK site, and do not form a direct part of this study.   
 
 
Figure 5.1: PowderCo Global Organisation Chart 
 
 
Food products have been made on site at PowderCo UK for over a century and the 
core manufacturing processes have changed little over time.  The site manufactures a 
base powder product which is blended with other dry ingredients to produce a range 
of finished products which are packed into bulk containers.  These are then shipped to 
contract packers in the UK, Africa and East Asia, where the products are packed into 
consumer units for transportation to UK and international customers. 
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The site operates seven days a week with two, twelve-hour production shifts daily 
(7am to 7pm; 7pm to 7am) although production line supervisors often arrive earlier to 
allow for efficient handovers between shifts. Manufacturing staff are organised into 
“cells” of three or four production staff, each with responsibility for a particular area of 
production.  There is a further level of production management for each shift team, 
whilst the overall direction of the site is provided by a senior management team led by 
the site director who reports into the manufacturing division of PowderCo Global.    
Each batch of product takes around 12 hours to produce from start to finish and the 
site operates on a 10-day operation schedule (referred to as a “campaign”) after which 
there is a 2-day break for deep cleaning and regular maintenance.  (In process 
cleaning, such as cleaning floors, caustic flushing of tanks and pipes etc. is carried out 
during the regular production and in production intervals between batches).  There are 
two longer shut down periods each year (in the summer and at Christmas) to allow for 
more complex maintenance and any production upgrades.  At the time of the incident 
the site had recently re-started production after an additional shut down period for 
specific upgrade work. 
 
 
5.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The primary method of gathering data for the case study was through semi-structured 
interviews, which were held between November 2015 and January 2016.  The 
development and validation of the semi-structured interview guide, and the interview 
method are presented in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The study participants were selected with the aid of a gatekeeper (participant P003) 
and comprised management and staff from the PowderCo UK site.  All participants 
were selected to meet the study inclusion criteria of having an involvement in the 
investigation or management of the quality incident and / or having a working 
knowledge of the site FSMS.   
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The participants varied in job role (quality, production and engineering) and level of 
responsibility, ranging from junior supervisory positions in manufacturing (cell team 
leaders) through to middle management (senior quality personnel).  The participants 
also had a wide range of experience within the organisation ranging from less than six 
months (P001) to over 25 years (P008), with the majority of the study participants 
having been employed at the site for between three and eight years.  In total eight 
members of staff were interviewed, with three individual interviews and one group 
interview with five members of the site HACCP team as shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Description of Study Participants (PowderCo UK) 
 
Participant 
Number 
Job Role FSMS / Incident 
experience 
Interview Type 
and Duration 
P001 Quality Supervisor FSMS user 1-to-1, 55 
minutes 
P002 Production Cell Team 
Leader 
FSMS user 1-to-1, 55 
minutes 
P003 Quality Manager, 
responsible for HACCP 
throughout the site 
FSMS lead.  Lead 
investigator of the 
incident. 
Group, 1 hour 
35 minutes 
P004 Production Shift 
Supervisor 
FSMS user. HACCP team 
member. 
P005 Production Cell Team 
Leader 
FSMS user. HACCP team 
member. 
P006 Quality Laboratory 
Manager. 
FSMS user. HACCP team 
member. 
P007 Quality Manager 
(Production). 
FSMS user. HACCP team 
member. 
P008 Senior Engineer.   Lead engineer involved 
in quality investigation.  
FSMS aware. 
1-to-1, 58 
minutes 
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Data was also collected through observation of working practices and examination of a 
range of documents as listed in Figure 5.2.  The Researcher was not given permission 
to copy documents, so comprehensive notes were taken for later review and analysis.  
Additionally, information was gathered from publicly available sources, such as brand 
and company websites. 
 
Although interviews and observation were completed at the PowderCo UK site only, a 
number of the documents shared with the Researcher concerned the broader 
organisation.    For example, the site quality policy statement made reference to the 
PowderCo Global quality policy; the supply chain review board referenced in the list of 
site actions is responsible for both food and non-food supply chain globally; the brand 
history leaflet referenced sales and marketing information for the products.  In this 
way, it was possible to place information about PowderCo UK and the quality incident 
within the wider global organisation.    
 
Both the escorted tour of the production facility and attendance at the morning site 
production meeting (referred to as an accountability meeting) allowed the Researcher 
to observe staff working practices and behaviours, see the QMS, FSMS and FSMnSs in 
use and examine and discuss the QMS, FSMS and FSMnS failure points in the metal 
contamination incident.   
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Figure 5.2: Documents Examined and Observation Points, PowderCo UK 
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In accordance with the analytical plan detailed in Chapter 4, all interviews were 
recorded digitally, then transcribed and checked by the Researcher.  The transcripts 
were coded inductively, with 53 codes being created (the code book, with definitions 
of each code and examples is given in Appendix B).  Codes were then categorised into 
themes using a clustering approach.  After several rounds of cross-checking, nine 
separate themes were developed, which are listed in Table 5.2 below.   
 
Table 5.2: Themes Developed in the PowderCo UK Case Study 
 
 Theme 
1 What Works 
2 Day-to-day 
3 What Doesn’t Work 
4 Culture & Values 
5 Communication 
6 This Is What Went Wrong 
7 Experience Required 
8 Problem Solving Our Way 
9 Formal Expressions of Culture 
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between the themes, the main case and the 
embedded case.  As can be seen in Figure 5.3, three of the themes pertain only to the 
incident and two only to the organisational level of the case, whilst the remaining four 
themes apply to both.   
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Figure 5.3: The Relationship of Themes to the Organisational Case and the Embedded 
Case (PowderCo UK) 
 
 
 
 
The following sections of this chapter describe the research findings in terms of these 
themes, firstly considering the embedded Incident and then the overall case.  A 
consideration of these findings against the literature presented in Chapter 3, the 
theoretical “roadmap” developed from PC (described in Chapter 4) and the second 
case study organisation (LiquiComp UK, described in Chapter 6) is given in Chapter 7.  
 
 
5.3 Findings 
 
5.3.1 The Embedded Case: An Incident of Metal Contamination 
 
One day, in the early summer of 2015, PowderCo UK was contacted by its UK based 
contract packer with information that a batch of product had tested positive for “metal 
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firings”32.  The packer had already carried out additional testing of the product and had 
identified very small, thin shards of metal (approximately 1 to 2 mm by 4 to 5 mm) 
mixed in with the product.  Scanned photographs of the metal shards were emailed to 
PowderCo UK by the contract packer, with physical samples being delivered by courier 
a short time thereafter.  The site quality team immediately sprang into action and set 
about following the company processes and procedures to investigate and manage 
potential food safety incidents.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, seven of the nine themes developed from the qualitative 
data identified pertain to this incident33.  These themes are: “Communication”; “This is 
What Went Wrong”; “What Doesn’t Work”; “Culture and Values”; “Problem Solving 
Our Way”, “Experience Required” and “What Works”.  The discovery, investigation and 
management of the incident, from the perspective of PowderCo UK, is described and 
discussed below.    
 
“Communication” 
As the starting point for each interview, participants were asked to describe how they 
first found out about the incident and how it was investigated and managed. Although 
the exact sequence of events and level of detail given varied between participants 
(depending on their technical role and involvement with the incident investigation), 
the overall picture of the incident given by participants was remarkably consistent: 
 
“… we found out about it to a certain extent second hand, because the incident 
was raised through a reporting of metal findings from our co-packer ….” (P007, 
Quality Manager) 
 
“…I think it was reported to us that the third-party packaging company informed 
us that they’d had some firings on their metal detector …” (P008, Senior 
Engineer) 
 
                                                          
32 “Metal firings” refers to the alert given by the metal detection system at the contract packers when 
packed product was scanned prior to releasing it for sale. 
33 As will be made apparent through the case study findings, the incident was investigated by Powder Co 
UK as a potentially reportable food safety incident.  However, as all of the affected product remained in 
the control of the company, there was no requirement to report the incident to the authorities, and it 
was managed internally by the company.    
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“… so they informed us they had found metal shards, four metal shards, they 
sent us the picture …” (P001, Quality Supervisor) 
 
All of the staff - even the newest member, P001, who had not been working in 
PowderCo UK when the incident came to light - were able to relate the main aspects of 
the incident investigation, describe the technical causes of the incident and the 
changes that PowderCo UK had made in terms of quality and food safety processes 
and checks to reduce the risk of such an incident reoccurring.   
 
The participants were also clear about the immediate actions taken on receipt of the 
notification from the contract packer about the finding of the metal contamination.  
Communication had been swift and followed the company documented processes and 
procedures:  
 
“As soon as that complaint came to us and those pictures came to us …we 
informed everyone, that’s head of site, head of quality …...” (P001, Quality 
Supervisor)  
 
Indeed, communication about the incident throughout the course of the investigation 
and during implementation of corrective actions had been regular and open:  
 
“the majority [of communication] was done through briefings, there was lots of 
RCA [root cause analysis] investigations going on and where were we at particular 
times, then it was getting broadcasted through the accountability meetings and 
via briefings to see where we were and what the next steps were” (P004, Shift 
Supervisor). 
 
This transparency in communication appeared to play a significant role in fostering a 
shared understanding of the problems and in consolidating a common set of values 
(this is described further in “Culture and Values”).  The apparent contrast in 
communication style between PowderCo UK and the second case study, LiquiComp 
UK, and the impact of this on the development of a cohesive organisational reality or 
“topos” (as per the PC framework), is discussed in Chapter 7.  
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In many ways, by the time of the data collection interviews, some six months after the 
start of the quality incident, the events had already passed into company folklore as a 
“war story”, telling of a difficult time for the organisation which had been overcome 
successfully.   
 
Another example of such a narrative was uncovered when the participants discussed 
other elements of the FSMnS in the factory.  In a quality incident which happened 
more than a decade before, product had been overdosed with a vitamin blend: “the 
yellow bag incident”.  Outcomes of the “yellow bag incident” were improved 
monitoring and control of vitamin addition to the products and to specific reviews of 
relevant control points as part of the FSMS.  
 
 “Oh yes, I remember the yellow bag incident…… we'd managed to get the 
vitamin premix screw running on its own, so it just pumped raw vitamin premix 
and that went through to the bag …...  But now there’s monitoring going on, 
there's alarms on the system which basically if one of the screws stops the 
other screws should all stop as well, so they're all linked in together.”  (P007, 
Quality Manager). 
 
The importance of communication in allowing narratives about good practice to build 
from failures can therefore be seen as an underlying capability in PowderCo UK which 
links to the organisational behaviour of learning from failure and the practice of 
Continuous Improvement (CI), both of which are discussed under the theme of “What 
Works”. 
 
“This Is What Went Wrong” 
In discussing the quality incident, (and through reference to the documentation 
supplied on the incident, as noted in Figure 5.2) a picture emerged of a complex series 
of events, involving failures in both production equipment and in detection of the 
problem, as illustrated in Figure 5.4.   
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Figure 5.4: An Overview of the Non-Reportable Food Incident at PowderCo UK 
 
 
 
As outlined earlier in section 5.1, the PowderCo UK production site has been 
operational since the early 20th Century. Over this time, the production plant has been 
modified and upgraded, to take into account changes in ingredients and technology.  
However, certain sections of the manufacturing plant have been virtually unchanged 
for decades and it was in one of these older areas of the plant that the metal 
contamination was generated.  Across the plant, most of the powdered product is now 
moved under vacuum transfer.  However, in some areas the powder is still transferred 
between processing stages using chain-driven equipment, which leads to the 
generation of a fine metal powder: 
 
 “We know where we routinely generate metal as a fine powder 'cos we've got 
a lot of chain-driven material…” (P007, Quality Manager) 
 
The PowderCo UK site operates with a comprehensive QMS and FSMS, including a 
HACCP plan which is linked to a PRP and the site maintenance plan.  A detailed risk 
assessment for physical hazards (ferrous and non-ferrous metal and other foreign 
bodies) is included as part of the site HACCP plan.  Under the HACCP and QMS, the site 
controls for potential metal contamination by using a number of magnets placed 
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through the production line to attract and remove ferrous metal.  Fine mesh (2mm) 
sieves are also used to screen out metal (ferrous and non-ferrous) and other 
extraneous materials at a number of control points through the production process. 
The magnets and sieves act as control points (CPs), with those located immediately 
prior to bagging of the finished powder being designated as CCPs.  The use of magnets 
and sieves as CPs should ensure that any physical contamination with ferrous metal is 
detected as early as possible in the production process, whilst the final CCPs are in 
place to ensure the safety of the product before it is bagged and leaves the site for 
transport to co-packers. (As highlighted in this case, further controls for physical 
contamination are in place in the co-packers.  These are in place primarily to guard 
against any contamination of the product during the packing into consumer units and 
hence ensure the safety of the product for the end consumer).   
 
In this particular incident, small, very fine shards of metal were generated due to a 
breakdown of part of the powder transfer equipment: a long, enclosed, chain-driven 
belt referred to on site as “Bin C”. This equipment, custom made for the site many 
years ago, has chains running along upper and lower tracks.  During routine operation 
the inside of the Bin is only visible through small observation windows.  Running 
maintenance is carried out on site by the engineering team (e.g. replacement of shear 
pins, which is discussed under the next theme, “What Doesn’t Work”).  More extensive 
work is conducted at approximately 12-week intervals by an outside contractor, who 
partially disassembles the bin allowing for deep cleaning and maintenance. 
 
When PowderCo UK was first informed of the finding of metal contamination a Local 
Incident Committee (LIC) was formed to investigate and report on the incident.  Set up 
by the Head of Site Quality, and composed of an incident manager plus representatives 
from quality, manufacturing, engineering and logistics, the outputs of the LIC are 
reported back to the site Senior Leadership Team, and also into the PowderCo Global 
manufacturing division.   
 
The immediate actions of the LIC were to shut down manufacture whilst the source of 
metal contamination was established and to place on hold any product still within the 
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factory.  This not only demonstrates the importance of food safety to PowderCo UK, 
but also highlights the potentially high quality costs to the organisation of managing 
such an incident, with not only the cost of staff and management time in investigating 
and resolving the incident, but the opportunity costs of lost production and potentially 
lost sales.    
 
An important step in the management of the incident was the production of a time 
line to identify what product was potentially affected and where it was in the supply 
chain, enabling product to be placed into quarantine if held at the co-packers or within 
warehouses prior to shipment to the retail trade:  
 
“… so pretty much (the) first thing we did was a timeline to see when the 
incident started occurring, once we'd identified that timeline then we could see 
what product was affected and also understand what product wouldn't be 
affected…” (P003, Quality Manager) 
 
 
Additionally, as per the company incident management processes (described by 
participants and as documented in the “Serious incident and investigation handling 
procedure”), an RCA was started to undertake the technical incident investigations.  
Given the nature of the metal contamination, and the traceability information for the 
affected product (the date of manufacture and the Lot codes), Bin C was identified 
quickly as the most likely cause of the metal generation.  The earliest point of 
contamination was also straightforward to establish, given that the site had re-opened 
after an extended shutdown only two days prior to the date of manufacture of the 
contaminated product. 
 
An inspection of Bin C by engineering and the outside maintenance contractor 
identified that a bearing had come loose in the gearing of the bottom chain.  This 
resulted in the chain itself loosening so that it was being worn by the gears, resulting in 
the potential to generate metal shards.   
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This failure mode was new to the site, and totally unexpected: 
 
“…. he [the contractor] said in all the years that he's been coming to the site 
he's never seen it [the chain] come loose before…” (P008, Senior Engineer) 
 
 
Having established Bin C as the site of the contamination, production with the second, 
smaller bin (Bin B) was restarted.  Refinements to the list of products on hold and in 
quarantine were also possible, so the supply of known unaffected products (those 
manufactured prior to the shut down and / or manufactured using Bin B) to the market 
was possible.  However, a large amount of product remained in quarantine and full 
production needed to be re-established.   
 
To re-establish full production, the engineering team and contractors rectified the fault 
with the bottom chain.  Bin C was put back into use and product started to run again 
on a concession basis, i.e. there was a temporary approval of use of the bin, with a 
requirement for additional quality checks for metal contamination and a full inspection 
of the bin after one or two campaigns34 (as described in the concession documents 
reviewed and listed in Figure 5.2).  However, the additional checks quickly picked up 
ongoing metal contamination, another unexpected or unforeseen aspect of the 
incident: 
 
“…we were still seeing signs of metal so that threw us a little bit  ...” (P008, 
Senior Engineer) 
 
 
So, Bin C was taken out of commission again and a further inspection showed that the 
top chain in the bin had also moved.  It was rubbing against the side of the bin, which 
showed bad scoring of the metal casing.  As the senior site engineer (P008) explained, 
“basically we had two problems”.   
 
                                                          
34 Increased surveillance of key magnets and sieves was retained on an ongoing basis following the 
resolution of the incident as part of the learnings from failure (detailed in documentation on in-process 
magnets and sieves, listed in Figure 5.2).  
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In reality, looking at the system overall there were more than two problems: the 
failure of the equipment causing the generation of the metal had been compounded 
by a failure to detect the damage to the inside of the Bin and to screen out the metal 
shards, as shown in Figure 5.4.  So why was the metal contamination not detected? 
This investigation formed a key part of the activities of the RCA team.  
 
First, the damage to the inside of the Bin had not been picked up during its routine 
operation, despite the fact that both the bottom and top tracks had slipped.  As the 
Bin is a covered unit, the inside is not visible to operators during production.  However, 
opportunities were missed to detect the equipment failure earlier.  These are covered 
in detail under the next theme “What Doesn’t Work”. 
 
Considering the detection of the fine metal shards themselves, as explained previously, 
a number of magnets of varying sizes and sensitivities are located along the production 
line as CPs and a final CCP for metal contamination.  Under the HACCP process 
operated by PowderCo UK, an annual review and verification of the plan is conducted.  
Additional reviews are required if there are any significant changes in production e.g. 
the introduction of new products, changes of process etc., and these are linked to 
steps in PowderCo UK’s change control process.  
 
The RCA investigation of the quality incident uncovered the fact that some time ago, as 
part of an engineering change, one of the magnets located in the Bin C area had been 
removed and replaced with a different magnet, just a few feet away:  
 
“… during that process one magnet had been removed, and it had been 
replaced by another magnet in a different place...”  (P007, Quality Manager) 
“Further down, yes, only a few feet away to be honest but … “(P003, Quality 
Manager) “… but I think the effectiveness of that magnet was gone …” (P007) 
“… there must have been an effect, yes… “(P003). 
 
 
Thus, despite PowderCo UK’s change control process requiring a HACCP review, and 
this review having been undertaken, it appeared that this seemingly small change in 
the metal detection system had an unforeseen, adverse effect.  In fact, as part of the 
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RCA, the site called in the suppliers of the magnets to undertake a full review of that 
element of the HACCP system (see theme “Experience Required”) and the change in 
this magnet was identified as one of the factors contributing to the failure of the 
detection of the metal shards.  
 
Another aspect of this issue identified by the RCA team was a lack of clear criteria for 
the line operators in what constituted problematic metal contamination.  As fine 
powder metal was seen and cleared from the magnets on a regular basis, it was 
challenging for the operators to distinguish what had been risk assessed as 
“acceptable” (i.e. “safe”) from “unacceptable” (i.e. “unsafe”) levels of metal cleared 
from the magnets:  
 
“…we did not have a clear understanding of how much is normal …” (P002, Cell 
Team Leader)  
 
“There also wasn't a standard of what we should be looking for as far as when 
we checked or inspected for metal…” (P004, Shift Supervisor) 
 
To address this aspect of the problem and help prevent similar failures in the future, 
clear guides were produced of acceptable and unacceptable levels and types of metal 
contamination, which are now kept with the standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
and quality check sheets at the production line side.  
 
Finally, the RCA considered how the metal pieces had been able to escape filtering out 
by the sieves placed at intervals in the production line.  Investigations had not 
uncovered any failures in the system of checking and cleaning sieves, nor any failures 
to replace a damaged sieve. It was therefore concluded that the nature of the metal 
shards, being of a very fine diameter (less than the 2mm mesh size) had enabled these 
shards to pass through the mesh – yet another unexpected and unforeseen event. 
 
“…so the material we were looking at, even though it was very long, obviously 
you put it side on end and it would still go through a sieve.” (P007, Quality 
Manager). 
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It can therefore be concluded that the failures in the CPs, CCPs and FSMnS and the 
subsequent failure in the FSMS resulted from a whole series of small events, which by 
themselves were not problematic, but which, when combined led to this non-
reportable food incident.  A key finding for this incident is that many of failures were 
deemed “unexpected” or “unforeseen” and hence had not been adequately controlled 
for by the existing HACCP plan and supporting PRPs, either as individual events or as a 
combination of events.  The relationship between these “unexpected” or “unforeseen” 
events and the identification of “factual possibilities” using the PC framework, will be 
considered in detail in Chapter 7.   
 
“What Doesn’t Work” 
The last theme, “This is What Went Wrong”, was developed from a cluster of codes 
which describe the investigation of the incident and identification of the technical 
causes of the incident.  This next theme, “What Doesn’t Work”, consolidates a series of 
codes which cast more light onto the factors underlying working practices and 
behaviours in PowderCo UK and which form a background to the incident.  
 
In fact, on reflecting upon the incident, the study participants themselves identified 
areas of weakness in the company’s operations.  A number of examples were given 
where the acceptance by the organisation of differing decisions, behaviours and 
working practices by various staff members resulted in the company missing 
opportunities to either prevent the incident from occurring or to detect the failure 
earlier.   
 
The first example concerns the working practices of the engineering team in 
maintaining the shear pins in the chain drive system in Bin C.  These pins snap if an 
extra load is put onto the system, e.g. if the chain is dragging.  The replacement of 
snapped shear pins is a reasonably routine event, but looking back, P008 said: 
 
“I suppose the alarms bell should have rung a little bit when we had we had a 
couple of shear pins snap on it [Bin C] and when the guys just changed the pins, 
you know, and then and it went on for a couple of days and then it went again. 
So I suppose really we should have thought about why it snapped then, but 
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some of the engineers will just say “oh well I changed the pins”, you know, they 
just change them....” (P008, Senior Engineer)  
 
 
Whilst the breaking shear pins were not directly related to the generation of the metal 
shards in the bin, an investigation of the gearing mechanism and chains at that time 
could have uncovered the slippages to the chains and the start of the damage to the 
bin. In other words, a more curious attitude, or a more rigorous investigation of why 
the shear pins had snapped twice in a short time, potentially could have prevented the 
quality incident from occurring, i.e. an opportunity was missed to prevent the incident.   
 
Underlying this missed opportunity is also an acceptance of variations in working 
practices in the engineering team, in that different team members appear to respond 
to the same event - a broken shear pin - in different ways.  Some engineers simply 
replace the pin to enable production to carry on with minimal disruption, whilst others 
appear to question the event more deeply and search for why the pins break.  This last 
behaviour fits well with the general approach identified in PowderCo UK of learning 
from failure, (which is covered further in section 5.3.2, under “What Works”), but it is 
obvious from this example that not all staff embrace that attitude equally, or at least 
not all of the time.  
 
This same scenario can also be considered from a quality cost perspective.  The 
engineers who simply replace a broken shear pin might be considered to be acting 
promptly to minimise internal failure costs.  In contrast, an engineer who takes the 
time to consider the reasons for failure is spending time (and hence money) on 
prevention costs, with, presumably an aim of reducing future problems and so 
reducing spend on future internal failure costs.   
 
Another example of a missed opportunity was given during the group discussion when 
the site HACCP lead (P003), reflected on age of the site and equipment and the HACCP 
team’s failure to fully account for that in the HACCP process: 
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“I think a lot of it came down to, really when you've got your hazard analysis in 
there for the food safety management system, is that, over time, the risks 
change and I don't think we've captured that very well, that the risk from the 
bin could increase over time as things get older.” (P003, Quality Manager). 
 
The need to consider the passage of time / age during HACCP plan reviews arises again 
in the second case study and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
The missed opportunities created by variations in working practices were also seen in 
two other areas.  It has already been highlighted that line operators lacked an 
objective standard to distinguish “acceptable” (i.e. “safe”) from “unacceptable” (i.e. 
“unsafe”) levels of fine metal collected on the detection magnets.  This indicates that 
line operators must have been using individual judgement about what actions to take 
when they found such deposits and when to alert management to a problem with the 
metal detection system, i.e. there was a variation in practice across the production 
operatives in this respect.   
 
Likewise, in other interviews, participants identified variations in working practices in 
the line operators working with Bin C which could have increased the risk of damage 
occurring to the bin.  In normal production, as the powdered product passes through 
the bins, the food product itself acts as a partial barrier or lubricant, reducing metal to 
metal contact.  Best practice, as per the site SOPs, is therefore to avoid running the 
bins empty as this conversely increases the risk of metal-to-metal contact and hence 
the risk of damage to the equipment.  However, not all staff adhered to this practice, 
and such variation in practice appeared to be tolerated:  
 
“Well according to the SOP if the bins are empty you’re supposed to stop.  But 
it depends upon when different operators, different operators take different 
ways.” (P002, Cell Team Leader) 
 
Overall therefore, a number of areas were identified where opportunities had been 
missed to prevent the occurrence of the quality incident or to identify it sooner.  
Importantly, many of these missed opportunities resulted from small differences in 
working practices between different staff.   The next theme therefore considers 
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whether the culture and values of the organisation can account for these differences in 
behaviour (working practice) between different staff members. 
 
“Culture and Values” 
Given the focus of this research on food safety and FSC, the data gathered was 
interrogated to gain an understanding of PowderCo UK’s attitude to food safety, both 
in terms of the embedded case and at the organisational level.  In the embedded case 
a “safety first” attitude was evident, as exemplified by the actions taken when Bin C 
was identified as the source of the metal contamination: 
 
“We immediately stop all the plant, we stop using C Bin, whatever was 
produced on site from C Bin, we put it on hold.” (P001, Quality Supervisor). 
 
In fact, Bin C was out of action for many weeks while the incident was investigated and 
new parts for it were being manufactured, which left the site running with reduced 
capacity and so behind on production targets, i.e. there was an ongoing cost of poor 
quality to the organisation.  This, however, was viewed as secondary to protecting 
consumer safety: 
 
“We did stop using one of the bins, we used the second bin which limited our 
production a little bit, but you know that's not the issue, it's a side effect.” (P007, 
Senior Quality Manager). 
 
The same degree of concern for food safety was demonstrated in other aspects of the 
incident investigation, for example in tracing potentially affected products35:  
  
“…we had to find out if there was product anywhere else, like at docks, or in 
transit, or anything made it actually onto the shelf ...yes, so we did the 
traceability twice …we did a verification of that traceability effectively and went 
through all of it again, just to make sure every single pack was accounted for.” 
(P003, Quality Manager). 
 
                                                          
35 In fact, the traceability exercise confirmed that all of the potentially affected product remained under 
the control of the company, at site or with company or third party co-packers.  Hence the incident was 
classified as a non-reportable food incident under EU and UK legislation.   
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The fact that undertaking the traceability exercise twice would have doubled the 
quality costs (an internal failure cost) for this activity was not seen as an issue by the 
team – assuring that they had full and accurate traceability for the products was far 
more important.   
 
Another aspect of organisational culture and values illustrated by the embedded case 
was the commitment of senior management to the investigation and management of 
the quality incident. 
 
As previously mentioned under the theme of “Communication”, when PowderCo UK 
were first notified of the incident by the contract packer, senior management were 
immediately informed and were highly involved in managing the incident. 
 
“A local incident committee is pulled together which is managed by senior 
management.” (P003, Quality Manager).  “OK.  And who's normally involved in 
that? (Researcher).  “That'd be the quality head, the site director, well, all of 
the senior leadership team, and then you have inputs from quality, engineering 
and production.  There would also be our logistics department involved as 
well, to see what the effects on supply might be.” (P003).  “And how quickly did 
that happen? How quickly did they get together?” (Researcher).  “On the same 
day [that the site was informed].” (P003). 
 
The involvement of the site management team in the incident investigation is clear 
from the above quote.  From the examination of documents pertaining to the incident, 
the involvement and concern of the broader organisation in PowderCo Global was also 
apparent.  For example, the site reported several times on the incident to a “Supply 
Chain Review Board”, a senior management team who look at supply chain issues 
across the entire corporation.   
 
Going back to the description of the formation of the LIC, this involvement and prompt 
action by PowderCo UK management not only illustrates the value of product safety to 
the company but also the value placed on systems and processes by the organisation, 
as the organisation reacted to the notification of the quality incident by implementing 
standardised, documented procedures.  The reliance on and trust in processes and 
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systems was particularly seen in data clustered under the next theme, “Problem 
Solving Our Way”.  
 
“Problem Solving Our Way” 
The examination of both the embedded case and the broader organisation revealed 
the central role that routines, processes and systems play in PowderCo UK.  Of 
particular note were the comprehensive processes used by the company to investigate 
and manage the incident.   
 
The setup of a LIC was obviously a routine matter, as was the choice of RCA to 
investigate the quality incident.   
 
“It’s like we’ve got a standard template in place, and for any major or critical 
incidents we follow that template, which is called a problem-solving template, 
a root cause analysis template.” (P001, Quality Supervisor)  
 
In fact, RCA as a technique was so embedded within the site there was a room named 
the “RCA Room” specifically set aside for teams to work on problems (including 
aspects such as production challenges, not just quality or safety issues). 
 
For the incident in question, as shown in Figure 5.2, a number of documents were 
examined by the Researcher.  Many of these documents demonstrated the 
standardised processes used by the business to deal with quality and safety issues, e.g. 
the concessions process which gives temporary approval for production to occur under 
non-standard conditions, or which allows for the release of product which is out of 
specification in some way.  In the embedded case, the concessions process was used to 
enable production to restart using Bin C after the initial fault had been identified with 
the gearing of the bottom chain and it was through the additional quality checks put in 
place as part of this concession approval that the ongoing problem with metal 
contamination was identified.   
 
PowderCo UK’s reliance on systems and processes will be discussed further in Section 
5.3.2, but it can already be seen as one of the elements which the organisation itself 
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would consider a strength or an asset to the business, and one of the reasons that the 
company is generally successful.  However, given the failure of the systems and 
processes which underlie this incident, this reliance might be called into question.  In 
the terminology of PC, the pro-active truth of “the systems are effective” and the 
pragmatic truth of “the systems failed” appear not to have been recognised, i.e. there 
is a truth gap.  This aspect of the case will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
It was also possible to identify other elements of the organisation’s practices and 
customs which can be considered as part of its success, and these are presented next, 
under the theme “What Works”. 
 
“What Works” 
As described earlier, the story of the management and resolution of the metal 
contamination incident had already been established in the organisation as an 
historical (albeit recent history) “war story”, where the workers overcame challenge 
and adversity to attain success.   
 
A part of this success was considered to be learning lessons from this non-reportable 
food incident with the aim of preventing similar failures in the future.  This was 
illustrated perfectly by one of the key actions taken to resolve the metal 
contamination incident and get the manufacturing plant back up to full production.  To 
enable this, an upgrade was made to the design of Bin C.  PowderCo UK went one step 
further than a simple repair to the gearing and chain system in the Bin; they went back 
to the original equipment manufacturers to commission a new conveyor, where the 
chain sits on a manganese strip, so that should a slippage occur again, the metal of the 
Bin would not be worn by the chain:  
 
“We looked at the age of it and things like that and called in the company that 
actually built the machine and who still had the drawings and we asked them to 
build us a new conveyor, a totally new conveyor.  With a redesign in it; we put 
a different design to it so that if the chain ever moved again, it wouldn't shred 
any metal.  So it's now got manganese strips.  'Cos the chain sits on a 
manganese strip and it glides on it.  So we put manganese strips on the side so 
when the chain moves over it won't wear it.” (P008, Senior Engineer) 
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From a quality cost perspective, this point also illustrates that PowderCo UK was 
prepared to invest in the future safety and quality of the product (i.e. a spend in the 
category of preventative costs) to avoid future failure costs.  
 
Further evidence of learning lessons from failure came in the plans put in place to 
upgrade the second, smaller bin on site so as to guard against future problems of chain 
wear on that bin as well (another preventative quality cost).  
 
Other lessons learned from the quality incident resulted in upgrades in controls and 
monitoring on site.  For example, the “gouges” in the interior of Bin C had been 
painted to increase their visibility.  This enabled any new wear to the bin, should it 
happen, to be easily identified during routine maintenance inspections. 
 
Another upgrade to the FSMnS was the increase in inspections for some of the 
magnets, for example:  
 
“Yes, we have changed the system from before. We had a system to check the 
Bin magnets at the end of the campaign only.  Now we check every shift.” 
(P002, Cell Team Leader). 
 
 
From a quality costing perspective, such upgrades to the FSMnS would be classified as 
an appraisal cost, and again demonstrates that PowderCo UK was prepared to invest in 
such spend to avoid future failure costs. 
 
From these examples it is clear that learning from mistakes can be considered as a 
strength of PowderCo UK. This ties in with the site’s long-established use of CI 
practices.  This and other elements of the organisational level findings of the case 
study are considered later in section 5.3.2.    
 
One final element of practice that can be considered to be integral to PowderCo UK’s 
successful resolution of the quality incident was in the organisation’s reliance on 
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experience and expertise, both internal and external to the company.  This is 
presented as the final theme for the embedded case. 
 
“Experience Required” 
As the study participants told the story of the metal contamination incident the 
important role played by experienced staff, and particularly by external consultants 
and suppliers, became clear.  External suppliers / contractors were crucial in the 
determination of the cause of the incident.  The roles of the magnet suppliers who 
undertook a full audit of the site system, and that of the maintenance contractor for 
the bins, who worked with engineering and discovered the faults in Bin C, have already 
been detailed. 
 
In addition to these experts, PowderCo UK employed an external food safety expert to 
undertake a full audit of the FSMS and FSMnS for metal contamination:   
 
“Did you make any changes to the HACCP plan or the pre-requisites to try and 
address this [failure in FSMS]? (Researcher).  “Yes, so we first of all needed the 
consultant, we did a sort of broader review really, using the external consultant 
'cos the external consultant is a food safety expert.” (P003, Quality Manager). 
 
These clear examples demonstrate again the prioritisation of food safety within the 
business as well as the trust placed by the companies on guidance and support from 
external experts. (The use of external consultants to undertake additional audits and 
reviews is also another example of an internal failure cost which resulted from the 
incident). 
 
Whilst internal expertise was also clearly valued by PowderCo UK (as showed for 
example, by the makeup of the LIC, involving experienced staff members and 
management), there was also some evidence that the value placed on experience may 
limit the engagement and participation of some staff.  For example, when discussing 
involvement in the RCA team, P002 explained that he had not been involved because 
he had not been working in the company for very long when the incident came to light.   
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“No, we were not involved … and also I believe that because I was quite new   … 
I think it’s because of my lack of understanding they did not involve me” (P002, 
Cell Team Leader).   
 
Whilst it is true that P002 did not have much experience in PowderCo UK’s operation, 
he had been working in food manufacturing for some years and therefore might have 
been able to provide relevant insights to assist the work of the RCA team. This 
contrasts somewhat with the approach taken in LiquiComp UK, where the incident 
investigation involved managers who were new into the business, and from whom 
insights into ways of improving practice were sought.  
 
Conclusion 
This thematic analysis of the embedded case shows that the metal contamination 
incident which took place at Power Co UK was complex, both in its origination and in 
its investigation.  Whilst the organisation had a well-established QMS, FSMS and 
FSMnS in place, the controls for metal contamination proved inadequate to prevent 
this incident.   
 
Both the generation of the metal fragments, and the failure of the control measures, 
were “unexpected” by the company, a finding which will be discussed in Section 5.4 
and in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The analysis of the incident uncovered both strengths and weaknesses of the 
organisation.  Clear strengths were demonstrated in the processes and systems used 
to investigate and manage the incident; in the importance with which food safety is 
held by the organisation, and in its ability to learn from mistakes, particularly through 
the creation of narratives or “war stories” about such challenging times.  These stories 
form a key part of communication in the company, which throughout the incident was 
open and timely, helping to foster a shared understanding of the events surrounding 
the incident and a shared understanding of the company values, particularly in respect 
to food safety.  No data was collected on the cost to the business of this specific 
incident, however it is evident that the business prioritised the safety of consumers 
over minimising the internal failure costs associated with shut down of facilities, 
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product tracking and traceability activity and the engineering work to repair Bin C.  
Indeed, this incident also demonstrated the willingness of PowderCo UK to incur 
prevention costs to reduce the risk of future failings by instigating the same 
engineering improvements to Bin B as well as improving the working of Bin C and by 
investing in improved surveillance and testing (as evidenced through increased magnet 
and sieve checks, put in place initially as part of the concessions process to restart 
production after the first finding of metal shards).  
 
The weaknesses identified through the thematic analysis relate predominately to the 
missed opportunities to prevent the incident, many of which were underpinned by 
small variances in ways of working.  This is illustrated by mapping out the points 
underlying the failure of the sieves and magnets as CPs and CCPs, as shown in Figure 
5.5 overleaf.  Whilst both people and process issues (as well as equipment failures) are 
demonstrated, it is the underlying variance in working practices – a people 
characteristic - which the standard processes cannot accommodate successfully.  This 
forms an important feature of the case which will be discussed in Chapter 7 in relation 
to PC and the dimension of possibilities.  The “truth gap” seen between the reliance on 
systems and processes to manage food safety and quality, and the failure of these 
systems, will also be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Having examined the embedded case, we now turn to examine the organisational 
level, to consider the study findings pertaining to the day-to-day operations of 
PowderCo UK. 
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Figure 5.5: Magnet & Sieve Checks – People or Process Failures?  
 
 
 
172 
 
5.3.2 The Organisational Level 
 
The previous section presented a thematic analysis of the embedded case of the metal 
contamination incident.  Whilst this incident offers insights into the workings of 
PowderCo UK at a time of QMS / FSMS failure, such events have been, thankfully, a 
rarity for the organisation – it has after all been a successful food producer for over a 
century.  As such, it is important to consider the general operations of the company.  
These are presented in this section in a similar fashion to the embedded case, though 
six of the themes developed in the inductive analysis: “Day-to-Day”; “What Works”; 
“Experience Required”; “Formal Expressions of Culture”; “Culture and Values” and 
“Communication”. 
 
“Day-to-Day”  
This first theme for the overall organisation brings together codes pertaining to the 
everyday running of the manufacturing plant.  Given the nature and focus of the 
research, much of this information concerned the FSMS, but much of the general 
philosophy and approach of the organisation can be understood by considering the 
quality and food safety systems. 
 
First, it is clear from the information collected, that both the QMS and FSMS used on 
site are well organised and fully documented, with appropriate reviews conducted on 
time by the relevant personnel.   Concentrating on the FSMS, in addition to the 
documentation provided to the Researcher, all of the participants were able to 
describe aspects of the system, the CCPs and the FSMnS used in the plant (with the 
level of detail given depending on experience and job function but appropriate within 
those limitations).   During the factory tour the CCPs were pointed out to the 
Researcher: they were indicated by specific “skull and cross bones” signs on the 
manufacturing line and information on the controls was readily available for 
consultation by production line operatives.   
 
As previously discussed in the embedded case, under “Problem Solving Our Way”, 
processes and systems are central to the ways of working at PowderCo UK.  Looking at 
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the broader workings of the company, there were clear demonstrations of the links 
made between different systems and processes. One example given was the link 
between new product development, when production trials are conducted in the 
factory, and the FSMS: 
 
“…. even for trials we still do a HACCP; there's a HACCP review even if it [the 
product] doesn't go to the consumer…” (P003, Quality Manager). 
 
Another element of the day-to-day use of systems and processes was the mix of simple 
and more sophisticated controls used across the production process.  For example, 
automated controls are in place to manage a CCP related to microbiological safety 
(time and temperature controls).  This contrasts with the simple, physical checks made 
of magnets and sieves as CPs/ CCPs for metal and other physical contaminants.   
 
Recording of checks of the control points likewise ranged from “pen and paper” 
systems (e.g. recording of the results of magnet checks) to the “IP21” in-house 
computerised system which monitors and records micronutrient addition to some 
products.  
 
This blend of simple and complex systems is not unique to PowderCo UK and fits with 
the Researcher’s prior experiences in the food industry.  However, it demonstrates the 
relative complexity of PowderCo UK’s quality and safety systems and the need to 
ensure that changes in one part of the system do not impact on other parts of the 
system in unforeseen ways, simply because of the mix of systems and recording 
processes in use. 
 
Another clear take out from the analysis of the case study data is the importance of CI 
activities in PowderCo UK. CI, and associated tools such as RCA, appear firmly 
embedded as a way of working as described for metal contamination incident under 
“This Is What Went Wrong”.  CI also fits with the site-wide targets of “zero accidents, 
zero defects and zero waste”, which are further discussed under the theme “Formal 
Expressions of Culture”. 
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Overall, systems and processes are seen as critical for the day-to-day operations within 
PowderCo UK, just as they were to manage the quality incident.  The use of CI and 
associated tools also fits with the learning from failure approach identified in the 
embedded quality failure case. 
 
So, if processes and systems are part of what makes PowderCo UK tick, what else can 
be seen as contributing to the overall success of the organisation? This is the topic of 
the next theme, “What Works”.  
 
“What Works” 
In examining this theme for the embedded case, PowderCo UK’s ability to learn from 
failure was highlighted as an organisational strength.  Related to this is a capability that 
was coded as “creative thinking”. For example, in a discussion of the efficacy of the 
control system for metal and other physical contaminants used across the site, P008 
related work he instigated some time ago to improve the system:  
 
“I always said that there was a gap there [in the controls for physical 
contamination], and I actually got back to the manufacturers, and asked them.  
Because our guys do a sieve check, so they take the sieve out and check it for 
any damage to make sure there's nothing gone through it.  But what I always 
said that is if something was ever in that sieve, when they pull that out, it 
would actually fall into our product.  So what I made them do, what we done 
we retro fitted some trays.  So they do a magnet check, pull the magnet out, 
put a tray in, pull the screen out, so any debris that's in there will fall onto the 
tray, and then they inspect the tray, so it wouldn't go into our product.” (P008, 
Senior Engineer) 
 
This example also offers another demonstration of PowderCo UK’s willingness to invest 
in preventative measures, in anticipation of reducing future quality failure costs.   
 
Creative thinking, or considering alternative possibilities – and in particular considering 
them as factual possibilities, using the terminology of PC - is one way that upgrades to 
controls and prevention of failures can be achieved without the need to experience a 
failure first.   The importance of considering possible system failures as factual 
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possibilities, in order to enhance development of a robust HACCP based FSMSs, will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
Lastly under this theme, the application of rigour or thoroughness in the way that staff 
undertake tasks, was evident in the operations of PowderCo UK.  Examples ranged 
from ensuring that spare sieves are always available on site (as the final sieving before 
bulk packing constitutes a CCP for physical contamination, and without this in place 
the production cannot run), to the double-checking of the traceability exercise 
conducted in the quality incident (see “Culture and Values” in section 5.3.1).  This 
approach appears central to the generally successful day-to-day operations of 
PowderCo UK.  
 
Another element of the success of PowderCo UK is the respect with which experts and 
experience are held. This aspect of the case study findings forms the next theme. 
 
“Experience Required”  
In the analysis of the quality incident, the important role played by external experts 
(consultants and suppliers) and the trust placed in internal staff with in-house 
experience was examined.   A similar level of trust and dependence on expertise is 
seen in day-to-day operations, particularly from a quality and food safety perspective.   
 
PowderCo UK employs a range of staff with food safety and quality experience and 
operates a site HACCP team, some of whom took part in the group interview during 
data collection (as outlined in table 5.1).  Emphasis is placed on the importance of staff 
having appropriate training and holding the appropriate food safety and HACCP 
qualifications:  
 
“… going back to what you said about what requirement for health and safety or 
food safety training is, depending on where you are in, and what you're doing, 
obviously members of the HACCP team have to have a lot higher level of training, 
but we have escalation all the way down to make sure even the process guys, the 
guys out on the plant, the logistics guys, they've all got a at least a basic 
knowledge of food safety and that's part of our on-going yearly training package 
…” (P007, Quality Manager)  
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Indeed, not only are staff expected to undergo and pass this training, all members of 
the site senior leadership team, including the Site Director, take an externally 
accredited Food Safety Level 3 Certificate when they take up positions in the 
management team.  Similarly, PowderCo UK recognises the value of independent 
review of its food safety systems.  Two levels of internal audits are undertaken 
regularly, by PowderCo UK and by PowderCo Global quality staff.  In addition, the site 
uses third party audit and certification to demonstrate the quality of its systems, and is 
both BRC and ISO 22000 accredited.  Both the training and audits equate to prevention 
costs in the terms of quality costing.   
 
Overall, it is clear that respect for expertise is part of the culture of PowderCo UK.  The 
external quality and food safety certifications can be seen as a formal expression of the 
prioritisation of food safety by the company.  The next theme considers such formal 
expressions of culture in more detail, and in particular considers the position of food 
safety and quality within this. 
 
“Formal Expressions of Culture”  
Although PowderCo UK has been operating as a manufacturing site since the early 20th 
Century, the mergers and acquisitions which are common across the food industry 
means there have been several owners of the site.  This, plus the passage of time, has 
inevitably brought periodic changes in official company mission statements.   
 
The current company mission statement for PowderCo Global has been in place for 
more than a decade and is highly visible to staff and visitors alike.  It sits as the 
headline on the front page of PowderCo Global’s website, is inscribed in large letters 
on the foyer wall of PowderCo UK’s reception area and is even written on the door 
fingerplates of all the meeting rooms across the site.  Likewise, PowderCo Global’s 
corporate values are easily found on their website and form part of the induction 
process for all new staff.  These values are further translated into expected behaviours, 
which comprise part of the annual review of staff Performance Development Plans 
(PDPs).  Staff are assessed on not only the absolute achievement of objectives in their 
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PDPs – “what” they achieve – but “how” they achieve these, in terms of fit with the 
behaviours.  
 
Whilst food safety and quality per se are not specifically mentioned in the corporate 
mission statement or values, there are corporate and site quality statements.  These 
make the link between the corporate core value of trust (by consumers and broader 
society) and product quality.  
 
Although the corporate mission statement is prominent across the site, none of the 
staff directly quoted the mission statement as an expression of the purpose of the 
organisation.  However, staff made the link between the official mission statement, the 
end consumer and food safety.  For example, when asked if or how food safety linked 
with the corporate mission statement, this was the response of one of the focus group 
participants:  
 
“… I think it's thinking of the person at the end of the supply chain, and that can 
be you and me, or a child in Nigeria or Malaysia, so thinking of them, and 
ourselves, is directly linked with making sure that the product is safe for 
consumption …” (P003, Quality Manager)   
 
Another formal expression of culture can be seen in site goals and targets.  The 
manufacturing and supply side of PowderCo Global, including the case study site, have 
adopted goals or targets of “zero accidents, zero defects and zero waste”.  These form 
a focus of the daily accountability meetings and are communicated on notice boards in 
staff coffee areas and office corridors.  Again, food safety is not directly named in the 
targets, but the displays around the site show how these targets are linked to safety 
and quality of the product e.g. cleaning of equipment (part of the PRPs) is linked to 
producing zero defects in the products.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that as a mature organisation there is a stable and well 
understood formal organisational culture.  Examining this in terms of the 
organisational culture model of Schein (2004, p 26), it appears that with the passage of 
time staff have been able to take the artifacts and symbols of the corporation’s culture 
178 
 
(mission, targets etc.) and imbue them with the basic underlying assumptions of the 
local site culture, which, as explained in the next theme, “Culture and Values”, is highly 
focussed on the staff and product safety.   
 
“Culture and Values”  
The “safety first” attitude of PowderCo UK during the management of the quality 
incident was described under this theme for the embedded case.  We now look at how 
the study participants expressed their general views and understanding of company 
values, to ascertain where food safety fits in their perception of company priorities 
outside of the particular focus of a quality incident.   
 
As detailed above, food safety is not named per se in PowderCo Global’s mission 
statement.  However, when participants were asked to describe the purpose of the 
organisation (PowderCo UK), food safety was the first item listed in all interviews: 
 
“The main focus for the site is, first is food safety… the first priority for 
everyone is food safety.” (P001, Quality Supervisor). 
 
“We want to make sure that there is no product which is unsafe for the public 
can go from here” (P002, Cell Team Leader). 
 
“To make product safely ….” (P005, Cell Team Leader). 
 
“To make product that people would feel comfortable buying, they’d feel 
assured that this is a product that’s not going to cause any harm...” (P003, 
Quality Manager). 
 
“Provide a safe product for our customers.” (P008, Senior Engineer). 
 
Doubt could be cast on this finding as an artefact created by the study participants 
being aware (through the provision of participant information sheets and obtaining 
informed consent) of the interest of the Researcher in food safety.  A particular 
concern might be raised about these views being expressed during the group 
discussion, given the presence of the HACCP lead in the group. However, as 
demonstrated by the quotes, this view was also expressed by staff in individual 
interviews, not simply during the group discussion.   
179 
 
In addition, the same situation was not encountered in the second case study, 
LiquiComp UK, suggesting that this finding is not merely caused by the study design (or 
from any group effect) but is an insight into the true values of the study participants.  
Indeed, this prioritisation of food safety as the purpose of the organisation fits with the 
“safety first” attitude discussed earlier in terms of the metal contamination incident.   
 
Participants also expressed pride in the work they carry out and the importance of 
food safety within PowderCo UK. As one participant put it: 
 
“… the outside [of the factory] probably looks a bit dirty, but you go inside and 
the standards that we’re actually trying to achieve here are top notch ….” 
(P007, Quality Manager).   
 
Another example of the importance of food hygiene and safety was shown by the 
pride with which participants spoke of a recent review of long term cleaning 
programmes carried out by an external contractor: 
 
“… during the meeting they [the contractor] turned around and said we’re 
actually doing far more here than any other factory they visit to do with long 
term cleaning, far more robust than anywhere else.” (P004, Shift Supervisor). 
 
Another good example of the high standards that the site is aiming for (and the 
willingness of the company to spend on prevention, in quality costing terms) was 
found during the production plant tour.  The Researcher was shown new flooring being 
laid in a storage area, where traditional wooden slated floors were being replaced with 
non-slip linoleum.  The wooden flooring had been raised as a potential concern in 
several BRC inspections; although the site had never been marked down in an audit 
because of this, management had decided to replace it as a proactive measure to 
improve hygiene, the new flooring being easier to clean and offering better protection 
against pest ingress.  
 
The commitment of senior management to food safety was also evident through the 
required training for food safety and HACCP, which has been described under 
“Experience Required”.     
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A final point to raise under this theme is the importance to the site of the health and 
safety of employees and visitors, as well as food safety.  As P008 put it when discussing 
engineering changes and the time taken to achieve these: 
 
“…. we need to make sure, not only as a safe product, but as a safety to our 
staff you know, and people around us…” (P008, Senior Engineer) 
 
A focus on accident prevention is seen in the site wide target of “zero accidents”, 
previously mentioned in the theme “Formal Expressions of Culture”.  Study 
participants also described a “ZAP” system, which is used across the site to record 
health and safety “near misses” and put in place remedial actions.  Further measures 
to embed the culture of health and safety across the site are also seen in the 
objectives set for staff: 
 
“... I must submit a minimum of 6 safety improvement ideas… I have already 
achieved that six, so small things make a lot of difference….” (P002, Cell Team 
Leader). 
 
Although no specific scheme to measure FSC or report on food safety issues (in a 
similar way to the ZAP reports) was described by study participants, the cross over 
with health and safety systems and culture was recognised: 
 
“…. we’ve got the ZAP process as well which generally uses about safety, but 
can also cover I guess some food safety stuff if it’s deemed to be a risk…” 
(P007, Quality Manager). 
 
“… and looking at overall safety we have an assessment, something called living 
safely which is about understanding behaviours and how the site is actually 
managing safety, going from we obey the rules sometimes all the way up to we 
live and breathe safety.  But the implication is that if you’re doing that for 
safety, you’re probably doing it, almost likely doing it for the other side of 
things which is the product safety, food safety piece”. (P007, Quality Manager). 
 
These examples illustrate a link between the “top down”, written directives and 
policies from senior management (as outlined in the previous theme) and actual 
working practices in the business.  In other words, at PowderCo UK, staff appeared to 
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approach food safety with an attitude of “what we say, we do” and not simply pay lip 
service to written policies on food safety and quality. 
 
The communication of formal policies, and how these are interpreted and 
recommunicated in the business, have already been touched upon in these last two 
themes.  Communication forms the final theme under which the overall PowderCo UK 
case will be described. 
 
“Communication” 
Communication during the investigation and management of the metal contamination 
incident was discussed in section 5.3.1, and the development of “war stories”, telling 
of the organisations successful fight to overcome adversity, was highlighted as an 
organisational strength.   
 
Storytelling is also evident in more general communications in PowderCo UK.  The 
history of the products, site and company are told in a leaflet and visually through 
physical artefacts, photographs and maps, in a small museum located near the site 
reception.   
 
In the organisation, product quality and health and safety messages are also often 
reinforced via stories.  During the Researcher’s visit to the PowderCo UK site, one story 
noted was a health and safety “news flash” poster located at a coffee point in the main 
office area. This told of fines issued to a laundry firm after a worker fell through a floor 
and received burns from equipment located below.  The key message of the poster 
was “What can you learn from this?”, illustrating that that PowderCo UK use such 
storytelling to impart knowledge and provoke learning on what could otherwise be 
perceived as “dry” and uninteresting topics. 
 
This type of visual communication might be considered passive, relying on people to 
use their own initiative and read the posters, for example, but it is a very transparent 
form of communication, in that such posters are open to view by anyone walking along 
corridors or using meeting rooms.  Such visual communication is also used by 
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management to focus the organisation on key priorities and objectives. Examples 
range from team work plans displayed in working areas, to site targets for “zero 
accidents, zero defects, zero waste” being set out on notice boards in the office 
corridors.   
 
A more active and directed form of communication comes in the form of the daily site 
accountability meeting, which is attended by the site director together with 
management representatives of production and supporting site functions, and which is 
held just inside the main entrance to the production area.  This meeting is supported 
by a series of meetings held earlier in the morning by individual site production teams 
and support functions, enabling information to flow up to and cascade back down 
from the main meeting.  
 
At the accountability meeting issues affecting the site are raised as incident reports 
(IRs); if these are not quickly resolved, are deemed to be of greater significance or 
require ongoing work, they are classified as a CAPA (corrective action, preventative 
action).  The meeting attendees also run through the three site targets of zero 
accidents, zero defects and zero waste and the top three priorities for action are 
agreed and documented on a series of white boards, placed in the production area and 
visible to all on-site staff.  This format allows IRs and CAPAs to be tracked and 
monitored easily, as well as longer term plans such as tracking capital spend (which is 
reviewed periodically).   The prioritised actions drive part of the workload of the 
management team, who are expected to work on resolving IRs and CAPAs at 3pm each 
day, in order to report progress at the following morning meeting.  Thus, the 
accountability meeting acts as an important vehicle for agreeing priorities, directing 
effort across the site and communicating both targets and progress.  
 
Another specific communication activity used across PowderCo UK was referred to by 
the study participants as “Gembas”, which are conducted by all levels of management. 
This is a Japanese term, explained as meaning “go and see”, the practice of which 
forms part of the company Six Sigma process improvement tool kit.  The Gemba 
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involves managers engaging with staff on the factory floor to look at work practices 
and understand issues.  It was variously described as: 
 
 “…. a bit like auditing, but with a different slant, so you’re just trying to find out 
what’s happening…” (P007, Quality Manager)  
 
“…. going out and looking at things and asking questions to the operators in a 
very polite way….” (P001, Quality Supervisor) 
 
Documentation provided to the Researcher on the Gemba method as used in 
PowderCo UK set out two different type of Gemba: problem focussed and safety 
focussed.  The first supports problem solving in a focussed area, in a coaching manner, 
whilst the second is used to identify sources of risk and identify preventative safety 
improvements.  PowderCo UK managers are expected to conduct four Gemba sessions 
each week (with some targeted to feed into IRs for the accountability meetings).  
Gemba appeared to be a longstanding practice which was viewed positively, giving 
staff an opportunity to communicate freely with management, and for management to 
get close to the issues that matter to their teams.   
 
Overall therefore, the open, transparent approach to communication seen in the 
quality incident is echoed in day-to-day communications on the site.  The 
communication methods experienced support story telling as a vehicle for CI, and set 
communication activities (Gembas and accountability meetings) are used to foster 
closer ties between management and staff and to focus the whole organisation on key 
priorities.   
 
Conclusion 
This thematic analysis of PowderCo UK from an organisational perspective has 
elucidated key insights into the attitudes, behaviours and working practices of the 
business.  Processes and systems are key to managing the business; communication is 
regular and open and there is a common understanding of the overall organisational 
mission and values which are interpreted at a local level to prioritise the safety of food 
and people.   These values are backed up by a management commitment to food 
safety evidenced by staff training; by the audit and certification of site quality and food 
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safety systems, and by the proactive approach to improving facilities to ensure good 
hygiene on site, such as the floor replacement programme.  Although a breakdown of 
quality costs was not obtained as part of the case study, it is clear that the organisation 
is willing to incur additional spend on prevention and appraisal costs, as evidenced by 
these examples.   
 
With this overall assessment of the organisation, we now return to the case of the 
non-reportable food incident, to consider if the organisation behaves and works 
consistently when comparing normal operations to a time of stress, or if there are any 
differences.  We also return to the first research objective: can the failure of the FSMS 
/ QMS be related to the process itself or is it due to the people implementing and using 
the systems? These questions are addressed in the next section.   
 
 
5.4 The Relationship between the Embedded Case and the Organisation 
 
Having analysed both the embedded case of the non-reportable food incident and the 
broader organisational case, it is important to consider the degree of congruity 
between the results.  Are the organisational values, behaviours and practices related in 
the narrative of the incident the same as those espoused in formal organisational 
processes and policies? Do the everyday working practices described by study 
participants differ from the actions taken by PowderCo UK under a time of stress?  
 
As previously described, common themes have been developed across the embedded 
and organisational cases.  The reliance on, and trust in experts (internal and external to 
the business) and experience was noteworthy.  There was also particularly strong 
alignment in the importance of processes and systems for the everyday running of the 
business and for incident management and problem solving.  In fact, the company 
might be seen as having an over-reliance on systems and processes.  Indeed, excessive 
paperwork and documentation are known barriers to the implementation of FSMS 
(Jevšnik et al., 2006; Fotopoulos et al., 2011).  Whilst there were few complaints by 
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study participants about the complexity of systems, gaps in the SOP and checklists for 
checking magnets and sieves were key in the system failures seen in the incident (as 
shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5).  The plethora of different systems and processes might 
result in “system swamping”, making it difficult for staff to identify any critical gaps in 
systems and processes and so acting as a barrier to effective food safety governance.    
 
Another key finding was the synergy between CI in day-to-day operations and learning 
from failure in the case of the quality incident, which can be considered as two 
complementary elements of organisational learning.   
 
The fundamental importance of food safety to PowderCo UK was also striking.  
PowderCo Global’s mission statement has been successfully interpreted by staff at the 
UK manufacturing site to position the key priorities of the business as the safety of the 
food it produces and the workers who make it.  This prioritisation was clearly echoed 
in the management and resolution of the metal contamination incident.  
 
In Chapter 3, FSC was defined as “the aggregation of the prevailing, relatively constant, 
learned, shared attitudes, values and beliefs contributing to the hygiene behaviours 
used within a particular food handling environment” (Griffith 2008, 2009, cited by 
Griffith et al., 2010a.  The prioritisation of food safety, both in terms of systems and 
processes and the central position that food safety takes when employees discuss the 
purpose of the organisation, suggests that in terms of Griffith’s definition, PowderCo 
UK could be considered as having a strong FSC.  A further analysis of the FSC of Powder 
Co UK using the model of Jespersen et al. (2017), and a comparison with the FSC of 
LiquiComp UK is presented in Chapter 7, section 7.2.  
 
One element missing from the description of the incident was any suggestion of a 
blame culture, with neither individuals nor functions being singled out as being 
responsible for the failure.   Blame could easily have been assigned to the engineering 
team for a failure to maintain Bin C in appropriate working order – surely they should 
have recognised that the age of the equipment increased risks of failure?  Likewise, 
blame could have been cast on the line operators who failed to recognise an 
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unacceptable level of metal generation when checking in-process magnets – surely 
they could see that a problem was occurring? Fault could also have been placed with 
the engineer who ran the project which moved the magnet in Bin C, and with the 
individuals who conducted the HACCP review and concluded that there was no risk 
attached to moving the magnet – surely they should have known better or conducted 
more tests, rather than just making this assumption?  
 
This avoidance of “naming and shaming” fits well with the open communication 
described through the course of the incident and for the daily operations of the site 
and must contribute substantially in allowing workers to voice concerns about food 
quality or safety without fear of retribution.  It also links to PowderCo UK’s focus on CI 
activities and the organisation’s demonstrated capability to learn from failure. 
 
So, if PowderCo UK did not blame people for the failures which resulted in the metal 
contamination, were processes held to fault?  Was there any sign that HACCP or other 
elements of the FSMS had been devalued by the incident, given that it happened 
despite having processes and systems in place?   
 
In fact, there was no evidence that the incident caused staff at PowderCo UK to 
mistrust the systems and processes in place; they had pride in their work and 
expressed faith in the site FSMS.  In fact, this misplaced faith in control systems and 
processes might be seen as part of the “culture & values” of the organisation, forming 
another potential barrier to effective food safety governance. 
 
Rather than people or the process being blamed for the incident, it was seen as being 
caused by unforeseeable events: the possibility of such a failure happening (the metal 
generation and the failure of detection systems) had not been considered and 
controlled for in the QMS and FSMS, i.e., in the terminology of PC, if the possibility was 
identified at all, it was not considered a factual possibility which needed to be seriously 
considered in plans.  There appeared to be no recognition of the “truth gap” between 
the pro-active truth of “our FSMS works” and the pragmatic truth of “we’ve seen a 
failure in the FSMS”.   
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In many ways, the classification of the incident as unforeseeable is an easy option, 
avoiding the necessity of searching conversations about the adequacy of actions and 
decisions made in developing and managing the FSMS and preserving an illusion that 
food safety is under complete control at PowderCo UK.  Again, considering the PC 
framework, it appears that PowderCo UK has a well-developed and integrated 
organisational topos; against this background it might not be seen as feasible to admit 
to significant shortcomings in the QMS and FSMS, as this could fragment the topos.  
Further consideration of the case in light of the PC framework and other literature is 
described in Chapter 7. Indeed, categorising incidents as “unforeseeable” rather than 
facing uncomfortable truths about possible inadequacies in processes or people might 
be viewed as a barrier to effective food safety governance.  Additionally, if incidents 
result from unforeseeable events, this calls into question the suitability of HACCP-
based FSMSs.  This point will also be explored in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
In summary, it appears that PowderCo UK have blamed neither people or process 
failures for the metal contamination incident, but before simply accepting this answer 
to the first research question, a further examination of the themes developed in this 
case must be considered.   
 
Figure 5.6 sets out a map, showing the relationship of the codes to themes, and 
additionally maps them (at both code and theme level) against the “people” and 
“process” clusters of the theoretical roadmap set out in Figure 4.3.  Codes and themes 
considered to be related to the people construct only are written in italics; those 
related to the process construct only are written in capital letters, and those related to 
both people and process are in italicised capital letters.  As can be seen, three themes 
(Communication, Experience Required and Culture & Values) are mapped to the 
people cluster alone, whilst two themes (What Went Wrong and Day-to-Day) are 
mapped solely to the process cluster, whilst the remaining three themes are mapped 
to both.   
 
To further clarify this, looking at the theme of “Problem Solving Our Way”, this was 
classified as relating to people and process. Four codes were clustered to form this 
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theme.  One code, “problem solving process” is considered to relate to process alone, 
as it covers aspects of the case such as the use of RCA and the LIC.  The remaining 
three codes, “cultural standard” (covering aspects such as the dominance of the RCA 
method leading to a specific workspace called the RCA room), “decision making” (a 
code which captures the actual decisions made during the incident management and 
resolution) and “rationale for decisions” (a code used when participants explain the 
reasons for decisions, which cover process and cultural explanations), relate to both 
the people and process clusters.  (Appendix B shows the full code book with 
examples).   
 
This thematic map shows the interwoven nature of the case and clearly demonstrates 
the complexity in trying to attribute the underlying cause of the incident – or indeed 
the generally successful operation of the FSMS – to either the people operating the 
FSMS or the process itself.  This may be another reason why, for staff and 
management at PowderCo UK, it is easier to consider the failures and the incident 
itself as unforeseeable, rather than try and ascribe overall responsibility to one aspect 
of the case or a single individual or group of individuals.   
 
Nevertheless, looking at the thematic map, it can be discerned that there is a strong 
reliance on processes and systems to manage the day-to-day activities of the business 
and to solve problems which occur.  This is shown for example, in the theme “Day-to-
Day”, with codes relating to the FSMS process, planning, standards for monitoring etc.  
The thematic map also shows that people related aspects of the business constitute 
much of what makes it generally successful: e.g. under the theme “What Works”, the 
aspects of rigour and applying lessons learned. 
 
However, whilst aspects of the processes failed in terms of the non-reportable food 
incident explored as the embedded case (e.g. standards for monitoring, in terms of a 
standard for metal contamination), people aspects underpin many of the failures 
demonstrated in the incident, e.g. under the theme “What Doesn’t Work”, the missed 
opportunities and variation in working practices.   
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It can therefore be concluded in this case that despite the organisation blaming neither 
people nor process, failures by people can be seen to dominate the underlying causes 
of the incident.  
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Figure 5.6: PowderCo UK Thematic Map 
 
Italics = people related; CAPITALS = process related;  ITALICISED CAPITALS = people and process related  
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the first case study, PowderCo UK, through a thematic 
analysis of the overall organisation, and the embedded case of metal contamination.   
 
The metal contamination incident perfectly illustrates the complex and interwoven 
nature of food incidents, involving failures in equipment and monitoring systems, as 
detailed in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.  In fact, the incident happened not because of a lack of 
quality and food safety systems but despite PowderCo UK having a comprehensive 
QMS, FSMS and FSMnSs, and indeed against a strong track record of ISO and BRC 
accreditation for quality and food safety. 
 
The thematic analysis also indicated that the incident happened despite the 
importance of food safety to both management and staff.  Management commitment 
was illustrated not only by their involvement in the investigation and resolution of the 
incident itself, but also through their commitment to food safety training and spend on 
proactive food safety measures, such as more hygienic flooring.  Although there was 
no formal recognition of quality or food safety in the overall global mission statement, 
all of the study participants voiced a belief that the purpose of PowderCo UK was to 
produce safe food and made links between the formal mission statement, food safety 
and the end consumer of their products. Taking Griffith’s definition of FSC (Griffith, 
2008, 2009, cited by Griffith et al. 2010a), PowderCo UK might be considered to have a 
strong FSC.  A fuller analysis of this is detailed in Chapter 7.  
 
Communication was open and transparent both day-to-day and throughout the 
incident; even staff not employed at PowderCo UK at the time of the incident (e.g. 
P001) were able to articulate a clear and consistent narrative about the incident and its 
resolution.  Such narratives or “war stories” enabled PowderCo UK to learn from 
failures, which linked strongly to their use of CI as everyday practice and can be viewed 
as a core strength of the organisation. 
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Systems and processes were fundamental to the ways of working at PowderCo UK, 
both for day-to-day operations and for incident management and investigation.  This 
was aptly demonstrated by not only the fast set up of the LIC when the company was 
first informed of the metal contamination, but also by the facilities specifically 
purposed for certain processes, such as the dedicated “RCA Room”.   
 
In fact, the company might be seen as having an over-reliance on and trust in such 
systems.  The plethora and complexity of systems can make it challenging for staff to 
identify critical gaps in systems, i.e. system swamping might act as a barrier to system 
effectiveness and hence become a barrier to food safety governance.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that the metal contamination incident can be seen as a failure of 
the FSMS did not reduce the organisation’s faith in the system.  In the language of PC, 
there was a “truth gap” between the pro-active truth of “the system works” and the 
pragmatic truth of “the system failed this time”.  This aspect of the case will also be 
explored further in Chapter 7.    
 
Whilst the thematic map shown in Figure 5.6 illustrates the complex interactions 
between people and process, it indicates that people concerns underpin the causes of 
this incident, small – but significant – variations in working practices and missed 
opportunities being two of the key people related aspects of this case study.  These 
elements relate back to the plethora of, and reliance on, systems and processes, as 
system swamping may impact on the ability of staff to identify key gaps in processes or 
to be cognisant with detailed requirements of processes.  
 
However, within PowderCo UK itself, the incident was seen as largely “unexpected” or 
“unforeseen”: neither people nor processes were blamed for the incident.  This 
categorisation of incidents as unforeseen, or even unforeseeable may also act as 
barrier to food safety governance, as it might impact the ability of the organisation to 
fully critique its current practices.  It also raises questions about the reliability of 
HACCP as a fully effective FSMS, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
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With these findings in mind, the next chapter addresses the second cases study 
LiquiComp UK, and its associated quality failure of cocked / shredded bottle caps, again 
using a thematic analysis and building upon the codes and themes identified in this 
case.   
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6.0 Case Study 2: LiquiComp UK 
 
This chapter moves on to the second case study, which again looks at an established 
manufacturer who experienced a non-reportable food incident.  LiquiComp UK 
manufactures a range of soft drinks and, just before Christmas 2015, discovered that 
packs had been produced with a defect where the caps were applied incorrectly to 
plastic drinks bottles.  This resulted in bottles with “cocked” caps (i.e. caps set on 
bottles at an angle, rather than flat), where the threads of the caps were at times 
slightly “shredded”, so that in some cases fine pieces of plastic were left on the neck of 
the bottle when opened36.   
 
This chapter is organised in the same pattern as Chapter 5, i.e. section 6.1 gives a short 
overview of the organisation; section 6.2 details specifics of the data collection and 
analysis pertaining to this case; section 6.3 concerns the findings of the case, divided 
into an examination of the quality incident and those related to the general 
organisation, whilst section 6.4 considers the relationship between the embedded case 
and the overall organisation, again with a view to answering the question of whether 
process, people or elements of both are to blame when FSMSs or QMSs fail.    
 
 
6.1 Company Background 
 
LiquiComp UK is the UK subsidiary of a multi-national food and drink company.  
LiquiComp Group was established over a century ago and trades globally, with a 
turnover in billions of US dollars. LiquiComp UK’s organisation is split between its head 
office (where corporate functions, sales, marketing, and R&D teams are based) and 
production sites. 
 
                                                          
36 It should be noted that the plastic “swarf” was seen on the outside of the neck of the bottle; no pieces 
of plastic went into the liquid inside the bottle.  
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LiquiComp UK manufactures both still and carbonated soft drinks.  The production 
facility at the heart of this case has been upgraded and expanded many times over its 
lifetime.  
 
At this plant specific product blends, other ingredients (such as carbohydrates, acids 
and sweeteners) are combined and packed on site into a range of different packs and 
sizes.  The finished products are then moved to a warehouse from where they are 
transported to UK and international customers.   
 
The site operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  Daily production breaks (1 hour 
in every 24) are scheduled for cleaning on each line to maintain safety and optimum 
performance in the factory.  A weekly shutdown, after 168 production hours, ensures 
appropriate cleaning between the manufacture and packing of different products.  The 
site also has two annual shut down periods for general maintenance, at Christmas and 
during the summer.   
 
Within the production area manufacturing staff are organised into teams, each with 
responsibility for a different production line.  The management of each team has a 
degree of autonomy and by default the teams compete, e.g. to achieve the best 
production figures.  Production is supported by a range of specialist functions, 
including health and safety, engineering, quality and logistics.  The factory is led by a 
site director supported by a senior management team.   The site director is also a 
member of the leadership team of LiquiComp UK.   
 
As is not unusual within the food industry, at the time of the data collection for this 
case study, the organisation was undergoing an operational restructure to meet 
developing business needs.   
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6.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used as the main data collection method.  (Chapter 4 
details the interview guide development).  
 
Study participants were recruited from the head office and manufacturing sites.    
Those based in the head office represented a range of central functions who were 
members of the Incident Review Committee (IRC).  The role of the IRC is to review 
quality and safety incidents and make recommendations of action to the senior 
management committee in the business (the SMC).  These participants had been 
involved in the review of the “cocked / shredded cap” quality incident which forms the 
embedded case and were recruited via a gatekeeper (participant L001).  An additional 
participant who was not a member of the IRC, but a junior member of the quality 
team, also participated in interviews at the head office.   
 
Manufacturing site participants were selected for either their involvement in the 
investigation and management of the quality incident and / or their knowledge of, and 
responsibility for, aspects of the site FSMS.  These participants were recruited via a 
member of the quality team, who was a direct report of participant L014. 
 
Across the sites the participants were predominately middle and senior managers or 
technical specialists.  At head office, the majority of study participants had been in the 
business a relatively short time.  In contrast, at the manufacturing plant most of the 
participants had worked at the site for over 10 years.    In total 17 members of staff 
were interviewed, with 12 individual face-to-face interviews, two individual telephone 
interviews and one group interview, which was a mixture of face-to-face and phone 
conference participation, as shown in Table 6.1.  Subsequent to the main interviews, 
an additional informal telephone interview was held with L001, the Researcher’s main 
contact for the study.  
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Table 6.1: Description of Study Participants (LiquiComp UK) 
 
Participant 
Number 
Job Role FSMS / Incident 
experience 
Interview Type 
and Duration 
L001 Business Quality Director Ran IIC and IRC.  
Author of SOP for 
product incident 
management. 
Group interview, 
including phone 
conference 
participation by 
L002, 3 hours. 
A follow up 
conversation 
lasting around 1 
hour was held with 
L001 subsequent 
to the main data 
collection.   
L002 Head of Risk Member of IIC and 
IRC teams.   
L003 Quality Technician Works for L001 on 
central quality tasks 
and incident 
management 
activities.  
L004 Consumer Manager IRC team member.   1-to-1, 54 minutes. 
L005 Regulatory Manager IRC team member. 1-to-1, 54 minutes. 
L006 Lawyer LIC and IRC team 
member. 
1-to-1, 43 minutes. 
L007 Corporate Affairs IRC team member. 1-to-1, phone 
interview, 36 
minutes. 
L008 Head of Supply Chain 
Planning 
IRC team member. 1-to-1, phone 
interview, 51 
minutes. 
L009 Food Quality and Safety 
Manager 
IIC and IRC team 
member. Member of 
RCA team at factory. 
Member of the 
HACCP team. 
1-to-1, 1 hour 21 
minutes. 
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L010 Line Operator Manager User of FSMS.  
Member of the 
HACCP team. 
1-to-1, 29 minutes. 
L011 Factory Leadership Team 
Member 
Member of RCA 
team at factory 
1-to-1, 44 minutes. 
L012 Technical Team Member User of FSMS 1-to-1, 33 minutes. 
L013 Packaging Manager Involved in incident 
investigation 
1-to-1, 24 minutes. 
L014 Director of Technical and 
Quality, Manufacturing 
Site 
Owns FSMS on 
production site. 
1-to-1, 1 hour 5 
minutes. 
L015 Manager, Third Party 
Manufacturing  
FSMS user 1-to-1, 35 minutes. 
L016 Manufacturing Site 
Continuous Improvement 
Manager 
Led RCA on failure of 
detection methods 
1-to-1, 34 minutes. 
L017 Site Engineer Led RCA on failure of 
production 
equipment  
1-to-1, 1 hour. 
 
 
Data was also collected through observation of working practices and document 
examination.  Some documents were made available to take away, whilst others (such 
as HACCP plans and the SOP for product incident management) were only made 
available for review on site, in which case notes were taken for later review and 
analysis.  These are detailed in Figure 6.1, which also lists the different observation 
points of the study.  The escorted tours of the head office and manufacturing plant, 
plus attendance at the morning operations and quality meetings, allowed the 
Researcher to observe staff behaviours and working practices.  At the production site, 
it was also possible to observe the FSMS and FSMnSs in use and discuss the failure 
points in the FSMS / FSMnS pertaining to the quality incident.  Information gathered 
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from observation and document review was used to triangulate findings from the 
semi-structured interviews in developing the codes and themes which are used to 
discuss and analyse this case study. 
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Figure 6.1: Documents Examined and Observation Points, LiquiComp UK 
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All of the interviews were transcribed in accordance with the analytical plan shown in 
Chapter 4.  Coding was completed using the a priori codes developed in the analysis of 
the first case study (PowderCo UK), with additional codes created inductively.  As 
described in Chapter 5, 53 codes were created for the PowderCo UK case study. 51 of 
these codes were judged to apply to this second case and 30 new codes were created.   
 
Each new code was considered for categorisation into new themes or into the nine 
themes created in the first case study.  After cross-checking, no new themes were 
generated and all codes were categorised into existing themes.  These are listed in 
Table 6.2 below.   
 
Table 6.2: Themes Pertaining to the LiquiComp UK Case Study 
 
 Theme 
1 What Works 
2 Day-to-day 
3 What Doesn’t Work 
4 Culture & Values 
5 Communication 
6 This Is What Went Wrong 
7 Experience Required 
8 Problem Solving Our Way 
9 Formal Expressions of Culture 
 
As in the first case study, there is an overlap between the themes which describe the 
embedded case and the overall organisational case (repeated here as Figure 6.2).  
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Figure 6.2: The Relationship of Themes to the Organisational Case and the Embedded 
Case (LiquiComp UK) 
 
 
 
 
In the rest of this chapter the research findings are presented primarily in terms of 
these themes, with a particular view to consider the “FBO People” and “FSMS Process” 
clusters set out in the theoretical roadmap in Chapter 4.  A comparison of this case to 
that of PowderCo UK, and a discussion of the results in terms of the PC elements of the 
theoretical roadmap, and further PC constructs, is set out in Chapter 7.  
 
 
6.3 Findings 
 
6.3.1 The Embedded Case: “Cocked / Shredded Caps” 
 
One Friday afternoon, a week before Christmas 2015, the Head of Manufacturing Site 
Quality at LiquiComp UK was informed by his microbiology team of a potential quality 
or food safety incident.    
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Each day, at two hourly intervals, product samples are taken from the production lines 
across the sites and held for microbiological testing as part of the manufacturing 
quality procedures.   On three consecutive days, samples with “cocked” caps had been 
found at one site; these were noted by the microbiology team because the incorrect 
sealing of these bottles meant that the samples were not fit for microbiological testing.  
More worryingly, the cocked cap itself could be a quality or even a food safety issue 
and, with packs found three days in a row, alarm bells started to ring.  
 
The Head of Manufacturing Site Quality immediately quarantined stock and over that 
weekend conducted further checks to determine the nature and extent of the issue.  
On checking bottles with cocked caps, he noted that fine shreds or tails of plastic from 
the inside of the cap were often left on the neck of the bottle when the cap was 
removed.  These shreds of plastic could potentially be inhaled or swallowed.  So, these 
bottles were not just of poor quality but potentially might be a food safety hazard.  The 
issue was therefore flagged to the Business Quality Director of LiquiComp UK and the 
formal incident investigation process was immediately kicked off.  In fact, the Business 
Quality Director cancelled a planned foreign business trip to enable him to go to the 
manufacturing site on the Monday morning and begin the formal processes.  
 
In this section the history of the embedded case - that is the identification and 
management of the incident as narrated by the study participants - is described and 
interpreted via the themes developed from the qualitative data.  Seven of the nine 
themes are used in this analysis, namely: “This is What Went Wrong”; 
“Communication”; “What Doesn’t Work”; “Culture and Values”; “Problem Solving Our 
Way”, “What Works” and “Experience Required”.  
 
“This Is What Went Wrong” 
 
“… so there was a whole sequence of little errors which gradually rolled and 
grew, and rolled and grew” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, 
Manufacturing Site). 
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This quote illustrates a key finding about this non-reportable food incident, in that the 
cocked / shredded caps had not occurred because of one major problem in the 
manufacture of the product, but rather as the outcome of a complex series of 
connected events.  The incident involved not only the equipment failure which 
generated the cocked / shredded caps but also a failure to detect the fault with the 
caps.  This is summarised pictorially in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
 Figure 6.3: An Overview of the Non-Reportable Food Incident at LiquiComp UK 
 
 
 
 
LiquiComp UK has a comprehensive FSMS (including a detailed HACCP plan, with linked 
PRPs and maintenance schedules) and a QMS for the manufacturing site.   In addition 
to CPs and CCPs set out in the HACCP plan, the production process has numerous 
QCPs.  In terms of CPs, these include intermediate checks during production prior to a 
final CCP e.g. checks of filters prior to the last filter before bottling.  A failure of this 
type of CP enables issues to be addressed early, but as a CCP follows later in the 
process, unsafe product should not result from a failure of this type of control.   
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In addition, QCPs are set as part of the QMS, for example to check the amount of liquid 
fill and the tightness of the cap on the bottle.  Failures in this type of QCP could result 
in quality issues and possibly regulatory or legal issues (leaking bottles; selling under 
volume product) but no impact on product safety is expected. 
 
In this incident, failures in QCPs, rather than CPs or CCPs, were evident.  However, the 
nature of the pack damage– the production of fine shreds of plastic from the cap, 
sticking to the rim of the bottles – could easily have posed a food safety hazard.  
Understanding the nature of the hazard and answering the question of whether it 
constituted a FSMS failure which necessitated a product recall and notification to the 
authorities was part of the incident management process, which is described later in 
“Problem Solving Our Way”.  This question also illustrates the interaction in food 
manufacturing between quality and safety and the challenges of developing an 
appropriate FSMS. 
 
So, at the start of Christmas week, the incident investigation kicked off with the 
establishment of an Initial Incident Committee (IIC) and initial investigations at the 
manufacturing plant.  By looking at the affected products and pack sizes, it was 
established that manufacturing line C was involved.  It was also determined quickly 
that the problem with the bottle caps was due to them being applied too tightly, or 
“over-torqued”:  
 
 “… that example with the shredded caps was fairly obvious, you know we 
completed that in half an hour, that it was an over-torqueing thing …” (L001, 
Business Quality Director) 
 
The over-torqueing could only have been caused by some failure in the capping 
equipment.  Therefore, an RCA specifically to investigate the capping equipment, led 
by a member of the production site engineering team, was started in parallel with the 
set-up of the IIC.   This RCA established that on the Line C, in just one of over 20 heads 
of the capping machine, a bolt had dropped out and jammed a magnetic clutch. This 
caused the over-torqueing of the caps, resulting in a 4% failure rate in the packed 
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products.  This fault was viewed as novel, both to LiquiComp and their equipment and 
packaging suppliers: 
 
“… I’ve not come across this particular issue previously, and the manufacturers of 
the magnet head, or the filler or the capper, likewise, they’d not seen this type of 
failure mode” (L017, Site Engineer).   
 
 
In some ways, this part of the investigation and the subsequent corrective actions, 
were seen as relatively straightforward: 
 
“There was a big work stream happening from the engineering perspective, not 
detracting away from the engineers, but for me that was an easier one, ‘cos they 
knew what the fault was….” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager). 
 
“… the engineering one was fairly open and shut.  The capper was you know, not 
fit for purpose effectively…” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality 
Manufacturing Site). 
 
What was not immediately apparent was why this the capping head had failed. This, 
together with developing preventative measures for the future, became the focus of 
the engineering RCA work stream.  
 
One of the first areas to be considered was equipment maintenance, as regular checks 
(daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly) by the site engineering team are scheduled.  The 
RCA found that all maintenance had been completed as per the schedules.  However, 
in none of the documentation supplied by the original equipment manufacturers, or in 
training received from these suppliers, were checks of the bolts in the capping head 
identified as on-site maintenance points: 
 
“So we were interested to learn why we didn’t have this as a risk factor, and it 
wasn’t in any of the documentation to say you need to inspect or check … we 
didn’t perceive this as a potential risk to food or reliability of the equipment.” 
(L017, Site Engineer). 
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In essence, the failure of the bolt in the capping head came to be regarded as an 
“unforeseen” design flaw, just waiting to manifest.  As L001 explained: 
 
“You can reasonably expect that if you buy an off the shelf piece of kit, the 
supplier has done their homework in terms of assuring that it’s fit for purpose …. 
we are not [manufacturing equipment] designers, we have to trust that they 
know what they are doing.” (L001, Business Quality Director) 
 
This “unexpected” risk of equipment failure due to a design fault gave rise to another 
key feature of the embedded case – should LiquiComp UK take legal action against the 
original manufacturers of the equipment to recover costs arising from the incident 
(withdrawal of product; rework of product; factory opening over Christmas period; 
potential loss of goodwill etc., i.e. a mixture of internal and external costs of failure 
from a quality costing perspective)?  In “Problem Solving Our Way” it is shown that the 
legal team play a major role in the management of all product related incidents, but 
with this possibility of legal action, their role became even more prominent.  
Communications were routed through and / or approved by the legal team to give the 
protection of legal privilege in the event of any legal action.  The impact of this on the 
incident investigation process and management is presented in detail in the themes 
“Communication” and “Culture and Values”.  
 
So, the equipment failure was understood.  But, as shown in Figure 6.2, this equipment 
fault was exacerbated by a failure to detect the over-torqued caps, which also involved 
the failure of multiple control points.  As one participant described it (perhaps in 
reference to the well-known work of James Reason (1997) on accident causation): 
 
“…it’s the old Swiss cheese where the particles can get through all the gaps ‘cos it 
happened to align in the right direction, at the same time, so it was just a perfect 
storm.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, Manufacturing Site).  
 
 
One of the initial consequences of the failure to detect the capping problem was the 
challenge of assessing the size of the issue, i.e. how many bottles were affected.   The 
last day of production of the affected bottles was known, as the discovery of cocked 
caps happened on the last production day of the year before the Christmas shut down.  
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Only after detailed investigations, taking impounded products and stripping pallets of 
bottles to look at failure rates, was it determined that 10 days was worth of production 
from Line C was potentially affected.  With a 4% failure rate, this amounted to 
potentially 8,500 affected bottles or approximately 220 pallets of product.  (From a 
quality cost perspective, this work highlights several internal costs of failure including 
the storage of impounded product, the staff costs to physically strip down pallets and 
check for damaged packs and the costs of managing this activity as well as the cost of 
the affected product packs).  
 
With that volume of stock potentially affected, even though it was of course spread 
throughout the total production of over 200,000 bottles, LiquiComp UK management 
were highly sceptical that staff had carried out the required quality checks correctly: 
 
“… by pure chance alone, given the amount of affected stock, you would have 
come across a defective one in your hands at some point, you know it’s almost 
incalculable that you wouldn’t have got one of those 8,500 in your hand at some 
point when you’re supposed to be doing these [quality checks] every few hours.” 
(L001, Business Quality Director) 
 
 
This aspect of the case is discussed further in “Culture and Values”. 
 
So how were all these cocked caps missed?  A second RCA stream was set up in 
January 2016 to investigate this and looked at the QCPs which should have identified 
the damaged caps.  The first QCP implicated was an in-line check system with an 
“electronic eye” which scanned the bottles, checking for both cap placement and 
product fill.  This detection equipment had limitations that seem to have been 
overlooked in the day-to-day operations of the plant.  This equipment had a limited 
angle of sight (i.e. not 360o) so it was possible that bottles with cocked caps had 
escaped detection:  
 
“… given that a cocked cap is cocked in one direction, depending on if you’re the 
electric eye looking at it, in a certain direction it has one profile, if you spin the 
bottle around – and they are spinning – it changes profile, so that’s another 
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learning really that the equipment isn’t 100% fool proof...” (L001, Business 
Quality Director) 
 
 
In fact, this detection system had recently been identified by the engineering 
department as dated and an application had been submitted for system upgrade: 
 
“…the quality detection system which looks at the cap, it was dated and an old 
design … it wouldn’t have been picking this particular issue up, so we had put it 
in for the next 3 years to upgrade...” (L017, Site Engineer).  
 
An added complication, which came to light as more of the stock was checked, was 
that not all of the over-torqued caps were cocked, i.e. some caps still appeared straight 
on the top of the bottles, and so would never be picked up by this type of check, even 
with a 3600 angle of sight.  Hence, for this particular manufacturing defect, this QCP 
was by itself insufficient and affected product could be expected to get through to the 
second control point.   
 
A second issue with the detection system fed into the failure of the second QCP, a 
physical check of the bottles called a “torque check”.  The QMS required the line 
operative to use this detection system to reject bottles (the same number of bottles as 
filling heads) from the production line every 2 hours.  Although not explicitly written in 
the procedure, the actual need was for bottles to be taken off the line sequentially, to 
ensure that one bottle from each filling head was tested.   However, it transpired that 
the equipment was not systematically rejecting one bottle from each filling head.  
Hence it was, in theory, possible that bottles with damaged caps from the one 
damaged filling head were not picked up for the “torque check”.    
 
The “torque check” itself was the next failure point.  This test examined “how much 
tension you put on the cap to actually align it on the bottle” (L009, Food Quality and 
Safety Manager).  Yet again, the method was, in hindsight, viewed as dated and 
potentially problematic.  The “torque check” was somewhat subjective: the amount of 
pressure exerted and measured by the line operative varied with their physical 
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strength and familiarity with the test. 
 
“… again on reading up more and more on it, obviously it can be quite subjective 
where the dial goes when you turn that cap … it depends on their strength as 
well … and the resting time between coming off the capper to conducing the 
test, it slackens off obviously over time as well.” (L009, Food Quality and Safety 
Manager) 
 
 
Additionally, the full “torque check” was a destructive test: after measuring the force 
required to remove the cap, each cap was supposed to be completely removed to 
check the integrity of the bottle neck and cap.  Significant doubts were raised about 
whether staff had completed checks correctly, or even at all: 
 
“…one of the real smoking gun aspects was the fact that there were, supposedly, 
line checks where an individual would take a bottle periodically off the line, they 
would open it up and they were supposed to check and see there was no 
damage.  The check sheets that had been filled out for that affected time period 
all had a beautiful row of ticks saying ‘acceptable, acceptable, acceptable’, so you 
can come to very little other conclusion that to say that was a fabrication…” 
(L001, Business Quality Director) 
 
During the post-incident RCA investigations, staff who worked on Line C were asked to 
demonstrate how they completed these tests.  These observations showed that staff 
were completing the tests correctly, but this finding was also questioned: 
 
“…we should have had the process in place to check the capping heads.  You 
know, hand on heart, I don’t know what the people on the line were doing when 
they were checking the torque.  So when we’d gone down in the first three 
weeks of January to just randomly observe people doing the check, they were all 
doing it completely perfectly.  But that’s after the event isn’t it, and they knew 
something had gone on …” (L016, CI Manager) 
 
Another factor uncovered during this RCA work stream was that discrepancies were 
found between the SOP setting out the test procedure and the check sheet completed 
at the line side: 
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“The SOP and the check sheets didn’t match up, so one’s telling you to do a 
destructive test, but it’s a satisfactory check ….” (L009 Food Quality and Safety 
Manager) 
 
This may have confused line operatives and as such it was impossible to hold staff 
accountable for any failure to complete tests: 
 
“…you can’t hold somebody to something you know is already fundamentally 
flawed… you need to be doing this check, you’re saying it’s filled in here, wait a 
minute, your SOP doesn’t tell you to do that. You can’t hold them accountable.  
Even though they’re writing ‘sat, sat, sat’, you wouldn’t have a leg to stand on …” 
(L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
This mismatch in the documentation meant not only that line operatives were 
receiving inconsistent instructions on the test procedure, but also that the processes 
to ensure that the Quality team reviewed all changes to documentation on test 
procedures had not been followed. This point will be further explored under “What 
Doesn’t Work” later in this section. 
 
Two further physical quality checks of product should also have been completed: a 
five-bottle check for weights (pack fill) and a traded unit inspection check, where a 
case of product (a film wrapped tray of bottles) was checked for traceability coding 
and overall integrity of the wrap.  In both checks packs were supposed to be physically 
handled and cocked caps should have been spotted.  Indeed, the traded unit check 
requires that the case of product is laid on its side, and leaks from products with 
damaged caps should have been observed.  It appears that there were multiple 
“missed opportunities” to identify the issue earlier.  This aspect of the LiquiComp 
operations will also be discussed further in “What Doesn’t Work”. 
 
So, should this particular issue have been foreseen?  Only one study participant 
suggested that this was the case: 
 
 “… the cap incident that you mentioned earlier, that is a foreseeable control … 
you can get damage to closures as a result of applying them ...” (L015, Manager, 
Third Party Manufacturing) 
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Even this study participant recognised that elements of the incident were less 
predictable: 
 
“… whether it was foreseeable you’d get stripped threads is a different 
question...” (L015, Manager, Third Party Manufacturing) 
 
Overall therefore the incident was viewed as complex, messy and generally 
unexpected with multiple causes, which had not been adequately controlled with the 
current systems. If we put this into the language of PC, there was a “truth gap” 
between some of the elements which LiquiComp UK relied on as “pro-active truth” to 
operate its production – the suitability of equipment and the adequacy of tests, 
evidenced through completion of check sheets – and the “pragmatic truth” that not all 
elements of the processes and systems were robust and reliable.  This aspect of the 
case will be explored further in Chapter 7. 
 
With this understanding of the incident, the actual processes of investigation and 
management of the incident will be presented in the next theme “Problem Solving Our 
Way”.   
 
“Problem Solving Our Way” 
The analysis and management of the cocked / shredded cap incident at LiquiComp UK 
can be split into two phases.  First, the company set up an IIC to determine the extent 
and severity of the incident.  With initial investigations indicating that the incident was 
potentially serious – there were many affected packs and a possible food safety hazard 
- the chair of the IIC (in this case L001) called together the IRC.  The IIC and the IRC act 
as a two-tier assessment process; the IIC giving a provisional assessment followed by a 
deeper questioning and assessment through the IRC.  
 
The IRC is composed of middle to senior managers representing all relevant areas of 
the business (quality, legal, marketing, logistics, communications, regulatory etc.).  Its 
role is to further investigate the incident and make a recommendation to the overall 
head of the UK business, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the SMC about actions 
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required to protect consumers and the business, i.e. they can recommend no action, 
product withdrawal (of stock from the supply chain and /or trade) or product recall 
(from consumers)37.   For this incident, this phase of the activity was completed in 
under a week, culminating with a final decision at 5pm on Christmas Eve.  
 
Importantly, neither the IIC nor the IRC determine the cause of any incident or put in 
place remedial actions for the underlying cause, although there appears to be some 
element of establishing plans to address product supply concerns.  This “single-
minded” approach was described by L005, the Regulatory Manager: 
 
“…at the early stages I'm not particularly interested in kind of how it happened, 
I'm kind of interested in how it presents itself.  Because from my perspective I'm 
only interested in whether or not, fundamentally, it's a technical breach of the 
Regulation 178 that I need to notify the Food Standards Agency about ….” (L005, 
Regulatory Manager). 
 
Being single-minded helps keep the process focussed and helps the business reach 
decisions in a speedy manner, which is critical when potential food safety issues are 
concerned:  
 
“…. L001 kept us to a specific agenda so we didn't go off, he kind of shuffled us 
back in, which was very good …” (L004, Consumer Manager) 
 
Whilst more experienced IRC team members do take a broader approach, an element 
of “single-mindedness” may be required to ensure that IIC and IRC team members take 
accountability for their specific functional areas.  However, this single-minded 
approach can limit some individuals’ overall understanding of the entire incident, 
which was evident when communication about the incident was explored, and 
potentially limits organisational learning.  This will be considered further under 
“Communication” later in this section and under “What Works” for LiquiComp UK 
overall in section 6.3.2.  
                                                          
37 The Regulatory and Legal teams also review whether official notification of any food incident should 
be made, depending on where any affected product is located (within or outside of company control) 
and whether the product has been assessed as potentially injurious to health and hence if an official 
trade withdrawal or consumer recall is required.   
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LiquiComp UK has an established and documented incident management processes, 
with a variety of SOPs for different incident types, including product incidents.  The 
process of investigating and managing incidents though the setup of an IIC and then, if 
required, an IRC, was generally well understood by head office staff, although it was 
commented upon that some newer members of staff did not appreciate the 
seriousness of the situation:  
 
“ …. so, certain people were not at all familiar with what the IRC was, or what the 
IIC was at that stage, for instance we had somebody in marketing for the brand 
that was affected come in.  And they’re quite senior, and but they were tapping 
away really loudly on their laptop on the conference call, um and that meant that 
it was very difficult for people to hear.  They weren’t at all aware of the gravitas 
of the situation …….” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
Similarly, in the affected manufacturing site, not all individuals involved in the IIC and 
IRC were familiar with the processes, partly because of the timing of the incident, 
immediately before the Christmas break, when some senior staff were on holiday:  
 
“….. the initial incident committee, I don't think people on site knew what they 
were.  I think from a site point of view, um, the people round the table left at 
that Christmas period, (name - head of site) had only been in the role a couple of 
months, he had done obviously recalls before but not in this particular way; we 
had (name) who was the new engineering manager, again, relatively new to 
position and post, um, myself, [and] um, (name) who's been on site but from a 
planning perspective, so you didn't necessarily have the expertise that you'd had 
before to know what the staging is  …” (L009 Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
Subsequent to the main data collection phase of this study, the Researcher 
understands that a communication and training programme to upgrade awareness and 
capability on the incident management processes has been completed.  This included a 
company-wide communication event, five smaller training sessions and a mock 
incident training exercise.   
 
The second phase of the investigation involved the establishment of teams based at 
the affected manufacturing site to conduct an RCA.  In fact, three RCA streams were 
established.  The first stream focussed on determining the cause of the equipment 
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failure and putting in place required corrective actions.  This work stream commenced 
in parallel with the IIC and IRC.  The second stream was set up to look at why the 
affected packs were not detected. This work started after the Christmas break, with a 
core team of three people focussing on this task for six weeks.  The third RCA stream 
was established to look at filling the shortfall in product supply caused by impounding 
stock and withdrawing stock from the market. 
 
Overall, RCA as a problem-solving method was well understood at the manufacturing 
site.  It appeared that staff were confident in choosing the techniques to use to ensure 
that an appropriately robust problem-solving approach was taken and that conclusions 
could be reached within an appropriate timeframe:  
 
“The root cause investigation, is that how problems are normally tackled around 
here?” (Researcher).  “It depends on the scale of the problems, so in my role, I’m 
the Continuous Improvement Manager, so I’ve developed some sort of tiers of 
root cause problem solving from a simple decision matric of 4 squares … and 
then through to a six-step root case process … and then we’ve got a 10-step 
Kaizen-like process on site which is quite detailed and thorough.  So, ‘cos I’ve got 
a bit of knowledge of all the processes, I’d sort of mix two elements together, our 
6-step root cause, pull some elements of the 10-step process in, some tools and 
techniques to try and help steer the group that I was leading to the outcomes.” 
(L016, CI Manager) 
 
 “…you said you used a 6-step process in this one and not the 10-step?” 
(Researcher).  “…a 10-step may be an item whereby you’re looking at items over 
a longer period, it could be potentially 2 or 3 months …. clearly this was an 
escalation to (CEO) and the SMC team … so it’s a very intense, deep dive, so a lot 
of data but in a much more condensed period of time.” (L017, Site Engineer). 
 
 
In talking about the problem-solving process with the study participants, it became 
clear that an important requirement of this process was the need to ensure 
impartiality.  To this end an independent medical advisor was used during the IRC 
review, both to provide expertise not available internally in LiquiComp UK, and to 
demonstrate appropriate due diligence should the company’s actions ever be 
scrutinised by regulatory authorities. More detail on the use of experts is given in the 
theme “Experience Required”. 
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Impartiality was also a concern in the second RCA work stream, where the 
investigation team was selected to encourage co-operation by production staff and 
management: 
 
“… we decided to create the robust team, a little separate from the [production 
line] management team … we had better have a third-party opinion, analysis, 
regarding this big incident.  We had already understood that was driven by the 
management people, so if management people were involved in this team we 
might have accused or blame some people, and then management people might 
have been defensive … so to avoid any negative aspects we had better create 
another team, a third-party team.” (L011, Factory Leadership Team Member) 
 
With the processes to resolve the problems understood, the results of these activities 
can be considered.  For this embedded case, the results of the problem-solving 
processes can be expressed at two levels: the immediate response of the business to 
the incident following the IRC, and the technical level, as explored through the RCA 
streams. 
 
The initial recommendation of the IRC to the CEO and SMC was to recall the batches of 
affected products.  This appears to have been primarily driven by the view expressed 
by one dominant IRC team member that the plastic shreds generated inside the cocked 
caps could pose a choking hazard (i.e. it was perceived initially by this manager as a 
food safety issue): 
 
“… he was explaining about how when he personally sampled a bottle it was like 
a fish bone, the swarf in his mouth could be like a fish bone and that was actually 
quite emotive, because a fish bone is pretty sharp, hard, quite long, and as we all 
probably know, someone we know or we may have had one stuck a bit in our 
throats.” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
However, some team members expressed concern that this recommendation was 
subjective and made on insufficient evidence, and indeed the CEO and SMC challenged 
this conclusion: 
 
“…we made our recommendation on the Wednesday to the SMC, which was 
pushed back …” (L001, Business Quality Director) 
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The IRC team was directed to re-evaluate the incident, to look again at the volume of 
affected stock (as data on this had been questioned) and to gather further input from 
the external medical advisor who was entrusted with making an objective, educated 
assessment as to whether the plastic swarf was a food safety hazard or not.  
 
When the first recommendation was made the external medical advisor had seen only 
pictures of the damaged caps.  After the push back from the SMC he was furnished 
with actual samples of the damaged products and on examining these concluded that 
the products were not injurious to health.  Hence after discussions with the full IRC 
team, the recommended action was changed to a “soft” trade withdrawal (i.e. one not 
requiring official notification to the FSA or recall from consumers): 
 
“…after further consideration and interaction with our medical expert, we were 
satisfied, and he was satisfied, that it wouldn’t pose a risk to human health such 
that we should recall the product.” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
“…we substantiated it more, we re-presented it [recommendation of action to 
the SMC] and it was accepted and then we went with the trade withdrawal…” 
(L001, Business Quality Director) 
 
Also critical to the final decision was the revised data on the amount of affected stock.  
As L001 explained, “understanding the scale of an issue can be pivotal in ensuring that 
the company takes a proportionate response”.  In this incident, between the first and 
second IRC recommendations the logistics and operations team confirmed that much 
less stock was impacted than originally believed, which played a role in revising the 
recommended action to a “soft” trade withdrawal.  (This decision is explored in more 
detail from a cultural perspective under the theme Culture & Values). 
 
This dialogue and reconsideration of recommendations illustrates the dynamic nature 
of the problem-solving process in LiquiComp UK.  It also clearly shows the challenge of 
making decisions in the absence of a complete data set – a challenge faced in most 
incident investigations when organisations are under time pressure.  It also illustrates 
the importance of expert opinion to LiquiComp UK, which is discussed further under 
“Experience Required”.  
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The second level of results of the problem-solving process pertains to the work of the 
RCA teams, who produced action plans for the business to address their specific areas 
of concern (capping equipment failure, failure of detection of the cocked caps and 
actions to restock the supply chain).   
 
In fact, the RCA studying the failure to identify the defective products presented an 
extraordinary number of corrective actions to the business: 
 
“…we came up with, I think it was 90 plus corrective actions…” (L009, Food 
Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
 
This once again illustrates the size and complexity of the incident and can also be 
viewed as “unexpected”.  With the business appearing to operate soundly on a day-to-
day basis, meeting production targets and with a good food safety record, this number 
of corrective actions, covering not just Line C but stretching across the production site 
operations, could never have been anticipated. 
 
Before moving on to consider some of the areas identified as corrective actions under 
the theme of “What Doesn’t Work”, consideration needs to be made of the 
communications made about the quality incident, and to return to the protection of 
information under legal privilege.  
 
“Communication” 
Of the seventeen study participants, twelve were directly involved in aspects of the 
cocked cap incident, as shown in Figure 6.4.  Everyone’s level of involvement in the 
incident might be expected to impact the way that they understood it and how they 
described it to the Researcher during the interview process, which needs to be 
considered in this case study analysis. 
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Figure 6.4: Participant Involvement with the Cocked/Shredded Cap Incident 
 
 
 
 
Four participants were not questioned directly about the product incident, as they 
made it clear that they had not been directly involved and were not able or willing to 
discuss it38.  With most of the remaining participants, the core of their stories about 
the incident were essentially similar, but there were also instances where narratives 
differed, often in quite significant ways.  For example, both the outcome of the IRC 
(that the damaged caps did not pose a safety hazard) and the action taken by 
LiquiComp UK (a soft withdrawal of product from the trade) were not always described 
in that way, even by participants who were closely involved in the IIC/ IRC teams.  This 
is illustrated in the following quotes:  
 
“…because he [the external medical advisor] had received the samples … he 
confirmed that it could be a food safety risk …” (L009, Food Quality and Safety 
Manager) 
 
                                                          
38 Whilst L003 had not been directly involved in the investigation or management of the incident, he was 
involved with L001 and L002 in the group interview which included discussions about the incident. 
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“… then after further consideration and interaction with our medical expert, we 
were satisfied, and he was satisfied, that it wouldn’t pose a risk to human health 
…” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
“… so when we came back in after that period [Christmas holiday], we had then 
gone to recall, the information packs had gone out, there was a lot of testing” 
(L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager).  “So that was a customer recall?” 
(Researcher).  “Yes, yes, so like a warehouse, well, to main end user customers…” 
(L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
“… And we made our decision to do a trade withdrawal on that day.” (L001, 
Business Quality Manager) 
 
Few staff outside of regulatory and quality functions might be expected to understand 
the nuances of calling the resulting action of an incident a “recall” versus a 
“withdrawal”, but as the quotes reveal, the terminology was not used consistently 
even within these functions.    Differences in description - even if staff mean the same 
thing - could be highly significant for the business, e.g. if a member of staff was asked 
to explain the incident during a quality audit or official inspection.  These different 
descriptions suggest a lack of clear communication on the outcome of events.   
 
Some of the differences noted might also be explained by the differing responsibilities 
of the study participants.  As described earlier, the role of the IRC is to examine the 
immediate incident and determine the appropriate business response, not to 
necessarily understand or solve the underlying case of the incident.  
 
“…people always want to know well, how did it happen, what have you been 
doing, and so on and pointing fingers.  L001 is pretty good at saying well it’s not 
really [a topic for the IRC] and I’m not interested at all.” (L005, Regulatory 
Manager) 
 
However, given the size and impact of the incident on the business, it was perhaps 
surprising that individuals were not concerned or curious about how the incident was 
initially detected or its underlying causes.  
 
“I must say I wasn’t involved in the actual how it was identified, so I don’t know if 
it was identified here or whether it was identified at a customer, I don’t really 
know …” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, Manufacturing Site) 
221 
 
Whilst this single-minded approach appears to be a strength in keeping the problem-
solving process focussed (as discussed in “Problem Solving Our Way”), it might also 
indicate a degree of silo-mentality.  This can impede communication, prevent the 
organisation developing a comprehensive understanding of events and even hinder 
them from making the most of opportunities to learn from failures.  
 
Concern was also expressed that communications by some staff and management 
during the incident investigation were guarded, potentially impacting the 
understanding and resolution of the incident: 
 
“…I suppose from my perspective, being sat on the outside periphery of it, it was 
obvious that people here [at the manufacturing site] were playing their cards 
close to their chests at times, not necessarily being as open and honest as they 
could have been, and information flow wasn’t always as seamless as you would 
hope it would be in a major issue.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, 
Manufacturing Site). 
 
A lack of transparency and openness in communications could impact the time taken 
to investigate incidents and indeed influence the outcomes of investigations if all 
pertinent data is not shared.   
 
The most significant influence on communication about the quality incident was the 
use of the legal team to filter and route communications to ensure that information – 
and hence LiquiComp UK - was protected by legal privilege.    
 
During any incident, sensitive information must be managed appropriately, and the 
routine use of social media has exacerbated concerns:  
 
“…we do limit who knows what. We have a social media policy and buried in the 
SOP it states that anybody involved [in the incident investigation and 
management process] is not to disclose it outside of the confines of the meeting, 
and we need to keep it tight...” (L001, Business Quality Director) 
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Relevant, timely communication was nevertheless important to gain the co-operation 
of production staff in the RCA investigations:  
 
“…we did an initial team brief to all the operators, all the shift managers and area 
managers … to say look, we’re investigating and we need your help … we were 
very clear ‘cos we had the communications with legal about this, that we 
informed everyone at the start of the brief that what we were telling them was 
under legal privilege and was strictly confidential, so they weren’t to go home 
and post it on social media or discuss it in public places or things like that.” (L016, 
CI Manager) 
 
There was a recognition however, that it became confusing about who could be told 
what: 
 
“I think on the communication bit, because we’d not come across the same 
legally privileged information before … It was a bit of blocker for us … and then 
we were starting not to be sure who we could tell what to who, and who’s given 
what out …” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
In reality, staff in the manufacturing plant knew that something significant had 
occurred: 
 
“But the fact is they [factory operatives] knew something was going on, they 
were affected by it.  They were having to do rework, there were people crawling 
all over the capper and parts of the machine to find out what had gone wrong, so 
they knew.” (L016, CI Manager) 
 
At the end of the RCA process concerning the failure to detect the cocked caps, open 
meetings were held with production staff to share the findings, but the communication 
delays were recognised as causing some frustrations: 
 
“…. We gave multiple presentations, to multiple people … we went through all 
the information warts and all, so everything was in front of the guys and they 
could see it… There were the standard things that came up … the standard 
questions, and if they think you need to answer those, they want an answer.  
And I understand the frustrations because I think we were feeling it: we waited a 
long time to get the comms out, you know we were holed up in that room for 
quite a while and it was a bit should we, shouldn’t we, can we do this, can we not 
do it …” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager). 
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Managing sensitive communications, such as those for a product incident, is always a 
balancing act.  Organisations have to weigh up the need to communicate sufficient 
information to enable investigations to take place with the need to ensure that 
confidentiality is maintained where necessary, and to ensure that the information 
shared is not misunderstood, taken out of context or miscommunicated onwards in 
the style of “Chinese whispers”.  Overall, LiquiComp UK seems aware of the 
importance of open and timely communication in ensuring that the incident 
management process can be conducted in a timely and accurate fashion.  However, 
changes in society, particularly the use of social media and a more litigious culture 
(which is discussed further in the theme of “Culture and Values”), have brought even 
more risks to the business, which are impacting communications in these situations.  
 
The imperfect flow of information, and the strict compartmentalisation by individuals 
only being interested in “what I need to know, right now, to do my job”, potentially 
impacts the overall organisational reality or topos, in the terms of PC, fragmenting this 
into two or more co-existing topoi.  This will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
7.   
 
“What Doesn’t Work” 
As mentioned previously, the RCA conducted on the failure to detect the damaged 
caps identified over 90 corrective actions, which covered not only the operation of the 
affected packaging line but more general operations across the manufacturing site.  In 
this way, the incident had already been used by LiquiComp UK to identify areas of 
weakness in their current operations, where opportunities to prevent the incident 
from occurring had been missed. 
 
The specific failure of detection of the damaged caps has already been discussed in 
detail.  Here, two specific areas of challenge, which might be viewed as drivers of these 
failures, or elements of “What Doesn’t Work”, will be presented. 
 
The first relates to the management of production line C where the cap failures 
occurred.  At the time of the incident, all line managers operated semi-autonomously, 
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organising their staff as they felt suitable to meet the company standards and 
production targets for their area of responsibility.  As explained by L009: 
 
“I’ve been in the business a long time, and I’ve seen how lines operate, and 
generally they [staff] are on a rotation basis, you’ll go from one task to another.  
It didn’t happen on this line. They were basically fixed to tasks and they didn’t 
have the skills to transfer them around.” (L009, Food Quality and Safety 
Manager) 
 
There were also suggestions of a higher than expected sickness absence rate for staff 
on the line, causing some staffing pressures.  This, together with the relative lack of 
skills, and lack of flexibility in the way the work force on the line could be utilised, 
appears to have helped create the environment in which the incident occurred.   
 
Indeed, prior to the cocked / shredded cap incident, there had been intermittent 
production problems on Line C, where small “tails” of plastic were formed at the 
junction of the cap and bottle.  These “tails”, caused by over-pressuring, were 
described by L009 as “not the best quality, but on times it’s acceptable”.  This problem 
was not directly related to the cocked/shredded cap incident and was the subject of 
separate quality investigations.  However, a total lack of acceptance of the “tails” may 
have triggered more in-depth examinations of the management and working practices 
on the line and so, potentially, could have prevented the more serious incident from 
occurring. 
 
The second area of challenge pertains to the differences discovered during the RCA 
investigations between SOPs and check sheets for the cap and pack integrity checks.  It 
was discovered that just one member of staff had responsibility for updating all of the 
manufacturing site’s SOPs, work instructions and check sheets and that this 
documentation had not been kept up to date due to staff overload:  
 
“...at this site a very particular person has to change the SOP, has to change the 
check sheet.  Shift managers, operators, shop floor people are not required to 
change the check sheet and SOP, one particular person needs to amend the SOP. 
But if he was very, very busy, that person was not available to handle all the 
information, what happened would be just amend the tiny piece, just the check 
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sheet, but amending the SOP would be lower priority.” (L011, Factory Leadership 
Team Member) 
 
Rather than blaming the individual concerned for failing in their responsibilities, the 
RCA team suggested that responsibility lay with management: 
 
“…from that person’s point of view, it was very difficult to have everything done.  
That could be a management issue I think, managers should handle the things, 
whether the person can handle all the SOPs and all the check sheet 
amendments, or not so.  If he was very, very busy, if his work overflowed, in that 
case the manager needs to handle, needs to prioritise what is necessary, but in 
reality it didn’t happen.” (L011, Factory Leadership Team Member). 
 
Closely related to this situation was the sheer number of SOPs and work instructions in 
existence.  The QMS was described by L001 as a “bureaucratic nightmare”, and he 
suggested that staff were suffering from “SOP paralysis”, where the culture demanded 
this documentation and did not allow staff to think for themselves.  In a similar vein 
L014 expressed his concern that it was impossible to judge which of the multitude of 
documents (over 2,500 in the QMS) was critical: 
 
“…you open up a manual of SOPs and you can’t tell in there which is the ones 
that are really critical to you and your process.  I remember looking at one once, 
and there was an SOP on how to stock the fridges for the offices! You know, is 
that a critical one to our business succeeding or failing, and making the 
consumers get good, fit, safe product to consume?” (L014, Director of Technical 
and Quality, Manufacturing Site) 
 
The “overload with detail” created by excessive documentation did not directly cause 
the cocked cap incident.  However, it undoubtedly made it very difficult for the staff 
member concerned to prioritise their work effectively, so contributing to the 
documentation miss-matches seen in the incident.   
 
The size and complexity of the QMS also links to another finding from the RCA 
investigations, mentioned in “What Went Wrong”, in that the changes made to the 
torque test check sheet should have, but had not, been reviewed by the Quality team, 
i.e. the correct processes for review of documentation changes had not been followed.  
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Additionally, the internal audit team, when reviewing this area of the factory, should 
have picked up on the misalignment of the documentation.  Any critical review of the 
testing process could also have picked up on the previously noted issues of the non-
sequential discharge by the detection equipment of bottles for testing and any issues 
with staff not completing the torque check correctly.  It was not possible to identify in 
this study whether the audit team had not conducted a review of this area of the 
factory or whether an audit had taken place but was ineffective in identifying the 
issues which subsequently contributed to the cocked / shredded cap issue.  However, 
it is clear that the sheer magnitude of the QMS meant that not only would production 
staff have challenges in identifying quality priorities, so too would the audit team, i.e. 
system swamping appears to be hindering the organisation from working effectively 
and efficiently. 
 
This triggers the question of why the staff at LiquiComp UK felt the need to create so 
much formal documentation. Operating a modern manufacturing system, to 
internationally recognised quality and food safety standards of course necessitates 
“process thinking” and the recording of this through documentation.  However, none 
of this explains a situation where SOPs proliferated for seemingly non-essential, non-
quality related activities and suggests that the use of a fixed process for everything is 
part of the culture and values of LiquiComp UK.  This will be explored later in this 
chapter.  
 
It is also worth noting that from a quality costing perspective, production of this formal 
documentation is a relatively costly exercise.  Such an expenditure on prevention costs 
would, in theory, be expected to improve systems and reduce failure costs 
(Feigenbaum, 1956); however as shown here, this is not necessarily true. 
 
“Culture and Values” 
We now turn to the organisational culture and values of LiquiComp UK and reflect on 
what the embedded case illustrates about these.  Given the focus of this thesis, how 
the organisation feels about food safety is the first aspect of values to be considered. 
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A belief that the company puts food safety, and so the safety of consumers, as a key 
priority was expressed by participants: 
 
“…clearly everybody in the business is aligned to the quality agenda and making 
sure that our food safety it’s just, not a given, given’s the wrong word, it implies 
it’s passive, it’s something we all actively support.” (L008 Head of Supply Chain 
Planning). 
 
Without a doubt, the amount of resource dedicated to the resolution of the cocked 
cap incident, the speed with which the incident was tackled and the involvement of 
senior management in the investigation and decision making processes indicates a 
high commitment to product quality and safety. (The time and resources dedicated to 
the investigation and resolution of the incident also illustrate the high cost of quality 
failure, in terms of quality costing principles.)  
 
“…so in the end (CEO) was involved, so you know we had the big man, his 
decision.  It’s his company, his brands’ reputation and the safety of the consumer 
is paramount.” (L004, Consumer Manager) 
 
However, other participants expressed a belief that at the manufacturing site, delivery 
of production targets was seen as more important than product quality, and hence 
safety.  For example, when talking about the role that line operators play in performing 
QC checks, L009 explained: 
 
“…theirs is a dual function.  So that probably if you asked them is it quality first or 
manufacturing, they’d probably say, I think that was the biggest one coming out 
[of the RCA investigation], that it’s more manufacturing driven, it’s trying to get 
the pop out the door” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
Similarly, L014 expressed concerns about the lack of understanding of line operatives 
about the quality tests they perform, and indeed the prioritisation of both food safety 
and quality in the manufacturing site management team: 
 
“So you’ve got people who are manufacturing, I test something but I don’t 
understand why I’m testing it, I don’t know what that means, what to do if it 
228 
 
gives me a wrong result, and a management that was focussed on getting the 
pop out the door.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, Manufacturing Site). 
 
Another core value identified from the operation of the IIC, IRC and RCAs was the 
desire to “protect the company”, i.e. to safeguard the company’s reputation and 
protect it against possible legal threats.  This was demonstrated by the prominent role 
of the legal team in the investigation and the use of legal privilege, as discussed under 
“Communication”.   Concerns about the spread of information via social media was 
identified as one driver of the use of legal privilege. Another, which reinforces the 
desire to protect the organisation from harm, is the risk of litigation:  
 
“…one thing you’ve got a real challenge on now is this whole legally privileged 
element.  You know, if we’re taking our contemporaneous notes, what happens 
to those notes, how are they referred to …. I think it’s a looming problem ... I 
think that’s something that’s going to vex a lot of organisations, because we are 
increasingly being bogged down in the litigious society that is emanating across 
the Atlantic, if not already here.  So that is a real challenge, that’s been a massive 
learning point for me and how I think about this concept of incident 
management.” (L002, Head of Risk) 
 
LiquiComp UK appears to be trying to strike a delicate balance in the incident 
management process between the need to assure the safety of consumers and the 
need to protect the organisation from legal, financial and reputational damage. 
 
The value that LiquiComp places on process, systems and documentation has already 
been highlighted.  Another example of this in action during the incident was where 
L016 was instructed by his managers to collect evidence in the RCA investigation as 
follows:  
 
“So there was quite a clear steer from my line manager and the site director of, 
don’t take something on face value, if somebody said it, go and find the 
paperwork.  If somebody says they’ve been trained, go and get their training 
record, find out when it was.” (L016, CI Manager) 
 
 
Discrepancies between documentation, or supposed “hard facts”, and what the study 
participants’ believed to have actually happened to cause the cocked / shredded cap 
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incident, manifested themselves as a lack of trust, particularly between line operatives 
and management.  For example, management expressed disbelief that staff carried out 
cap and pack integrity tests correctly – or even at all - when the quality control check 
sheets were completed showing all packs were correct, and yet faulty product was 
known to have been shipped to the warehouse.   
 
This lack of trust contrasts with the faith placed by management in the incident 
investigation teams and the determination to uncover the real causes of the incident 
so that improvements could be made:  
 
“There wasn’t a time pressure put on it [the RCA investigation].  The main focus 
was to get to the issue, keep digging no matter what you need to do …. Do what 
you need to do to get to the facts, don’t risk it and miss something.” (L016, CI 
Manager) 
 
One last element of culture illustrated by the incident, was the power of senior 
management.  As previously mentioned, the commitment of senior management to 
address the quality incident was clearly expressed by study participants.  It was also 
obvious in the construction of the IRC team which involved senior, experienced staff: 
 
“… when it goes to an IRC in LiquiComp UK the most senior person is involved in 
each of the functions concerned, whether that’s sales, manufacturing, quality or 
whatever they need to be involved … because to go to an IRC is an issue of such 
seriousness you want the most qualified people to advise.” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
There was however, also evidence that people in positions of power could dominate 
discussions and perhaps overly influence decisions. For example, it was earlier 
described how a dominant individual on the IRC influenced the original view that the 
plastic swarf deposited on the bottle necks might be a safety hazard.   
 
Likewise, the ability of the CEO and the SMC to push back the original 
recommendation for product recall from the IRC, could also be perceived as the 
exercise of positional power. Indeed, it could be suggested that the SMC was 
“repositioning” the incident from one where product was considered to be a food 
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safety hazard to one where it was seen as a quality issue only, i.e. there was a trade-off 
between food safety and quality.  However, this does not appear to have been the 
case.  In fact, the interviewees were clear that the final decision to progress with a soft 
trade withdrawal (which did not necessitate reporting to the authorities) was driven 
primarily by the expert assessment and advice offered by the external medical adviser, 
as described earlier by L006:  
 
“… then after further consideration and interaction with our medical expert, we 
were satisfied, and he was satisfied, that it wouldn’t pose a risk to human health 
…” (L006, Lawyer) 
 
Thus whilst the legal responsibility for the decisions made by LiquiComp UK on 
whether to instigate a product withdrawal or recall rests with the senior managers, 
they were dependent on the expertise of the IRC and the medical adviser to make the 
appropriate decision.  In fact, the close involvement of the senior team in decision 
making can be seen as an appropriate use of power and the practice of good food 
safety governance by the business. 
 
With this in mind we need to consider how the quality incident illustrates positive 
areas for LiquiComp UK, and this is discussed next, in the theme “What Works”. 
 
“What Works” 
Individuals and teams get many opportunities to demonstrate skills and commitment 
in times of crisis and this proved to be the case during this incident. From the site 
Quality Director, who worked over the weekend following the discovery of the 
affected packs to analyse stock, through to the IRC and SMC team members who 
worked right up to 5pm on Christmas Eve, the commitment of LiquiComp UK staff to 
resolve the incident in a robust and timely fashion was clear.  
 
Another successful element in the resolution of the incident was the level of co-
operation and team work seen between staff and external partners.  For example, 
L004 described the work she undertook with the external digital agency who look after 
the LiquiComp UK brand websites.  It was decided to prepare a “banner” for the 
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website, alerting consumers to the pack defects, in case the company decided to 
progress to a product recall.   
 
“… because it’s Christmas Eve and they were closing at 1 o’clock, and no decision 
had been made by 1 o’clock, they said ‘look, everything is built, all we need is 
words, and just let us know.  Give us a ring and we can do it for you.’ So I mean 
they bent over backwards for us...” (L004 Consumer Manager). 
 
Similarly, productive working relationships were described with the capping machine 
manufacturers, the third-party logistics suppliers and the external medical advisor, all 
of whom were instrumental in supporting LiquiComp UK through the incident 
investigation and resolution. 
 
The examination of the processes undertaken to investigate and resolve the quality 
issue also demonstrated a high level of rigour in the company’s activities (as well as 
illustrating the high internal failure costs).  For example, L009 described the product 
testing undertaken to determine the timeline of the quality failure (i.e. to establish the 
starting point of the capping failure): 
 
“…we made sure a full layer of a pallet, so the very top layer was stripped and 
looked at, so a destructive test.  Initially we were looking for cocked caps, they 
were opening those caps and then finding the damage.  This was a fully 
destructive test and trying to get the information back as quickly as possible to 
build the timeline.” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager) 
 
There was also clear evidence that LiquiComp UK was not just gathering evidence on 
what went wrong but was proactively putting corrective actions in place across the 
organisation.  
 
Improvements in quality procedures had already been instigated in the manufacturing 
plant at the time of the Researcher’s site visit.  For example, a new test for “closure 
angle” was being trialled to replace the subjective “torque check” test, not only on the 
impacted production line (C) but on the sister line, D, and further across the site: 
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 “So what we are going to do from now, we are going to install the closure angle 
test. And we’ve already installed the closure angle test for C and D and the next 
step is to extend our experience across the site” (L011, Factory Leadership Team 
Member) 
 
Improvements had also been put in place quickly in the capping machine itself.  At 
first, a temporary fix was made through the disassembly of the machines and the 
application of a food grade chemical thread lock to all the bolts to keep them firmly in 
place.  This was followed by a permanent improvement through a change in product 
design: 
 
“So we worked quickly with the supplier to re-design the heads [of the capper] … 
both machines now have a different head design.  So still a magnetic head, but 
instead of fastening bolts, they are epoxy bonded, so effectively now there’s 
none of the bolts across the two machines, C and D.  And it probably took us 
about 3 to 6 months; 3 months to get a design agreed, installed and trialled, and 
then a full set manufactured for C.  And D has recently been done as well”. (L017, 
Site Engineer) 
 
Within the constraints formed by working under legal privilege, the engineering team 
had also sent out an engineering alert across LiquiComp Group to alert other sites to 
the potential technical problem with the capping heads and aid proactive action in 
other manufacturing sites.  
 
Outside of the manufacturing environment, IRC team members also took the 
opportunity to review the performance and capability of their teams, and to address 
identified improvement areas.  For example, L004 discussed the ability of her team to 
manage a product recall: 
 
“There has been the fact that if we were to have a product recall my team of 5 
couldn’t cope with it.  So we don’t have the capability to have an outsourced call 
centre that could manage on our behalf, so now I’m working with [L007, 
Corporate Affairs] and the procurement team to get a facility set ready for us to 
press the button should we have another issue.” (L004, Consumer Manager). 
 
 
233 
 
Improvements to the incident investigation itself were also identified.  A key learning 
was the need to ensure that key players in the process – be that members of the IRC, 
the external medical advisor, or members of the SMC – see and handle actual products 
with the known defects.  For example, in discussing how the IRC obtained a more 
detailed opinion from the external medical advisor: 
 
“…there was a dawning realisation that if we wanted to make that a more 
substantial experience for him [than just seeing pictures of the defects], upon 
which he could give us a better-informed answer, we should get some product 
under his nose, so we actually did that on Christmas Eve…” (L001, Business 
Quality Director) 
 
Recognising mistakes and learning from them, and the creative thinking required to 
improve processes and practices, can be considered as an important asset of 
LiquiComp UK which correlates with the long history of CI in the business, and this will 
be discussed further in section 5.3.2, under the theme “Day-to-Day”. 
 
“Experience Required” 
The importance of experience and expertise, both internal and external, has already 
been highlighted in this analysis.  The external medical advisor was the key player in 
determining the final IRC recommendation to undertake a soft trade withdrawal of 
product, rather than a consumer recall.  Likewise, the expertise of the packaging 
suppliers and the manufacturers of the original capping equipment was critical in 
determining the underlying cause of the equipment failure:  
 
“And actually I got the cap supplier in when we knew we’d got the problem, ‘cos 
it was so important and those guys, together with our engineers and the 
machinery manufacturers, I think all three of them got together in the 
engineering stores and literally took apart one of the capping heads and found 
the sheared bolts….” (L013, Packaging Manager). 
 
There was also recognition that the prior experience of IRC team members relatively 
new to LiquiComp UK could bring benefits to the incident management process.  This 
was described to the researcher by L008, who had only been with LiquiComp UK a few 
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months when the incident occurred:  
 
“…the question asked by L001 and the group was, ‘L008 have you any insights 
from your previous organisations that can help us manage this situation better?’ 
They were directly asking for that, just trying to make their approach the best it 
could be.” (L008, Head of Supply Chain Planning). 
 
The important role that experts played in resolving the incident was, however, 
undermined at some points by the dominant voices of senior staff involved in the IRC.  
It has been previously discussed that one senior manager drove an initial decision on 
the safety of the affected products by talking about his experience of the plastic shards 
feeling like fish bones.  L005 described this as the IRC team basing their initial 
discussions on incomplete information and “unofficial medical” opinions: 
 
“I think there was a certain amount of gathering of sort of informal opinions 
from doctors and paediatricians, which I don’t think we should have considered 
under the banner of medical opinions …  [we should have] just concentrated on 
the processes we have within the business.” (L005, Regulatory Manager). 
 
Subsequently, the team sought further opinion from the external medical advisor and 
the recommendation to recall product was changed to one to enact a trade 
withdrawal.  It can therefore be seen that the use of experts, particularly external, 
independent experts, was used by LiquiComp UK to balance strong opinions and 
ensure that a robust decision-making process was followed. 
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this analysis of the cocked / shredded cap incident has not only shown 
the complex, messy and generally unexpected nature of the issue, but, through the 
themes developed, gives an insight into the processes and systems which LiquiComp 
UK used to manage and resolve the incident.  The themes also allow an insight into the 
behaviours exhibited by staff, management, external suppliers and consultants leading 
up to the occurrence of the incident and during its investigation and resolution.   
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This embedded case shows an organisation which has well developed processes and 
systems for incident investigation and management.  Staff involved in managing the 
incident showed a high level of dedication and commitment and through this 
demonstrated the importance of food safety and quality to the company.   
 
However, the underlying picture was complicated.  Whilst equipment failures and 
limitations were evident in the failure of some of the QCPs (e.g. the limitations of the 
detection system), management expressed the view that manufacturing line operators 
had failed to undertake and record quality checks correctly.  The company drew short 
of officially “blaming” staff for the failure to detect the cocked caps due to the failure 
of another part of the quality system, as relevant SOPs and check sheets had not been 
kept up to date or correctly reviewed and there was a question about the conduct of 
relevant internal audits.  
 
Thus the two barriers to food safety governance identified in the first case study are 
also implicated in this case.  System swamping appears to be hindering the ability of 
the business to operate quality and safety systems effectively and efficiently and the 
simultaneous failure of multiple aspects of the quality systems was viewed as 
unforeseeable.  
 
Two other aspects of the findings must also be highlighted.  LiquiComp UK clearly 
places a high value on experience and expertise, as demonstrated by the significant 
role played by the external medical adviser in the IRC recommendations, and by the 
role played by packaging and equipment manufacturers in the manufacturing RCA.  
However, the relative power of senior management to influence decisions was also 
clear, in both the initial recommendation for product recall (driven by the strong 
opinions of one senior manager) and the push back on this recommendation by the 
CEO and SMC.  On a positive note, this exemplifies the close involvement of senior 
management in such issues, the importance that LiquiComp places on fast and 
accurate resolution of such events, and senior management’s commitment to good 
food safety governance.  Of greater concern was the “single-minded” approach taken 
by some members of the IRC– the view that people need to stick to their own areas of 
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expertise and not think or advise more broadly – which could potentially inhibit a full 
and open dialogue in a situation where senior management challenge the view of a 
lone expert.   
 
The second area to highlight is the impact of the use of legal privilege on 
communications about the incident across the business.  As previously discussed, the 
desire to “protect the company” may have unforeseen consequences in limiting 
dissemination of a comprehensive understanding of the incident and so limit 
organisational learning.  
 
Taken together the “single-minded” focus and desire to “protect the company” 
resulted in “constrained communication” which could also be viewed as acting as a 
barrier to food safety governance.   
 
Moving on, in the next section a thematic analysis is again used, this time to examine 
the general, day-to-day operations of LiquiComp UK, before concluding this chapter 
with a comparison of the embedded and overall organisational case.   
 
6.3.2 The Organisational Level 
 
This section, covers findings related to LiquiComp UK’s general operations.  It is 
presented in relation to the following themes: “Day-to-Day”; “What Works”; 
“Experience Required”; “Formal Expressions of Culture”; “Culture and Values” and 
“Communication”. 
 
“Day-to-Day”  
As previously discussed in the analysis of the cocked cap incident, under “Problem 
Solving Our Way”, LiquiComp UK sets high store by processes and systems to manage 
its business.   
 
This was most clearly demonstrated in the incident management process used, which 
was well organised and documented.  Indeed, this process forms a specific SOP that, as 
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discussed previously, was generally well understood at head office although somewhat 
less so at the manufacturing site. 
 
The factory QMS and HACCP systems have also previously been outlined.  In addition 
to the manufacturing site systems, LiquiComp UK has a comprehensive QMS for its 
head office, primarily because the company’s R&D facilities, including a small, but 
busy, development laboratory are situated there.  This QMS is based on a BRC 
framework and has “the intent of being able to design safe, good quality and legal 
products” (L001, Business Quality Director).  Thus, the importance of safety and 
quality, and the use of structured processes to control this, is set as a standard right 
from the start of the life of any product, way before it becomes a recipe to be 
produced in volume for supply to consumers.   
 
At the manufacturing plant, staff readily described the elements of the QMS and FSMS 
(HACCP, PRPs and maintenance plans) which related to their job responsibilities, be 
that approval of packaging materials or new ingredients, or the HACCP and PRPs for a 
designated area of the manufacturing plant.  
 
During the factory tour undertaken as part of the case study, the embedded nature of 
the PRPs was particularly clear.  For example, the Researcher was clearly briefed 
before entering the manufacturing area and asked to sign a health declaration.  There 
was also routine compliance with personal hygiene requirements, e.g. changing 
footwear before entering the aseptic filling hall (where still drinks without added 
preservatives are produced, these recipe constrictions demanding production in a 
‘clean’ environment).  In terms of HACCP, the CCPs were marked in the relevant areas 
with large red signs.  However, for staff to get further information on these CCPs, they 
were instructed to consult a manual, which is available on the site computer system, 
but not directly available at the production line side. The implications of this will be 
discussed further under “Communication” later in this section. 
 
As with other production sites, both simple and sophisticated controls are used.  The 
syrup room, where drinks are mixed and processed prior to packaging into individual 
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packs, is highly automated and has a dedicated computer control room.   In contrast, 
many of the quality and safety control checks for the packed products rely on less 
sophisticated technology and use manual recording of test results with paper and pen: 
 
“The metal detector is a CCP for us and we do a challenge test on that every 4 
hours, where we put a test stick through, and then all that data then for the test 
stick calibration is recorded on a check sheet.” (L010, Line Operator Manager). 
 
CI activities and tools are also well embedded within the manufacturing site having 
been used for many years as part of routine practice.  This fits with the manufacturing 
site practice of daily “Accountability Meetings”.  These are held for each production 
area to identify challenges and concerns within the last 24 hours. Similar morning 
meetings are held by production support teams, such as quality.  Representatives from 
each of these meetings then attend a mid-morning meeting with the Site Director and 
site management team to addresses quality, production and health and safety 
concerns.  CI processes are routinely used to address points raised, particularly where 
there are recurring issues.  
 
Overall therefore, it can be shown that LiquiComp relies on a system of inter-related 
systems, processes, checks and documentation to manage its routine day-to-day work 
– as well as less routine events such as product quality and safety incident 
investigations.  These processes appear to be treated very matter-of-factly as simply 
the way things happen at LiquiComp UK. 
 
So, if processes and systems are “the way we (LiquiComp UK) work”, what specifically 
does work well on an organisational basis? This is the topic of the next theme.  
 
“What Works” 
One element of “What Works”, which stood out in the embedded case as a strength 
for LiquiComp UK, was the commitment demonstrated by the staff involved in 
investigating and resolving the cocked cap issue.   So, is there similar evidence of 
commitment to the organisation on a broader basis?  
 
239 
 
In considering this question, it is pertinent to reflect on the history of the organisation 
and its environment at the time of the research study.   Many staff at the production 
plant had worked there for a long time: 
 
“…we've got quite an aged workforce now, so there’s a lot of people been here 
20, 30, 40 years, which generally you don't get in companies anymore …” (L009, 
Food Quality and Safety Manager). 
 
At the time of the data collection, an operational restructuring programme was 
underway at the manufacturing site.  This, combined with the impact of the non-
reportable food incident, was recognised as creating a challenging work environment 
for staff and management: 
 
“…because we’re in this restructure at the moment the management team is 
probably less visible than it has been for a while, because it’s been absorbed in 
the restructure…” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, Manufacturing Site). 
 
“…the incident which occurred back here in December, you know, the morale, 
and how that impacted the site, from an engineering operational team, it was a 
difficult place to be.” (L017, Site Engineer). 
 
Despite this, staff were recognised as continuing to undertake their responsibilities to 
a high standard, demonstrating their commitment to the organisation: 
 
“It’s a bit of risk to us now, because we’re saying to these people, ‘sorry, you 
don’t have a job’ … and you’ve got to keep them on board … you’ve still got to 
keep the day-to-day ticking over.  And, credit to them, the professionalism of the 
people is absolutely superb, they’re just carrying on doing the job they’re being 
asked to do.…” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality, Manufacturing Site).  
 
It is therefore fair to conclude that even in the relatively turbulent times of an 
operational restructure, staff continue to demonstrate their commitment to the 
organisation, suggesting that this is a deeply rooted strength for LiquiComp UK. 
 
Another strength identified in the embedded case was the rigour demonstrated in 
undertaking the incident investigation.  In terms of everyday operations in the factory, 
the FSMS and FSMnS also had a high degree of care and thoroughness – in other 
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words, rigour - built in. For example, L010 described the monitoring process for 
checking the fillers after cleaning: 
 
“…and then we would swab the filler into production, using a quick swabbing 
technique, electronic swabbing.  So if anything fails, we take recovery swabs as 
well and we re-clean until it passes effectively.” (L010, Line Operator Manager). 
 
Although the cocked cap incident would appear to cast doubt on the actual rigour of 
the company’s quality and safety processes, the overall rigorous approach to quality 
and food safety appears to have greatly contributed to the successful operations of the 
business over many years.  
 
“Experience Required” 
In the embedded case it was shown how LiquiComp UK placed a great value on the 
experience and expertise of staff and consultants to investigate and resolve the cocked 
/ shredded cap incident.  We now consider whether a similar value is placed on 
experience and expertise, particularly in terms of food safety and quality, outside of a 
“crisis” situation. 
 
LiquiComp UK employs a number of highly experienced staff to develop, manage and 
monitor food safety and quality.  In addition to the manufacturing site HACCP team, 
senior members of the quality community co-ordinate activities with their European 
counterparts to develop common standards and approaches across LiquiComp Global.   
 
At the time of this research, the LiquiComp UK manufacturing site had held ISO 9001 
accreditation for its QMS for many years.  However, it does not hold external 
certification for food safety against a scheme recognised by GFSI.  Rather, the site 
relies on internal audits by quality and food safety audit teams from its own business, 
from other parts of the global organisation, customer audits, and, of course, 
inspections by enforcement authorities.  However, a goal is stated in the LiquiComp UK 
Quality Strategy proposal for 2016 to progress to FSSC 22000 certification.  
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In summary, therefore, specifically in terms of expertise and experience in food safety 
and quality audit, LiquiComp UK appears to value “internal” expertise (be that from 
the UK organisation or from other parts of LiquiComp), rather than independent, third 
party expertise.  Whilst this approach is changing, as evidenced by the intent to gain 
FSSC 22000 accreditation, this contrasts with the respect for, and reliance on, external 
experts in the management of the cocked cap incident.   
 
“Formal Expressions of Culture”  
Before looking at the culture and values generally expressed across the organisation, it 
is valuable to consider the more formal expressions of culture set out by LiquiComp 
UK.   As might be expected, LiquiComp UK has developed a corporate identity and 
strategy.  It has a specific vision, mission and ambition cycle, combining elements of 
the global corporation’s core values with that of the UK specific brands.  This corporate 
identity is highly visible in the head office and on the front page of the corporate 
website.  However, both product branding and the company identity are far less visible 
at the manufacturing site impacted by the non-reportable food incident.   
 
There also appear to be significant differences in the recognition and use of the 
corporate mission statement between the head office and this manufacturing site.  
When organisational purpose, mission and values were raised in the semi-structured 
interviews, all the head office based staff talked at some point about the corporate 
mission (even if it was only to express a personal dislike of the statement), whereas 
only two of the eight participants from the manufacturing site mentioned it at all.   
The need to bring together staff across the different locations and build a new 
organisational identity has already been recognised by the senior management team.  
Indeed, the business held a one-day, off-site conference for all staff earlier in the year 
to start this process: 
 
“…We had a big meeting ... it was the first time that they’d shut [the 
manufacturing sites] and got everybody that works for company in one room, so 
it was hundreds of us, so nobody was making any [brands] that day … and it was 
sharing the values for the company, what our objectives are for the year...” 
(L004, Consumer Manager). 
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Another key consideration is the prioritisation of food safety within the official values 
and strategy.  Although food safety is not specifically mentioned in the LiquiComp UK 
overall strategy, quality and consumers are placed centrally.  The organisation also 
shares a common quality charter with other European arms of the organisation, which 
has as an aim the creation of centres of excellence for food safety (i.e. within the 
LiquiComp Group quality and food safety are embedded in the same strategy).  Some 
concern was expressed that the official quality strategy needed to be more tailored for 
the needs of the LiquiComp manufacturing site: 
 
“… he’s [Head of Quality for LiquiComp Europe] starting to set out a new quality 
strategy for the business…. I understand what they’re trying to drive to and it fits 
exactly with what we need to do here.  We just need to reorder it slightly for 
what we need to do, to match our own personal circumstances … because in 
some respects they’re trying to put racing wheels on when you’ve not even got 
an axle at the moment.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality). 
 
 
In conclusion, it appears that LiquiComp UK still has work to do to make the formal 
aspects of organisation vision, mission etc. visible, particularly within manufacturing 
sites, and then to create an appropriately tailored quality and food safety strategy.  
 
“Culture and Values”  
Moving on from official statements, this theme evaluates how the study participants 
expressed their understanding of the organisation’s culture and values.   
 
There was a degree of coherence with the official company strategy, as both quality 
and consumers are central to this, and many participants expressed the purpose of 
LiquiComp UK in these terms: 
 
“…to provide our consumers with delicious tasting products...” (L004, Consumer 
Manager). 
 
“…to manufacture prime brand quality…” (L012, Technical Team Member). 
 
“...to provide relevant products for the consumer, at the right quality and at the 
right value.” (L008, Head of Supply Chain Planning). 
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“… to make high quality soft drinks …” (L005, Regulatory Manager). 
 
“… to deliver very good, tasty, healthy food to consumers…” (L011, Factory 
Leadership Team Member). 
 
Interestingly, although all participants were aware that food safety was the main 
interest of the Researcher (through the provision of participant information sheets and 
the informed consent process), only 2 out of 17 participants mentioned the safety of 
products in their initial description of the organisational purpose: 
 
“... to provide consumers with a safe, enjoyable product and experience...” 
(L015, Manager, Third Party Manufacturing). 
 
“... to make a drink that people want to buy, safely, … that people want to go out 
and drink and buy, but to do it in a way that it’s not going to hurt them, you 
know…” (L013, Packaging Manager). 
 
So, whilst food safety was described as a key priority by participants in the context of 
the cocked / shredded cap incident, this was not reflected in their descriptions of the 
overall organisational priorities.  
 
One possible explanation for this was given by L006, who expressed the opinion that 
head office based staff would see the commercial aims of the organisation as more 
pertinent to them than food safety: 
 
“ … if you go to [affected manufacturing site] it’s much more prominent, because 
I guess it’s the site where the product’s being made, whereas here [head office] 
we are more, um, especially on this side of the office, the marketing, design 
teams, are much more about being creative and coming up with ideas and 
powering the brands forwards rather than the nuts and bolts of safety and 
quality, so perhaps it’s just the natural organic split that means that here food 
safety culture is not as prominent….” (L006, Lawyer). 
 
Another explanation for participants not expressing food safety as an organisational 
purpose might be the overall perception that soft drinks are fundamentally safe 
products: 
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“Quite often within the soft drinks industry the risks are seen as lower, so you 
will see more focus on culture in companies that are dealing with higher risk 
products like milks...” (L015, Manager, Third Party Manufacturing). 
 
“Here, personal opinion, it’s kind of taken as a given [by other people] that we 
make pretty bomb proof products, and for the most part therefore it [food 
safety] doesn’t worry people day to day…” (L001, Business Quality Director). 
 
There was however recognition in the quality community that this “don’t worry” 
attitude can result in complacency and that work is required to build an FSC in the 
organisation: 
 
“... so the complacency is a potential to catch us out … [it] means we occupy our 
days with lots of other stuff and it’s [safety] really only brought to the attention 
of our business when it cocks up.  It’s not so obviously part of the DNA, I would 
say.” (L001 Business Quality Director). 
 
“…to me it’s absolutely critical that we get that [FSC] embedded and that’s the 
first one.  ‘Cos ultimately, the people on the line, I want them to think that their 
kid could drink this product that’s coming off the line, and get that connection, to 
say well, my actions will drive whether somebody drinks and enjoys that or 
drinks and gets sick off it, and actually get that connection, because that’s 
something we’ve lost.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality). 
 
In fact, other study participants expressed the view that the predominant culture could 
be described as a “compliance culture”, where, for example, internal audit teams were 
trained and expected to audit for compliance to the QMS, rather than to specific food 
safety or quality standards.  This suggests that significant change is required to re-
focus the day-to-day approach to food safety.  In line with this, at the time of the data 
collection, LiquiComp UK had appointed a new Site Director for this manufacturing 
plant, who had already expressed a vision for improvement in quality and food safety 
on the site. This, together with the organisational changes in progress39, was expected 
to change the focus on quality and hence food safety across the manufacturing 
community.   
 
                                                          
39 This organisational change might also be expected to have an impact on both the total cost of quality 
and the distribution of these costs, for example, moving responsibility for routine operations from a 
specific QA staff member to a production team might result in a reduction in appraisal costs.   
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The Researcher also understands that since the main data collection phase of the study 
the central quality team has worked with non-manufacturing departments to 
strengthen the understanding of food safety throughout the business.  For example, 
the quality team has worked with R&D to articulate and agree what “safety by design” 
means for new product development.  Such activities build accountability for food 
safety across business disciplines and help to foster FSC across the wider organisation.  
  
Another notable finding was that three of the 17 study participants, all technical and 
quality staff at the production site, mentioned the safety or well-being of staff in their 
description of organisational purpose; L013 (above), L014 and L009: 
 
“…we’re here to provide products that the consumers want; you know [to] meet 
or exceed their expectations.  And for me the ethos is that we do that in a safe 
way, that doesn’t harm the environment, and enriches the people who work 
here, gives them opportunity to grow.” (L014, Director of Technical and Quality). 
 
“I think the purpose of our organisation is obviously the health and safety and 
well-being of the guys on the line, the quality of products as well, then it goes to 
cost, delivery etc.” (L009, Food Quality and Safety Manager). 
 
This fits with the prioritisation of health and safety at the manufacturing site over 
recent years, which has seen significant improvements in the site safety record: 
 
“…. we’ve gone from having one of the worst safety records to having one of the 
best, in fact the best in LiquiComp Global, with over a million hours with no 
accidents. So it shows that cultural change can happen.”  (L014, Director of 
Technical and Quality). 
 
As L014 expressed in the last quote, the change in the health and safety culture of the 
organisation demonstrates that organisational culture change is possible.   
 
Looking at health and safety, the focus at the manufacturing site was easy to see.  On 
entering the factory grounds, the first interactions any visitor has are with site security 
and reception.  All visitors are informed about walking safely around the site (to avoid 
accidents with delivery vehicles) and are given clear instructions about fire alarms and 
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assembly points. Thus, the importance of health and safety on site is immediately 
apparent.   
 
Another example of health and safety practices was demonstrated when the 
Researcher attended a line side accountability meeting.  These meetings take place in 
a noisy environment, where wearing ear protection is mandatory.  To enable the 
meetings to take place safely in that location all staff are issued with radio linked ear 
defenders, enabling them to hear all the meeting participants clearly, whilst still 
protecting their hearing.   
 
Finally, the health and safety statistics for the site (days since last lost time accident 
etc.) are given on a prominent sign at the site entrance, demonstrating transparency in 
the data and pride in the site health and safety record. 
 
The measurement of FSC was a key topic of conversation in the semi-structured 
interviews.  No specific scheme is currently in place in the organisation to assess this.  
From a health and safety perspective, the organisation records “near misses”, now 
called “ZAPs” (zero accidents), and the Director of Technical and Quality is already 
considering how to build a similar system for food safety and quality: 
 
“… health and safety have their safety triangle and they started by setting up 
what they call ‘near misses’ or more recently called ‘ZAPs’, so steal with pride, 
and use the same sort of thing, looking at quality improvement activities that we 
can launch and use the same sort of vehicle and mechanism to do that…” (L014, 
Director of Technical and Quality). 
 
One challenge to building a stronger FSC in the organisation also came from L014. He 
related that the management team have, in the past, failed to embed initiatives, 
leading to scepticism amongst the work force: 
 
“… unfortunately we tend to have a focus on something, and then, we move on 
to something else and it just lapses, the jaws of culture grind up some initiatives 
very, very quickly.  So, one thing, and this has been a discussion in the 
management team, is we need to be absolutely relentless on, if we do put 
something in, supporting it and making sure it gains the traction until it gets 
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really embedded into the place.  Because the culture here is, ‘oh, it's another 
management imitative.  Give it 6 weeks and then it'll be gone it'll be onto the 
next one’, and you've got to change that.  And now having more new people into 
the management team, we are starting to see there is much more focus on 
actual long term delivery, rather than ‘oh yes, got to do something, let's do 
something’, then it sort of fizzles out. So it is getting better.” (L014, Director of 
Technical and Quality). 
 
This suggests that a firm commitment to improving FSC, with targets set across the 
organisation and not just for the quality team, will be critical to achieve long term 
improvements.  As concluded in “Formal Expressions of Culture”, more work is 
required to build the top-level strategy for quality and food safety to act as a 
foundation for organisation wide targets and commitments.   
 
Finally, we need to consider a theme which underpins and influences most of the 
themes already discussed – “Communication”.  
 
“Communication” 
In the discussion on communication during the investigation and management of the 
cocked / shredded cap incident it was noted that concerns about the use of social 
media and litigation relating to product incidents is driving the use of legal privilege 
and the closer involvement of the legal team in managing communications.  
 
More generally, a wide range of communication tools were used across LiquiComp UK 
to focus the organisation on objectives and priorities and to celebrate personal and 
organisational success.  For example, updates on product launches are communicated 
by email, over the company intranet and using “Yammer”, a Microsoft system used to 
create social networks for businesses. One concern expressed at the affected 
manufacturing site was that the reliance on IT based communications might create a 
barrier in communicating effectively with staff who are less comfortable with 
technology.  The example was used of requesting feedback from staff, which required 
the completion of an on-line form:  
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“Everything we get is via email or on the plasmas and the interaction, it's all on 
line. Some people are really good with it and'll come along with that, others 
don’t, you know, so it's making sure that you’re resonating with your audience.  
To measure your success, 'cos you might have actually been successful, but if 
they don't fill in an online form, it doesn't mean that it's not [successful]” (L009, 
Food Quality and Safety Manager).   
 
Another area where the use of technology might constrain communication is the 
information available at the production line on CCPs.  As noted previously, CCPs are 
marked by large, red signs along the production line, but more detailed information is 
only available in on-line manuals.  This contrasts with health and safety information, 
where key information is available in paper copy at each piece of equipment.  This 
point was discussed with L014, who conflated this with a lack of staff’s understanding 
and connection to QCPs40: 
 
“But you know, where's the document that says this machine does this, and this 
is how you check the quality of what it's doing, and this is what you do if it goes 
wrong?  That's not there, but it's allowed for a lack of that connection.” (L014, 
Director of Technical and Quality). 
 
Formal communication between functional teams and senior management frequently 
takes the form of reports.  These are sent as pre-reads for senior management team 
meetings.  For example, L001 shared a copy of the Quality and Food Safety update 
prepared for the SMC.  This report gives information on product incidents, 
investigations into alleged illnesses and the progress of the quality team against key 
strategic actions.  Similar reports are prepared by other areas of the business e.g. L008 
discusses the regular updates on stock status for the company at the commercial 
review meeting.  
 
At the manufacturing site, daily communication between the site teams (production 
and supporting functions) and the site director takes place in the form of a mid-
morning accountability meeting, as outlined in “Day-to-Day”.  Teams for each 
production area, and for the support functions, hold preliminary meetings earlier in 
                                                          
40 This again demonstrates the intertwined nature and understanding of food safety and quality at 
LiquiComp UK.  
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the morning, enabling information to flow up to and cascade back down from the main 
meeting.  The production team meetings take place at the line side (as described in 
“Culture and Values”).  Large whiteboards are used to record actions, incidents to be 
raised to the main accountability meeting, and to track progress of outstanding work, 
e.g. to tackle quality or production concerns.  Keeping the information at the 
production line helps to keep issues in focus and ensure that teams are working on 
agreed priorities.  
 
One of the study participants also spoke about the practice of conducting “Gembas” 
across the manufacturing site.  This practice was widely used by PowderCo UK and 
described in the previous case study.  In LiquiComp UK, “Gemba” appears to have been 
introduced as part of a raft of CI practices, but is now less used, having been one of the 
initiatives which failed to become embedded long term within the site: 
 
“And I go and do GEMBAs on a regular basis.  So you go out into the factory, and 
you know, from years of experience I suppose, but you get a gut feel as well?” 
(L014, Director of Technical and Quality).  “Do you do those round here? I 
haven't heard anybody else mention them?” (Researcher).  “Yes, we do 
GEMBAs.  It's not as embedded as it should be… I do it religiously myself …” 
(L014). 
 
Overall, the major constraints on communication described in the embedded case did 
not appear to affect day-to-day operations, and initiatives such as the company wide 
meeting to present objectives etc. (see “Formal Expressions of Culture”) could be 
expected to improve inter-site and inter-departmental relationships and 
communication.  Nevertheless, further improvements in relevant communications on 
quality and safety on the manufacturing line were believed to be required.  Initiatives 
such as better signposting of CCPs, access to relevant information and the use of 
pictures to communicate safety and quality standards were brought up by senior 
members of the quality community as potential improvement ideas for the site. 
 
Conclusion 
The thematic analysis of the main case has elucidated several aspects of the working 
practices and behaviours of LiquiComp UK.  The overall picture is of an organisation 
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which puts trust in processes and systems for all aspects of its business. There is 
recognition within the quality community that the current QMS is overly complex and 
burdensome so that a cultural change is required to reposition activities away from 
compliance to the system, towards a proactive quality and food safety approach.  It 
was also clearly evident that staff - both relatively new and those who have worked for 
the company for many years - are committed to the organisation.  
 
However, this analysis raises some key concerns in terms of the prioritisation of food 
safety in the organisation at the time of the study. Whilst many study participants put 
product quality as a key purpose of the organisation, the key manufacturing priority 
was judged to be “getting the pop out of the door”.  At the manufacturing site the 
HACCP system is established and PRPs such as personal hygiene are well embedded; 
however overall in the organisation there is an element of complacency towards food 
quality and safety.  LiquiComp UK’s core products are viewed as “pretty bomb proof”.  
Indeed, acidified, sugar containing, carbonated products generally have a low risk of 
contamination with pathogenic organisms, but as the embedded case demonstrates, 
even these products can suffer from other quality and safety related failures.   
 
The culture and values of the company are developing and not yet fully shared right 
across the organisation.  Senior management appear committed to making the 
changes required to ensure the future of the brands, the manufacturing sites and the 
overall organisation.  They also recognise that culture change requires a consistent 
approach and ongoing prioritisation by the senior management team.  Whilst this was 
positively demonstrated by the improvements in health and safety at the 
manufacturing site considered in this case study, it was also recognised that the site 
management team have previously failed to embed other initiatives and that a 
consistent approach will be required to improve FSC. 
 
Following this analysis of both the embedded and organisational cases, a comparison is 
between them is required.  Consideration will be made as to whether the organisation 
works and behaves in a similar fashion when under the pressures of managing a 
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quality incident as it does during day-to-day operations and if not, look for possible 
reasons for the differences elucidated.  
 
 
6.4 The Relationship between the Embedded Case and the Organisation 
 
Overall, the findings of the thematic analysis show that LiquiComp UK demonstrates 
many consistent behaviours and attitudes across times of normal operations and times 
of heightened pressure.   
 
There is clear alignment between the importance of processes, systems and routines 
for the day-to-day running of business and the use of well-structured processes for 
incident investigation and management.  CI tools and techniques are embedded in 
everyday work and were used for problem solving during the incident which forms the 
embedded case.   
 
The use of CI illustrates an organisational appetite for learning.  This was also clearly 
seen in the cocked/ shredded cap issue, where a key lesson for the incident 
investigation process itself was the importance of having physical samples of affected 
products for all parties to examine.  Members of the IRC also used the opportunity to 
evaluate how well prepared their own areas were for implementing a product recall 
and had begun to put in place plans to address any shortcomings.  These examples 
come on top of the numerous corrective actions identified as part of the RCAs at the 
manufacturing site.   
 
However, an unanticipated side effect of the wholesale adoption of processes and 
systems to run every part of the business was seen in the non-reportable food 
incident, with the mismatch between SOPs and check sheets for the “torque test”.  The 
plethora of processes and documents with its combination of paper based and 
networked systems could be termed system swamping, and poses challenges for the 
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company and its employees, namely: 
 
 How do staff know which are the critical procedures for the safe and efficient 
running of the business are when there are so many “important” ones? 
 
 How do staff access the information they need at the time when they need it, 
when it’s spread across different systems and formats – and if they do access it, 
can they be certain they’ve got the right information? 
 
 How does the company keep all these documents up-to-date, whilst also 
retaining the right level of control?  
An excess of complex documentation has been identified as one of the barriers to the 
successful implementation of FSMS, particularly HACCP (Fotopoulos et al., 2011; 
Jevšnik et al., 2006).   Although the volume and complexity of documentation has not 
prevented LiquiComp UK from implementing both a QMS and an FSMS, “system 
swamping”, does appear to be somewhat of a barrier to the successful maintenance 
and on-going use of the QMS and FSMS and so to food safety governance.  At the time 
of the data collection, LiquiComp UK was in the process of implementing an SAP 
quality module and a complementary software system to collect and trend quality 
data, with the aim of streamlining both data collection and analysis, to enable staff to 
focus attention on key information.  Whilst this should help to address the some of the 
concerns about documentation management and data collection, it will be critical to 
ensure that the ability to collect and hold more data does not lead to more complexity, 
rather than the intended simplification and prioritisation. 
 
Another point of difference noted between the embedded and organisational cases, 
and one which can also be seen as a barrier to effective food safety governance, 
relates to the style of communication. On an everyday basis, communications appear 
generally open, timely and inclusive.  However, during the quality incident a key 
concern was to keep a tight hold on information with anxieties expressed about the 
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use of social media and the increasingly litigious nature of society.  Whilst such 
concern is understandable, this “constrained communication” appears to have led to 
tensions with front line manufacturing staff who were, reportedly, frustrated about 
the lack of information.  Even amongst technical staff and management there was a 
lack of knowledge of, or a misunderstanding of, the complete incident which has the 
potential to cause miscommunications in the future.  It might also prevent the wider 
dissemination of lessons learned from the incident, as there was a lack of a fully 
coherent “story” about the incident which was understood across the business.  
 
Another element of disparity was seen in culture and values.  Concern for food safety 
came to the fore in dealing with the incident but appears to be of a lower priority in 
routine operations.  “Getting the pop out of the door” – albeit good tasting, high 
quality products – seemed to be the usual priority at the manufacturing site and many 
study participants at head office recognised that they did not have front line roles to 
play in assuring food safety.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Griffith (2008, 2009 cited by 
Griffith et al., 2010a) defines FSC as “the aggregation of the prevailing, relatively 
constant, learned, shared attitudes, values and beliefs contributing to the hygiene 
behaviours used within a particular food handling environment”.  This infers that the 
day-to-day values and priorities of LiquiComp UK would indicate the true FSC of the 
organisation – being more prevalent and constant – rather than behaviours and 
attitudes demonstrated only at a time of crisis, when food safety was a high priority. (A 
more comprehensive analysis of the FSC of LiquiComp UK is given in Chapter 7, Section 
7.2).  In fact, the tight control of communication about the incident means that staff 
may not even be aware that food safety was the key priority at this time.  These 
findings substantiate the concerns raised by some study participants of the amount of 
work required within LiquiComp UK to improve the FSC of the company and suggest 
that “culture and values” may form another barrier to effective food safety 
governance.  
 
This case study also suggests that the broader “organisational culture” can act as a 
barrier to effective food safety governance.  Whilst all participants based at head office 
made at least some reference to the official company mission statement, very few of 
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those based at the affected manufacturing site did.  In every corner of the head office 
there were visible displays of company symbols, from brand history displays to 
samples of new products in coolers, with copies of the mission statement and 
objectives on poster displays and leaflets.  In contrast, the company identity was far 
less visible at the manufacturing site; in the words of L014, “… so a meeting room like 
this, we could be anywhere”.   Taken together, this suggests that the three levels of 
organisational culture defined by Schein (2004) - artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, 
and basic underlying assumptions – differ between the head office and manufacturing 
sites.   In terms of the construct of PC, this indicates that there are several 
organisational topoi in LiquiComp UK (head office; manufacturing site; staff; senior 
management etc.) and that there is a lack of integration into one overarching topos.  
This will also be considered in more detail in Chapter 7.   
 
Before moving on, it is important to address the question of whether in this case the 
people, processes or both underlie the failure in the FSMS / QMS, i.e., how does this 
case fit with these constructs in the theoretical roadmap set out in Chapter 4 (Figure 
4.3)?  In fact, a convoluted mixture of people and process issues underlie the failures 
uncovered.  For example, the mechanical failure which set off the quality incident, i.e., 
the bolt dropping out of the capping head, can be traced back to two underlying 
issues: poor design (as the bolts could work loose) and a failure to recognise the need 
for regular inspection and maintenance of the bolts.  Whilst the gap in inspection and 
maintenance programmes are process failures, it can be argued that the actions – or 
lack of actions - of people underlie both of these gaps.  The possibility of a failure of 
the bolts does not appear to have been considered and hence was not managed by 
either the equipment manufacturers, or of course by LiquiComp UK.  This limitation on 
possibilities fits with the paradigm of PC and will be addressed in the next chapter.   
 
A further example - the “torque check” QCP - has been mapped out to illustrate the 
multiple failure points and the underlying causes of people and process failures and is 
shown in Figure 6.5 overleaf.  Overall, it might be concluded that whilst the embedded 
case illustrates that both process and people failures caused the quality incident, it is 
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the shortcomings of the people who develop, implement and manage the processes 
which underlie the majority of these failure points.   
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Figure 6.5: The “Torque Check” – A People or Process Failure? 
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The people Vs process debate should also be considered from the perspective of the 
overall thematic analysis.  As was set out in Chapter 4, no new themes were developed 
for this case over and above those created for the PowderCo UK case study.  Figure 
6.6. overleaf is therefore adapted from the thematic map developed for the PowderCo 
UK case study, with new codes added in green typeface, and again categorised as 
people related (in italics), process related (in capitals) or both (italicised capitals)41.  
The thematic map reinforces the conclusion of the inter-related nature of people and 
process elements, in both the routine operations of the organisation and in the 
analysis of the non-reportable food incident, but with people elements underpinning 
the majority of themes. 
 
One last point must be re-visited, the perception by the organisation that the non-
reportable food incident was unforeseeable, at least to some degree.  This echoes an 
element of the PowderCo UK case, although the drivers of why the organisations take 
this view are somewhat different.  In PowderCo UK it was postulated that individuals 
might be reluctant to voice concerns about the weaknesses in the organisation (be 
they people or process weaknesses) as they are constrained by the strong, overarching 
organisational topos.  In contrast, it appears that LiquiComp UK lacks an overarching 
topos.  In this case, individuals may be reluctant to apportion blame on processes or 
people as do not want to highlight the fragmented nature of the topoi between 
different departments and sites. Whatever the underlying reasons, classifying the 
incident as “unforeseeable” can be viewed as a barrier to effective food safety 
governance, as it impacts on the ability of the organisation to fully recognise the need 
for changes and take full learning from failures.  
 
 
 
                                                          
41 The two codes which do not relate to the LiquiComp UK case are shown for completeness, but struck 
out with a green line. 
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Figure 6.6 LiquiComp UK Thematic Map 
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6.5 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has described the second case study, LiquiComp UK, again using a 
thematic analysis to explore both the embedded, critical case of a non-reportable food 
incident – the cocked / shredded caps – and the overall organisation. 
 
As with the PowderCo UK case, the incident itself was complex and unexpected (see 
Figures 6.3 and 6.5) and occurred despite the company having a comprehensive QMS 
and FSMS in place.  As elucidated by the thematic analysis, LiquiComp UK placed great 
trust in and reliance on such systems.  Processes and systems were seen as the basis 
for day-today operations and indeed were critical in allowing LiquiComp UK to 
investigate and resolve the quality incident in a robust and timely manner. However, 
the sheer volume and complexity of systems – system swamping - was one of the 
underpinning issues which contributed to delays in the cocked caps being detected by 
staff earlier.  This barrier to effective food safety governance links with findings from 
the extant literature presented in Chapter 3, that the complexity of HACCP based 
FSMSs can act as a barrier to FSMS implementation, and this point will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.   
 
Contrasting communication styles were identified in the embedded and overall 
organisational cases. In general, communication was regular, open and inclusive, 
however, constrained communication was a key feature of the embedded case, due to 
the use of legal privilege to safeguard the organisation from legal, financial and 
reputational damage.  Constrained communication may act as a break on 
organisational learning from failure and act as a barrier to effective food safety 
governance.    
 
Whilst LiquiComp UK clearly prioritised food safety during the quality incident, the 
importance of food safety versus other demands, in particular the drive to “get the 
pop out of the factory” has been identified and discussed as a potential cause for 
concern.  If one considers that FSC is represented by “prevailing, relatively constant, 
learned, shared attitudes, values and beliefs ….” (Griffith, 2008, 2009, cited by Griffith 
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et al., 2010a), then the everyday beliefs and actions of staff are a better indicator of 
the organisation’s FSC than the attitudes and behaviours exhibited during the incident 
investigation and resolution.  This suggests that the FSC of LiquiComp UK is 
underdeveloped and culture and values have also been identified as a barrier to food 
safety governance in this case.   Further analysis of the FSC of LiquiComp UK is given in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Furthermore, it was apparent that LiquiComp UK continues to develop its 
organisational culture and strategy.  Significant differences in the visibility and 
understanding of the organisational culture between the head office and 
manufacturing sites and this somewhat fragmented organisational culture appears to 
form another barrier to effective food safety governance.   
 
A key aim of this thematic analysis was to explore whether food incidents can be 
related to specific people or process elements of a failure in FSMSs.  The thematic map 
set out in Figure 6.6 highlights the interactions between people and process in this 
case, both in terms of the functional day-to-day operations of the organisation and the 
food incident.  However, as with the PowderCo UK case, people related elements - 
variations in working practices, missed opportunities and unforeseen possibilities –are 
primary contributors to the root cause of the product incident.   
 
There were several unforeseen, or even unforeseeable, elements to the non-
reportable food incident, including not only the primary failure of the capping machine 
but also the simultaneous failure of multiple control points.  As previously noted in the 
PowderCo UK case, this finding will be used to question the reliability of HACCP-based 
FSMSs in Chapter 7. 
 
Having considered the thematic analysis of both case study organisations, Chapter 7 
presents a detailed comparison and discussion of the cases.  First, the results of the 
thematic analyses are compared and contrasted, before the findings are considered in 
light of the extant literature on barriers to and drivers for FSMSs and FSC.  Finally, the 
case studies are re-analysed using the concepts of PC, which enables both the 
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determination of the utility of PC to investigate non-financial MCSs and cases of 
organisational failure, whilst also offering new insights into the cases themselves. 
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7.0 Discussion   
 
The last two chapters have presented the findings of the thematic analysis of the case 
studies, PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK.  This analysis has given insights into what 
happened in the embedded cases of the non-reportable food incidents, how the cases 
were investigated and resolved and who was involved.  The analysis also started to 
uncover some of the underlying reasons as to why the incidents happened, including 
failures in manufacturing and test equipment, mismatch of SOPs and check lists for 
product quality tests, and failures to take account of the consequences of small 
process changes.  A comparison was also made between the generally successful day-
to-day operations of the organisations and the incidents, giving further insights into 
how and why these occurred and what underpins the generally successful operations 
of the two food manufacturers.  
 
In both cases, the non-reportable food incidents happened despite the companies 
having comprehensive QMSs and FSMSs; both organisations were process driven not 
only in using these systems to manage the quality and safety of food production, but 
also in the way that they used processes and systems to investigate and resolve the 
incidents.  Most strikingly, in both cases the quality incidents were viewed as 
unexpected or unforeseeable: the possibility of failures happening in this way had not 
been anticipated or completely controlled for in either organisation.  The classification 
(by the organisations) of the incidents as unforeseeable has been identified as a 
potential barrier to food safety governance, along with system swamping.  In the case 
of LiquiComp UK three other potential barriers were identified: constrained 
communication and two aspects of culture, both the overarching organisational 
culture and the everyday culture and values exhibited by staff and management.   
To understand these and other findings in more detail, the cases are first directly 
compared (section 7.1) then reconsidered against the theoretical roadmap.  The 
elements of “FBO People” and “FSMS Process” are further explored by considering the 
case studies against the extant literature on FSMS and FSC (section 7.2).  Then the 
findings are further analysed and considered against the main constructs of PC (section 
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7.3), before conclusions are presented in section 7.4.  First though a detailed 
comparison of the cases is made (section 7.1).  
 
 
7.1 Cross-Case Comparison: PowderCo UK vs. LiquiComp UK 
 
Both LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK are UK based food manufacturing arms of multi-
national organisations.  Both companies own highly respected, long established brands 
and operate from manufacturing facilities which, whilst they have been updated over 
time, have been in operation for many years, in fact in the case of PowderCo UK, for 
over 100 years.  Neither company produces products which would be considered as 
specifically “high risk” within the food industry (e.g. chilled, ready-to-eat foods, or a 
product such as infant formula which is designed for a highly vulnerable population).  
 
From an incident perspective, both organisations suffered from a potential physical 
contamination issue, although the source of this potential contamination was 
different.  In the case of PowderCo UK the fine metal shards came from processing 
equipment, whilst in LiquiComp UK, the issue concerned damage to plastic bottle caps.  
In neither case was formal notification of the incident deemed necessary.  In the case 
of PowderCo UK all potentially affected stock remained within the control of the 
company, whilst in the case of LiquiComp UK the pack defect was, after expert review, 
not considered to pose a health risk to consumers.  Formal product recalls due to 
physical contamination of foodstuffs are still relatively rare, representing just 5% of 
food incidents in the UK in 2016/17 (Food Standards Agency, 2017b).  However, this 
category of incidents has been associated with some of the largest and most costly 
product recalls in recent years.  For example, the 2016 recall by Mars Inc. of chocolate 
potentially contaminated by plastic, affected 55 countries and was estimated to cost 
tens of millions of dollars (Quinn, Butler, & Smithers, 2016). 
 
To understand other similarities and differences between the cases, a cross-case 
comparison is presented under the nine themes developed in the inductive analysis.  
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Table 7.1 considers the incidents themselves whilst Table 7.2 examines the overall 
organisational cases.  The most striking similarities and differences are then discussed 
in more detail, before moving on to considering the cases in terms of the primary 
literature on food safety management, FSC and the cost of quality.  
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Table 7.1: Cross-Case Comparison - the Embedded Cases   
Theme PowderCo UK LiquiComp UK 
This is What Went 
Wrong 
 A case of physical contamination: fine metal 
shreds42. 
 Generation of metal shreds due to equipment 
failure. 
 Problem compounded due to failure of CPs and 
final CCP (magnets and sieves). 
 Problem detected by off-site contract packer. 
 Root cause of the incident (problem with the 
equipment) was complex to diagnose – initial 
findings were not correct. 
 Change in magnet location partially blamed for 
failure of detection: move had been checked and 
approved by HACCP team / process. 
 A case of potential physical contamination: 
cocked/shredded caps43. 
 Mechanical failure in capping equipment resulting 
in pack damage. 
 Problem compounded by multiple failures in QCPs 
(cap integrity not identified as a CCP). 
 Problem detected during unrelated quality check. 
 Root case of the incident (problem with the 
equipment) was easy to identify. 
 Failure of detection related to: limitations with 
detection system; pack reject system not working 
correctly; failures in physical pack checks by staff. 
 SOP and work sheet for “torque check” not 
matching, so physical pack checks unreliable. 
                                                          
42 All product remained within the control of PowderCo UK, hence no formal notification as a food incident was required 
43 After expert review, the decision was reached that the products did not pose a risk to health (plastic swarf only found on cap rim, not inside bottle; swarf was not of a 
nature to be injurious to health), hence no formal notification as a food incident was required. 
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 Lack of visible standard for “normal” amounts of 
metal powder vs unacceptable “shreds” also 
identified in RCA. 
 No blame attached to staff for failure to detect the 
metal contamination. 
 Failure seen as unexpected, even unforeseeable – 
equipment never failed in this way before. 
 
 Staff not directly blamed for failure – but 
management highly sceptical that checks 
completed correctly. 
 Failure of capping equipment seen as unexpected 
– a design flaw waiting to happen – and capping 
head bolts not identified as requiring 
maintenance by original equipment 
manufacturers. 
 Failure of multiple checks seen as unexpected / 
unforeseeable – “Swiss cheese” effect. 
Communication  Consistent narrative describing the incident 
amongst all participants. 
 Communication was swift at the start; regular and 
open throughout the investigation and 
management of the incident. 
 Incidents used as “war stories”, allowing narratives 
about lessons learned from failures to circulate 
around the organisation. 
 Narrative about incident not completely 
consistent – product recall or withdrawal? 
 Communication swift at the start (factory quality 
head to Business Quality Director and then other 
senior management), but constrained during 
incident investigation by use of “legal privilege”.   
 Some concerns that guarded communication 
impeded incident investigation and resolution. 
267 
 
 Single minded approach to keep communication 
highly focussed during initial incident 
investigation to focus on immediate concerns 
and decision, i.e. is product safety affected, 
should product be recalled or withdrawn. 
 Apparent lack of curiosity amongst study 
participants about root cause of incident. 
 Legal privilege resulted in confusion about what 
could be communicated, when and to whom; 
delays in communication caused some degree of 
frustration for staff. 
What Doesn’t Work  Opportunities missed to prevent incident 
occurrence, e.g. breaking shear pins not 
investigated. 
 Increasing age of equipment not factored into 
HACCP reviews as a potential hazard. 
 Individual judgement being used by workforce to 
determine “acceptable” vs “unacceptable” metal 
 Management of production line semi-
autonomous; staff not trained on all equipment; 
staff not rotating across jobs as per other 
production lines.   
 Minor quality defects in packaging viewed as 
“acceptable” – missed opportunities to examine 
management of line and working practices. 
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contamination, rather than an objective, 
consistent standard being used. 
 Increasing age of test methods not triggered in 
HACCP review. 
 Documentation management (SOPs and work 
sheets) inadequate. 
 Sheer number of SOPs meant that staff could 
not prioritise work on documentation, or 
potentially understand key activities in daily 
production. 
Culture and Values  “Safety First” attitude and values clearly 
demonstrated. 
 Thorough, rigorous approach to incident 
investigation and resolution. 
 Senior management commitment evident 
through involvement in incident management. 
 Use of systems and processes to manage incident 
demonstrates value PowderCo UK places on 
these.  
 Beliefs expressed that safety of consumers is the 
highest priority, but views also expressed that 
“getting the pop out of the door” is highest 
priority at manufacturing site. 
 Incident investigation and resolution approach 
was comprehensive and thorough. 
 Core value is to “protect the company” (from 
legal, financial, reputational damage). 
269 
 
 Expert advice respected, e.g. role that magnet 
suppliers, maintenance engineers and equipment 
manufacturers played in RCA and solving 
equipment failure.  
 Systems, processes and documentary evidence 
prized above what people say has happened, i.e. 
hard facts highly valued. 
 Lack of trust between management and line 
operators (questioning whether they carried out 
the tests properly), contrasting with high trust 
placed in RCA teams. 
 Power and responsibility of senior management 
evident – high involvement in incident; had 
ability to dispute results and push for re-
evaluation to ensure they trusted outcome of 
IRC.  
Problem Solving Our 
Way 
 Routines, processes and systems play a central 
role in everyday work and incident management 
and investigation. 
 Root Case Analysis embedded as a way of 
working, to the extent that an “RCA Room” is 
dedicated to this approach. 
 Highly systematised – IIC, IRC, RCAs. 
 Clear focus of each part of the process – overlap 
not condoned.  This kept focus and speed during 
the investigation, but potentially limits overall 
understanding and potential learnings. 
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 Staff are confident in using the RCA process and 
tools, adapting these as required to meet their 
needs.  
 Impartiality of the investigation was an 
important concern, which correlates with the 
with trust issues identified in “Culture and 
Values”. 
 The role of the IRC is to recommend action, but 
they are not the final decision makers.  In this 
incident the SMC and CEO pushed back on the 
IRC recommendation and demanded re-
evaluation of both volume of stock affected and 
safety impact. 
 Over 90 corrective actions identified in RCAs, 
covering many areas, not only the affected 
production line.  Is it possible for the business to 
effectively address all of these corrective actions 
at the same time?   
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What Works  Stories of the organisation overcoming adversity 
(“war stories”) are used to communicate lessons 
learned. 
 Rigour and thoroughness was evident e.g. 
commissioning original equipment suppliers to 
manufacture new conveyor, with an upgraded 
system to prevent future defects of the same 
kind. 
 Proactive work on second Bin to prevent the 
same equipment failure shows planning, learning 
from failures and a “safety first” attitude 
(prioritising safety over costs, time equipment is 
out of commission etc.). 
 Commitment of individuals was highly evident 
(weekend working; finishing on Christmas Eve at 
5pm). 
 Good co-operation seen between staff and 
external partners and suppliers. 
 There was a proactive approach to putting in 
place corrective actions and upgrading systems 
to prevent future failures. 
 Cross-company communication was seen, within 
the limits imposed by the use of legal privilege. 
 Evidence was seen of individual team learning 
lessons from the incident e.g. customer care 
team capability to manage recall. 
 Key learning identified as requiring that all 
decision makers see failed product / pack to 
ensure that correct conclusions can be drawn. 
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Experience Required   External experts and partner companies were key 
to the detection, investigation and resolution of 
the quality incident. 
 On-site experience valued in investigation team; 
some newer team members were not included in 
the initial investigation, despite previous industry 
experience, potentially limiting PowderCo UK 
from benefiting from other insights and best 
practices. 
 External exerts key to investigation and decision 
making (e.g. medic; packaging suppliers). 
 Recognition of previous experience to ensure 
processes used were robust and best in class. 
 However, seniority and the dominance of some 
senior managers seen as over-riding – at least 
initially – the views of true experts.   Use of 
valid, impartial experts was required to 
counterbalance this. 
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Table 7.2: Cross-Case Comparison - the Organisational Cases 
Theme PowderCo UK LiquiComp UK 
Day-to-Day  CI is embedded as way of working. 
 The use of systems and processes is highly 
embedded. 
 There are well organised and documented 
FSMS and QMS.   
 The formal recognition of the importance of 
food safety is clear. 
 CCPs are clearly signposted in the factory, and 
information on the controls is readily 
available. 
 A mixture of simple (manual checks and paper 
records) and sophisticated (automated checks 
and recording) controls are used in the 
manufacturing site. 
 CI is embedded as a way of working. 
 A high store is set in systems and processes. 
 Both the QMS and FSMS are extensive and well 
documented. 
 The embedded nature of PRPs is evident. 
 CCPs are marked, but staff need to access the IT 
system to get further information on the controls. 
 A mixture of simple (manual checks and paper 
documentation) and sophisticated (automated 
systems in syrup room) controls are present 
across the manufacturing site. 
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What Works  Creative thinking was evident, to envisage 
things that can go wrong and put in place 
adequate controls. 
 Rigour and thoroughness of approach in 
managing day to day operations and controls 
was clear, e.g. upgrade of flooring for better 
hygiene. 
 Staff loyalty and commitment was evident, even 
at a time of organisational restructuring. 
 General rigour and thoroughness in 
manufacturing processes was demonstrated, e.g. 
PRPs for cleaning.  
Experience Required  HACCP and Food Hygiene certification 
required not just for line operatives and 
quality but all management team, 
demonstrating that training used to build skills 
and experience. 
 The PowderCo UK site uses 3rd party audit and 
certification to demonstrate its quality, and is 
BRC and ISO 22000 accredited for food safety. 
 However, the value placed on experience may 
limit the participation of staff who have 
experience elsewhere.  
 Experienced staff are valued.  Evidence of 
coordination with experts in other parts of the 
company (e.g. visits from head office team). 
 Site holds ISO 9001, but does not currently hold 
certification against scheme recognised by GFSI.  
However, implementation of FSSC 22000 planned.  
 Internal expertise seems to be valued more than 
external for day-to-day activities. 
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Formal Expressions of 
Culture 
 The official corporate mission statement is 
highly visible, e.g. on the company website, 
foyer wall, door fingerplates.  
 Values are expressed on the website, 
explained as part of the induction process and 
incorporated into the “success” measures of 
the annual review process (success is 
measured by behaviours as well as outcomes 
of objectives).   
 Food safety and quality not specifically 
mentioned in corporate mission, but 
corporate and site quality statements make 
the link between quality and consumer trust, 
which is a corporate value. 
 “Zero accidents, zero defects, zero waste” are 
goals for the site.  Food safety is not specified, 
but posters and displays around the site show 
 The corporate identity, vision, mission etc. are 
highly visible on the website, and in head office.  
In contrast, there is little visibility at the case 
study manufacturing site. 
 The need to build common identity recognised by 
senior management. 
 Food safety is not specifically stated as part of the 
corporate mission / values.   
 Quality and consumers are part of official 
company strategy.  
 There is a common quality charter with European 
business, but concern expressed that this needs 
to be better tailored for the LiquiComp UK 
manufacturing sites (which are currently not at 
same level of sophistication as some of the other 
LiquiComp businesses). 
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how these goals / targets link to product 
quality and safety.   
Culture and Values  All participants put food safety as the main 
focus or priority for the site.  
 Participants expressed pride in their work, 
high standards and the quality of the site 
(despite outward appearances of the 
building). 
 Senior management commitment to food 
safety as evidenced by the requirement for 
training and certification of individuals and the 
site. 
 The importance of Health and Safety of staff 
and visitors also highly evident – the site uses 
a ZAP system to record “near misses”. 
 Some possibility of using ZAP system to record 
food safety near misses was mentioned. 
 Many participants expressed the purpose of 
LiquiComp UK in terms of providing quality 
products for customers.   
 Only 2/17 participants specifically mentioned 
food safety as the main purpose for general 
operations.   
 At head office, it is thought that food safety is 
more important for manufacturing, but the 
overall idea that products are inherently safe 
might mean that people don’t worry about food 
safety day-to-day. 
 There is some recognition that inherent 
microbiological safety of soft drinks may lead to 
complacency and that work is required to build a 
food safety culture. 
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 The Health and Safety of staff and visitors is a high 
priority at the manufacturing site, with large 
improvements in health and safety culture change 
in recent times. 
 ZAP system in pace for health and safety; 
participants mentioned “stealing with pride” from 
this to introduce a specific scheme for food 
safety. 
 Recognition given that in the past management at 
the production site have introduced many ideas 
which haven’t gained traction, causing scepticism 
in workforce.   
Communication   History of site and products is evident and a 
source of pride. 
 Product quality and safety messages often 
reinforced with stories – not just site ones, but 
more general (e.g. health and safety notices 
near office coffee point). 
 Wide range of communication tools used, 
particularly using email, new technology etc. 
 Concern expressed that use of technology can 
constrain communications in the manufacturing 
site – access is not as easy; older workforce who 
are not IT savvy etc. 
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 Notice boards in corridors and team areas 
used to communicate objectives, results, 
company values etc. 
 Daily “accountability meeting” – drives bottom 
up and top down communication. The site 
director runs the main meeting. Meeting 
process gives focus and prioritisation of key 
activities for the site.  
 “Gembas” – management tool to engage with 
line operatives to look at work practices and 
understand issues.  Participants viewed these 
positively. 
 Communication of CCPs also potentially 
constrained by technology (have to look up on IT 
system; full details physically available not on the 
production line).  This contrasts with health and 
safety information which is available lineside in 
folders kept with each piece of manufacturing 
equipment. 
 Formal communication processes are used to 
ensure that senior management are fully 
informed of issues etc. 
 At the production sites daily “accountability 
meetings” are used within teams and with site 
management.  Keeping information at production 
line side drives focus and priorities. 
 Some mention of Gembas, but this was used as an 
example of a management tool which did not 
really last.  
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As well as the organisational and incident similarities touched upon earlier, it is evident 
from the summary of findings shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 that there are many other 
similarities between LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK.  Both organisations prize the 
use of systems and processes; CI is well established as a way of working; problem 
solving through RCA and associated tools is highly embedded and both organisations 
have well established QMSs and FSMSs.  When the incidents occurred, both companies 
took a similar process-based approach to the investigation and management of the 
incident. Indeed, both companies might be considered to demonstrate an over-
reliance on systems and processes, resulting in system swamping where individuals 
found it difficult to identify key gaps and weaknesses in the systems, impacting the 
organisations’ governance of food safety. 
 
From a cultural perspective, in both cases the overall safety of the end consumer was 
of primary importance in making the decisions about how to manage the incidents.  
Both organisations relied on expertise, and particularly the use of external experts, to 
identify and resolve the incidents they experienced.  Likewise, in keeping with the CI 
practices used across the organisations, both LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK 
demonstrated an ability to learn from failure, with the identification of corrective 
actions arising from the incident investigations and the application of these learnings 
not just to the affected manufacturing areas, but more widely across the organisations.  
 
There were also many commonalities between the incidents themselves. In both cases 
the incidents occurred despite the comprehensive QMSs and FSMSs, not because of a 
lack of these.  In both, the incidents were complex and messy, with equipment failure 
being compounded by a failure to detect the affected product or packs.  In both cases 
multiple control points failed, rather than the incidents resulting from the failure of 
only one major control point.  As such, both incidents fit with the description given by 
Reason, Carthy and de Leval (2001) of incidents in well defended but complex systems, 
where an element of chance or bad luck is involved in bringing about “the precise 
conjunction of defensive gaps and weaknesses necessary to permit an adverse event”.  
Indeed, this element of chance fits with the belief by both organisations that the 
incidents were largely unexpected or unforeseeable.   
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However, despite this element of chance or bad luck driving failures in complex 
systems, the perception that the incidents were unexpected and unforeseeable is 
perhaps itself unexpected.  Whilst there is a relative paucity of detailed research on 
FSMS failures from a management control perspective, some work has been 
undertaken to analyse food safety failures from a systems perspective, for example the 
work of Nayak and Waterson (2016) who constructed Accimaps of the UK E. coli 0157 
outbreaks in 1996 and 2005.  In this paper the authors noted that a limitation of their 
research, which sought to identify similarities and differences in human and 
organisational factors leading up to these incidents, was hindsight bias (Fessel, 
Epstude, & Roese, 2009), where predictive judgements are distorted by knowledge of 
the outcome of events.  Indeed, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) report that the perceived 
inevitability of past events increases significantly.  In other words, in the current study 
it might have been expected that participants would believe that the quality incidents 
experienced were failures “waiting to happen”, not that they were unforeseeable.   
 
Classifying such incidents as unforeseeable can be considered another barrier to 
effective food safety governance.  This element of the cases, along with another 
common thread between both incidents, that of the failure to take full account of the 
age of equipment - the conveyor Bin for PowderCo UK; the detection equipment for 
LiquiComp UK - will be discussed later in this chapter in relation to the framework of 
PC, the identification of “factual possibilities” and the truth gap between proactive and 
pragmatic truth.  
 
Whilst there were many similarities between the cases, some significant differences, 
both overall and specifically in the investigation and management of the incidents, can 
also be seen.  The first difference noted was in the style and nature of 
communications.  In day-to-day operations both organisations prided themselves on 
having regular, open communication with all staff.  At the manufacturing sites, both 
organisations ran similar accountability meetings, with this bottom up and top down 
communication enabling the organisations to focus on key priorities to manage their 
operations efficiently and effectively.  However, during the quality incidents significant 
differences were seen between the companies in communication style and processes.   
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At LiquiComp UK communication was tightly managed by the legal team and the use of 
legal privilege to help guard the company against legal, reputational and financial 
harm.  This was driven by a concern about the possible impact of the incident being 
discussed on social media and the litigious nature of society in general.  Whilst these 
concerns are understandable, the impact was to restrict communications, leading to 
challenges in knowing what could be communicated, to whom, and when.  Some study 
participants recognised that this led to some frustrations for staff at the manufacturing 
plant, who knew that an incident had occurred but who had to wait a long time to get 
information about this.  Constrained communication has been identified as another 
potential barrier to food safety governance from this case. 
 
In contrast, in PowderCo UK the incident seemed to be common knowledge.  
Participants described regular briefings about the incident to the manufacturing 
teams.  Even staff who had not been employed at the site when the incident first 
occurred had a thorough grasp of it.  There appeared to be a practice in the company 
of turning such events into “war stories”, where the key elements of the incident and 
how it was successfully overcome, were used to communicate key lessons from 
failures.  This fitted well with the practice of CI in the organisation. 
 
The outcome of these differences in communication could be seen in the coherence of 
the descriptions of the incident.  All participants at PowderCo UK gave similar 
descriptions of the incident, whereas in LiquiComp UK, although the core of the story 
(the cocked / shredded cap) was always present, there were often large gaps in what 
participants knew and how they described the outcome of events.  Differences in 
knowledge were to some degree understandable, given the range of staff interviewed 
and their differing responsibilities.  The “single-minded” approach to the working of 
the IIC and the IRC (to make a recommendation on the impact of the event on the 
safety of the products and whether or not product should be recalled or withdrawn) 
also meant that staff might not have a full understanding of the root cause of the 
problem and subsequent corrective actions at the manufacturing plant.  However, it 
was notable that even at the manufacturing site some middle and senior management 
lacked a complete understanding of the issue and / or used inconsistent terminology 
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to describe the outcomes of the IRC.  For example, some participants referred to a 
product recall rather than a withdrawal, which has a different meaning and 
implications from a regulatory perspective, and which could potentially cause 
confusion in future communications.  The lack of a widespread, common narrative 
about the incident might also inhibit full organisational learning from the event.  A 
further consideration of communication, in the context of PC, is given in section 7.3. 
 
The second major difference between the organisations was seen in the area of FSC. 
Both organisations expressed consumer safety as their highest priority in dealing with 
the quality incidents.  At PowderCo UK this focus was also evident in daily working, 
with all participants describing the key purpose of the organisation as the production 
of safe food.  In contrast, at LiquiComp UK, the majority of participants expressed the 
organisation’s purpose in terms of making tasty and good quality drinks for consumers. 
The inherent microbiological safety of soft drinks (versus, for example, dairy based 
products) appears to lead to a more complacent attitude to food safety, with an 
overall belief that such products are always safe. In addition, there were indications 
that even the quality of products takes a back seat in comparison to hitting production 
targets, e.g. with the acceptance of “tails” on the caps of packs produced on Line C 
prior to the cocked cap incident.  
 
The value of food safety and quality to the organisations was also evident in the 
approach taken to audit and accreditation.  It is certainly true that food safety and 
quality audits have many limitations (Powell et al., 2013).  However, in a recent study 
of the audit process and management of this, Bradford-Knox (2017) identified that 
auditors consider audits as part of a CI process, where food safety and quality are 
managed and improved rather than policed.  This appears to be the philosophy with 
which PowderCo UK approach audit and certification.  Being accredited to both BRC 
and ISO 22000, PowderCo UK took pride in the feedback from external audits, and 
indeed took a proactive approach, e.g. making the decision to replace flooring in the 
manufacturing plant, as this was always raised during audits, even though it had never 
caused an audit failure.   
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In contrast, whilst LiquiComp UK was accredited to ISO 9001, they have to date not 
pursued third party certification for food safety but have relied solely on internal 
audits (including audits from the parent company).  This approach was described as 
the manufacturing site having more of a “compliance culture” than a proactive, quality 
culture.  The need to build a stronger FSC has been recognised by the quality team at 
LiquiComp UK and the operational restructuring occurring at the manufacturing site at 
the time of the data collection was partially designed to address the prioritisation of 
quality and food safety.  In addition, the quality team were setting up structures across 
the business to reinforce the importance of product safety and quality (e.g. introducing 
“safety by design” criteria and processes for R&D) and had also put in place an 
objective to obtain FSSC 22000 accreditation for the manufacturing sites.  
Nevertheless, at the time of the incident, both overall organisational culture and the 
day-to-day culture and values expressed and demonstrated by staff and management 
have been identified as potential barriers to food safety governance, particularly in the 
LiquiComp UK case. 
 
The final point of difference between the cases to highlight at this stage is that of a 
“blame culture”, which also fits with the proposed barrier of organisational culture.  As 
discussed in the conclusion to Chapter 5, it would have been very easy for 
management at PowderCo UK to have blamed staff for failing to anticipate the failure 
in equipment, for failing to detect the metal contamination, and for failing to draw the 
correct conclusions in the HACCP review after one of the in-line magnets was moved.  
Instead the organisation took the approach of openly discussing the incident, 
recognising the shortfalls and operating a positive attitude to putting in place 
improvements. 
 
In contrast the LiquiComp UK management team were openly sceptical about whether 
line staff had conducted quality checks correctly, or even whether they had completed 
checks at all.  Although individual production line staff were not blamed, this was 
ascribed to a recognised shortfall in the management of the production line, gaps 
between the SOPs and process check sheets and the recognition that the member of 
staff responsible for updating the documentation was extremely over-worked.  
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Nevertheless, during participant interviews this inability to “blame” staff appeared to 
be a source of frustration for some of the management team, i.e. they appeared to 
take this approach reluctantly, rather than the lack of blame being a positive choice of 
the management team.  Reason et al. (2001) identify a blame culture, specifically the 
blame of front line operators, as one of the characteristics of “vulnerable system 
syndrome”, which makes organisational systems more liable to adverse events.  They 
also show how blaming individuals can lead to a vicious cycle, where real opportunities 
to learn from failures and make improvements are overlooked.  In the case of 
LiquiComp UK, the underlying scepticism and lack of trust in front line staff could have 
contributed to the somewhat less positive and productive framing of the quality 
incident observed in LiquiComp UK in comparison to PowderCo UK and suggests that 
learning from the incident may be impacted.   
 
Having directly compared the two case studies on the basis of the thematic analysis 
and discussed some key characteristics of them, the following sections examine the 
cases in the light of the theoretical roadmap.  First, the existing literature on barriers to 
and drivers for FSMSs and on models of FSC is used to look at the dimensions of “FBO 
People” and “FSMS Process” in the roadmap, to evaluate whether the findings of the 
cases support or refute this existing literature.  A short evaluation of the cases in terms 
of the literature on quality costing completes this section. 
 
 
7.2  FBO People & FSMS Process:  Comparison of Cases to the Literature 
 
With this understanding of the similarities and differences between PowderCo UK and 
LiquiComp UK and their respective quality incidents, based on the thematic analysis, 
the question now needs to be asked about how or whether these cases fit with 
previous research.  This specifically addresses the second research objective, i.e. 
whether the barriers to the implementation and maintenance of FSMSs (especially 
HACCP) which had been found in the literature can be used to account for failures in 
FSMSs in the case studies.  
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In Chapter 3, models of barriers to and drivers for the implementation and 
maintenance of FSMSs were reviewed, along with literature on FSC.   Several 
points must be addressed before considering the case studies in terms of this 
body of literature.   
 
First, the incidents investigated as embedded cases are classified as non-
reportable food incidents.  The thematic analysis of the case studies 
demonstrated that in both organisations the incidents occurred despite FSMSs 
and QMSs having been implemented, not because of a lack of such systems, and 
in both cases failures of CPs, CCPs and /or QCPs were seen, i.e. there was 
involvement of both QMSs and FSMSs.   
 
As established in Chapter 2, whilst some authors draw a distinction between food 
safety and quality (e.g. Spink and Moyer, 2011), many others consider food safety 
as an aspect of food quality (e.g. Röhr, Lüddecke, Drusch, Müller, & Alvensleben, 
2005; Caswell, 1998).  From an audit perspective food safety and quality 
attributes are frequently assessed together (Mensah & Julien, 2011), and recent 
work studying critical factors for the implementation of FSMSs has combined 
these systems with ISO quality systems (Kafetzopoulos & Gotzamani, 2014).  With 
this understanding, plus the conflation of food safety and food quality seen in the 
case study companies, it is therefore reasonable to consider these incidents in 
the light of the body of literature on the implementation and maintenance of 
FSMSs. 
 
Finally, the nature of the cases themselves justifies their examination in the light of the 
literature on FSMSs and FSC.  As previously shown, both embedded cases were flagged 
up to the organisations as potential food safety failures, and indeed could have been 
reportable food safety incidents but for certain elements.  In the case of PowderCo UK, 
all of the potentially affected product was within the control of the company, whilst in 
the case of LiquiComp UK it was determined that the plastic swarf generated by the 
over-torqued caps was not a specific health hazard.  Thus, the cases might be 
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considered to be “near misses” in terms of reportable food incidents, and hence 
interpretation under this field of literature is of value.  
 
The first area to be considered is the extensive literature examining the barriers to and 
drivers for the implementation of FSMSs.  One common criticism which can be levelled 
at the models of barriers and drivers identified and critiqued in Chapter 3, is the 
limitations of the research base, with studies generally being restricted in geographic 
area, industry scope and size, and / or the number of participants.  Therefore, in order 
to take a broader view, the two review papers identified and presented in Chapter 3 
(Fotopoulos et al., 2011; Jevšnik et al., 2006) are used as the main focus of the 
comparison of the cases to the FSMS literature.  Each of these review papers set out a 
number of factors acting as barriers to, or drivers for, HACCP implementation and 
effectiveness and these factors were further classified in Chapter 3 into those related 
to people (management and staff) and those related to the FSMS process (process, 
technical and operational areas).  These factors are re-presented in Figure 7.1.   
 
It is not the purpose of this analysis to identify new barriers (or benefits) for the 
implementation of FSMSs / HACCP, but rather to determine the extent to which the 
previously reported barriers can explain the non-reportable food incidents at 
PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK (as per research objective 2).  Each incident is 
considered in turn below. 
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Figure 7.1: Factors Related to the Success of HACCP Implementation and 
Classification into People or Process Areas.  
 
 
 
For PowderCo UK, many of the barriers to FSMS implementation in the literature can 
conversely be seen as strengths of the organisation.  For example, rather than a “lack 
of commitment to food safety by employees” (Factor 2, Fotopoulos et al., 2011) being 
seen, a high level of commitment and a “safety first” attitude was demonstrated.  
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Likewise, training on food hygiene and HACCP (Element 1, Jevšnik et al., 2006 and 
Factor 5, Fotopoulos et al., 2011), management commitment (Element 7, Jevšnik et al., 
2006), technical skills (Element 4 Jevšnik et al., 2006, Factors 1 and 7, Fotopoulos et al., 
2011) and communication (Element 15, Jevšnik et al., 2006) could all also be viewed as 
strengths of the organisation.   
 
Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the case which can be explained by these 
previously identified barriers.  For example, an element of faulty hazard analysis 
(subsequent to the change of an in-line process check magnet during a planned 
engineering change) was found during the root cause investigation of the incident 
(Element 9, Jevšnik et al., 2006).  Likewise, the issue of the age of equipment can be 
classified under the factor of infrastructure (Element 21, Jevšnik et al., 2006).  Similarly, 
the lack of a clear standard for metal contamination, identified as one of the root 
causes of the incident, might be classified as a communication issue (Element 15, 
Jevšnik et al., 2006), or indeed a training issue (Element 1, Jevšnik et al., 2006 and 
Factor 5, Fotopoulos et al., 2011), as line staff were not trained to identify acceptable / 
unacceptable levels of metal powder.  There are also clear links between system 
swamping as a proposed barrier to food safety governance, and the excessive 
paperwork and documentation identified as Factor 10 by Fotopoulos et al. (2011) and 
Element 5 by Jevšnik et al. (2006).  
 
Overall however, it is clear that the complexities of the quality failure in PowderCo UK 
cannot be explained fully by the key barriers to FSMS implementation and 
maintenance identified in previous studies. First, rather than the FSMS lacking 
credibility (Element 8, Jevšnik et al., 2006) PowderCo UK displayed a high level of trust 
in and commitment to systems and processes, including their FSMS.  Indeed, as 
identified in Chapter 5, this level of trust appears somewhat misplaced given that the 
metal contamination incident occurred despite the comprehensive systems in place.  
This aspect of the company’s culture & values may even be viewed as a barrier to 
effective food safety governance.  Second, the classification of the incident as 
unforeseeable stands apart from this previous work on barriers to FSMS 
implementation.  In general, lack of knowledge, skills and competence might hinder 
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the development of an effective FSMSs and lead to a perception that failures of such 
inadequate systems were unexpected and unforeseeable.  However, in the case of 
PowderCo UK a high degree of training and competence was evident in the 
organisation.  The failure to foresee the possibility of this particular incident cannot be 
explained simply by a lack of training and knowledge and this aspect of the case is 
considered further using the constructs of PC in section 7.3.  
 
The same overall findings hold true for the incident studied at LiquiComp UK.  Again, 
there were many demonstrations in the general operation of the business where 
potential barriers to FSMS implementation from the literature were organisational 
strengths for this company, e.g. personal hygiene (Element 11, Jevšnik et al., 2006); 
maintenance and sanitation (Element 19, Jevšnik et al., 2006); technical expertise and 
support (Factor 7, Fotopoulos et al., 2011).  However, in considering the embedded 
case, some of the barriers identified in the literature can be mapped against the 
underlying causes of the incident.  For instance, one of the factors in the cocked / 
shredded cap incident was the mismatch between an SOP and check sheets for the 
torque check of bottle cap integrity.  This failure to keep the paperwork up to date had 
been blamed on an excessive workload for the responsible staff member, i.e. an issue 
with resources (Element 6, Jevšnik et al., 2006; Factor 9, Fotopoulos et al., 2011).  
Furthermore this failure in documentation was itself due at least in part to the volume 
and complexity of documentation used at the manufacturing site - system swamping - 
which clearly links to the identification of excessive paperwork and documentation as 
a factor for HACCP failure or inefficiency (Factor 10, Fotopoulos et al. 2011; Element 5, 
Jevšnik et al., 2006).    
 
Lack of training is another factor implicated in the failure of FSMS implementation in 
the literature (Element 1, Jevšnik et al., 2006 and Factor 5, Fotopoulos et al., 2011).  In 
the case of LiquiComp UK, a lack of employee training for staff on Line C (where the 
quality failure occurred) was noted.  This training gap was not specifically related to 
food safety, but more broadly to the operation of all the equipment and tests on the 
production line.  This training gap did however reduce the availability of staff to 
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undertake the correct quality checks, which links back to the resource squeeze 
previously identified.     
 
The LiquiComp UK case study also identified that whilst the safety of consumers was 
the key priority for the business when investigating and managing the incident, during 
normal operations the need to meet production targets was viewed as a higher 
priority.  This suggests that some doubt may be cast on staff and management 
commitment to food safety, two other barriers noted in the literature summarised in 
Figure 7.1 (Element 7, Jevšnik et al., 2006; Factor 2, Fotopoulos et al., 2011).    This 
links with the potential barriers to food safety governance identified in this case, 
namely organisational culture and culture and values.  
 
Constrained communication was also identified as a barrier to food safety governance 
in the LiquiComp UK case and clearly links to the identification of communication as a 
barrier to effective FSMS implementation (Element 15, Jevšnik et al., 2006).  However, 
as in the PowderCo UK case, the unforeseeable aspects of the case study (the failure in 
the capping head; the simultaneous failure of multiple QCPs; the identification of so 
many corrective actions) cannot be explained by the barriers to FSMS implementation 
noted in the extant literature.   
 
Before moving on to consider the literature on FSC, there are two specific models of 
the barriers and drivers of FSMS implementation which are worthy of specific 
comparison against both case study findings. The model of Ball et al. (2009) was 
developed from research in small and medium meat processing plants in Ontario and is 
the only one of those reviewed which specifically sets out production system factors 
which influence the implementation of FSMSs, namely facilities and equipment, 
process characteristics and product characteristics.  The case studies here differ 
significantly from Ball et al.’s (2009) sample, being large companies and both 
manufacturing products with a lower risk profile than meat. Nevertheless, in both 
cases issues with facilities and equipment and process characteristics were related to 
the root cause of the quality incidents.  In LiquiComp UK the perceived inherent safety 
of the product, i.e. a product characteristic, was also related to the lower prioritisation 
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of food safety versus product output at the production site.  These cases therefore 
support the merit of Ball et al.’s (2009) approach in food manufacturing settings. 
 
The second model which requires specific consideration against the case study findings 
is that of Kafetzopoulos and Gotzamani (2014) as this work specifically considered CFEI 
of both QMSs and FSMSs and studied FBOs with externally accredited systems.  Of 
note is the identification of process improvement as a driver for effective QMS/FSMS 
implementation.  Whilst CI / learning from failure is a notable element of the current 
cases, both LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK experienced the incidents despite 
demonstrating this organisational characteristic.  Similarly, adjustment of instruments 
and machines is identified as a CFEI; the failures in monitoring equipment and 
processes seen in the current cases might be considered as fitting with this CFEI.   
 
On balance, whilst some elements of the non-reportable food incidents can be 
explained by the literature on barriers to FSMS implementation and maintenance, key 
features of the cases - that the incidents occurred despite having FSMS and QMS 
systems in place; the unexpected or unforeseeable nature of the incidents and an 
organisational culture which fosters an over-reliance on formal systems and processes 
to assure food quality and safety - cannot.  In addition, whilst communication is 
identified as a factor in the literature, the influence of organisational values on 
communication timing, style and content, is not fully captured within this.  This is 
particularly clear in the LiquiComp UK case where the nature and timing of 
communications during the cocked/shredded cap incident was strongly impacted by a 
non-food safety value of the organisation, i.e. the requirement to “protect the 
company” from financial, reputational and legal risk.   Therefore, the conclusion must 
be drawn that the factors identified to date in the literature as barriers to successful 
FSMS implementation and maintenance only partially explain these specific incidents 
and fail to address their true complexity.   
 
In light of this conclusion, and before progressing to examine the cases against the 
second part of the theoretical roadmap, i.e. the constructs of PC, a consideration must 
therefore be made of the other main thread of literature reviewed in Chapter 3, 
292 
 
namely the role of FSC to evaluate whether this literature better explains the case 
study findings. 
 
As previously discussed in the literature review, FSC has been identified as an emerging 
risk factor for food safety (Griffith et al., 2010a), and a poor FSC can perhaps be viewed 
as the summation of the people related barriers to successful FSMS implementation 
and maintenance.  It is therefore highly pertinent to consider the case study findings 
on culture, and specifically FSC, in terms of the literature in this area.   
 
A number of models of FSC, both academic and commercial, have been developed in 
recent years and were reviewed in Chapter 3.  As the framework developed by 
Jespersen et al. (2017) represents a collation of the major work on FSC, the case study 
findings are specifically considered against this model, which is re-presented here as 
Figure 7.2 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Food Safety Culture Dimensions Framework (Jespersen et al., 2017) 
 
 
 
In Chapter 5 a brief assessment of PowderCo UK’s FSC was made, by comparing the 
case study findings to the definition of FSC set out by Griffith (2008, 2009, cited by 
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Griffith et al., 2010), with the Researcher concluding that the company exhibited a 
strong FSC.  This was evidenced by practices during the investigation and management 
of the quality incident, together with overall organisational behaviours and practices.  
A more detailed analysis of FSC is achieved by mapping the case study findings against 
Jespersen et al.’s (2017) framework, as shown in Figure 7.3.  As can be seen, in three of 
the five dimensions, PowderCo UK demonstrates attributes which support the 
previous statement that the company exhibits a strong FSC.  There is clear evidence of 
food safety as a priority in terms of people systems, e.g. the requirements for staff and 
managerial training and the clear and consistent communications to staff on a routine 
basis and during the incident investigation and resolution.  Adaptability is also self-
evident in the case analysis, with the emphasis on RCA, CI and learning from failure.  In 
terms of value and mission, the “safety first” attitudes and beliefs of the organisation 
were demonstrated not only in discussing the purpose of the organisation, but through 
the company’s painstaking approach to resolving the metal contamination incident.   
 
However, this more detailed analysis of FSC also demonstrates potential areas of 
weakness for PowderCo UK.  First, in terms of risk awareness, as despite the 
comprehensive FSMS and highly visible communication on CCPs, the incident 
highlighted concerns in that the age of equipment had not been factored into HACCP 
assessments.  In addition, the impact on the robustness of the FSMS of changing the 
strength / location of a magnet during an engineering change was not appreciated, 
despite a subsequent review of safety controls as required under the HACCP plan.  
Likewise, the factor of consistency raises concerns.  The company has a documented 
quality policy; both their QMS and FSMS are documented and third party accredited 
and comprehensive FSMnSs are in place throughout the factory (e.g. the IP21 system 
for micronutrient addition).  However, the incident highlighted small variations in 
working practices, which were implicated in the failure to detect the metal 
contamination and missed opportunities to resolve the incident faster (e.g. the 
investigation of breaking shear pins).   
 
Overall, using this model supports the previous conclusion that PowderCo UK has a 
robust FSC, whilst highlighting some areas for improvement.  The model also explains 
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further elements of the non-reportable food incident at PowderCo UK which were not 
mapped onto the barriers to FSMS implementation set out in Figure 7.1.   
 
 
Figure 7.3: FSC of PowderCo UK Using the Dimensions Framework (adapted from 
Jespersen et al., 2017) 
 
 
 
Moving on to consider the LiquiComp UK case, the picture of the FSC was far less 
consistent, as shown in Figure 7.4.  Although during the cocked / shredded cap 
incident the company was clear in its determination to protect the end consumer and 
provide safe products, during routine operations meeting production targets was 
perceived as a higher priority than food quality and safety.  As non-alcoholic drinks are, 
from a microbiological perspective, inherently robust, there were indications that the 
safety of the products was taken for granted and so not expressed as a top priority or 
concern in routine operations.  Likewise, looking at other elements of the dimensions 
framework, there are similarly mixed indicators for FSC, with the framework once 
again offering support for the importance of variations in working practice and issues 
with the age of equipment / tests as underlying causes of the incident.  The FSC 
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analysis against the framework also supports the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6 that 
the FSC of LiquiComp UK requires improvement.   
 
 
Figure 7.4: FSC of LiquiComp UK Using the Dimensions Framework (adapted from 
Jespersen et al., 2017) 
 
 
 
Overall, the FSC dimensions framework captures many of the people related elements 
of the barriers to the successful implementation and maintenance of FSMS seen in the 
LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK cases, and can be seen to explain specific elements of 
the cases (variations in working practices, related to consistency and age of equipment 
/ tests related to risk awareness) which were not explained by the literature on 
barriers to FSMS implementation and maintenance.  The current cases also 
demonstrate that this model can be effectively used to assess the FSC of an 
organisation (using qualitative data) and to compare and contrast the FSCs of different 
organisations.   
 
However, just as elements of the quality incidents were not encompassed by the 
literature on barriers to FSMS implementation, important aspects of the cases are not 
reflected by this FSC model.  Again, the perception that the incidents were 
296 
 
unforeseeable cannot be explained by this model.  Neither does it clearly capture the 
nuances of constrained communication, nor the impact of the unshakable trust in 
systems and processes which forms a fundamental part of the culture in both case 
study organisations. 
 
In part, the limitations of these two streams of literature is due to their focus, as they 
concentrate solely on FSMSs / FSC, rather than looking at the organisations and their 
control systems in a more holistic manner.  In the research cases, aspects such as the 
economic climate, the impact of new product development and technology change 
might be seen as related to the root cause of the quality incidents and the overall 
successful (or not) implementation and maintenance of FSMSs.  However, none of 
these aspects of the environment are clearly flagged as potential issues or causative 
factors in the literature considered so far.  
 
In summary therefore, the extant literature on barriers to and drivers for FSMS 
implementation and maintenance, together with the literature on FSC, explains some, 
but not all, of the identified causes of the quality incidents under examination.  This 
leads to the conclusion that the cases require examination through a more holistic 
research perspective, which leads to the use in this research to the management 
control paradigm of PC which forms the second part of the study’s theoretical 
roadmap.  
 
As presented in Chapter 4, PC is an integrative framework which, through 
consideration of organisational actors and their relationship to the world, enables 
evaluation of the organisations’ topoi or realities.  In the Section 7.3 the inductively 
developed codes and themes are mapped against the four PC dimensions, in order to 
evaluate whether this offers different insights into why the quality incidents occurred 
and whether we can better understand the reasons for the differences seen between 
the two case study organisations.  
 
However, before moving on to consider the cases against the PC dimensions and 
concepts, we must return briefly to the topic of the cost of quality.  Whilst financial 
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information was not collected as part of this research, insights into different aspects of 
quality costs were gathered as part of the case studies.  These can be split into costs 
generated routinely by the companies, and those which arose because of the non-
reportable food incidents; both are summarised in Table 7.3.  Even without financial 
data, the scale of internal and external failure costs arising from these incidents is 
readily apparent.  Equally apparent is the increased spend post-incident to prevent 
reoccurrence of similar issues, exemplified by refurbishment of equipment not directly 
affected by the incident (upgrade / refurbishment of Bin B in PowderCo UK and repairs 
to other capping machines in LiquiComp UK).  It is however, impossible to judge 
whether this spend on preventative costs will result in decreased failure costs in the 
future, as proposed by Feigenbaum (1956), without collecting indicative financial data 
over time.   
 
One interesting contrast between the cases arises in that of appraisal costs after the 
incident.  Both organisations implemented new test procedures so incurring 
development and verification costs which fit into the appraisal costs category.  For 
PowderCo UK this process appeared to be relatively simple - the development of 
additional visual criteria for metal contamination and an increased frequency of 
testing.  Costs for the development and verification of these tests might be relatively 
small, but the increased frequency of testing leads to higher ongoing appraisal costs.  
In comparison, in LiquiComp UK the replacement of the torque closure tests with a 
new closure angle test was time-consuming and costly, with new equipment required 
and the new tests being implemented in parallel to the existing test regime whilst 
verification was undertaken.  Thus implementation of the tests was likely to be far 
costlier than that experienced by PowderCo UK.  However, post-verification the old 
torque test should be discontinued, hence ongoing appraisal costs would reduce to 
similar levels prior to the incident (assuming the tests take approximately equal time 
to perform).   
 
Another facet of quality costing is apparent from the case studies, in that costs may be 
seen as a driver for decisions made by staff (and management) in both cases to 
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investigate and resolve manufacturing issues which arose prior to the non-reportable 
food incidents which formed the embedded cases.   
 
In the case of PowderCo UK, the Senior Engineer (P008) described the actions of other 
members of the engineering team who responded to broken shear pins on Bin C prior 
to the metal contamination incident: “… the guys just changed the pins, you know, and 
then and it went on for a couple of days and then it went again …. “.  Whilst this issue 
was not directly related to the gear and chain slippage which resulted in the formation 
of metal shards, the decision to simply replace the pins rather than conduct further 
investigations was a missed opportunity to uncover these problems with the Bin.  
Although costs were not directly explored as a rationale for this decision, it can be 
postulated that there was an underlying drive to get production back up and running, 
i.e. to minimise the internal failure costs of production downtime.  In contrast P008 
spoke about more experienced staff taking the time to investigate engineering 
problems; this would result in higher internal failure costs and indeed also form a 
prevention cost, but in the metal contamination incident such costs would potentially 
have been much lower than the internal failure costs incurred by the incident. 
 
Similarly, in LiquiComp UK, a long-standing quality issue on Line C, with “tails” formed 
on the bottle caps, was raised.  Again, whilst this quality problem was not directly 
related to the cocked / shredded cap incident, it formed a missed opportunity to 
identify issues with the work environment on the line.  Financial drivers for the 
business continuing to accept reduced quality packs were not explored in the case 
study, but it can be postulated that a drive to minimise internal failure costs and 
prevention costs were factors in the decision to continue production and allow the 
release of these packs.  The potential costs incurred in more fully investigating and 
resolving the “tails” issue might have identified the shortfalls in the tests for cap 
integrity.  Whilst this would not have prevented the failure of the capping head, it 
could have led to faster identification of the problem, and so reduced the costs to 
LiquiComp UK in resolving the more serious incident. 
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From this brief analysis, it appears that application of the PAF quality costing model, 
even in the absence of financial data, may explain some of the factors of the case 
studies and is worthy of further detailed investigation in future research.  With that in 
mind, we now return to the consideration of the cases from a holistic perspective, 
using the second element of the theoretical roadmap, i.e. the constructs of PC. 
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Table 7.3:  Cross-Case Comparison of Quality Costs  
Category of Quality 
Costs 
PowderCo UK LiquiComp UK 
Prevention Costs Overall organisation: development and implementation 
of QMS and FSMS; holding of critical parts for safe 
manufacture (e.g. spare sieves); proactive upgrade of 
flooring; internal audits; third party audit and 
accreditation; training of staff and management. 
 
Incident: staff re-training on metal contamination 
checks; site audit by magnet suppliers and food safety 
consultant; upgrade of Bin B.  
Overall organisation: development and implementation of 
QMS and FSMS; calibration and validation of test equipment; 
training; internal audits.  Plans to upgrade production site to 
accreditation to FSSC 22000.  Development of “safety by 
design” plans.   
 
Incident: staff re-training; proactive repair and replacement 
of capping heads using similar equipment to line C; costs of 
communication to other sites.  
Appraisal Costs Overall organisation: costs of routine inspection and 
testing (e.g. staff time for magnet and sieve checks; 
IP21 system).  
 
Incident: development and verification of revised 
checks for metal contamination.   Increased inspection 
costs for additional magnet and sieve checks. 
Overall organisation: routine inspection and testing costs. 
 
Incident: purchase of equipment and verification of new 
closure angle test.   
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Internal failure costs Incident: staff and management time to investigate and 
resolve incident; traceability costs; product inspection 
and testing (on-site and at contract packers); external 
consultants; initial repair of Bin C; re-design and re-
manufacture of Bin C; line downtime during incident 
investigation and resolution; rework of products (re-
testing and re-packing); scrap of high risk products; 
staff and management time to develop production 
concession plan; development of improved metal check 
procedures.  
Incident:  staff and management time for incident 
investigation and resolution; traceability costs; product 
inspection (stripping pallets to check for defects); external 
consultants; repair of affected capping head; replacement of 
capping head on line C; line downtime during incident 
investigation and resolution; staff over-time (holiday period) 
for production on other lines to meet sales commitments; 
scrap of affected products; development of new test 
procedures.  
External failure costs  Not applicable as all product within PowderCo control.  Costs of soft product withdrawal (communication; 
transportation; storage; rework; scrap). 
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7.3 Review of the cases using Pragmatic Constructivism.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, PC can act as a paradigm to explore and understand an 
organisation’s functioning management control systems as constructed through the 
activities of the actors involved.  PC considers four dimensions of reality – values, facts, 
possibilities and communication – and their integration to form the basis of effective 
functioning actions (H Nørreklit et al., 2010).  
 
The use of PC in the current study offers two aspects of reality.  At an organisational 
level both PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK can be viewed as successful organisations 
with effective FSMSs and QMSs.  The PC dimensions can therefore be used to 
understand how and why the systems are effective.  However, the embedded cases 
might be viewed as times when the FSMS / QMS were ineffective, thus this section 
also examines whether PC can be used to explore and understand how and why the 
systems were ineffective at these times.  This presents a new approach to the use of 
the PC framework, as whilst previous research has identified dysfunctional systems 
and topoi (Beusch, 2011) and studied a failing industry sector (Jakobsen, 2017), the 
Researcher is not aware of any previous work using PC to study specific system failures 
or incidents.   
 
Inductively developed codes, themes and fit with Pragmatic Constructivism  
Whilst the inductive analysis of the qualitative interview data generated insights into 
the two case study organisations and their respective quality incidents, reflection on 
these themes within the structure of the PC framework reveals more of the underlying 
reasons for the findings. This is accomplished by mapping the inductively generated 
codes and themes against the four dimensions of the PC framework, shown in the 
theoretical roadmap in Figure 4.3 and re-presented here as Figure 7.5 
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Figure 7.5: A Theoretical Roadmap to Study Food Safety Governance 
 
 
 
The mapping was undertaken at two levels to give the final working map, which is 
shown in Figure 7.6.  Firstly, the nine themes were mapped against the framework.  As 
a check of validity for the decisions made in this exercise, each individual code was 
then separately mapped against the four PC dimensions.  The exercise was conducted 
for both case studies, as additional codes were generated in the second case.  Next, a 
comparison was made at the code level, between the location (PC dimension) each 
code was mapped to at the theme level and the location when the individual codes 
were directly mapped to the PC dimensions.  In many cases, it was clear that whilst an 
overall theme might fit best under a certain dimension, some of the codes making up 
that theme exhibited a better fit with one of the other dimensions.  An example of this 
is shown in Figure 7.7 for the theme “Day-to-Day”.  The “Day-to-Day” theme was 
mapped against the PC dimension of facts, but it also crosses with the PC dimension of 
possibilities, as two of the codes clustered under the theme of “Day-to-Day” - 
“continuous improvement” and “actions from alerts” - were judged to fit more closely 
with the possibility dimension in the code mapping exercise. Similar diagrams for each 
of the nine inductively developed themes are given in Appendix D.  
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As is clear in Figure 7.5, the four PC dimensions are inter-related and influence each 
other, hence the overlap of inductively developed themes across more than one 
dimension could be reasonably anticipated.  The two-stage mapping process adds 
complexity to the data analysis, and indeed appears to differ from the approach taken 
in other studies where data has been coded against a priori codes and then the PC 
dimensions (e.g. Cinquini, Campanale, Pianezzi, & Tenucci, 2017), coded against a mix 
of interview topic areas and the PC dimensions directly (e.g. Laine, Korhonen, Suomala, 
& Tervala, 2017), or simply analysed using the four dimensions and the integration of 
these (Jakobsen, 2017).  However, it is through this two-stage analytical process that 
the interactions between the PC dimensions in the case studies becomes clear.  The 
overlap of themes and dimensions has been expressed in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 by colour 
coding.  In Figure 7.6 the themes are located under the dominant dimension from the 
thematic mapping exercise, with the colours showing any split across other relevant PC 
dimensions.   
 
 
Figure 7.6: Themes Mapped Against the Four PC Dimensions 
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Figure 7.7: An Example of the Mapping of Codes and Themes to PC Dimensions 
 
 
 
Clustering the inductively developed codes and themes into the PC dimensions 
therefore offers an alternative viewpoint of the case studies, and illustrates how the 
two aspects of each organisation – the “effective” overall organisation and the 
“ineffective” organisation experienced in the non-reportable food incident – interact.  
For example, the dimension of facts covers two themes.  The first, “Day-to-Day”, sets 
out much of the basis of the generally successful nature of the businesses, whilst the 
second, “This is What Went Wrong”, conversely, looks at the problems encoutered by 
the organisations in the quality incidents investigated.  
 
Both themes have been presented comprehensively in Chapters 5 and 6, but directly 
comparing and contrasting these two themes using the constructs of PC confirms 
patterns of behaviour which offer deeper insight into how and why the incidents 
occurred.  
 
Both LiquiComp UK and PowderCo UK operate with established and comprehensive 
business systems and processes, including QMSs and FSMSs, which underpin much of 
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the operational success of their businesses.  In both cases, the organisations could be 
seen as relying on the fact that they had FSMSs and QMSs in place which were 
validated and verified as appropriate through review and audit, i.e. they trusted the 
systems in place and relied on the data generated by the use of these systems to make 
business decisions.  In previous work using PC, it has been suggested that accounting 
(as an MCS) acts as a coordinating system, to facilitate the creation of a shared reality 
or topos, enabling cooperation between different organisational actors to address 
complex issues (Cinquini et al., 2017).  In the current cases, the FSMSs and QMSs 
appear to play a similar role, i.e. they act as a core fact which shapes the organisational 
reality and enables business issues to be addressed.   
 
We have seen however that in both of these cases the quality incidents occurred 
despite having these systems and processes in place; the fact of having a trusted 
system in place did not protect either organisation from costly non-reportable food 
incidents.   
 
In the paradigm of PC, an organisation’s values impact what an organisation 
understands as, relies on and, indeed, values as facts.  Neither PowderCo UK nor 
LiquiComp UK ascribed the incidents solely to failures in systems and processes; in 
contrast the failures were seen as complex, unexpected and largely unforseeable 
events.  Whilst both organisations implemented corrective actions to improve aspects 
of their respective FSMSs and QMSs (and LiquiComp UK in particular had begun to 
review their systems to reduce their complexity), the bulk of each company’s systems 
remained unchanged.  Therefore both organisations could be said to have continued 
to trust and rely on these systems to manage their operations.  The incidents 
experienced did not fundamentally shake either organisations’ belief in and 
dependance on the facts obtained from these systems – both organisations continued 
to value these systems.  This suggests an over-reliance on these process and systems 
within the organisations; despite the evidence to the contrary, there is still faith that 
the systems will protect the organisations from future quality and food safety failures.   
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This insight can be further explored using the concepts of pro-active truth (what is 
believed will work, based on analysis of current data) and pragmatic truth (an ex-post 
evaluation of actual experience), which are closely related to the PC framework (L. 
Nørreklit, 2017b). Where the expectations of pro-active truth are not borne out by 
actual events, this is termed a truth gap (H. Nørreklit et al., 2017).  For both case study 
organisations the pro-active truth can be expressed as an expectation that FSMSs and 
QMSs will guard against food incidents, whilst the pragmatic truth is that for both 
companies incidents occurred, hence in both cases a truth gap is seen.  F. Mitchell, 
Nørreklit and Nørreklit (2017) state that the truth gap should become a basis for 
organisational learning and improvement.  Although both case study companies have 
CI well embedded as organisational practice, the failure to recognise the truth gap in 
terms of the overall efficacy of their QMSs and FSMSs, suggests that organisational 
learning from the incidents might be inadvertantly limited.   
 
The themes under the dimensions of values and communication have also been 
discussed in depth in chapters 5 and 6, but using PC highlights the relationship 
between these dimensions.   The communication styles used by the two case study 
organisations during their repsective quality incidents were markedly different.  
PowderCo UK communicated to staff and management in an open and transparent 
manner, with the incident appearing to be well known and well understood across the 
organisation.  In contrast, in LiquiComp UK, there was a concern to keep a tight control 
over information, using legal privilege; i.e. the previously discussed barrier, 
constrained communication, can be seen.  As already discussed, these contrasting 
styles of communication appeared to be driven by different values.  The open 
communication in PowderCo UK was driven by values such as “safety first”, “desire to 
improve” and “visibility”, whilst the tight control in LiquiComp UK was driven by an 
underpinning value of “protecting the company” from financial, legal and reputational 
harm.  This latter value appeared to take precedence over other values held by staff 
and management in LiquiComp UK, so having the greatest impact on communication 
during the management of the quality incident.  Any factors which negatively impact 
communication are likely to impact the integration of the four PC dimensions, as 
communication can be seen as the driver which integrates the actors’ facts, 
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possibilities and values in the PC framework (L. Nørreklit, 2017a).  This will be further 
discussed below.  
 
The final PC dimension, possibilities, and the interaction of the dimensions of facts and 
values with this dimension, also drives new insights into the case studies.  Three 
themes are placed under the possibilities dimension: “what works”, “problem solving 
our way” and “what doesn’t work”.  Looking across these three themes the first 
impression reinforces the conclusion that the systematic use of processes and tools, 
such as RCA, enabled both case study companies to investigate and manage their 
respective non-reportable food incidents in an efficient and effective manner.  This fits 
well with the use of systems and processes in every day operations and the high value 
placed on systems and processes in both organisations.  However, part of the 
underlying cause of both incidents was a breakdown in processes: the “variation in 
working practices” seen under the theme “what doesn’t work”. This was exhibitied in 
LiquiComp UK in the conduct of the bottle cap torque test, and in PowderCo UK in the 
assessment of metal contamination.   
 
H. Nørreklit et al. (2010) state that “possibilities create room for choice”.  In the 
incidents under discussion, one could argue that there were gaps in the processes and 
control systems which left too much room for the line operatives to make choices, and 
hence the “variation in working practices” occurred which were causal elements in the 
incidents.  Alternatively, looking at the interconnections between the PC dimensions, it 
can be argued that the issue underlying the “variation in working practices” is not that 
alternative choices were possible, but that line operatives did not make the right 
choices.   
 
In the case of PowderCo UK, inappropriate choices were made by operatives who were 
responsible for checking the sieves and magnets because of a lack of factual 
knowledge on the acceptable (i.e. safe) level of fine metal powder cleared from the 
magnets.  In other words, the operatives were not able to make the right choice from 
the possibilities available because they had inadequate facts on which to base their 
decisions.  
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In the case of LiquiComp UK, the possibilities to choose from were whether to 
complete the torque tests correctly, or not.  Whilst the lack of agreement between the 
SOP and work instructions might suggest that here too the choices were made because 
of inadequate facts (a lack of knowledge on how to conduct the tests properly), I 
contend that this was not the case.  Observations carried out by the LiquiComp UK RCA 
team after the incident showed that line operatives were conducting the torque tests 
properly.  This indicates that the possibility of conducting the torque tests wrongly was 
not chosen because of a lack of knowledge, but rather that values drove this choice; 
that meeting production targets was more valued within the manufacturing team than 
food safety and quality.  This reinforces the finding that organisational culture can act 
as a barrier to effective food safety governance and that there was an inadequate FSC 
in LiquiComp UK at the time of the incident. 
 
Another common element across both incidents was the belief that the incidents 
were, at least in part, unforseeable.  Under the PC framework, possibilities for action 
need to be factual possibilities, i.e. facts and possibilities must be integrated (L. 
Nørreklit, 2017a).  In both case studies it can be seen that the different failure points  
were not considered as factual possibilities by the organisations during the 
development of their QMSs and FSMSs.   
 
For example, in the case of PowderCo UK, the chain-driven conveyors in Bins B and C 
had been working successfully for many decades and the highly experienced staff and 
contract maintenance personnel had never seen a similar failure (“… he [the 
contractor] said in all the years that he's been coming to the site he's never seen it [the 
chain] come loose before…” (P008, Senior Engineer)).  Likewise, the bolt that failed in 
the capping machine in the LiquiComp UK site was totally unexpected (“… I’ve not 
come across this particular issue previously, and the manufacturers of the magnet 
head, or the filler or the capper, likewise, they’d not seen this type of failure mode” 
(L017, Site Engineer)).  Therefore, in both cases, even if such equipment failures had 
been considered as possibilities which needed to be controlled and monitored within 
the QMSs and FSMSs, it is highly likely that they would have been rejected by the 
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teams responsible for developing and reviewing the systems as unrealistic possibilities, 
not factual possibilities which could actually occur.  
 
One factor which may be influencing the determination of possibilities as either 
unrealistic or factual, is the value which both organisations place on experts and 
expertise.  The literature on barriers to the implementation of FSMS indicates that a 
lack of knowledge, experience and skills in HACCP is a demonstrable barrier to 
successful implementation of such systems (e.g. Fotopoulos et al., 2011; Jevšnik et al., 
2006).  However, the use of experts may itself bring limitations to the development of 
FSMSs and QMSs.  Experts’ views may be limited by what education and experience 
has taught them should and can occur; non-routine possibilities might be automatically 
discounted.  In other words, were the incidents truly unforeseeable or simply 
unforeseen because the experts did not consider these failures as factual possibilities?   
 
Additionally, by categorising the incident as unforeseeable, PowderCo UK were able to 
shy away from blaming either the people producing the product and running the FSMS 
and QMS, or the processes and systems themselves.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
avoidance of a blame culture appears helpful, as it allowed PowderCo UK to discuss 
the incident with their staff and foster a culture of learning from failure.  However, by 
deeming the incident unforseeable the QMS and FSMS are being considered as 
sacrosanct and the superiority of HACCP to assure food safety treated as an inviolable 
fact, despite the fact that the metal contamination incident occurred.   
 
Similarly, in LiquiComp UK, the initial failure of the capping head was also seen as 
unforseeable.  In this case some gaps were recognised in the processes (e.g. the 
limitations in detection system) and the people related element of the failure was also 
recognised (the failures to keep documents up to date; the failures in the quality 
checks).  Despite this, the fundamentals of the QMS and FSMS were not challenged at 
that time, although subsequent to the incident work has commenced to streamline 
and prioritise the food safety and quality documentation (suggesting that the 
previously discussed barrier of system swampling has been recognised in part).  
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Another underlying challenge for LiquiComp UK lies in the general perception that 
their products are “virtually bomb proof”, as this belief is again likely to constrain 
thinking about possible failures and their classification as factual possibilities rather 
than unrealistic possibilities. 
 
The systematic and rigorous nature of HACCP underlies its strengths and indeed the 
whole proactive approach to managing food safety. However the case studies suggest 
that this systematic approach has limitations. Firstly, HACCP plans are built on the 
ability to understand and control known variables. If, as in these case studies, a hazard 
is not foreseen (e.g. the failure of the capping head bolt in the LiquiComp UK case) 
and/or the failure of a CCP in a novel way is not foreseen (e.g. the fine slivers of metal 
passing lengthwise through the sieve mesh in the PowderCo UK case), then adequate 
controls cannot be put in place, and HACCP-based FSMSs may not be a foolproof way 
of preventing food incidents.    
 
Secondly, in both case studies, age related failures of equipment occurred. During the 
annual review of HACCP plans the question is asked “has anything changed which 
would impact the hazard analysis?” If nothing obvious has changed (no new products, 
ingredients, regulatory requirements etc.) the HACCP plan is re-ratified. However, time 
has moved on; even if nothing else has changed, equipment is older and monitoring 
systems may become outdated.  As both cases demonstrate, the passage of time and 
age of equipment did not trigger any re-evaluation during the annual HACCP reviews. 
That is not to say that no consideration of age/time was made, as in both organisations 
the engineering departments had flagged up the relevant equipment/tests as requiring 
updating. However, in neither case had the HACCP team identified immediate safety 
concerns, so upgrading of equipment and tests was put into a medium- to long-term 
plan and not addressed promptly.  
 
The age and outdated design of equipment and facilities was identfied as a 
contributory factor to the listeria outbreak at Maple Leaf Foods Inc in 2008 (Jespersen 
& Huffman, 2014), indicating that consideration of age and time is indeed a missing 
element in the annual revalidation and reverification of HACCP plans .  Whilst it would 
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be relatively easy to amend the annual HACCP reviews to prompt HACCP teams to 
consider these factors, this would merely address one specific gap in the review 
process, or, in the terminology of PC, make one more item a factual possibility to be 
considered by the HACCP teams. However, no checklist can be exhaustive, and other 
possibility gaps might still exist.   
 
Taken together, the systematic approach of HACCP and the explicit and implict trust 
displayed by the case study organisations in both FSMSs and QMSs, might be limiting 
what possibilities the organisations consider as factual possibilities and so what 
possibilities get actioned in the safety and quality management systems.   From a 
broader perspective, the current research suggests that traditional risk assessment 
based management systems, such as HACCP, may be inadequate to prevent less 
common or emerging hazards. 
 
Set against this concern are some examples in the theme “what works”, where outside 
of the formal systems and processes, creative thinking has been used to put in place 
additional pre-emptive controls or to improve the incident investigation process. For 
example, in PowderCo UK, P008 (Senior Engineer) worked with equipment 
manufacturers to develop and retrofit trays underneath the control point sieves.  P008 
considered it a factual possibility that material collected on the magnets / sieves could 
fall into the product when the control points were being checked and so turned this 
possibility into action to strengthen the product safety controls.   
 
Although additional insights to the cases have been identified by reflection on the four 
PC dimensions, the true strength of this paradigm lies in the integration of the 
dimensions to give the organisational topos.  Integration is required for construct 
causality, i.e. for organisational actors to construct cause and effect enabling them to 
produce successful actions.   Hence the degree of integration in each organisation is 
now considered. 
 
In the case of PowderCo UK, there is clear integration of the four dimensions; all of the 
actors interviewed appeared to share a common worldview of the organisation’s 
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purpose and the incident under investigation. A common language was used in 
describing the incident and the general working practices and routines of the site. 
Values, facts and possibilities for action were consistently communicated across the 
organisation. In other words, the communication fostered the integration of the facts, 
possibillites and values and a coherent topos for the PowderCo UK site was displayed. 
There was also evidence that the local site topos was integrated with that of the 
parent company, for example in the interpretation of the PowerCo Global vision and 
mission to incorporate food safety. 
 
This presentation of a strong, coherent topos should, under the theory of PC, be the 
hallmark of a successful organisation that works and, as previously described, 
PowderCo UK has a long history as a successful organisation producing safe food 
products. Nevertheless, the embedded case of the metal contamination incident 
demonstrates that elements of the organisation did not, in this instance, work.   
 
As discussed above, one of the elements identified through the PC framework in this 
case was a failure to consider potential hazards as factual possibilities, which allowed 
the eventual breakdowns and the incident to be viewed as unforeseeable by the 
organisational actors. I propose that the close integration of the dimensions and the 
strength of the organisational topos might in itself be one of the factors constraining 
the consideration of different possibilities, i.e that “over-integration” of the 
dimensions leads to a failure in construct causality and a disfunctional topos in much 
the same way that a lack of integration of the dimensions can.  This finding differs from 
previous research using PC, which has, in the main, proposed a lack of integration as a 
block to organisational performance and success (e.g. Cinquini et al., 2017). 
 
Re-examining the PC literature with the question of “over-integration” in mind, 
uncovers potential support for this proposal.  Firstly, in work by Jakobsen (2017) the 
strong, coherent topos of the Danish family farming community is described as illusory, 
given that the industry measure of success – production volume / growth – is 
inconsistent with the financial realities of the sector.  Jakobsen (2017) suggests a lack 
of external communication or perspective as an issue, restricting the identification of 
314 
 
alternate possibilities.  However, it is clear from the research that individual farmers do 
receive some external input from consultants and banks. Alternatively, it can be 
postulated that the “over-integration” of the PC dimensions inhibits the farmers from 
recognising alternate communications and possibilites, impeding construct causality 
and so preventing successful actions from occurring.  From an alternate perspective, 
Seal and Mattimoe (2014) have examined the role of dialectics in purposfully 
identifying and utilising difference between the topoi of different functional areas to 
create a strong organisational meta-topos and effective buisness strategy.  This 
supports the idea that in an organisation with a very close or “over- integrated” topos 
the possibilities created by dialectic debate will be missing, resulting in a poorer 
organisational performance.    
 
In the case of PowderCo UK, recognition of the truth gap -  the difference between the 
proactive truth of successful, safe production, 100% of the time, and the pragmatic 
truth of the metal contamination incident – could be one way for actors to break 
through barriers created by the over-integration of the PC dimensions.  If actors are 
trained and conditioned to think in certain ways to fit within the organisation, they 
may feel uncomfortable in thinking differently and identifying different potential 
problems outside of the norm, akin perhaps to a form of groupthink, as propounded 
over 40 years ago by Irving Janis (1973).  However, recognising the fact of the truth gap 
may enable actors to engage in dialectic debate, to think of alternate possibilities 
without threatening the overall organisational topos, and so to construct the 
conditions for successful actions.   
 
Turning to LiquiComp UK, different levels of integration and the presentation of 
several topoi within the case could have been expected, given the split of study 
participants between different sites and functional groups. This indeed was the case; 
however, the different world views presented did not split clearly along the expected 
lines. For example it might have been expected that all actors from the quality 
function, whether based at head office or at the manufacturing site, and whatever 
their grade, would present a fairly coherent topos.  In actuality, actors within this one 
function presented somewhat differing views, giving different descriptions and having 
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differing understandings of the incident, suggesting a lack of integration of the four 
dimensions even at the functional level. 
 
It was also clear that in LiquiComp UK, in comparison to PowderCo UK, there was less 
successful integration of the different functional and site topoi into an overall 
organisational topos for the UK business, or into the meta-topos of the global 
company. That said, there was clear evidence that senior management were working 
to develop organisational values, strategies and plans which would drive the creation 
of an overarching, integrated UK entity topos e.g. through the large, business-wide 
meeting, which was the first time that all UK staff had been gathered in one place.   
 
The LiquiComp UK case study offers additional insights towards building a coherent 
organisational topos.  Firstly, there was a high level of trust placed in the systems and 
processes used by the organisation including those used to investigate the manage the 
quality incident. One element of the process used to manage the incident was that it 
encouraged people to be “single-minded”in their approach, i.e. to keep within their 
own expertise, which showed synergy with the value placed on experience and 
expertise by the organisation.  Additionally, a culture to  “protect the company” was 
also identified , and the constraining effect of this on communication during and 
surrounding the quality incident has been explored.  L. Nørreklit (2017a) describes 
communication as the glue that connects people, enabling them to cooperate and to 
integrate the four dimenions of PC into a working reality construction.  Thus together, 
these cultural and process factors identified in the LiquiComp UK case appeared to, 
albeit unintentionally, disrupt communication and so impede the cooperation of the 
actors and the integration of the PC dimensions. Improving cooperation and reducing 
functional boundaries could build commonalities between the individual 
functional/site topoi seen in the case study and so encourage the development of a 
more coherent overarching organisational topos.  
 
Improved cooperation and communication, leading to improved integration, is not 
proposed simply for its own sake.  As previously explained, under the PC framework 
integration is required for construct causality, enabling actors to act and succeed.  
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Previous research on organisational change has demonstrated that restricting 
participation and communication adds risks to change plans and casts doubt on 
whether any integration of the dimensions under these circumstances will produce 
lasting results (Guven-Uslu, 2017).  As incident investigation and resolution inevitably 
involve change, similar concerns can be raised for the LiquiComp UK case: changes put 
in place as a result of the incident may not be embedded and effective long term 
without broader participation of actors across the organisation allowing for true 
integration of the dimensions and an effective construct causality. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the findings of the case studies in comparision with each 
other and against the theoretical roadmap, first by considering the literature on FSC 
and FSMSs, and then by exploring findings in light of the PC paradigm. The cases have 
also been considered in light of the PAF dimensions of quality costing.  However due to 
a lack of financial information on the cases, limited conclusions can be drawn from this 
field of work and future research should explore this area in more detail.  
  
A key finding is the determination that the current literature on barriers to the 
implementation of FSMSs does not adequately explain the causes of the incidents 
examined in this research.  Whilst issues with training, communication, faulty hazard 
analysis and excessive paperwork and documentation are common to both cases and 
the literature, other factors identified in the literature as barriers to FSMS 
implementation can be seen as organisational strengths, for example, management 
and staff commitment in PowderCo UK; personal hygiene, technical expertise and 
support in LiquiComp UK.   
 
In terms of the literature on FSC, analysis of the organisations against the Dimensions 
Framework (Jespersen et al, 2017) gave, as might be expected, a more nuanced 
appreciation of the FSC in each company, whilst confirming the findings of the 
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thematic analysis that PowderCo UK demonstrates a more developed FSC than 
LiquiComp UK.  However, the consideration of the cases also highlighted some 
limitations of this model, and FSC models in general, in that they consider FSC in 
isolation, with little account of the wider environmental context within which 
companies operated and as such also do not fully account for the occurrence of the 
non-reportable food incidents studied here.  In particular the PowderCo UK case 
highlights the fact that even FBOs with relatively robust FSCs can experience food 
incidents and that a focus on FSC alone is unlikely to be sufficient protection against 
FSMS failure in any organisation.  
 
Of the potential barriers to food safety governance identified in the thematic analysis, 
there are some clear links with this literature, with system swamping linking with the 
known barriers of excessive paperwork and documentation; constrained 
communication with communication as a barrier, and culture and values and 
organisational culture linking with staff and management commitment to food safety, 
a key element of FSC.   
 
However, neither the literature on FSC nor that on barriers to FSMS implementation 
help explain the barrier to food safety governance created by incidents being viewed 
as unforseeable.  Likewise, the unshakeable trust in systems and processes displayed 
by both companies – a key aspect of their culture and values – runs contrary to the 
literature, where a view that FSMSs lack credibility is seen as a barrier.    
 
In contrast to the focussed nature of the analysis against FSMS barriers and FSC, PC 
offers a  broader perspective and brings new insights to the cases.  An important 
insight concerns the recognition that the quality incidents represented a truth gap, 
between the pro-active truth believed by the case study organisations - our QMS and 
FSMS are strong and effective - and the pragmatic truth that the incidents represented 
failures in the quality and food safety processes and systems, be they due to the 
processes themsleves or the actions, or lack of actions, of the organisational actors.  
Neither organisation fully recognised this truth gap.  Although PowderCo UK had 
undertaken extensive expert reviews of their system for identifying and removing any 
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metal contamination, only minor adjustments were made to the system – in principle 
the systems and processes were still believed to be robust, comprehensive and 
reliable.  The situation at LiquiComp UK was a lttle different, as work had commenced 
to simplify and streamline some of the systems and processes (in recognition of the 
impact of system swamping).  Nevertheless, the organisation retained an unshakable 
faith that overall their QMS and FSMS were robust, comprehensive and reliable if 
somewhat overly complex.  
 
Consideration of the possibilities dimension also brought specific insights in terms of 
the potential classification of the incidents as largely unforeseeable.  It can be argued 
that the incidents were simply unforeseen, rather than unforeseeable, however using 
the constructs of PC it is suggested that the failures were both unforeseen and 
considered unforeseeable because organisational actors did not recognise, even after 
the incidents, the potential problems in the systems as factual possibilities.   
 
The reliance on experts, both internal and external consultants to the business, has 
been related to the failure to recognise potential problems as factual possibilities.  
Whilst sufficient knowledge and skills in food safety and quality are critical to develop 
QMS and FSMS systems, it is proposed that experts may be overly focussed on more 
routine and well-established hazards and overlook the importance of lesser known or 
emerging hazards.  In turn this means that HACCP-based FSMSs may not be a fail safe 
way of preventing food incidents if potential hazards can not be, or are simply not 
foreseen. 
 
Another key finding of the analysis concerns the integration of the four dimensions to 
create the organisational topoi.  The suggestion is posed that for LiquiComp UK closer 
integration of the four dimensions is required to build a coherent overarching 
organisational topos, enable effective construct causality and thus allow actors to take 
successful actions, i.e. closer integration will better allow the identification of factual 
possibilities and counteract the tendency for failures to be perceived as unforeseeable.  
 
319 
 
In contrast, the topos of PowderCo UK was highly integrated.  In this case it is 
postulated that this close integration might itself be constraining the ability of actors 
to construct a full range of factual possibilities, necessary to identify potential 
problems outside of the norm of the standard QMS and FSMS control points (i.e. those 
currently perceived as unforeseeable). To my knowledge, previous research using the 
PC framework has not explored the impact of “over-integration” on construct causality 
and this offers a contribution to the theory of PC and the actor-reality construction.  
 
Another aspect of the cases, namely the aspect of age and time as a contributory 
factor to the quality incidents, is also worthy of particular consideration, in that it 
highlights a possible constraint of the current PC framework.  Just as a HACCP plan 
considers organisational conditions at a set point in time, so does an analysis of 
organisational topos, and just as the current study illustrates that in the absence of any 
other change time must be considered as a change factor in HACCP reviews, the 
impact of the passage of time on the topos must be considered.  An appreciation of 
time is implicit in the PC framework, given that facts reflect the past / immediate 
present (point of analysis), values and communication sit in the present, and 
possibilities give alternatives for the future (L. Nørreklit, 2017a).  However, every 
action that is taken and every possibility that is realised changes the nature of the facts 
available; they can also influence values and be a topic of communication, hence the 
topos evolves constantly.  Whilst the nature of case study research is that it takes place 
over a period of time (e.g. Cinquini et al. (2017) conducted interviews over a 16 month 
period), the impact of time and the evolving nature of the topos is under explored in 
the literature and the current research illustrates the importance of further 
development of the PC framework in this respect. 
 
It is also important to step back from considering the general PC constructs and to 
revisit the theoretical roadmap developed in Chapter 4 which also incorporated the 
people versus process debate underlying this research, i.e., when food safety systems 
go wrong, is it the fault of the people or the process itself?   The interwoven aspects of 
people and process in contributing to the food incidents was shown in the thematic 
analysis of each case (Chapters 5 and 6), with the conclusion that people issues 
320 
 
underpin these failures.  In both case studies the underlying trigger for the non-
reportable food incident was an equipment issue.  Therefore in both cases it might be 
considered that the FSMS and QMS processes had failed as the processes had not 
enabled the organisations to envisage the exact failures and put in place adequate 
controls.  On the other hand, the construction of the processes relies on the skills and 
judgement of the actors involved, and so the shortfalls in the processes are actually a 
result of people failures, not process failures per se.  The analysis using PC underpins 
this conclusion, as this shows the importance of people, particularly in determining 
factual possibilities on which to base decisions and actions.  
 
Overall, this research illustrates the benefit of positioning future studies on food safety 
and quality within the area of management control and in utilising PC as a 
management control theory, as it enables both process and people elements of FSMS / 
QMS failure to be addressed.  
 
This research makes contributions to literature on food safety and quality.  By using 
the case study approach to consider the causes of non-reportable food incidents in 
generally successful organisations with well established QMSs and FSMSs, rather than 
investigating the barriers to implementation of such systems, it was established that, 
at least for these case studies, the absence of barriers for FSMS implementation did 
not protect the organisations from experiencing these incidents.  Indeed, some of the 
barriers to FSMS implementation identified in previous research (e.g. Jevšnik et al., 
2006) could be viewed as strengths for the case study companies.  In addition, rather 
than the incidents being viewed in hindsight as inevitable, they were seen by the case 
study organisations as unforseeable, and so were uncontrolled by their current FSMSs 
and FSMnSs.   
 
A contribution is also made to the literature on PC by utilising the framework in the 
novel management control setting of quality and food safety management.  The 
current research also demonstrates the use of the PC framework in cases of 
organisational failure, which contrasts with the main use of the framework which was 
developed to explain and understand effective practice.  Finally, the research raises 
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the question of “over-integration” of the four dimensions as a block for the 
identification of alternate factual possibilities, and so of the creation of an effective 
construct causality.  This contrasts with the literature to date, which has focused on a 
lack of integration of the four dimensions as the underlying reason for failures in 
construct causality and poor performance (e.g. Cinquini et al., 2017).   
 
These areas, together with limitations of the research and recommendations for future 
studies will be presented in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
 
Food and drink are necessities for life.  Unfortunately, despite legislation, best practice 
and scientific expertise, the safety of the food supply chain all too often fails and high 
numbers of food safety incidents are reported every year (e.g. European Commission 
Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, 2017). Instead of supporting life, 
health and well-being, all too often food and drink bring foodborne illness, and 
consumers’ trust in the industrialised, global food supply chain has been damaged 
(Yamoah & Yawson, 2014). 
 
This project was designed to address one aspect of this complex issue through the 
research question “Why do food safety systems fail and how does this relate to the 
governance and management control of food safety in food manufacturers?”   
 
The first three chapters of this thesis presented the rationale for this research, set out 
the background to food safety governance and management control and reviewed the 
literature, examining barriers to and drivers for the implementation of FSMSs, 
published data on food safety failures and FSC. The use of quality costing in the food 
industry was also considered.  From this the research question and objectives for this 
research were developed.  This was followed in Chapter 4 by an exploration of the 
philosophical background of the research field, with the elaboration of PC as a 
management control paradigm, which was used as the basis of a theoretical roadmap 
to guide both the research design and data analysis.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented the results of the two organisational case studies – 
PowderCo UK and LiquiComp UK - together with their respective embedded cases of 
non-reportable food incidents.  This was followed in Chapter 7 by a discussion of the 
research findings, comparing and contrasting results from the case studies with each 
other and, in the context of the theoretical roadmap, to the extant literature on FSMSs 
and FSC and the constructs of PC.      
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This final chapter concludes the thesis by reconsidering the research question and 
objectives (section 8.1); presenting the contributions made to knowledge, theory and 
industry practice and policy on the management of food safety (section 8.2); eliciting 
the limitations of this work (section 8.3) and offering recommendations for future 
research (section 8.4).  The chapter closes with a personal reflection on the research 
process (section 8.5).  
 
 
8.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
Research Objective One 
The first research objective stemmed from the question posed by R.T. Mitchell (1998): 
“When HACCP appears to fail, is it the fault of the HACCP system itself or does the real 
failure lie with the people who are trying to implement it?”  The objective was 
therefore to determine whether reported food safety incidents can be related to 
specific people or process elements of FSMS failure.    
 
As previously discussed, the case studies presented in this thesis concern non-
reportable food incidents, rather than ones which had required reporting to the 
authorities.  Nevertheless, as each case was investigated as a potential reportable 
food safety incident and involved failures in CPs / CCPs / QCPs, they were 
determined as relevant examples to study in order meet this objective, 
particularly given the practical challenges of gathering information on reported 
food incidents.     
 
As discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, both cases exhibited failures in people and 
process elements of their QMSs and FSMSs.  However, where process elements 
were determined (e.g. in LiquiComp UK, the excessive complexity of the QMS, 
and in PowderCo UK, the lack of an appropriate standard for metal 
contamination) these can be ascribed to failures by the people implementing and 
maintaining the systems.  In conclusion therefore, the fundamental failures in 
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FSMS can be regarded as failures by the people implementing and maintaining 
FSMSs and QMSs.    
 
Despite this conclusion, this research indicates a potential challenge with the 
underlying precept of HACCP (which forms the core of modern FSMSs) in that as 
a preventative system, HACCP relies on the identification and control of known 
hazards. Common to both cases was the belief that the incidents were largely 
unforeseeable in the way that the original equipment failure happened and / or 
in the failure of control systems.  The hazards which presented were therefore 
not adequately controlled, as the possibility of such failures had not been 
considered.  This factor has been discussed in Chapter 7 through the lens of PC, 
where the shortfall in identifying potential hazards as “factual possibilities” was 
presented.  Again, it is a people failure to insufficiently explore potential hazards 
and recognise them as “factual possibilities”, but nonetheless this finding 
indicates a weakness in the HACCP process. The implications of this for industry 
practice and future research will be addressed in sections 8.2 and 8.4 
respectively.   
 
Research Objective Two 
The second research objective was to determine the extent to which the barriers 
to the implementation and maintenance of FSMSs (particularly HACCP) found in 
the literature can be used to account for failures in FSMSs, and hence to a 
subsequent food incident.  
 
Five potential barriers to food safety governance were identified in the thematic 
analysis of the case studies, and, as presented in Chapter 7, links between four of 
these – constrained communication, system swamping, organisational culture 
and culture and values –and the extant literature were established.  However, 
neither case could be adequately explained by the previously identified barriers 
to FSMS implementation. Indeed, in both cases, some of the identified barriers to 
FSMS implementation could, conversely, be seen as strengths of the case study 
companies.  In particular, the fifth barrier to food safety governance, that the 
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incidents were viewed as unforeseeable, stands apart from the previous 
literature, as does the explicit and implicit trust placed in food safety and quality 
systems and processes by both case study organisations.   
 
This finding highlights that just as audits and inspections can not necessarily 
predict that a company will not suffer from a food safety or quality failure 
(Mullen et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2013), neither will the absence of the barriers 
to FSMS implementation and maintenance.   
 
Research Objective Three  
The third research objective was to evaluate the relationship of FSC to failures in 
FSMSs.  The research therefore evaluated the FSC of each organisation, seeking 
to understand whether a consistent approach to food safety was demonstrated 
during the investigation and resolution of the quality incidents and during normal 
operations.   
 
In the period since this research project commenced there has been a significant 
increase in communication about FSC right across the food industry, with models 
of FSC being refined (e.g. J. Z. Taylor et al., 2015), new models being developed 
(e.g. Jespersen et al., 2017) and FSC being a core topic at industry focussed food 
safety conferences (such as Food Manufacturer’s Food Safety Conference, June 
2017).  It might therefore be expected that there was good awareness of FSC 
within at least the quality communities of the case study organisations, as indeed 
was found.  The value placed on food safety by the broader organisations was 
also seen in the case studies (e.g. by supply chain, regulatory and manufacturing 
teams).  The research methodology used proved suitable to make this 
determination and to offer a qualitative assessment of the FSC of both companies 
with PowderCo UK being assessed as having a relatively strong FSC, whilst the FSC 
at LiquiComp UK appeared to be less well developed.  
  
In neither case study was FSC being formally measured by the organisation, but 
the quality teams in both companies had given consideration of how to improve 
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FSC and both were interested in building on existing tools and practices on health 
and safety culture to develop proxy measures of change in FSC.  
 
As discussed previously, the research findings support the importance of people – 
their knowledge, values and behaviours – in ensuring the correct development 
and implementation of FSMSs.  That is, this research study provides support for 
the premise that a good or strong FSC is important for appropriate food safety 
management.  However, this study also highlights that having a relatively strong 
FSC does not necessarily prevent failures in food safety management, as 
evidenced by the incident which occurred at PowderCo UK.  This indicates that 
FSC should be viewed as only one element of food safety management and that a 
holistic approach, addressing both people and process is required for optimum 
performance.  
 
Research Objective Four 
The fourth research objective was set out in two parts. The first part of the 
objective was to address the research of food safety management from the 
perspective of management control, utilising PC, in order to ascertain the utility 
of PC for studying control systems outside of the accounting mainstream.  The 
second part of this objective was to gain insight on the use of PC in cases of 
management system failure as well as management systems under control.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a theoretical roadmap was developed by combining 
the constructs of PC with the two clusters of barriers to FSMS implementation 
(FBO People and FSMS Process).  This roadmap was used in the development of 
the semi-structured interview guide used for data collection.  This approach was 
particularly valuable in ensuring consistency across the interviews, not just in the 
initial interview questions, but during probing follow up questions by using the 
four PC dimensions of values, facts, possibilities and communication to frame 
these questions.  Using the PC dimensions was also of practical help in steering 
both the Researcher and the study participants away from concentrating solely 
on technical and scientific points, thus enabling a broader conversation about 
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food safety management from a management control perspective.  PC was also 
used to further interrogate and explain the findings of the thematic analysis of 
the case study data, as set out in Chapter 7, and new insights to the cases were 
developed in this way.  The contributions arising from this analysis will be 
covered later in this chapter. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, PC posits the integration of the four dimensions of fact, 
possibilities, values and communication to form a functional organisational topos.  
Although studies utilising PC have identified dysfunctional topoi and systems (e.g. 
Beusch, 2011), this study took the relatively novel approach of setting out to 
deliberately explore a system failure.  The research has successfully 
demonstrated the value of using PC to investigate the embedded cases of system 
failure, and compare these with the workings of the generally successful 
organisational cases.  
 
The Research Question 
Having considered the four research objectives, we now return to the overall 
research question and specifically the relationship of failures in food safety to the 
governance and management control of food safety.  The multifactorial nature of 
food safety governance was established in Chapter 2, where it was determined 
that FBOs play a key role in assuring food safety, having a requirement to set in 
place appropriate FSMSs in order to comply with the law. 
 
The current research demonstrates that even FBOs apparently working in 
compliance with the law and using comprehensive FSMSs, can experience food 
incidents, albeit non-reportable food incidents in these case studies.  Both case 
study organisations used a primarily technical approach to food safety 
governance in that they placed great emphasis on systems and processes for 
both day-to-day management of food safety and for the investigation and 
resolution of the incidents they experienced.  This is not an unexpected finding, 
given the emphasis under UK and EU law to manage food safety using HACCP-like 
systems, i.e. to take a technical approach to food safety.  
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However, the case studies illustrate the interwoven nature of people and 
processes in the control of food safety and quality.  Considering the barriers to 
food safety governance identified in this research, system swamping may appear 
initially to be technical in nature, with the technical systems approach requiring a 
plethora of systems, processes and paperwork.  However, this barrier is really a 
social construction, with the case study organisations interpreting the legal 
requirements for documented HACCP-like systems to mean the construction and 
documentation of detailed processes for every aspect of food safety 
management.  The other proposed barriers – constrained communication, culture 
and values, organisational culture and the unforeseeable nature of food incidents 
– are also clearly people oriented.  This indicates that in FBOs food safety 
governance actually relies on a socio-technical approach, and that a higher 
emphasis on the social aspects of food safety governance is required to address 
these barriers.  
 
 
8.2 Contributions 
 
In addressing the research question and objectives, this thesis offers 
contributions to academic knowledge, to theory, and to industry practice and 
policy on food safety management, which will now be presented. 
 
Academic Knowledge  
The first contribution from this research is to the literature on food safety and 
quality and the determination that known barriers to FSMS (particularly HACCP) 
implementation do not fully explain the non-reportable food incidents 
experienced by the case study companies.   
 
As set out in Chapter 3, much of the current literature seeks to understand the 
challenges for the implementation and maintenance of FSMSs. This research 
differs in that it studies cases of generally successful organisations, with 
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established QMSs and FSMSs, and examines serious, but non-reportable, food 
incidents.  The comparison of the causes of the incidents and system failures with 
the barriers to FSMS implemetation is, to the Researcher’s knowledge, a novel 
contribution to the field of food safety management research.  
 
A further contribution to knowledge lies in the investigation of the first research 
objective, i.e. to answer the people versus process question related to the causes 
of HACCP failure posed by R.T. Mitchell (1998).   Whilst people issues have been 
identified as underpinning the failures to monitor food safety / quality and detect 
product failures at an earlier stage, a key contribution of this work lies in the 
identification of a weakness in HACCP-based FSMSs, which are built on the 
premise that food safety hazards can be foreseen and controlled. 
 
The unexpected or unforeseeable nature of the incidents investigated as 
embedded cases demonstrate that a traditional hazard identification and risk 
assessment based process, as used in HACCP, was inadequate to identify and 
control for the equipment and system failures seen.  Indeed, the classification of 
the incidents as unforeseeable or unexpected is a contribution in itself, and as 
discussed contrasts with the expectation that incidents are likely to be viewed as 
events “waiting to happen” due to the effects of hindsight bias (Fessel et al., 
2009).   
 
This finding might therefore be of particular interest to academics in the field of 
food safety as it suggests that HACCP based systems may not be adequate to 
anticipate and control for the full range of hazards – particularly less well known 
or emerging hazards - which can result in food incidents.  New processes and 
systems for hazard identification and risk analysis should be explored to 
complement traditional risk assessment based systems and improve food safety 
governance within the food industry.   
 
Theory 
The food industry is the largest manufacturing sector in the EU, employing 4.25 million 
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people with a combined turnover of €1.089 billion (FoodDrinkEurope, 2016a) and can 
be considered a complex socio-technical system (Nayak & Waterson, 2016).  Control 
systems to manage food safety are legally mandated in the EU and many other legal 
jurisdictions.  As such, a FSMS forms a cornerstone of the required MCSs for any food 
business.  Whilst there is a body of literature on FSMSs, particularly HACCP, and quality 
management (e.g. Grover et al., 2016; Ren, He, & Luning, 2016), there is remarkably 
little published on FSMSs in the management control literature.  The case study 
presented by Di Cimbrini and Migliori (2016) forms a notable exception, and even that 
paper considers HACCP from a quality management, rather than a management 
control, perspective.  
 
The present study therefore makes a significant contribution to the management 
control literature by using management control theory to study a non-financial system 
which is pertinent to a major industrial sector.   
 
Not only is the study of food safety management as an MCS a contribution to 
theory, so too is the use of PC to frame the research.  Although PC is gaining 
traction within the management control research environment it is relatively new 
and to date the majority of research using PC has focussed on accounts, 
accounting or accountants.  Using PC to explore quality and food safety MCSs 
helps to develop and enrich the academic community’s understanding of PC 
itself.  Similarly, a contribution is made by the use of PC in the current study to 
understand and explain a situation of organisational failure.  This contrasts with 
the predominant use of the framework, which was developed to explain and 
understand effective, rather than ineffective, practice. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7, central to PC is a requirement for the 
integration of the four dimensions of communication, possibilities, values and 
fact.  Through this integration a coherent and functional organisational topos is 
formed and without adequate integration there is a fragmented topos and a lack 
of construct causality to enable actors to take effective actions.  Put simply, 
integration of the four dimensions is required for a functioning and effective 
331 
 
organisation.  As discussed in Chapter 7, this pattern of inadequate integration 
was demonstrated in the LiquiComp UK case study.  However, in the other case, 
PowderCo UK, very close integration of the dimensions was seen.  The 
Researcher has therefore postulated that PowderCo UK may offer an example 
where “over-integration” of the dimensions, rather than a lack of integration, is 
constraining construct causality, i.e. resulting in a dysfunctional or ineffective 
organisation.  This is, to the Researcher’s knowledge, a new contribution to the 
theory of PC.   
 
This contribution is important as it suggests that rather than functioning topoi 
existing at a point of integration, which forms the end of a simple scale from 
unintegrated to integrated dimensions, there is a wider scale from unintegrated 
to over-integrated, with functional topoi sitting at the mid-point, as illustrated in 
Figure 8.1.   
 
 
Figure 8.1: Functioning Topoi on a Spectrum of Dimension Integration 
 
 
 
 
This scale of the integration of PC dimensions enriches the PC framework, 
offering the opportunity for finer grained analysis and interpretation of 
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organisational topoi.  By offering an alternative explanation for failures in 
construct causality – over-integration as well as a lack of integration – this should 
enable PC to better reflect the complexities seen in real life situations. 
 
Food Safety Practice and Policy 
The first contribution to food safety practice and policy from this research relates 
to the consideration of the passage of time within QMS and FSMS reviews.  For 
example, best practice for HACCP requires at least an annual review and 
revalidation of the plan, part of which requires the review team to question 
whether any changes to the product, ingredients, process etc. have occurred.  In 
both case studies the age of equipment (production and / or monitoring 
equipment) was related to the root cause of the incidents experienced, yet in 
neither organisation was time, or age, considered as a “change” during annual 
process re-validation activities.  The current research highlights the importance of 
adding a consideration of time / age as an element of re-validation activities. 
 
A second contribution to food safety practice and policy from this research is the 
insight that the unexpected or unforeseeable nature of the incidents potentially 
relates to such failures not being identified as factual possibilities through QMS 
and HACCP reviews. In particular, the reliance on expert opinion (which by 
definition might be considered to be deep, but potentially narrow, and to 
concentrate on known hazards which are likely to occur) was suggested as one 
reason that the possibility of the failures happening was not identified.  Previous 
research has concluded that poor HACCP plans include too many CCPs (e.g. 
Fielding et al., 2011) and also that a lack of expertise is a factor when FBOs fail to 
successfully implement HACCP (e.g. Lowe & Taylor, 2013).  The current research 
does not contradict these findings, but suggests that FBOs need to balance 
concentration on known hazards with identification of potential new hazards and 
to better consider the impact of seemingly unlikely failures as well as highly likely 
failures. The involvement of staff who are knowledgeable and curious, but not 
necessarily expert, may play an important role by allowing teams to explore more 
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possible failure points in FSMS as potential factual possibilities and so encourage 
the development of HACCP plans with greater breadth as well as depth of insight.  
The research also makes a contribution to the practices of, and policies on, 
communication on food safety and quality incidents within FBOs.  The case 
studies illustrate the positive role that open communication on incidents can play 
by fostering the development of a strong FSC (as seen in PowderCo UK).  The 
cases also illustrate the challenges faced by organisations who are striving to do 
the right thing in terms of food safety, but are concerned with the financial, legal 
and reputational costs of inappropriate communication (as illustrated by the 
LiquiComp UK case) which can be seen to constrain communication.  
 
Given the prominence of social media and the increasing risks of litigation where 
food safety and quality issues arise, the concerns noted by LiquiComp UK are 
likely to become more prevalent in the food industry.  A contribution of this 
research is therefore to highlight the need for companies to consider their 
policies and practices on communication at the time of any food incident, to 
ensure that management of communication does not adversely affect the 
understanding of company values on food safety and from that the FSC of the 
organisation. 
 
A final contribution to industry practice and policy also relates to communication 
on food safety and quality issues, but in this case, concerns communication 
across the industry and with other stakeholders such as enforcement officers.  
The research findings highlight the role of learning lessons from failures, 
particularly those previously considered unforeseeable.  Sharing the knowledge 
that such failures not only can happen, but have happened, would enable other 
organisations to reassess and improve their own practices.  However, a vehicle to 
facilitate such communication, in an anonymised form, is likely to be required.  
Present communications on food incidents by authorities, such as the UK FSA, 
prioritise consumer safety at the time of the incident.  They therefore 
concentrate on identifying affected products to allow for their prompt 
withdrawal or recall from the market.  Information on exactly what happened, 
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how or why, is less available.  Few organisations volunteer detailed information 
or discuss incidents widely, the paper published on Maple Leaf Foods in Canada 
being a notable exception (Jespersen & Huffman, 2014).  Whilst information 
pertaining to incidents is viewed as highly sensitive, this research study adds 
weight to the need to review practice and policy in this area for the good of the 
industry as a whole and, from that, for consumers.  The concept of sharing 
sensitive information by the food industry is already established to some degree 
in the UK in terms of communications with the National Food Crime Unit / Food 
Standards Scotland re food crime (Food Standards Agency, 2017c; Food 
Standards Scotland, 2017) and appropriate practices could be developed from 
these existing schemes.  A failure to address the need for better information 
sharing runs the risk that opportunities to improve practices, improve food safety 
and reduce the incidence of foodborne disease will be missed. 
 
 
8.3 Limitations of the Research  
 
All research designs and methods have recognised limitations.  Criteria such as 
reliability and validity are hotly debated as to their applicability for qualitative, 
case study research (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 400).  Nevertheless, the specific 
study design and methodological approach described in Chapter 4 was 
undertaken to address such issues.  For example, data triangulation using 
interviews, observation and documentation as data points, was used to address 
concerns of data consistency.  The robustness of data analysis was also 
addressed, as thematic analysis has been criticised as an imprecise method 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).  However, by combining the method of Braun and Clarke 
(2006) with that of Guest et al. (2012, p 21 - 48), as described in Chapter 4, this 
limitation of the method has been addressed in the current research.   
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There are however other limitations to the research which must be 
acknowledged.  These are predominately concerned with the generalisability of 
the findings of this research and the possibility of response bias.  
 
Firstly, the research comprises qualitative case studies of two large, UK based 
food manufacturing businesses, conducted between November 2015 and August 
2016, and it does not claim to be representative of a wider population of food 
manufacturers or other types of FBO.  In particular, given the importance of SMEs 
to the sector (being responsible for over 60% of employment and 49.5% of 
turnover in the sector (FoodDrinkEurope, 2016a) it is clear that the case study 
organisations cannot be considered as representative of all food manufacturers, 
let alone all FBOs. That being said, the case study organisations are typical of 
large manufacturing companies, and insights on this part of the industry are 
critical when one considers that a food safety or quality error made by a large 
manufacturing company has the potential to affect many consumers and has 
much higher cost implications than one made by a small producer with limited 
local trade.  For example, the 2016 recall by Mars of chocolate bars potentially 
contaminated with plastic was estimated to cost the company tens of millions of 
dollars and affected products in 55 countries (Quinn et al., 2016).  More recently, 
Lactalis has recalled 12 million boxes of baby milk potentially affected by 
Salmonella from 83 countries (BBC News, 2018). 
 
A second limitation of the ability to generalise from the findings of the current 
research is the use of non-reportable food incidents as the embedded cases, 
rather than reported incidents.  The applicability of using these incidents has 
been justified previously.  Whilst the incidents investigated were not classified by 
the case study organisations as one’s requiring reporting to the authorities, this 
was determined in both cases as a result of the company investigations.  Had the 
product reached the end consumer in the case of PowderCo UK, or the nature of 
the plastic shreds (or the profile of the end consumers) been slightly different in 
the LiquiComp UK case, both could have been considered as reportable food 
incidents.  Indeed, contamination by foreign bodies and packaging defects 
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accounted for a total of 125 reported food incidents in the UK in 2016/17 (Food 
Standards Agency, 2017b).  Whilst further research on reported food incidents is 
desirable, the practical limitations of accessing organisations willing to share such 
data must be recognised.   
 
In conclusion, whilst there are limitations to the extent to which the findings of 
the current study can be generalised to other incidents, or other types of FBO, it 
is well recognised that the purpose of case study research is not to enable 
generalisation from specific cases to other settings.  Rather the purpose of such 
research is to enable generalisation to theory (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p 414), which 
has been accomplished in this research through the use of the theoretical 
roadmap.   
 
Moving on to response bias, some concerns must be acknowledged in this regard 
to the data collected in both organisations.  In PowderCo UK, the boundary of the 
case study was set at the manufacturing plant.  Whilst some information 
pertaining to other parts of the global organisation was obtained (through 
document analysis, for example), in contrast to the access provided by LiquiComp 
UK, at PowderCo UK no access was provided to senior management, commercial 
or legal personnel involved with the incident.  This may have impacted the 
breadth of information gathered, with the organisation presenting a stronger FSC 
and a more integrated topos than exhibited by LiquiComp UK because of the 
more limited access given within the business.  Having said that, it was clear from 
the data collected that neither the FSC of LiquiComp UK, nor the degree of 
integration of the topos, significantly changed if only the manufacturing site was 
considered, so it can be concluded that the differences in case study boundaries 
had a limited impact on the research findings. 
 
A second aspect to response bias comes about as not all study participants could 
offer a detailed, first hand, insight into the embedded cases of the non-
reportable food incidents.  In the case of PowderCo UK, for example, P001 had 
not been employed by the company at the time of the incident, whilst in 
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LiquiComp UK, no direct access was given to line operatives or supervisors due to 
the operational restructuring which was taking place at the time of the data 
collection.  Whilst knowledge of the incidents was one recruitment criteria for 
participant selection, a second criteria was knowledge of (through design, 
management or daily work) the organisations’ FSMSs, as this was critical to gain 
an overall understanding of the normal working practices of the businesses and 
allow comparison between generally effective practice and the incident.  Thus 
whilst some participants were not directly involved with the management or 
resolution of the incidents, all offered insights into the day-to-day running of the 
operations.  Similarly, whilst access to line operatives working on Line C at the 
time of the incident was restricted in LiquiComp UK, access was granted to the 
new supervisor of the line, who had in-depth knowledge of the processes and 
systems used and the changes put in place, which supported the data obtained 
from a number of staff and management involved in the incident investigation 
and resolution.  
 
Finally, the sensitive nature of food safety and food incidents as a topic may be 
seen as potentially biasing the information obtained, particularly during group 
interviews, where the presence of more senior staff might be seen as 
constraining input from other participants.  As set out in Chapter 4, the issue of 
topic sensitivity was anticipated when designing the research study, and 
managed through anonymisation and data security.  In addition, a non-disclosure 
agreement was put in place with LiquiComp UK, to further give assurances to 
participants and the company overall of the integrity of the research and the 
Researcher and to encourage frank and full disclosure of pertinent information, 
given the anonymisation of the research results.  From a group perspective, the 
possible impact of “group effects” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 526) in such 
interviews was also raised in Chapter 4.  Careful facilitation of the group 
interviews, plus triangulation of data between interviews and with data from 
document analysis and direct observation, was used to minimise any such group 
effects. 
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Overall therefore, whilst some response bias cannot be ruled out, stringent 
efforts were made to minimise this.  However, response bias remains a possible 
limitation of this work as with any qualitative, interview based research. 
 
Other common criticisms of qualitative research, namely those of subjectivity and 
reproducibility, particularly the influence of the Researchers previous experience 
on these issues, are the subject of the personal refection in section 8.5.  Some of 
the specific challenges of using PC, a relatively new and still developing research 
paradigm, are also addressed in section 8.5.  
 
A final specific limitation of this research pertains to the lack of specific financial 
data gathered on the cases.  This limits the use of the PAF quality costing model 
and the conclusions which can be drawn in this area.  Both additional qualitative 
data on quality costing (e.g. from interviews with members of the finance team) 
and costing data would be required to fully develop insights in this area and this 
remains an area for future research.  
 
 
8.4 Areas for Future Research 
 
Based on the contributions and limitations of this research, a number of areas for 
future research have been identified. 
 
Given the limited number of cases and incidents in this research, further study of 
food incidents, both reported and non-reportable, should take place. By 
examining further cases it would be possible to explore whether the key findings 
and conclusions of this work – the unforeseeable nature of incidents and the 
importance of identifying factual possibilities in hazard analysis – hold true in 
other cases.  Studying cases in smaller, less established manufacturing 
companies, in companies with both high and low levels of resource, in other 
areas of the food industry (companies in other countries; the hospitality industry 
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or food retailers; producers of higher microbiological risk foods) would offer 
further insights. 
 
Further study of FSC and its relationship to the PC framework would also be 
insightful.  A number of additional studies on FSC have been published since the 
start of this work (e.g. J.Z. Taylor et al., 2015).  Research using PC to assess the 
organisational topoi (overall and for a quality / food safety incident) with 
organisations who have utilised one of the off-the-shelf methods to assess FSC 
would enable a critique of the FSC models and measurement systems.   
Additionally, both case study organisations were considering the use of in-house 
proxy measures of FSC, based on existing programmes to encourage a good 
health and safety culture.  Longitudinal research to assess the implementation 
and effectiveness of such an introduction would be of benefit to researchers and 
practitioners.  
 
As detailed in Section 8.2, the current study contributes to the body of literature 
using PC by assessing its utility to explain a case of failure in a management 
control system, rather than explaining effective practice. Further research using 
PC to explain and understand “failed” management control systems is required to 
firmly establish its use in this way.  Similarly, further work to explore the concept 
of a scale of integration and over-integration as an explanation for ineffective 
construct causality is also required, be that in the context of management control 
in the food industry or other areas.   
 
As previously discussed the results of this research have indicated a potential 
flaw in the use of HACCP to manage food safety with the traditional risk 
assessment process (risk versus likelihood) depending on hazards being 
recognised and assessed, whilst this research indicates that incidents result from 
unforeseeable, or at least unforeseen, circumstances.  In addition to further 
research to understand if this finding can be substantiated in other food incident 
cases (be that non-reportable or reported incidents), research is needed to 
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address the potential application of these findings in other risk assessment based 
processes in the food industry.   
 
Following well-publicised cases of food fraud (particularly economically 
motivated food adulteration) such as the horsemeat scandal in Europe in 2012 
and the risk of ideologically motivated food contamination, standards and 
guidelines have evolved to address these concerns (e.g. British Standards 
Institute, 2014). TACCP (Threat Assessment Critical Control Point) and VACCP 
(Vulnerability Assessment Critical Control Point) have been developed from the 
HACCP approach.  Research is required to understand if the same challenges of 
identifying factual possibilities, and classifying events as unforeseeable, pertain to 
TACCP and VACCP as well as HACCP based FSMSs. The teams charged with 
developing TACCP and VACCP plans are often not experts in “thinking like a 
criminal” and in developing comprehensive defence plans.  Understanding 
whether this relative lack of expertise inhibits or encourages the identification of 
factual possibilities is therefore highly pertinent for the food industry and 
regulators as well as being of academic interest.   
 
Finally, two other areas of research are pertinent from a theoretical perspective.  
First, additional research is required to develop more comprehensive insights into 
the use of and contribution of quality costing in the food industry pertaining to 
the management of food incidents.  Second, further research is required to 
develop time as a dimension within the PC framework and the evolving nature of 
organisational topoi with time.   
 
 
8.5 A Personal Reflection on the Research Process 
 
A PhD is often compared to an apprenticeship, where the student acquires the 
skills and knowledge to undertake independent research in a specialist field 
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(Phillips & Pugh, 2010).  As such, a short reflection on my growth towards this 
outcome is pertinent.   
 
Through my own studies I have compared the PhD process to riding in the Grand 
National: every stage is like a fence, which appears – and indeed is – enormous.  
However, once jumped the fence retreats into the distance, you look back and 
think “why was that so hard?”  Then the next fence looms up looking larger and 
harder than anything you’ve faced before, until that too, is successfully cleared.  
Of all the fences jumped, I have chosen two which I feel are particularly worthy of 
sharing my reflections on. 
 
The first area concerns the possible influences of my previous work experience 
on my PhD studies.  I graduated in 1987 with a degree in nutrition and worked as 
a dietitian in the National Health Service before moving into the food industry, 
where I held a variety of nutrition science and food regulatory positions for over 
20 years.  Whilst I did not directly work on food safety and quality, I worked 
closely with quality and safety teams, and have experience in investigating and 
resolving food incidents.  Indeed, this was why the subject area for my PhD 
initially appealed: I know how much effort FBOs put into making food safe and of 
high quality, yet I’ve also seen that things can go wrong, so I was keen to 
understand more about why that happens. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, I decided to use a qualitative approach for my 
research.  As I progressed with the study, the challenges of ensuring the high 
quality of the work became apparent.  I vividly remember a meeting with one of 
my supervisors (who most often uses a quantitative approach in his work) when 
he asked “if someone else did this work would they get the same results as you?” 
and I responded “no”.  So, had I unwittingly sabotaged the quality of my own 
work?  
 
As a scientist, my aim in research was to be an objective, unbiased observer.  
With a positivist philosophical approach (although I had not appreciated at the 
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time that this was what it was), research quality entailed concerns with random 
sampling, the reproducibility of results and the validity of conclusions based on 
statistical probabilities.  Yet here I was undertaking qualitative work, which by its 
very nature means that the researcher becomes an intrinsic part of the work.  As 
Bryman and Bell (2015, p 416) express it “The qualitative researcher seeks close 
involvement with the people being investigated, so that he or she can genuinely 
understand the world through their eyes.”  What was the impact of my 
experience and knowledge of the food industry on my research and was my 
instinctive answer of “no” to the question on reproducibility a real issue? 
 
This one simple question set off a period of work to critique and demonstrate the 
quality of my research methodology, the results of which formed a key part of my 
work in Chapter 4.  And what did this give me as an answer to my supervisor’s 
question?  Well, no, another researcher would not necessarily get the same 
results that I have, unless they too had similar background knowledge and 
experience in the food industry.  My background aided me in gaining access to 
the case study companies. Rather than being a random PhD student asking for 
access to discuss a sensitive topic, I had a reputation and track record which 
helped my initial contacts justify and legitimise my work and so gain approval 
from senior managers to participate in the research.  Likewise, my background 
helped me to build a rapport with participants when conducting interviews, so 
that they felt able to share information about sensitive areas.  After all, admitting 
that you and your organisation have potentially made mistakes is not an easy or 
comfortable experience.  By showing my understanding of the challenges of 
working in the food industry, I was able to probe and get fuller and richer 
answers to my questions.  Benefits of access, relationship building and the 
nuanced understanding that comes from shared experiences have been 
recognised as possible advantages in “studying the familiar” (R. Berger, 2015).   
 
However, the challenge of over-familiarity between the research and the 
researched, must also be recognised (R. Berger, 2015).  Whilst my prior work 
experience helped me dig deeper during the interview process, I also reflected 
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that I had simultaneously taken care to avoid making assumptions during data 
collections, which would bias my findings.  From the construction of the semi-
structured interview guide (which I validated through review with industry 
experts) to ensuring the clarification of acronyms, I had actively sought to avoid 
making assumptions about the questions to ask, or the answers to the questions, 
because of my experience.   
 
So overall, whilst I still believe that my answer to “would someone else get the 
same results as you?” is “no”, a more complete answer is “no, I’ve got better 
insights into this area than someone else might get, because of my background 
and experience”, which from a qualitative research perspective gives an 
improvement in the quality of the study.   
 
These considerations were formed as part of my reflexive practice through the 
course of my PhD study, to understand and account for, explicitly, my 
positionality (versus the case study organisations and participants) and the 
impact of this on both the research process and results.  As expressed by R. 
Berger (2015) “the idea of reflexivity challenges the view of knowledge 
production as independent of the researcher producing it and of knowledge as 
objective”, nevertheless through the act of reflexivity my aim has been to 
maintain the independence and objectivity of my research.  I have previously 
described the steps taken to avoid introducing bias in data collection through 
making assumptions based on my knowledge of the food industry.  Likewise, 
through the development of a detailed analytical strategy, by repeated reflection 
on the thematic analysis and discussion of findings with my supervisors and other 
researchers at doctoral colloquia and other research conferences, I have sought 
to ensure transparency in the research process and to achieve the required 
degree of independence and objectivity required for high quality research.  
 
In reflecting on research quality and reflexivity, I touched on the second 
challenge I faced as a novice researcher: getting to grips with different 
philosophical approaches in research.  More specifically, this second challenge 
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concerns that of working with a research paradigm, the actor-reality construct 
and PC, which is relatively new and still evolving. 
 
When my first supervisor initially suggested that I consider PC as a basis for 
developing a theoretical roadmap for my research, she shared an article 
published in Financial Management which sets out PC as a conceptual framework 
for management accounting (H. Nørreklit, L. Nørreklit, & Mitchell, 2013).  As I 
explored PC and the actor-reality construction more, I realised that this starting 
point was deceptively simple and that using PC within my research presented 
challenges and opportunities.  The first challenge is how to categorise PC.  
Although my initial introduction to PC described it as a conceptual framework, 
other papers refer to it as a paradigm (H. Nørreklit, L. Nørreklit, & Mitchell, 2010), 
an ontology (Seal, 2012), a performance measurement framework (F. Mitchell et 
al., 2013), both an epistemology and an ontology together (Pianezzi & Cinquini, 
2016), a meta-theory (Seal & Mattimoe, 2016) and a conceptual methodology 
(Jack, 2017).  This became the first challenge in using PC: in what way was I using 
it and how would I describe its use?  
 
Similar challenges arose from other parts of the PC vocabulary.  For example, the 
concept of the organisational topoi is used in much of the research, but there is 
inconsistency in the use of the singular “topos” and the plural “topoi” across the 
literature to describe the reality of an organisation, when considering a single 
organisational unit versus the over-arching top level of an organisation.   
 
Whilst this variation in descriptors comes from evolving nature of PC, the central 
tenants of its four dimensions and the importance of the integration of these 
dimensions has not altered.  Thus, the terminology has posed a challenge in 
understanding and describing PC in my written work and presentations, rather 
than a challenge in using PC to inform the development of the theoretical 
roadmap for my own research, and its application in data analysis and 
interpretation.  
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Leaving aside the challenges of classification and terminology, my main reflection 
on using PC has been on whether it has added value to my work.  As explained in 
Chapters 4 and 7, I utilised PC firstly to inform the development of my main 
research tool (the semi-structured questionnaire) and then in the analysis and 
interpretation of results.  In this analysis I took the codes and themes developed 
from the inductive analysis of the data, mapped these against the dimensions of 
PC and then interpreted the results in light of the PC constructs.  This additional 
layer of analysis added complexity to my work, not least in how to present and 
explain these differing levels of analysis.  However, I believe that the use of PC 
has added value.  The thematic analysis was very useful to set out and explain the 
what, when, where, who and how questions about the case study companies and 
the quality incidents.  It also began to give insights into the underlying question of 
why the incidents happened, and why certain behaviours and actions had 
occurred, for example, the insight into the role of experts in each organisation.  
However, adding PC enabled greater insights to be developed. For example, 
adding the PC constructs to the combination of the incidents being “unforeseen” 
and the value placed on experts and processes in both organisations, led to my 
positing the gap in identification of factual possibilities as an underlying cause of 
the incidents.   
 
For future work however, I believe that rather than completing a full thematic 
analysis before applying the PC framework, it might be more straightforward and 
equally insightful to inductively develop codes and then map these against the PC 
dimensions without the intermediate step of developing themes from the codes.  
Whilst this breaks from accepted practice in thematic analysis, it fits well with an 
abductive approach informed by PC and that used by other academics working 
with PC, as previously described.   
 
Further debate on the best practice of data analysis when using PC could be 
usefully undertaken with the community of researchers who use PC and the 
actor-reality construction.  This community has welcomed my participation in 
annual conferences on the actor-reality construction where I have not only been 
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able to see how the use and theory of PC is developing but, through the 
network’s support and feedback, have been also able to develop my skills as a 
researcher in management control and my ideas for this thesis.   
 
This neatly takes me back to the start of this section, and the apprenticeship 
nature of the PhD.  Choosing PC as the basis for my theoretical roadmap 
introduced some unexpected fences into my gallop around the PhD Grand 
National, but has given me experiences that have enabled me to develop key 
skills towards becoming an effective academic researcher.  As a developing field 
of work, the use of PC offers me opportunities for further research, as I move on, 
hopefully, from my apprenticeship and take my next steps as an early career 
researcher.  
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Appendix A: Summary of Literature on Food Safety Violations, Incidents or Outbreaks of Foodborne Illness and 
FSMS / FSMnS Failures 
 
# Authors Area of concern Method  Findings Process / People issues identified 
1 Kwon, Roberts, 
Shanklin, Liu 
and Yen (2010) 
 
Health inspection 
violations in 
ethnic 
restaurants in 
Kansas USA 
Review of 500 randomly 
selected Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment 
inspection reports (250 ethnic 
and 250 non-ethnic 
restaurants).  Data coded re 
violation type, critical / non-
critical, date of inspection etc.  
and statistically analysed.  
Ethnic restaurants had higher 
numbers of total and critical 
violations.  Time / temperature 
violations were most common, 
followed by violations relating 
to personal hygiene and 
equipment cleanliness.  Ethnic 
restaurants demonstrated a 
higher failure rate (25.2% vs 
10%) for knowledge of 
foodborne illness prevention 
and application of HACCP than 
non-ethnic restaurants. 
The violations noted demonstrate 
that process and people related 
elements e.g. time and temperature 
control can be a failure to have an 
appropriate system in place 
(process) or a failure to follow the 
correct process (people).  The 
authors stress the need for food 
safety training to improve food 
handling etc., i.e. they see changing 
the behaviour of people as key to 
improving food safety in this 
environment. 
366 
 
2 Gormley et al. 
(2011) 
Review of 
foodborne 
outbreaks in 
England and 
Wales 1992 -2008 
2429 foodborne outbreaks 
recorded in the Health 
Protection Agency surveillance 
database were analysed. 
Overall rates of foodborne 
illness are declining.  
Outbreaks are most likely to 
occur in food service 
establishments (52.6% of 
cases). Poultry meat was the 
most commonly implicated 
food vehicle.  Contributory 
factors in outbreaks were 
cross-contamination, 
inadequate heat treatment, 
inappropriate food storage 
and infected food handlers. 
Both processes and people are 
implicated as the causative agents of 
foodborne illness. 
3 Soon, Singh and 
Baines (2011) 
A review of 
foodborne 
disease in 
Malaysia. 
Review of foodborne disease 
surveillance data from Ministry 
of Health in Malaysia from 1990 
to 2009.  Detailed analysis of a 
snapshot of 30 cases in Jan 2008 
The majority of foodborne 
related diseases are associated 
with outbreaks in institutions 
(schools, academic 
institutions, community 
gatherings).  Unhygienic 
In addition to increased surveillance 
and monitoring, increased training 
and education is highlighted as a 
need, i.e. addressing people aspects 
of the issue.  Also recognised that 
knowledge alone is insufficient – 
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is shown to illustrate key causes 
of food contamination. 
handling of food and lack of 
cleanliness in food preparation 
establishments – i.e. insanitary 
food handling procedures – 
identified as key contributing 
factor. 
authors identify FSC as a key 
concern. 
4 Hall et al. (2012) Epidemiology of 
foodborne 
norovirus 
outbreaks in USA 
2001 – 2008  
Analysis of 2,922 foodborne 
norovirus outbreaks, allowing 
identification of key vehicles of 
transmission (food type), 
location and probable causes of 
transmission.    
Leafy vegetables, nuts and 
fruit, and molluscs identified 
as primary food groups 
associated with norovirus 
infection.  Restaurants, 
delicatessens and other 
commercial settings identified 
as locations of infection.  
Infected food handlers 
implicated in 82% of 
outbreaks. 
Key interventions for reduction in 
incidence of infection were hand 
washing, compliance with policies 
on sickness and the presence of a 
certified kitchen manager. These are 
primarily people issues. 
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5 Potter, Murray, 
Lawson and 
Graham (2012) 
Trends in product 
recalls in agri-
food in UK, 
Ireland and USA.  
Compilation of a database of 
product recalls between 2004 
and 2011 using US FDA, USDA 
Food Safety & Inspection 
Service, UK FSA and the 
Republic of Ireland Food Safety 
Authority of Ireland 
information.  Recalls were 
classified under RASFF headings, 
with additional new codes 
created as required.  
2070 product recalls were 
identified, 74% in the USA.  
The frequency of recalls was 
found to be increasing over 
the time period analysed; 
partly explained by three large 
scale US recalls in this time 
period.  24% of all recalls were 
associated with processed 
foods, followed by meat (13%) 
and fruit, vegetables and 
salads (10%). Recalls were 
further split into 3 categories: 
biological product recalls 
(36%), with Salmonela, Listeria 
and E. coli being the most 
common hazards; chemical 
product recalls (9%), which 
encompassed dyes, irradiation, 
The authors suggest that 
“operational product recalls” are 
“largely caused by preventable 
human errors”, i.e. people related 
shortcomings in food safety 
management.  However, the authors 
present no data to substantiate this 
assertion and the wide range of sub-
categories under this category could 
have very different root causes.  The 
classification of different recalls can 
also be challenged. For example, 
Sudan 1, Sudan 4 and Para Red Dye 
recalls in 2005, along with 
melamine, are classified as chemical 
product recalls.  Whilst these 
elements are, of course chemicals, 
the use of such chemicals is strongly 
associated with food fraud.  
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food additives, food contact 
materials and pesticides etc..  
The largest category pertained 
to “operational product 
recalls” (55%) which included 
incorrect labelling, packaging 
defects, unauthorised 
ingredients, and food fraud.  
Likewise, the Peanut Corporation of 
America Salmonella case has been 
identified as one of food fraud, 
rather than a “simple” case of 
biological contamination.   
Despite suggesting that human error 
– people – underlie a large 
proportion of product recalls, the 
authors suggest that further 
research to investigate how to 
reduce such incidents might 
consider practices such as HACCP, 
traceability and statistical process 
control, i.e. processes, illustrating 
the intertwined nature of people 
and process in FSMS success and 
failure.  
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6 Vemula, Kumar 
and Polasa 
(2012) 
A review of 
foodborne 
diseases in India 
from 1980 to 
2009 
Review of the scientific reports 
of 37 reported outbreaks.   
Compared with other papers 
reviewed, the outbreaks 
reported here were more 
varied, with adulteration (e.g. 
with illegal food colouring), 
chemical contamination (e.g. 
pesticides), and illness caused 
by toxins in foods (e.g. from 
consumption of mouldy 
sorghum) as well as illness 
resulting from microbiological 
contamination of food being 
presented.  Much of this is 
likely to be due to India being 
a developing country with a 
high population of rural poor.  
However, as India is 
increasingly involved in 
international food trade, the 
The discussion in this paper focuses 
on the need to improve surveillance 
of foodborne illness in India, and to 
improve awareness of the risks of 
food spoilage etc.  There is no 
discussion about the implications for 
the Indian food industry, particularly 
for companies who export products 
to other markets.  No clear picture 
can be ascertained as to whether 
process or people issues would be 
most important to address in the 
local food industry. 
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cases of deliberate 
adulteration of products are 
particularly concerning. 
7 Soon, Manning, 
Davies and 
Baines (2012) 
Investigation of 
food safety 
breakdowns at 
farm level 
(primary 
producers) and 
possible role of 
HACCP 
A desktop study of outbreaks 
and recalls of fresh produce in 
US A and EU. 
The outbreaks discussed are 
focussed on microbiological 
contamination of produce.  
Agricultural practices (e.g. 
source of irrigation water, 
presence of domestic or wild 
animals) and the actions of 
workers highlighted as 
potential sources of 
contamination.  
The authors’ research involves the 
assessment of whether the HACCP 
process can be applied in primary 
production.  It is suggested that 
process implementation (guidelines, 
manuals) is insufficient by itself to 
improve produce microbiological 
safety.  This suggests that whilst 
process development (a modified 
form of HACCP) might be beneficial, 
addressing people aspects 
(education, culture) will be key for 
success. 
8 Painter et al. 
(2013) 
Categorisation of 
foodborne 
illnesses against 
Review of all outbreaks 
reported to the CDC, 
categorising against food groups 
4,589 outbreaks with an 
implicated food vehicle and a 
single aetiological agent 
The study was not designed to 
examine system failures.  However, 
the importance of complex foods 
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food categories in 
the USA, 1998 - 
2008 
and identifying key causative 
agents. 
examined.  Norovirus 
responsible for most 
outbreaks; 49% of outbreaks 
associated with complex 
(rather than single ingredient) 
foods.  Produce (fruits, nuts, 
vegetables) and poultry were 
the food groups most often 
implicated. 
and norovirus indicate cross-
contamination by food handlers as a 
cause for concern, i.e. people 
related issues.  Additionally, the 
authors stress the need to prevent 
contamination of poultry and 
produce, i.e. this indicates process 
concerns. 
9 Xue & Zhang 
(2013) 
An analysis of 
2387 incidents of 
acute foodborne 
illness in China. 
Foodborne illness reports 
identified in professional 
Chinese journals, from 1999 – 
early 2010.  
Data identified 99,487 illnesses 
and 380 deaths: much less 
than official Government 
figures for the same period 
(possibly due to focus in 
journals on metropolitan areas 
and requirement for 
professional evidence).  
Microorganisms linked to 
57.8% incidents and 36.3% 
In common with the study of 
Vemula et al. (2012), this report also 
highlights that the rural population 
are at risk of foodborne illnesses 
from chemicals and toxins to a 
higher degree than typically 
reported in Western societies.   
The authors stress that human 
factors - negligence, intentional 
behaviour, weak regulatory 
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deaths.  Chemicals (food 
additives, pesticides, 
rodenticides, veterinary 
medicines) linked to less illness 
but higher percentage of 
deaths. Detailed information 
also given on location and type 
of foods involved.  Detailed 
information also given on 
human causes, ranging from 
unhygienic practices, to 
ingestion of decayed food, 
overuse of additives, illegal use 
of feed additives etc. 
enforcement and lack of knowledge 
- were largely accountable for the 
food safety problems analysed.   
10 Van Doren et al. 
(2013) 
Investigation of 
foodborne illness 
from microbial 
contamination of 
Literature search and 
investigation of CDC database to 
identify and describe foodborne 
illness attributed to spice 
Multiple causes of infection 
noted, including inappropriate: 
growing conditions (using 
manure as a fertiliser); 
treatment of spices – “steam 
The causes identified indicate 
failures in the process of food safety 
management, e.g. inappropriate 
heat treatment.  However, it seems 
likely that a lack of knowledge (a 
374 
 
spices, 1973 - 
2010 
consumption (including in 
processed foods). 
washing” which cleans spice 
but which does not effectively 
reduce pathogens; sampling 
for testing to verify safety of 
spices; addition of spices to 
ready-to-eat products after 
the main pathogen reduction 
step (i.e. spices not subject to 
this); vendor control (e.g. use 
of unregistered suppliers). 
people issue) lies at the heart of 
many of these issues. 
11 Callejón et al.   
(2015) 
Reported 
outbreaks due to 
fresh produce 
(fruits and 
vegetables) in the 
USA and EU, 
trends and 
causes. 
An analysis of reported food 
outbreaks in fresh fruit and 
vegetables, confirmed by 
laboratory detection of a 
suspected causative agent, in 
the EU and USA between 2004 
and 2010.   Data is taken from 
USA CDC reports and EU RASFF 
reports.   
In this time period the USA 
reported 377 outbreaks, the 
EU 198.  No clear trend in the 
number of outbreaks was seen 
in either region, with numbers 
per year varying between 23 
and 60 reported outbreaks in 
the USA and 10 and 42 in the 
EU.  Norovirus was the main 
This study shows both the strengths 
and limitations of the information 
available in CDC and RASFF reports.  
Detailed information is available 
about type of contamination, 
affected products, place of outbreak 
etc., but limited data is available to 
ascertain the underlying cause of 
any outbreaks.  Given the 
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pathogen identified, followed 
by Salmonella spp. and 
Escherichia coli.  Salad 
vegetables were most 
commonly affected, along with 
sprouts (alfalfa, mung etc.) in 
both regions.  In the EU a high 
number of norovirus 
outbreaks were also 
associated with berries, whilst 
in the USA melon was the fruit 
most implicated in outbreaks 
(predominately Salmonella 
contamination).  
From this data, produce-
associated outbreaks were 
more likely to take place in 
food-service establishments 
(particularly restaurants), and 
predominance of norovirus 
outbreaks, the expectation is that 
contamination results from poor 
food handling practices.  The 
expectation appears to be that such 
failures result from people factors - 
the actions, or lack of actions of food 
workers (e.g. handwashing).  
However, process related failures 
(e.g. on farm washing of produce 
with contaminated water) might 
also be implicated, but cannot be 
fully ascertained from the data 
available.   
376 
 
private homes, although other 
outbreaks had been described 
at hospitals, nursing homes 
etc. 
12 Manning, 
Wallace and 
Soon (2016) 
An analysis of 
four major 
foodborne 
disease outbreaks 
related to 
complex food 
manufacturing 
environments. 
A narrative analysis is presented 
of four well known cases of 
foodborne disease related to 
microbiological contamination 
of food products.  
Case 1 relates to a typhoid 
outbreak in Aberdeen in 1964 
which affected 507 people, 
causing 3 deaths.  The incident 
was caused by contamination 
of corned beef with Salmonella 
Typhi, due to use of 
unchlorinated cooling water in 
the canning plant in Argentina, 
with subsequent cross-
contamination during meat 
slicing in the UK. 
Case 2 concerns a UK outbreak 
of botulism in 1989.  Changes 
in the recipe of a hazelnut 
The four cases are used to highlight 
the complexity of designing 
adequate FSMS in food 
manufacturing.  Cases 1 and 2 
demonstrate the importance of PRPs 
for hygiene and cleaning.  Case 2 
also demonstrates the requirement 
for food safety to be considered 
during new product development.  
Cases 2, 3 and 4 all demonstrate the 
need to establish appropriate 
corrective actions if CCPs fail, or 
routine testing indicates issues with 
product safety and quality.   
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puree (replacement of sugar 
with sweetener) used to 
flavour a yogurt resulted in the 
growth of Clostridium 
botulinum in the puree and 
subsequent toxin production, 
which was carried over into 
the yogurt.  This resulted in 27 
cases of botulism, including 1 
death. 
Case 3 concerns the outbreak 
of Salmonella Typhimurium in 
peanut products 
manufactured by the Peanut 
Corporation of America (PCA) 
in 2008.  715 cases presented 
across 48 US states, with 166 
hospitalisations and 9 deaths.  
3918 products were recalled 
Although the authors concentrate 
on the technological aspects of the 
food safety failures, two of the cases 
have been directly related to people 
related aspects.  The PCA case has 
been recognised as an example of 
food fraud (R. Johnson, 2014), with 
company executives being 
prosecuted for knowingly shipping 
contaminated products on falsified 
certificates of analysis.  The former 
president of PCA was sentenced to 
28 years in prison (Wagner, 2015).  
In Maple Leaf Foods, whilst a 
combination of technical and 
behavioural deficiencies and 
assumptions were identified as the 
root causes of the incident, much of 
the organisation’s efforts have 
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and PCA closed and filed for 
bankruptcy in 2009. Multiple 
failures in the FSMS were 
found.   
Case 4 concerns the Listeria 
monocytogens outbreak in 
Maple Leaf Foods products in 
Canada in 2008.  57 people 
suffered from listeriosis, with 
22 deaths, following 
consumption of contaminated 
cooked meats.  The outbreak 
was traced to a failure in 
cleaning / sanitisation 
protocols for certain meat 
slicing equipment, with a 
conflict between demands to 
increase production output 
and the plant time required for 
concerned the transformation of 
their FSC – i.e. the people elements 
of the FSMS (Jespersen &  Huffman, 
2014). 
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dismantling and deep cleaning 
of the equipment.  
13 Wright (2016) An analysis of 
three well known 
food safety 
incidents, which 
Wright attributes 
to failures in FSC.  
A short presentation of three 
food safety incidents, followed 
by a detailed description and 
discussion of FSC, including how 
to analyse, categorise and 
improve FSC, building on 
Wright’s previous work for the 
FSA (Wright et al., 2012a, 
2012b) 
The three cases presented are: 
1) The 2007 Salmonella 
Motevideo outbreak at 
Cadbury, caused by waste 
water dripping onto milk 
chocolate crumb.  Three 
people were hospitalised, 
many more made ill, and 
Cadbury was fined over £1 
million.   
a) 2) The 2008 PCA case 
(discussed above by Manning 
at al. (2016). 
b) 3) The 2010 Harles and 
Jentzsch GmBH case of dioxin 
contamination of animal feed 
Wright presents all three cases as 
those where, amongst other causes 
(e.g. in the case of Cadbury a leaking 
waste pipe), food safety outbreaks 
resulted from intentional 
noncompliance with procedures, be 
that systematic breaches of safety 
procedures and testing regimes, the 
failure to notify the appropriate 
authorities of food safety failures 
and / or the failure to recall 
products.   
As such, it is clear that poor 
decisions made by people were 
central to the placement on the 
market of unsafe products. What is 
less clear from these cases is 
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which resulted in the closure 
of thousands of farms, the 
slaughter of thousands of 
animals and company losses of 
around €100 million, with the 
eventual bankruptcy of the 
company.  
whether / how the actions and 
decisions of people related at all to 
the original failures.  For example, in 
the Cadbury case, the court found 
clear evidence of a change in policy 
on product testing for Salmonella 
and release.  What is not clear here 
is whether there was a human 
element involved in the root cause 
of the waste water contamination or 
were process failures seen, e.g. was 
a decision made to reduce plant 
maintenance which impacted on the 
equipment failure?   
14 Zhang and Xue 
(2016) 
An analysis of 
media reports of 
food scandals or 
incidents related 
to food fraud / 
A manual search of media 
reports of food scandals 
identified 1553 reports for 2004 
– 2014. Reports were analysed 
by EMA database category for 
Although this paper concerns 
food fraud / economically 
motivated adulteration, much 
of the “contamination” 
identified and reported affects 
As this report relates specifically to 
food fraud it is self-evident that 
people related factors underlie the 
identified safety issues, food fraud 
being a deliberate choice to 
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economically 
motivated 
adulteration in 
China and Hong 
Kong. 
specific types of food fraud plus 
food type, source or location 
(farm, supermarket, street 
vendor etc.) and “adulteration” 
type (e.g. contaminant 
(chemical, microbiological, 
physical), counterfeit foods 
etc.).   
food safety e.g. the presence 
of forbidden additives; 
presence of human or animal 
medicines; microbiological 
contamination; physical 
contamination (Insects, metal, 
cigarette ends etc.).  The 
results indicate that most 
cases involve legitimate food 
businesses (25.69% of cases 
concerned products sourced 
from illegal food shops), 
although it is not possible to 
ascertain from this data 
whether or not products sold 
in supermarkets / restaurants 
etc. were obtained through 
legitimate supply chains. 
adulterate / mislabel products etc. 
for economic gain (Spink & Moyer, 
2011). However, it appears from the 
results that many of the cases 
concern legitimate food businesses 
(e.g. 12.3% of cases involving 
supermarkets / groceries), hence 
there may also be elements of 
process failure (such as inadequate 
processes for supplier checks). 
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15 Nayak and 
Waterson 
(2016) 
A socio-technical 
systems analysis 
of two major UK 
outbreaks of E. 
coli 0157, from 
1996 in 
Lanarkshire and 
2005 in South 
Wales.  
The authors present an Accimap 
analysis of each outbreak.  This 
is a control theory-based 
systems approach for accident 
analysis, considering 6 
“organisational levels”.   
For the purpose of this review, 
results at the company level 
are most pertinent.  The 
Accimaps presented identify a 
number of inter-related causes 
(direct and indirect) which 
resulted in the E. coli 
outbreaks under 
consideration.  These included 
factors such as the lack of 
documented FSMSs; 
complexity of regulations; 
untrained helpers and staff 
serving meals; no cleaning 
protocols and negligence in 
providing training for staff.  
Both process and people failures are 
presented as causes of the food 
safety failures, however the authors 
particularly comment on 
“complacency failures” and safety 
culture within the businesses 
concerned i.e. a people focus.   
16 Djekic, Jankovic 
and Rajkovic 
(2017) 
Analysis of 
foreign bodies in 
The RASFF database for 
1/1/1988 to 31/12/2015 was 
examined to extract hazard 
1446 foreign body 
notifications were reported 
with 185 notifications prior to 
The violations noted suggest issues 
with control systems.  For example, 
pest contamination suggests failures 
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European food 
using RASFF data.  
notifications under the category 
of “foreign body”.  Results were 
analysed statistically to test for 
relationships between European 
regions, types of foreign body 
and food industries.  Results 
were reported in two time-
frames, prior to 2006 (the 
introduction of EU food hygiene 
law) and the subsequent period.    
2006, and 88 – 213 (typically 
100 – 120) notifications each 
year since.   The top 3 food 
categories associated with 
foreign body contamination 
were fruits and vegetables; 
nuts and seeds; bakery and 
confectionery products.  The 
top 3 contaminants were pests 
(insects, faeces, larvae etc.), 
glass and metal.  Glass and 
metal contamination was 
reported most often in 
Western European countries, 
pests in Eastern European 
countries and plastic, rubber 
and wood in the Northern 
European region.  
in pest control (basic PRPs), whilst 
metal contamination suggests a 
failure in FSMnSs for metal, which 
the authors relate to failures to 
implement appropriate systems and 
/ or to adequately verify or validate 
the FSMnSs.  Whilst recognising the 
limitations of the research, the 
authors put emphasis on people 
related aspects of FSMS 
implementation and maintenance, 
particularly training to improve food 
safety knowledge.  
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17 Park, Kim and 
Bahk (2017) 
An analysis of 
food safety 
incidents in South 
Korea, 1998 - 
2016 
In the absence of an existing 
database of reported food 
safety incidents, the authors 
collected data on incidents from 
public institutions, food safety 
professionals (e.g. FBOs, food 
society journals) and 
mainstream media 
(newspapers, TV, websites etc.).  
After excluding overlapping 
reports, the results were 
collated and analysed by time 
(incident report date), food 
category, stage of the food 
chain in which the incident 
occurred and hazard type.  
Reports from 975 cases were 
examined (average 51.3 cases 
per year).  Fruits and 
vegetables (19.8%) and fish 
and fish products (10.2%) 
represented the top 2 food 
categories for reported safety 
issues, with 63.1% being 
related to the first stage of 
food production, described as 
“food material production”.  In 
terms of hazards, chemicals 
represented 41.6% of reported 
incidents, followed by 
biological (22.7%) and physical 
contamination (20.4%).   
Whilst details are not given in the 
paper, and so the conclusions 
cannot be verified, the authors claim 
to have gone “beyond an analysis of 
specific chemical or biological 
factors … to determine a deeper 
cause”. They claim “that human 
error during the production and 
processing stage underlies most of 
the food safety incidents”.  Also of 
note is that the authors propose the 
introduction of GMP and HACCP to 
improve food safety, along with 
general education of the general 
public i.e. a mixture of process and 
behaviour change is recommended 
to reduce the occurrence of future 
food safety incidents.  
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18 Aguiar et al. 
(2018) 
An analysis of the 
incidence of 
physical hazards 
in dairy products 
in Brazil, as 
reported via a 
consumer 
complaint 
website (Reclame 
Aqui). 
Data collected directly from the 
Reclame Aqui website for all 
September 2012 – December 
2016, covering 11 dairy 
industries.  Data classified by 
product type (e.g. UHT milk, 
Parmesan cheese), physical 
contaminant (hair, metal etc.).  
Chi-square test used to analyse 
complaints by product type and 
year.   
515 incidents relating to 
physical contamination were 
identified (2% of total 
complaints), with 37% of these 
related to yogurt / milk drinks 
and 14.6% relating to UHT 
milk.  42.6% of complaints 
pertained to “foreign objects”, 
demonstrating the difficulties 
consumers have in describing 
the actual hazard type.  As the 
data relates to consumer 
reports of contamination, only 
limited conclusions can be 
drawn.   
This paper suggests contamination 
results from failures in food 
processing (to protect against 
physical contamination) and food 
inspection (labels of dairy products 
in Brazil carry a seal signifying that 
manufacturing has been inspected 
by official authorities).  The 
recommendations for improvements 
made by the authors include both 
people (training) and process 
(reviewing CCPs) elements.   
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Appendix B: Description of Codes with Examples 
 
# Code Description Example 
1 Communication Discussion / description of communication e.g. who is 
involved in an activity; types of communication used 
between parties e.g. email, daily meeting reports 
“… as soon as that complaint came to us and those 
pictures came to us, as a senior management, we 
informed everyone, that’s head of site, head of quality, 
quality compliance manager, engineering manager, 
production manager ….” (P001) 
2 Problem solving process Discussion / description of problem solving processes e.g. 
root cause analysis, risk analysis. 
“… what we also had to do was back track and identify 
well, if this material was being identified at our co-packer 
here, when was it made, where’s the gap, have we been 
making material on an on-going basis, and then try to put 
together not only a mechanism, for tracking the problem 
and fixing it, but looking back historically ad identifying 
which is the highest risk product, what was the risk, is 
there anything we needed to do for a recall …” (P007) 
3 FSMS Discussion / description of specific types of food safety 
system e.g. description of critical control points or 
elements of PRPs 
“Obviously we’ve got a pre-requisite programme, which 
we manage from a hygiene point of view, glass and hard 
plastics, wood policy, all those sort of thigs, plus we have 
a maintenance strategy based on top of that which links 
into the food safety plan as well and the pre-requisite 
programme.  So rather than maintenance becoming a 
CCP point, it’s more a pre-requisite programme”. (L010) 
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4 Cultural standard Discussion / description of element which form cultural 
standards or expectations in the organisation e.g. when a 
process is routinized so that it has a specific physical 
location named after it. 
(Participant discussing food packaging materials and 
recycling) “... as part of any development of a food 
contact material we won’t do anything until the supplier 
has proved to us that those materials pass all of the 
relevant EU legislation on food contact materials.  And to 
be honest, it’s routine for everybody now. A supplier, 
well a reputable supplier, wouldn’t even think of giving 
you something that didn’t match but we need all of that 
documents, we need all of the proof, so yes, you know 
we wouldn’t even think of doing anything, we wouldn’t 
even do a trial before we got all of that information.” 
(L013) 
5 Upgrade of controls Description of upgrade of controls used vs current FSMS / 
FSMnS 
“… so we brought in new procedures, which is the closure 
angle check.  The traded unit, they moved where the 
check was being conducted, and ensured that it was a 
fully destructive test, that the caps were being taken off 
the bottles and the same with the torque check as well.” 
(L009) 
6 Use of external experts Discussion / description of use of external experts / 
consultants e.g. pest control specialists 
“… so if you think about our cleaning programme, we’ve 
got 2 tiers, we’ve got the operators and then we employ 
Sodexo as line based facility cleaners …” (L010) 
7 Applying lessons 
learned 
Discussion / description of activities to improve systems / 
processes which results from the conclusion of problem 
solving work e.g. refurb of Bin B based on failing of bin C 
“But the root cause threw out a whole load of other 
things around quality culture and some systems and 
processes on site that needed to be adapted, ‘cos they’re 
generic things like change control, documentation 
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management systems, and they’re not just by line C, 
they’re used by every line, every function on site and we 
spotted gaps in those. So, it’s escalating them up.” (L016) 
8 Decision making Discussion / description of decisions made during incident 
management (embedded case) or in similar incidents in the 
past 
“… we immediately stop all the plant, we stop using Bin 
C, whatever was produced on site from Bin C we put on 
hold” (P001). 
9 Reasons for failure Discussion / description of detailed reasons for failure e.g. 
age of equipment, belts slipping  
“… not detracting from the engineers, but I would, for me 
that was an easier one, ‘cos they knew what the fault 
was. They, you know, it was like some ball bearings that 
had come out of a fixing and jammed it (the capper) 
basically …” (L009) 
10 Faith in control systems Discussion / description of positive faith in organisation’s 
control systems (especially FSMS) 
“… we’re probably doing more than most food companies 
would be expected to do, let alone actually do    … in that 
BRC audits, we don’t normally have a problem with, ISO 
audits we don’t normally have a problem with. Our own 
internal auditing structure are much more stringent for 
looking at the quality side, but also the safety side …” 
(P007) 
11 Expectation of 
involvement 
Discussion / description of participants’ expectations of 
their involvement in problem solving process / 
communications or of who else is involved in aspects of 
incident management 
(Discussing the makeup of the IIC and IRC teams) “So we 
keep it flexible, according to which location’s got the 
biggest vested interest, (head office), (manufacturing 
site), co-packers, and which kind of function’s got the 
biggest vested interest ...” (L001).  “So the composition of 
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the team will depend on the nature of the incident?” 
(Interviewer). “Absolutely does” (L001). 
12 Panic Discussion / description of a state of “panic” or extreme 
concern 
“I think the fact that it had got through all the processes 
and got to the co-packer was a significant cause of 
concern for us and the risk going forwards was that 
obviously material had gone to (export market), so that 
was where it became immediately apparent that it was a 
relatively major issue compared to what we’d normally 
deal with on a daily basis…” (P001) 
13 Variation in working 
practices 
Discussion / description of a variation in practice between 
different staff members 
“… and I think there was the human element that certain 
checks that should have been performed were not always 
being performed …” (L006) 
14 Continuous 
improvement 
Discussion / description of CI activity ongoing prior to the 
specific quality incident (embedded case) 
“we know we routinely generate metal as a fine powder 
‘cos we’ve got a lot of chain driven material, we’ve had 
an ongoing process of removing it as much as possible to 
transfer to vacuum transfer …” (P007) 
15 Age of equipment Discussion / description of age of factory / equipment 
/process etc. 
“I think a lot of it came down to, when you’ve got your 
hazard analysis in therefore the food safety management 
system, is that, over time, the risks change, and I don’t 
think we’ve captured that very well, that the risk from 
the bin could increase over time as things get older ...” 
(P003) 
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16 Rigour Discussion / description of additional effort / care in the 
processes of determining cause of failure or in making new 
processes better, or in applying experience & skills for 
benefit of the organisation 
“The main focus was to get to the issue, keep digging no 
matter what you need to do, so if you need people, bring 
them in.  If you need people who were on shift, you need 
them to come in on their day off, get them, or if you need 
to stay late to speak to somebody, it was kind of, do what 
you need to do to get to the facts, don’t rush it.” (L016) 
17 Lack of knowledge of 
current controls / 
process 
Discussion / description of a lack of knowledge of current 
controls (prior to incident) or process  
(focus group, talking about review of site magnets by 
external consultants) “… so they came in and did a 
complete review of all of our magnets and made 
recommendations that maybe some of the magnets that 
we had in place weren’t quite the best design for the 
places that we got … we even managed to find some 
magnets we hadn’t recognised we’d got!” (P007) 
(laugher) “we found two magnets that we didn’t know 
we had” (P003) 
18 Missed opportunities Discussion / description of actions not taken / decisions 
not made which could have prevented the incident or 
altered the course of the incident 
“So there was a failure there, where people were doing 
the test, [number of] bottles, no one had linked that 
actually we have to do one per filler head, capper head.  
That aspect is in place in places that really understand 
what purpose that test is.” (L015) 
19 Unexpected events / 
results 
Discussion / description of an event or result which is 
unexpected, not anticipated, or unforeseen e.g. no history 
of equipment failure in this way 
“ … and then they ran some product and were still getting 
the metal shavings …” (P008) 
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20 Wearing blinkers Discussion / description of “wearing blinkers” / missing 
things when going through the problem solving process or 
when making changes to production system which affect 
FSMS 
“ it’s quite ways to within engineering to wear blinkers, 
and think you’ve found something, you’ve found the 
problem, but obviously there was two issues …” (P008) 
21 Creative thinking Discussion / description of developing new standards, new 
ideas e.g. trays under magnets 
“…because one of the things I did was challenge the 
design of the head (of the capping machine).  So we 
worked quickly with the supplier to re-design the heads 
…” (L017) 
22 Problem identification Discussion / description of identifying the problem, finding 
a gap in current processes / systems / controls etc.  May be 
part of problem solving process or separate from it.  
“.. that example with the shredded cap was fairly 
obvious, you know we completed that within half an 
hour…” (L001) 
23 Rationale for decision 
making 
When a rationale is given by participants for particular 
decisions 
“… So we asked ourselves, and this was part of the push 
back from SMC, we asked ourselves, who really is the 
target market here, who were we worrying about?” 
(L001) 
24 Safety first Use when participants describe an action / decision which 
put safety concerns above products volume / costs etc. 
“I mean the first thing is, if the product had been 
considered to be injurious to health it would have been 
recalled. There’s no grey area, that’s white … we 
identified that it wasn’t injurious to health and therefore 
we didn’t do a recall; if it had been, we would have.” 
(L008) 
“… so the senior management director, from senior 
director to the operative who is working on the factory 
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shop floor, everyone knows like food safety is the main 
concern ...” (P001)  
25 Standard for monitoring Discussion / description of a standard or routinized part of 
the FSMnS e.g. checking magnets at the end of shift 
“We check the magnets twice a shift, um, I’m sorry, twice 
a day, that’s once a shift, and then um sieves as well, so 
we check the sieves …” (P001) 
26 Standard for release Standards used to gain release / approval of product to the 
market e.g. micro testing of finished product 
“.. we have the packers that are protecting the consumer 
with their metal detection ....” (P003) 
27 Visual demonstration Description of visual demonstration of monitoring in 
FSMnS / FSMS or in the depiction of standards e.g. use of 
real product samples in problem solving sessions 
(Describing visual displays of incidents and management 
of them). 
“There are timelines that have been produced around 
specific IICs that have gone on for 6 months or almost a 
year in some cases, where you have a timeline, that, 
there is a bigger timeline which takes account of all of the 
IICs and IRCs that have occurred over the last 3 to 4 
months …” (L003) 
28 Actions from alerts Description of actions taken when alerts are raised by 
monitoring systems in factory 
(Participant describing the discovery of the quality issue 
of cocked caps and immediate actions) “We just didn’t 
know where it [the capping problem] had started, so day 
by day, from the Sunday, (Quality Manager) had put 
some into hold on quarantine …” (L009) 
29 Expert advice Description of getting expert advice (internal – other 
departments, or external – consultants etc.) 
“… for example, for the physical removal, which is sieve 
and magnets, we, with the consultant ….” (P003) 
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30 Record keeping Description of how records are kept by the business, 
including during incident management process and in 
production (in process QCPs and CCPs) 
(focus group discussing CCPs in the factory) “… How’s 
that monitored?” (Interviewer) “It’s recorded on record 
sheets, production record sheets” (P004)  “it’s holding 
times critical …” (P007) 
31 Link to other processes Descriptions of cross-process links e.g. FSMS / FSMnS to 
technical change process. 
(Focus group discussion of engineering changes which 
impacted the detection of the metal fragments).  “ … and 
again an assessment of our change control process which 
basically allowed us to remove a magnet that shouldn’t 
have been removed and replace it with a magnet that 
was not equivalent or suitable” (P007) “that was another 
part of it, defect and change control” (P003). 
32 Checking for compliance Description of instances of compliance checks e.g. 
managers checking handwashing; checking of control 
systems such as sieve integrity.  
(Discussing delivery of raw materials) “… it comes up by 
tanker load for pumping off into our cold store and it 
comes up with a certificate of analysis from (supplier) 
and then it gets tested again before it goes down the cold 
store.” (L012) 
33 Desire to improve Description by participants of desires and plans for self-
improvement or where they wish for organisational 
improvement 
“And actually, myself and (colleague) we have a plan 
where we’re going to revamp the system and make it 
encapture general sort of improvements not just safety 
improvements, but quality improvements and also 
efficiency improvements as well.” (L016) 
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34 Concern for the future Description / discussion of situations which pose a risk or 
problem in the immediate or longer future e.g. detection 
of stainless steel 
(Discussing the issue of need for protecting data and 
issues of litigation etc.)  
“So that really I think is a looming problem and I would 
suggest for the purposes of your research and study, I 
think that something that's going to vex a lot of 
organisations, because we are increasingly being bogged 
down in the litigious society that is emanating across the 
Atlantic, if not here already.  So that that is a real 
challenge that's been sort of a massive learning point for 
me and how I think about this concept of incident 
management”. (L002) 
35 Cost of work Discussion / description of the costs (money, time people) 
of undertaking specific activities such as maintenance, 
including costs of impact of the quality issue.  
“… so in the meantime, we were running another Bin, 
obviously it’s a lot smaller, and less capacity and we were 
struggling in the factory, because the factory will fill that 
Bin quite quickly ...” (P008) 
36 Benefits of work Discussion / description of the benefits of certain activities 
e.g. faster production speed 
“… we did it this this September just gone, we just had a 
big shutdown, so we did a lot of work but we've paid 
benefits, the plant has been running really well.” (P008) 
 
 
37 Lack of experience Discussion / description of situations where staff lack 
experience 
“… I’ve got new members of staff that don’t really 
understand the site ...” (P008) 
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38 Benefits of experience Discussion / description of situations where there are 
benefits of staff experience 
“… you know I worked in (major retailer) for a long time 
and did many recalls at (major retailer), and therefore 
kind of if actually we did a recall here I would actually 
know what to do, just ‘cos I’ve got experience …” (L005) 
39 Planning Discussion / description of planning operations, activities, 
day-to-day or within the management of the incident 
“… as part of the Customer Care element I got involved to 
kind of understand the problem a bit more, how much 
stock was actually out there, because in my head I’m 
thinking, if this goes to a public recall have I got the 
correct resource, have I got enough vouchers in the draw, 
enough letterhead, all of that, and we’re near Christmas, 
holiday period, so I think one of my ladies was on holiday 
as well, so I was a man down as such …” (L004) 
40 Priorities Description / discussion of priorities for organisation; may 
be related to organisational values e.g. consumer at the 
heart. 
“… so the senior management director, from senior 
director to the operative who is working on the factory 
shop floor, everyone knows like food safety is the main 
concern ...” (P001) 
41 Visibility Visible demonstrations of values and culture e.g. posters, 
slogans 
“… so it’s on the wall, in foot high letters, from all our 
desks we can see (mission statement strap line) at the 
top of it” (L008) 
42 Mission Expressions of formal organisation mission statement “… so it’s on the wall, in foot high letters, from all our 
desks we can see (mission statement strap line) at the 
top of it” (L008) 
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43 Targets Discussion / description of targets set e.g. annual 
objectives 
“We all have a series of objectives for the year and during 
the course of reviews with our managers we understand 
how we’re doing with those objectives …” (L008) 
44 Measures of success Discussion / description of organisation’s measures of 
success; can be related to targets but have more specific 
values 
“We have a company-wide meeting every month, both 
here (head office) and in (manufacturing sites) and so the 
managing director did an update on how we’re 
performing against our 5 business objectives, so it’s very 
transparent, it’s very clear, it’s very well communicated, 
it’s baked into our development programme, and 
obviously our bonuses are based on company 
performance as well as personal performance, so 
everyone has a real vested interest in achieving those 
goals.  And everything we do is working towards those 
objectives” (L007) 
45 Co-ordination Discussion / description of how targets / goals / measures 
are co-ordinated across the organisation or between teams 
(Discussion on cascading goals in focus group) 
“So this idea we've talked about the zero accidents, zero 
defects, zero waste, does that get cascaded down to 
the operators? “(Interviewer) “Pretty much so yes.  It 
gets talked about at every single performance meeting 
that we have, and every accountability meeting that we 
have.” (P004) “It’s linked into every part of the business.” 
(P003) “It runs off the back of that ...” (P004) “Yes, all of 
our PDPs are off the back of that.” (P003) “So most of this 
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would come under the incident managing and zero 
defects.” (P007) 
46 Organisational learning Description / discussion of formal and informal systems for 
learning across the organisation 
“So we had conducted all the maintenance requirements 
set out by the makers of the equipment, so we followed 
that, and we also used their skills, expertise, we looked at 
our people's competencies, we checked training 
documentation.  We have individuals who do this 
particular task, and they've been away to Italy where the 
equipment's made, they've been on the recommended 
training, so we were quite comfortable with the 
maintenance we were delivering.” (L017) 
47 “What we say, we do” Discussion / description of putting values / mission / 
priorities/ targets into action 
“… looking at overall safety, we have an assessment, 
something called living safely, which is about 
understanding behaviours and how the site is actually 
managing health and safety, going from we obey the 
rules sometimes, all the way up to we live and breathe 
safety.  But the implication is that if you’re doing that for 
safety you’re probably doing it, almost likely you’re doing 
it for the other side of things, which is the product safety, 
food safety ...” (P007) 
48 Pride Discussion / description pride in achievement of goals etc.; 
including pride in tackling difficult situations   
“So what I made them do, what we done was retro fitted 
some trays, so they do a magnet check, pull the magnet 
out, put a tray in, pull the screen out, so any debris that’s 
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there will fall onto the try, and then they inspect the tray, 
so it wouldn’t go into our product, that was something 
extra if you like ...” (P008) 
49 Recognition Discussion / description of recognition or rewards given by 
the organisation 
“Um, there's also formal reward and recognition process 
called the (name) that we have.” (L016) “Yes.  I saw one 
of the boards with photos on as we were going round the 
factory.” (Interviewer) “But also simple things like people 
saying thank you, well done, job well done, pat on the 
back, little things like breakfast, canteen vouchers, free 
breakfast, staff shop vouchers.  So we've got a number of 
mechanisms on site, how we do that.” (L016) 
50 Trust Description of trust as a value or target (Joint interview, discussing selection and approval of 
suppliers and co-packers) “So, we either do that by 
assessing what they've got for themselves already.  So if 
they have got BRC and they're maintaining it, and it's on 
an annual review, and it's against an international 
standard, that's reasonable cause to say well, the fact 
that you've worked down and got the certificate, means 
you're probably likely to keep it, and all the while you 
keep it, you're at least operating at the same level we 
probably would.  You have to put a certain level of trust 
in those things otherwise the whole fabric of GFSI breaks 
down.” (L001)  
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51 Senior management 
commitment 
Discussion / description of the commitment of senior 
management to values, processes etc. 
“...the whole company, and I mean the whole company, 
we stopped the factories for a day, so if you want an 
example of the company investing in sharing its way 
forward with everybody, I mean stopping the factory 
production is a big investment for the company to get the 
messages out.” (L008) 
52 Overload with detail Use when participants fail to recollect all details of an area 
and ascribe this as due to excessive information, or where 
excessive complexity of system causes challenges in daily 
operations 
“… actually the amount of paper we have for quality, the 
you have all the operational stuff on top of that, all the 
engineering documentation, and all the safety stuff, no 
wonder the operators become a bit blasé to it, because 
literally they’re constantly filling in paper ...” (L014) 
53 Organisational change Discussion / description of how organisation has changed 
over time or is changing and implications of this. 
“I couldn't swear to say I actually know of a statement on 
food safety.” (L012) “Is there a site quality mission or 
anything like that” (Interviewer) “Yes, now then (pause)” 
(L012). “There might be. I'm just asking, who knows, I 
don't know whether there is or not, so it's not a right or a 
wrong answer.” (Interviewer) “I’m not so certain there is 
… but I think that's obviously, other than [strap line of 
company mission statement] I can't see that there's a site 
specific quality one.” (L012) 
54 Senior management 
power 
Description of examples / occasions where senior 
management over-rule advised actions / enforce their 
views or opinions 
(explaining the IRC process and recommendations)  
“.... you’ve only got three options: don’t do anything, do 
a trade withdrawal, do a public recall.  And then officially 
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(CEO) replies back and says ‘yes, I endorse that, get on 
with it’ or ‘no, I don’t, do something else’ …” (L001) 
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Protect the company Description of actions taken by company to protect the 
company (legally) rather than putting consumer safety and 
well-being as #1 priority (linked to legal privilege, due 
diligence) 
(Talking about communication about the incident) “Um, 
as you can appreciate, releasing documentation on this 
particular incident, because it was legally privileged, and 
working with (colleague) and (lawyer) and the team, 
there wasn’t a lot shared at early stages of the process, 
other than what we could share.  The engineering alert 
was the key part of the early understanding of the issue.  
So the engineering alert went out in a very summary 
form of things to check.  I’d written the document 
alongside the legal team …” (L017) 
56 Commitment of 
individuals 
Descriptions of actions of individual staff which go beyond 
the “9 to5” daily job e.g. working weekends, in Xmas 
holiday 
“… but it was a testament to the number of people that 
right up there to the wire on Christmas Eve, and then 
subsequently still carrying on pieces through.  Add onto 
that throughout the Christmas period and into the new 
year.” (L002) 
57 Pressure from parent 
company 
Description of pressures (implied or actual) from parent 
company to be given info  / get results etc. 
“There was a bit of an external timeframe because we’re 
part of a big group, so we had a bit of interest from the 
Europe level and the international level of somebody will 
be here in 2 weeks and they’ll want a status update …” 
(L016) 
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58 Keeping it tight When participants describe restricting or limiting 
communications in order to avoid distractions / whispers 
about the incident. 
(talking about knowledge of the incident internally) “I 
think obviously the brand team are aware, because it’s 
their brand, and you know they have a link with it as well, 
because they have to.  Um, so kind of, the legally 
privileged minutes were obviously circulated to the 
chosen few, and then the rest, it was kind of, you know, 
we’ve got an issue but it’s not a major issue, it’s fairly low 
key, so don’t go, you know, oh yes, by the way blah, blah, 
blah, it’s only for those people, that kind of need to know 
basis kind of thing.” (L004) 
59 Recognition of risk Descriptions of “recognition of risk” due to size of 
organisation, type of products etc. 
“… when we make an error it’s bigger, because we’re a 
big business …” (L001) 
60 Don’t worry (about a 
thing) 
Description / discussion of a lack of concern / worry about 
a situation; a lack of recognition by others of complexity of 
situation, amount of work required etc. 
“.. I think the people who were involved from a recall 
point of it, then forget how much work went into getting 
us back up as a site, and running ….” (L009) 
61 Teamwork When participants describe working together (formal 
teams or informally), especially for problem solving 
“ .. we obviously have a risk register, and a risk 
management process, and (L001) and I are heavily 
involved in that with (name), our legal advisor, and again, 
we set up a risk committee, so it’s got a core of (number) 
people …” (L002) 
62 Expectation of 
improvement 
When participants express an expectation of improvement 
in quality systems / processes, but have no actual 
knowledge of whether this has taken place 
(Discussing operational restructure at the manufacturing 
site) “And it's the first time I've seen the alignment all the 
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way from the SMC down, on what they want to achieve 
... “ (L014) 
63 Goodwill When participants favourably describe interactions with 
external organisations to aid in problems solving, 
resolution of the quality incident 
(Explaining about preparation work carried out with 
website agency) “… and because it was Christmas Eve, 
they were closing at one, and no decision had been made 
by one o’clock, and they said, ‘look, everything is built, all 
we need is the words, and just let us know, give us a ring 
and we can do it for you’.  So I mean they bent over 
backwards for us, which was really sweet of them”. 
(L004) 
64 Single-mindedness Description of “single-minded” approach to focus on just 
an individuals’ area of expertise and / or just the issue to 
hand; and /or where a lack of interest in past or future 
events is described 
“... I must say I wasn’t involved in the actual how it was 
identified, so I don’t know if it was identified here or 
whether it was identified at a customer, I don’t really 
know …” (L014) 
65 Not the experts Description / discussion of a non-expert opinion being used 
as the basis for decision making , process change etc. 
(Discussing the initial IRC meetings) “... you know at that 
meeting, so we had the meetings, we had certain medical 
opinions and possibly sort of opinions, claimed to be 
medical opinions but possibly weren’t” (L005) “What do 
you mean by that?” (Interviewer) “I think people were, I 
think there was a certain amount of gathering of informal 
opinions from doctors and paediatricians, which I don’t 
think were, you know, we should have considered under 
the banner of medical opinions, the proper medical 
opinions that we got for the purpose of informing our 
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decision.  You know, a little more conjecture in them …” 
(L005) 
66 Speed vs accuracy Description / discussion of a conflict between need for 
speed versus accuracy in decision making, problem solving 
process etc. 
(Explaining about the set-up of the IRC) “… and we 
probably convened it too soon, really, before we had all 
the information.  So a lot of the conversations that we 
had, were based on incomplete information.” (L005) 
67 Lack of trust Description / discussion of a lack of trust / faith in actions, 
beliefs, behaviour of colleagues 
(Describing communication to staff during incident 
investigation) “…so I think a lot of it they thought we 
were just keeping it all to ourselves, and we wanted 
people not to know about it.” (L009) 
68 Not my mission When participants describe scepticism towards corporate 
mission statement, values etc. or express concern about 
interpretation of these across the company.  
“so there’s (Company mission statement strap line), yes, 
which is just [slightly derogatory term] as far as I’m 
concerned ...” (L005) 
69 Dominant voices Description / discussion of situations where a senior 
person dominates, forcing a certain decision / actions, 
even if they are not best placed in terms of expertise 
(Participant discussing the decision as to whether the 
product needed to be recalled) “So that was the key thing 
but that actually took quite a long time in the 
circumstances for us to establish, because we had one 
really dominant voice, who was a very senior person, 
who had formed his own view, which kind of scared us 
...” (L006)  
70 Disconnect When a description / discussion of disconnect between 
how different parts of the organisation work or operate 
“ …and I don't know if some of this goes back  … [the] 
sort of era, where manufacturing made, quality inspected 
and released, and you had the silo 
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compartmentalised,  compartments, that resulted in 
actually having these almost like gulfs between areas…” 
(L014) 
71 Not perfect is still OK When participants describe / discuss situations where a 
reduction in product quality is seen as acceptable by the 
business 
“...before this timeline we’d been seeing a bit of scoring, 
or what are called tails on the bottle. (explanation of 
what this looks like) .... It’s not the best quality but on 
times it’s acceptable.” (L009) 
72 Systems challenge Description / discussion of situations when IT or other 
systems are not fully operationalised and so are 
‘unreliable’ or difficult to use 
(describing building a picture and tracing affected stock 
during quality incident) ““So, then it was looking at a 
picture on Monday of the time line, 'cos we had to try 
and build one, which turned out wasn't the easiest.  The 
complications over it, and the biggest major 
complications was we have a SAP system on site, which 
we transitioned to (date)… from a financial point of view, 
but from a production point of view, I would suggest it 
was still in its infancy.” (L009) 
73 Feeling uncomfortable When participants describe feeling uncomfortable or 
uneasy, having insufficient data or evidence to make 
decisions 
(Describing the IRC and the push back from senior 
management). “Yes.  Well, as I said, I've only been at 
LiquiComp UK 2 years, and done 3 IRCs, so that was the 
first time that the recommendation had been challenged 
enough to go back and then have a review. And a review 
was always necessary, but in terms of coming to a change 
of conclusion, that was the first time I've experienced 
that” (L007) “Right. Did it feel strange? How did 
everybody react to that?” (interviewer) “I think um, it 
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didn't feel strange, I think that hindsight is an amazing 
thing, but wishing that we'd had more clear evidence 
would have enabled us to get to the second conclusion 
the first time round, but that's just the way it is. We 
didn't have enough evidence at the time and we made 
the decision based on what we knew on that day, in that 
room.” (L007) 
74 Size of issue Descriptions / discussion of the size or scope of an issue “so yes, come back in, back to reality, with a big problem 
to unpick. “ (L016) 
75 Feeling defensive Descriptions / discussion of staff feeling defensive (about 
cause of issue, usual working practices etc.) or blaming 
others.  
“... because if you think about it we weren’t monitoring it 
correctly, the finished product. And then probably, the 
argument, and there was many of them, well why 
haven’t the engineers not detected it (the equipment 
failure) when they’re doing plant maintenance? Why is 
not been picked up?” (L009) 
76 Quality / safety not first Description / discussion of attitudes (staff or management) 
when quality and / or safety are seen as being secondary 
to other concerns 
“So that probably if you asked them [line operatives] is it 
quality first, or manufacturing, they'd probably say, I 
think that was the biggest one coming out, that it's more 
manufacturing driven, it's trying to get the pop out the 
door, which I do understand, but you need to then shift 
the mind-set of them doing a target or targeted task, that 
their job description dictates, to then shifting them into a 
position that I'm now at a bench and I'm doing a quality 
check.” (L009) 
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77 Desire for impartiality Discussion / description of situations when ‘impartial’ 
analysis or investigation is required 
“... my understanding is (pause), yes, actually, we had 
better have a third-party opinion, analysis, regarding this 
big incident.  We already understood that was driven by 
the management people, so if management people were 
involved in this team we might have accused or blame 
some people, and then management people might have 
been defensive. So to avoid any negative aspects we had 
better create another team, a third-party team. “ (L011) 
78 Silo mentality Discussion / description of parts of the organisation 
working remotely, separately, in silos.  (NB Refers to 
sections / team rather than individuals) 
“There is a gulf you know and um, you know a lot of 
people, I'd probably say there's less than a 100 people on 
this site who've been to (head office), have even see 
head office. Some people here probably couldn't even 
tell you where head office was …” (L014) 
79 Competition not 
cooperation 
Discussion / description by participants of parts of the 
organisation competing rather than cooperating 
“… I don't know if some of this goes back … [the] sort of 
era, where manufacturing made, quality inspected and 
released, and you had the silo compartments, that 
resulted in actually having these almost like gulfs 
between areas.  You know, and it creates this sort of very 
insular approach.  And the way that (manufacturing site) 
was structured again, in my mind, you had ‘ambients’, 
with all the carbonate lines, then you had ‘asceptics’, 
with all the still lines, and you know they were like 
competitive cells, as well. So it created almost like a, little 
fortress mentality in some respects.  And you know, 
there's 2 quite strong characters running each side of the 
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business, and I think there was almost like a reluctance to 
lose face?” (L014)  
80 Too nice Discussion / description by participants of behaviours or 
attitudes of staff / management as being “too nice” to 
push for results” 
(Discussing gathering information in the run up to and 
during the quality incident).  “And unfortunately I don't 
think (previous Quality manager) to his credit, didn't 
necessarily have the strength of character to be able to 
push through that at times. I think there was a bit too 
much "nicey, nicey" about it sometimes.” (L014) 
81 Solidarity Discussion / description by participants of company 
management or staff acting together and / or acting / 
planning for the future in a coordinated way 
“You know, and a clear vision. And it's the first time I've 
seen the alignment all the way from the SMC down, on 
what they want to achieve …” (L014) 
82 Finding excuses Use this when participants describe or explain away others 
failures of behaviour; when they find reasons or excuses to 
accept or understand failure to meet standards etc. 
“.. maybe people weren’t following processes that were 
there, or they were following part of them but not strictly 
to the letter of how everything should have been done.  
But then there’s always reasons why people act in those 
ways you know.  As I say, there was a lot of time pressure 
in that area because of how that area was structured, the 
number of people operating in the area.  The sickness 
absence in that area as well meant that people were 
running 2 fillers at once which is, if you go down to line 2, 
you can see it’s quite a busy area …” (L016) 
83 Difficult times Discussion / description of difficult or challenging times, 
particularly related to the quality incident  
“Then you know, the incident which occurred back here 
in December, you know the morale, and that, how that 
impacted the site, you know from an engineering 
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operational team, you can just, uh, it was a difficult place 
to be” (L017) 
84 Health and Safety First Discussion / description of health and safety being number 
one priority of the business (NB not food safety) 
“I think the purpose of our organisation is obviously the 
health and safety and well-being of the guys on the line.  
The quality of the products as well, and then it goes into 
the cost, delivery etc.” (L009) 
85 Concern for failure Discussion / description by participants of concerns about 
potential situations which could result in failures 
(Describing QMS processes) “…What’s not in our favour is 
the amount of volume we’ve got to get through, which 
makes it a very, very busy endeavour. What we don’t do, 
and should be doing more of, is packaging related quality 
analysis …” (L001) 
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Appendix C: Example of N-Vivo Coding 
Coding example for Participant L005  
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Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk.       Date: 14th August 2015 
PhD Study: Request for Company Participation 
Study Title: Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No: 338 
My name is Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak.  Following a career working as a nutritionist and regulatory 
affairs expert in the food industry I am now studying for my PhD at the University of Portsmouth 
and am conducting research on the management of food safety in the food industry.      
I am interested in working with a small number of food and drink companies to conduct case 
study research examining their food safety management and monitoring processes and practices.  
If a company has experienced a food safety or quality incident in the past, I am also interested in 
exploring this past incident.  I am interested purely in studying any past incident and current 
practices from a management perspective – I will not be conducting a quality or food safety audit.   
As my research will be undertaken as a case study, it will involve studying a range of published 
documents (e.g. HACCP plans, food quality charters, incident management meeting minutes), 
observing current working practices (e.g. through a production site tour) and undertaking a series 
of semi-structured interviews and / or focus group discussions with members of staff who have 
relevant responsibilities in the running of the food safety management system today (the exact 
format will be agreed with yourselves).  The interviews / focus group discussion involve a series 
of questions being asked of the interviewees, which may be modified slightly from one interview 
to another depending on the responses of the interviewees. All the questions will be related to the 
systems used to manage and monitor food safety, to the organisational culture of the firm and if 
appropriate, to any past food safety or quality incidents. The time taken for the research work will 
vary with the exact access and research method agreed (approx. 1 hour per individual interview) 
and I am happy to discuss this further. 
 
All information provided to me as part of the study will be held securely.  At the end of the study 
a short report will be provided to company management, but no individual data will be disclosed 
– participant names and job titles will not be used in any report.  In the same way all data will be 
anonymised so that no reference to individuals’ names or job titles, to the company name or 
product names will appear in any academic publication.   
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Please contact me if you are interested finding out more about this research (my email address 
and mobile phone number are given above). Taking part in the research is voluntary so the 
company and any individual may withdraw consent at any point prior to the data being analysed. 
Nobody is under any obligation to participate, and there will be no negative consequences should 
they withdraw from the study.  
 
Thank you for reading this letter.  Please feel free to contact me if you have any further 
questions.  
 
Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak, BSc (Hons) Nutrition, MBA 
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Research Student: Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak,  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Tel: 023 9284 4831 / Mobile 07890 607932         
Email:  sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Professor Lisa Jack,  
Accounting and Financial Management,  
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: 023 9284 4136 
Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk.        Date: 14th August 
2015 
 
Participant Information Sheet: Organisations 
 
Study Title:  Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No:  338 
I would like to invite your organisation to take part in my PhD research study.  Before you decide, 
I would like you to understand why this research is being done and what it would involve for you 
and your organisation.  Please feel free to discuss this with colleagues and please contact me if 
there are any points that are not clear.  
What is the purpose of this research?   
This purpose of this research is to study the management of food safety in the food industry and 
the management and monitoring systems which companies use to do this.    
All food businesses are expected by their customers and by the authorities to produce safe food.  
However, there are still a high number of food safety incidents reported every year to the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) (over 1500 in 2013) and many people continue to become ill because of 
eating unsafe food.   
This research is important as it will study the food safety management and monitoring systems 
and incident management processes used by a small number of companies, together with 
gathering an understanding of the culture of the companies – what is important to the company 
and staff and how is this measured.  If the company has experienced a food safety or quality 
incident in the past, and is willing to discuss this, I would like to understand this incident from a 
management perspective i.e. what the company did when it discovered the issue and what 
investigations it undertook.   
 
Why has my organisation been invited?  
A number of companies of different sizes and in different sectors of the food industry have been 
invited to take part in the research. 
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Does my organisation have to take part?  
It is up to the organisation to decide whether to participate in the study.  I will describe the study 
and go through this information sheet.  If your organisation agrees to take part, I will ask you to 
sign a consent form on behalf of the company.  I will then ask you to help me to identify and 
contact relevant people within the company to participate in the research study, and will seek their 
consent to participate. 
Participation in this research is purely voluntary and both the company and individual participants 
may withdraw at any stage prior to the data being analysed.  Participants are under no obligation 
to participate and there will be no negative consequences if they withdraw.  
What will happen to the organisation and our staff if we take part? 
I will ask the organisation to help me identify relevant staff and management to participate in the 
study. 
Individuals will be asked to take part in an individual interview or a focus group discussion with 
other colleagues to express their personal experience and views on this subject matter. A list of 
questions will be asked to the interviewees, and the questions might be changed slightly from one 
interview to another depending on the response of the interviewees. The interviews will be audio 
recorded, and the interviews might take up to an hour.  I may request extra time to discuss more 
issues if required.   
I will also be asking the company to provide documents which give additional information on the 
discussion topics (for example, a copy of the company HACCP plan and incident management 
policy) and for a short escorted tour of relevant production facilities, so that I can best understand 
the food safety management and monitoring systems in use.  I may therefore require some 
additional time from some members of staff or management who are participating in the study to 
help me gather this information.  If relevant, I may also ask permission to attend certain regular 
meetings (e.g. quality briefings), to help familiarise myself with the company, its products and 
the food safety management and monitoring systems used. 
A final part of the study is to work with selected organisations to develop a monitoring system 
for food safety culture (using direct or proxy measures of food safety culture).  This would involve 
working closely with a relevant member of the quality or food safety team to design and trial any 
agreed measures, and to review the success of the trial after an agreed period (around 3 months).  
Individual staff, after giving their informed consent, will be asked to review the success of 
implementation by means of a short questionnaire. 
Both organisation and individual consent forms emphasise that the information collected might 
be shared with authorised people for academic purposes. Collected data (recorded interviews, 
copies of documents) will be transferred to a computer.  All computer files will be password-
protected and the recorded interviews will be immediately erased from the recording device. The 
consent form will also include that the information collected will be saved securely as it might be 
needed for future academic publications (PhD thesis, journal articles, book chapters, conference 
presentations). As soon as the research and the publications are completed all data collected will 
be erased. 
A short report of my results will be provided to the company.  Individual participants will not be 
identified by name or job title in this report or in my PhD thesis and any other academic 
publications.  The organisation’s name and its brands will also be disguised in my PhD thesis and 
any other academic publications. 
 
 
424 
 
Expenses and payments 
All interviews and other data collection will be scheduled to take place at times and locations 
convenient participants, within their normal place of work.  I am afraid I can offer no expenses to 
the organisation or to individual participants.  However, the organisation will be supplied with 
two short reports of my findings, one specific to your individual organisation and a second 
summarising my findings across all participating organisations. 
What will the company and staff have to do?  
If the company decides to accept this invitation and returns the signed consent form, I will contact 
you to arrange dates and times to visit relevant facilities to conduct the research. 
Once individual participants have been contacted, and have agreed to participate and signed 
consent forms, I will arrange a convenient time and place to meet with them for the interview / 
focus group discussions, when I will ask questions relating to the subject matter.   
All interviews will be carried out in a quiet environment for recording purposes.  
Each interview should take approximately an hour.  Additional time will be required with any 
staff / management who are asked to help me locate certain documents and / or to escort me on a 
factory tour. 
One or two of the companies I am working with will be asked to help set up and evaluate a new 
food safety measure.  The exact time requirements for this may vary depending upon the measures 
devised.  Any staff that are affected may be asked, after giving their informed consent, to complete 
a short questionnaire to get their views on the new measures, which should take only a short time 
to complete. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There are no significant risks of taking part in this research.   
Staff involved in the research will be asked to commit a small amount of time to the research 
study (approximately 1 hour per interview, plus additional time to help with gathering documents 
etc.).  All interviews, factory site visits etc. will be organised to minimise disruption to the work 
of participants. 
The reputation of the company will be protected by ensuring the anonymity of the company, its 
brands and its staff in all publications.  The organisation and its brands will only be identified the 
company specific report.  In all other reports and academic publications, the company and its 
brands will not be identified.  The names and job titles of all participating individuals will not be 
given in academic publications or in any reports supplied to participating companies. All data 
collected will be held securely to ensure the confidentiality of the company and its staff. 
Although the researcher will not be conducting a quality or food safety audit on current practices, 
research participants may raise concerns about the food safety of current working practices. Prior 
to the research commencing, the researcher will work with the management of the organisation 
to establish a secure and confidential means for participants to report any such concerns.  The 
researcher will ensure that such information is not included in the research in any way. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The possible benefits of this research are that we will have a fuller understanding of what 
companies do when they discover a food safety incident, what food safety monitoring systems 
are in use in companies and how company culture impacts on food safety.  These findings will 
help inform the food industry and enforcement authorities of best practice so that improvements 
in food safety can be made by the industry. 
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As an individual company this work gives you the opportunity to evaluate current food safety 
management and monitoring systems, incident management policies and the organisational food 
safety culture.  Should a food safety or quality incident be examined, the research would give the 
opportunity to reflect on actions taken to manage this incident.  There may also be the opportunity 
to develop and evaluate a monitoring system for food safety culture, which can be seen as an 
advantage in a highly competitive industry sector. 
Will our participation be kept confidential?  
Input into the research will be kept confidential, both from a company and individual perspective.  
Collected data (recorded interviews and documents) will be transferred to a computer and all 
computer files will be password-protected.  The recorded interviews will be immediately erased 
from the recording device. All collected information will be kept in password-protected folders 
on a secure University computer drive. Any handwritten notes taken during the study will be kept 
in a secure, locked location.  At the end of the study they will be scanned and kept on the secure 
computer drive with the other data, and all hard copies will be disposed of securely. 
The consent form will emphasise that the information might be shared with authorised people for 
academic purposes. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and 
will do their best to meet this duty.  
The consent form will also state that the information collected will be securely saved as it might 
be needed for future publications. Once the research and the publications are completed all data 
collected will be erased.  
What will happen if the company or any individual does not want to carry on with this 
study?  
When you give your consent for the company to participate, it is understood that circumstances 
may change and that you may no longer wish to carry on with the study.  You may withdraw your 
consent for the company to participate at any time prior to the time of results being analysed. You 
will not be compelled to give a reason for leaving. On leaving the study, all the information you 
have provided will be deleted.  
Likewise, should any individual decide that they no longer with to carry on with the study, they 
may withdraw their consent at any time prior to the time of results being analysed.  They will not 
be compelled to give a reason for leaving the study and any information they have provided will 
be deleted. 
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to the researcher; Sally-
Ann Krzyzaniak (023 9284 4831/ sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk) or my supervisor 
Professor Lisa Jack (023 9284 4136/ lisa.jack@port.ac.uk) who will do their best to answer your 
questions.  If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact Rd. Judy Rich, 
Faculty Research Degree Coordinator (023 9284 4048 / judy.rich@port.ac.uk). 
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis and available at the University library.  
It is also hoped that the results will produce journal articles, book chapters and academic 
conference presentations, which again, will be available via the library electronic resources.  
Neither the company, its brands nor any individuals working for the company will be identifiable 
from the results in any document. Once the research and the publications are completed all data 
collected will be deleted. 
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Who is organising and funding the study? 
This research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth.   
Who has reviewed this study? 
Research in the University is looked at by an independent group of people, called the Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests.  This study has been reviewed and given a favourable 
opinion by the Portsmouth Business School Research Ethics Committee.  
If your organisation has its own ethics procedure which would relate to this research, please 
contact the researcher, Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak, by telephone or email (07890 607932 / sally-
ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk) so that we can discuss how to apply for the appropriate company 
approvals prior to any research starting. 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to know the further details of research in the University, please follow the 
following link to the University of Portsmouth research website: http://www.port.ac.uk/research/  
If you would like details on the research carried out in the Portsmouth Business School, please 
follow the following link to the Portsmouth Business School research website;  
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/faculties/portsmouthbusinessschool/research/ 
If you would like further information about this project, please contact the researcher;  
Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak, Tel:  07890 607932    Email: sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking the time to read this document. Hopefully it has answered all of your 
questions, but if not please get in touch.  If the company decides to participate in this research 
you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent 
form.  
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Research Student: Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak,      Company Code:  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Tel: 023 9284 4831 / Mobile 07890 607932 
Email:  sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Professor Lisa Jack,  
Accounting and Financial Management,  
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: 04423 9284 4136 
Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk. 
 
Consent Form: Organisation 
Study Title: Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No: 338 
Name of Researcher: Sally-Ann C Krzyzaniak              Please initial box 
   
I confirm that I have read and understood the information 
sheet dated 14/08/2015 for the above study.  I have had 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have these answered satisfactorily.  
  
   
I understand participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw company consent at any time without giving any 
reason, up to the point where the data is being analysed.  
  
   
I agree that the information collected during the study can be 
shared with authorised people for academic purposes. 
 
  
 
   
I agree to the data I contribute being stored securely, until all 
academic publications (PhD thesis, journal articles, book 
chapters and conference presentations) have been completed. 
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I confirm that I have the authority to give consent for the 
company to participate in this research. 
  
   
I agree to the following types of data being collected by the researcher: copies  
of documents (e.g. site quality and HACCP plans; minutes of meetings;  
photographs of documents); interviews or focus group discussions with relevant  
company personnel. 
 
I agree to information on food safety / quality incidents being collected by the  
researcher 
I confirm that I have discussed with the researcher company policies for raising 
food safety concerns and have agreed a secure and confidential procedure for  
employees to utilise during the research study.   
 
 
I agree to working with the researcher to develop, implement and review the  
success of a monitoring system for food safety culture (using direct or proxy  
measures of food safety culture). 
 
I agree to the company …………………………..taking part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant: .................................................................................................. 
Signature: .......................................... Date: ........................................................ 
Name of person taking consent: .................................................................................. 
  
Signature: .......................................... Date: ......................................................... 
(When completed, one copy to be retained by participant; 1 copy for researcher’s file) 
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Appendix F: Individual Invitation Letter, Information Sheet and 
Consent Form 
 
Research Student: Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak,  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Tel: 023 9284 4831 / Mobile 07890 607932 
Email:  sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Professor Lisa Jack,  
Accounting and Financial Management,  
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: 04423 9284 4136 
Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk.       Date: 14th August 2014 
Invitation Letter: Request for Participation 
Study Title: Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No: 338 
Dear Potential Participant  
My name is Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak.  I am a PhD student and am conducting research on the 
management of food safety in the food industry and the management and monitoring systems 
which companies use to do this.    
I will be working with a small number of food manufacturing companies to ask questions about 
their food safety systems and practices and their organisational culture.  
It has been identified that you might be a possible key contributor to this research.  I would 
therefore like to invite you to participate in the research study, on which more information is 
provided in the enclosed information sheet.    
During the research I will be undertaking a series of semi-structured interviews and / or focus 
group discussions.  These involve a series of questions being asked of the interviewees, which 
may be changed slightly from one interview to another depending on the response of the 
interviewees. All the questions will be related to the systems used to manage and monitor food 
safety, to report food safety or quality incidents and to the organisational culture of the firm.  It is 
expected that an interview would take around an hour of your time. 
 
All information provided to me as part of the study will be held securely.  At the end of the study 
a short report will be provided to company management, but no individual data will be disclosed 
– participant names and job titles will not be used in any report.  In the same way all data will be 
anonymised so that no reference to your name or job title, your company name or product names 
will appear in any academic publication.   
 
Please contact me via email or phone if you are interested in taking part in this research.  Taking 
part in the research is voluntary so you may withdraw your consent at any point prior to the data 
being analysed. Participants are under no obligation to participate, and there will be no negative 
consequences if they withdraw from the study.  
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Thank you for reading this letter.  Please feel free to contact me if you have any further 
questions.  
Yours faithfully, 
 
Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak 
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Research Student: Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak,  
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Tel:  023 9284 4831/ 07890 607932 
Email:  sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Professor Lisa Jack,  
Accounting and Financial Management,  
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: 023 9284 4136 
Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk.       Date: 14th August 2015 
Participant Information Sheet: Individuals 
Study Title:  Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No: 338 
I would like to invite you to take part in my PhD research study.  Before you decide, I would like 
you to understand why this research is being done and what it would involve for you.  Please feel 
free to discuss this with colleagues, friends or family if you wish and please contact me if there 
are any points that are not clear.  
What is the purpose of this research?   
This purpose of this research is to study the management of food safety in the food industry and 
the management and monitoring systems which companies use to do this.    
All food businesses are expected by their customers and by the authorities to produce safe food.  
However, there are still a high number of food safety incidents reported every year to the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) (over 1500 in 2013) and many people continue to become ill because of 
eating unsafe food.   
This research is important as it will study the food safety management and monitoring systems 
and incident management processes used by a small number of companies.  I am also interested 
in understanding the culture of the company – what is important to the company and staff and 
how is this measured.  If your company has experienced a food safety or quality incident in the 
past, and the management of the organisation has agreed for me to discuss this, I may also ask 
you questions on this topic.   
Why have I been invited?  
You are identified as a possible key contributor in the present research due to your knowledge of 
and use of the food safety processes used by your company. 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide to participate in the study.  I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet.  If you agree to take part, I will ask you to sign a consent form.   
Participation in this research is purely voluntary and you may withdraw at any stage prior to the 
data being analysed.  Participants are under no obligation to participate and there will be no 
negative consequences if they withdraw. 
 
432 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will take part in an individual interview or a focus group discussion with other colleagues to 
express your personal experience and views on this subject matter. A list of questions will be 
asked to the interviewees, and the questions might be changed slightly from one interview to 
another depending on the response of the interviewees. The interviews will be audio recorded, 
and the interviews might take up to an hour (an hour and half for a focus group).  I may request 
extra time to discuss more issues if required.  I may also ask you to provide documents which 
give additional information on the discussion topics (for example, a copy of the company HACCP 
plan) and / or to escort me on a short tour of the relevant production facilities.   
The consent form emphasises that the information might be shared with authorised people for 
academic purposes. Collected data (recorded interviews, copies of documents) will be transferred 
to a computer.  All computer files will be password-protected and the recorded interviews will be 
immediately erased from the recording device. The consent form will also include that the 
information collected will be saved securely as it might be needed for future academic 
publications (PhD thesis, journal articles, book chapters, conference presentations). As soon as 
the research and the publications are completed all data collected will be erased. 
A short report of my results will be provided to the company.  Neither you nor any other 
participant will be identified by name or job title in this report and none of the responses you 
provide will be reported in a form that can be used to identify you.  The same rules will apply in 
my PhD thesis and any other academic publications, and additionally the name of the company 
and its brands will also be disguised.  
Expenses and payments 
The interview will be take place at a time and location which is convenient to you at your place 
of work.  I am afraid I can offer no expenses for your participation. 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to accept this invitation and return the consent form, I will contact you to arrange a 
convenient time and place to meet with you for the interview / focus group discussion, when you 
will be asked questions relating to the subject matter.   
The interview will be carried out in a quiet environment for recording purposes.  
The interview should take approximately an hour of your time (an hour and a half for a focus 
group).  If you are asked to help me locate certain documents and / or to escort me on a factory 
tour, this may take up to another hour of your time. 
One or two of the companies I am working with will be asked to help set up and evaluate a new 
food safety measure.  If you are affected by this, you may be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire to get your views on the new measures. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There are no risks of taking part in this research.  Your name and job title will not be used in any 
report of my research findings, either to the company or in any academic publication.  Direct 
quotes of information given in interviews, will only be used in reports and other publications if 
they cannot be used to identify individual participants, companies or brands. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The possible benefits of this research are that we will have a fuller understanding of what 
companies do when they discover a food safety incident, what food safety monitoring systems 
are in use in companies and how company culture impacts on food safety.  These findings will 
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help inform the food industry and enforcement authorities of best practice so that improvements 
in food safety can be made by the industry. 
Will my participation be kept confidential?  
Your input into the research will be kept confidential.  Collected data (recorded interviews and 
documents) will be transferred to a computer and all computer files will be password-protected.  
The recorded interviews will be immediately erased from the recording device. All collected 
information will be kept in password-protected folders on a secure University computer drive. 
Any handwritten notes taken during the study will be kept in a secure, locked location.  At the 
end of the study they will be scanned and kept on the secure computer drive with the other data, 
and all hard copies will be disposed of securely. 
 
The consent form will emphasise that the information might be shared with authorised people for 
academic purposes. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and 
will do their best to meet this duty.  
The consent form will also state that the information collected will be securely saved as it might 
be needed for future publications. Once the research and the publications are completed all data 
collected will be erased.  
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with this study?  
When you give your consent, it is understood that your circumstances may change and that you 
may no longer wish to carry on with the study.  You may withdraw your consent to participate at 
any time prior to the time of results being analysed. You will not be compelled to give a reason 
for leaving. On leaving the study, all the information you have provided will be deleted.  
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to the researcher; Sally-
Ann Krzyzaniak (07890 607932 / sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk) or my supervisor 
Professor Lisa Jack (023 9284 4136/ lisa.jack@port.ac.uk) who will do their best to answer your 
questions.  If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact Dr. Judy Rich, 
Faculty Research Degree Coordinator (023 9284 4048 / judy.rich@port.ac.uk). 
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis and available at the University library.  
It is also hoped that the results will produce journal articles, book chapters and academic 
conference presentations, which again, will be available via the library electronic resources.  You 
will not be identifiable from the results in any document. Once the research and the publications 
are completed all data collected will be deleted. 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
This research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth.   
Who has reviewed this study? 
Research in the University is looked at by an independent group of people, called the Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests.  This study has been reviewed and given a favourable 
opinion by the Portsmouth Business School Research Ethics Committee. 
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Further information and contact details 
If you would like to know the further details of research in the University, please follow the 
following link to the University of Portsmouth research website;  
http://www.port.ac.uk/research/  
If you would like details on the research carried out in the Portsmouth Business School, please 
follow the following link to the Portsmouth Business School research website;  
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/faculties/portsmouthbusinessschool/research/ 
 
If you would like further information about this project, please contact the researcher;  
Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak, Tel:  07890 607932 Email: sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking the time to read this document. Hopefully it has answered all of your 
questions, but if not please get in touch.  If you decide to participate in this research you will be 
given a copy of this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form.  
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Research Student: Sally-Ann Krzyzaniak,     Participant Code : ………………… 
Portsmouth Business School Postgraduate Centre,  
University of Portsmouth,  
Portland Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3AH. 
Tel: 023 9284 4831 / Mobile 07890 607932 
Email:  sally-ann.krzyzaniak@myport.ac.uk. 
First supervisor: Professor Lisa Jack,  
Accounting and Financial Management,  
Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth,  
Richmond Building, Portland Street,  
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE. 
Tel: 023 9284 4136 
Email:  lisa.jack@port.ac.uk. 
Consent Form: Individuals 
Study Title: Key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations. 
REC Ref No: 338 
Name of Researcher: Sally-Ann C Krzyzaniak              Please initial box 
   
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 14/08/2015 for the above study.  I have had the opportunity 
to consider the information, ask questions and have these answered 
satisfactorily.  
  
   
I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, up to the point 
where the data is being analysed.  
  
   
I agree to my interview being audio recorded, and to being quoted, 
using my original words, in reports of the research. 
  
   
I agree that the information collected during the study can be 
shared with authorised people for academic purposes. 
 
  
   
I agree to the data I contribute being stored securely, until all 
academic publications (PhD thesis, journal articles, book chapters 
and conference presentations) have been completed.   
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I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
Name of Participant: .................................................................................................. 
Signature: .......................................... Date: ........................................................ 
Name of person taking consent: ..................................................................................   
Signature: .......................................... Date: ......................................................... 
(When completed, one copy to be retained by participant; 1 copy for researcher’s file) 
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Appendix G: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE  
Research Question: What are the key determinants for the governance of food safety in food business organisations? 
Interview preamble 
Thank you for giving me some of your time today to have this interview with you.   You should have seen the information sheet on my research project, but 
just as a quick recap, my research is concerned with the management of food safety in the food industry.  Just to be completely clear I am not conducting a 
quality or food safety audit, in the way that an EHO or BRC auditor would do.   
I will be asking you questions about the food quality incident X which happened in (date)  
I am interested in understanding the incident itself, what the company did when it discovered the issue and what investigations it undertook, that is I am 
interested in the management of the incident and the processes used by the company when it happened  
I am also interested in the management and monitoring systems generally used by the company to look at food safety and in understanding the culture of 
the company – what is important to the company and staff and how is this measured.  
You have also been given a consent form to read and sign.  As I explained in the information sent to you, all the information you give me will be 
anonymised, so neither your name or job title will be used in any reports, either to the company or in any academic publications.  For all reports and 
publications external to the company, I’ll also be making sure that company and brand names are not given, and that the product and company can’t be 
easily identified. 
So before we start the interview I’d just like to check if you have any other questions, and also check that you are happy for this interview to be recorded.   
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Question Area Interview Questions Notes 
TT1 Historical food safety or 
quality  incident (QFSI)/ 
incident management policy 
and procedures 
IQ1a: Can you tell me about X incident?  I’d like 
to understand what happened and what the 
organisation did. 
OR 
Can you tell me about the company’s incident 
management policy and procedures? I’d like to 
understand what happens when an incident 
occurs and what the organisation does (USE IF 
NOT INVOLVED IN / CAN NOT DISCUSS 
INCIDENT) 
 
Prompts:  
Facts - who was/is involved, timescales, 
actions, was a specific company protocol 
followed? 
 
Note only relevant where 
specific incident is discussed.  
Otherwise ladder to get values 
and possibilities in IQ1a 
IQ1b: Can you explain to me why the 
organisation acted in this way? 
 
Prompts:  
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Facts and values- look at each action identified 
in Q1 and prompt for “why” – ladder to get full 
information. 
Possibilities: were alternative actions 
considered?  What were these?  Why were 
they not chosen? 
 IQ1c: Did the business undertake any analysis 
of the situation to understand the cause of the 
incident (Clarify that don’t mean chemical / 
micro analysis)?  Can you tell me about this?  
What did the organisation decide was the 
cause of the incident?  
Prompts:  
Facts - when was analysis conducted, who was 
involved, why were these people chosen, what 
was the result, were the results used to drive 
the decisions made? 
Communications - how was the analysis and 
the results communicated and to whom? 
Values - If no analysis conducted, why not, who 
decided this? 
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 IQ1d: Did the business make any changes to 
the Food Safety Management System (FSMS) / 
Food Safety Monitoring System (FSMnS) after 
the X incident?  Can you describe these to me? 
Prompts:  
Facts – what, where, when, how? 
Values – why? 
Communications - how communicated? 
Possibilities – were other changes considered? 
Why were they not chosen? 
 
 IQ1e: Do you feel that the incident was related 
to a specific problem in implementing or 
maintaining the company FSMS / FSMnS?  Can 
you tell me a bit more about this? 
Prompts:  
Problems / barriers related to people or 
process concerns? 
 
TT2 Use of FSMnS IQ2a: I’d like to understand what monitoring 
systems the company uses to ensure food 
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safety as part of its overall food safety 
management system. 
Can you tell me about the monitoring systems 
(MnS) & measurements used?   
Prompts:  
Facts - walk through production or FSMS  
process flow as a prompt for remembering 
MnS. 
 IQ2b: Why were these specific monitoring 
systems chosen? 
Prompts:  
Values and possibilities - related to CCPs, 
standard industry practice, look at automation.  
Look for considerations of cost, quality, time.  
Also balance of costs, risk (of problem) and 
severity (of problem). 
 
 IQ2c: You’ve told me about monitoring 
systems at these places (list).  Do these cover 
the manufacturing / processing / preparation 
of food only or other areas too?  Why is that? 
Prompts:  
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Values and possibilities - PRPs as well as 
HACCP, suppliers, related activities e.g. 
labelling, packing, pilot production, R&D. 
 IQ2d: Do the MnS get reviewed?  Who does 
this and how often does it happen? 
Prompts:  
Facts, possibilities - look at HACCP plan for 
revision dates. 
 
 IQ2e: How do the results of the different MnS 
get recorded?  Are these reported within the 
business?   
Prompts:  
Possibilities, communication - who reports 
results, to whom and how, how frequency? 
 
TT3 Food Safety Culture IQ3a: How would you describe the purpose of 
this organisation? 
Prompts:  
Values, communication: does the organisation 
have a mission statement or stated values?  Is 
food safety mentioned in this?  Is there a 
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separate food safety mission statement?  If so, 
who has underwritten this and who “owns” it?   
 IQ3b: How is success measured in this 
business? 
Prompts: 
Values, facts, possibilities – financial measures, 
MBOs, are quality or food safety goals set as 
success measures, is six sigma or a similar 
quality system used to measure success?  Does 
senior management look at food safety criteria 
as a measure of success? 
Communication – how are the success criteria 
communicated and by whom? 
 
 IQ3c: Does the organisation assess or measure 
food safety culture in any way?  What sorts of 
measures are used?  If no measurement is 
carried out, why do you think this is? 
Prompts: 
Facts, communication: audits, questionnaires, 
EHO assessments. 
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